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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 73 records · Page 4
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2011

Gas analysis for LANL weapons surveillance

Gas analysis is performed at LANL as one part of weapons surveillance conducted to identify stockpile aging concerns and to predict the lifetime of weapon components and materials. These analyses include gas dissolved in and evolved from polymeric materials. Radiolysis and thermal decomposition of polymers are examples of processes which lead to gas production. These are accessed using canister aging studies with gas analysis typically performed using gas chromatography and gas chromatography/mass spectrometry. More recently we have developed methods to measure dissolved gases in polymeric materials suspect in the failure of potting materials. This talk provides a brief overview of recent work.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
DOE OSTI2015

User Guide for the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center Dust Cloud Calculator V.1.0

The Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center (AFNWC) Dust Cloud Calculator is a Java™ application that can calculate the dust loading and radiation dose for an aircraft or cruise missile flying through a dust cloud created by a nuclear detonation. The dust cloud model is based upon the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) dust cloud and fallout model. The AFIT model uses a combination of algorithms from the Weapons System Evaluation Group (WSEG) model 10 fallout code, the Defense Land Fallout Interpretive Code (DELFIC), and algorithms developed at AFIT to calculate the nuclear dust cloud.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2017

Using Modeling and Simulation to Complement Testing for Increased Understanding of Weapon Subassembly Response.

As part of Sandia’s nuclear deterrence mission, the B61-12 Life Extension Program (LEP) aims to modernize the aging weapon system. Modernization requires requalification and Sandia is using high performance computing to perform advanced computational simulations to better understand, evaluate, and verify weapon system performance in conjunction with limited physical testing. The Nose Bomb Subassembly (NBSA) of the B61-12 is responsible for producing a fuzing signal upon ground impact. The fuzing signal is dependent upon electromechanical impact sensors producing valid electrical fuzing signals at impact. Computer generated models were used to assess the timing between the impact sensor’s response to the deceleration of impact and damage to major components and system subassemblies. The modeling and simulation team worked alongside the physical test team to design a large-scale reverse ballistic test to not only assess system performance, but to also validate their computational models. The reverse ballistic test conducted at Sandia’s sled test facility sent a rocket sled with a representative target into a stationary B61-12 (NBSA) to characterize the nose crush and functional response of NBSA components. Data obtained from data recorders and high-speed photometrics were integrated with previously generated computer models in order to refine and validate the model’s ability to reliably simulate real-world effects. Large-scale tests are impractical to conduct for every single impact scenario. By creating reliable computer models, we can perform simulations that identify trends and produce estimates of outcomes over the entire range of required impact conditions. Sandia’s HPCs enable geometric resolution that was unachievable before, allowing for more fidelity and detail, and creating simulations that can provide insight to support evaluation of requirements and performance margins. As computing resources continue to improve, researchers at Sandia are hoping to improve these simulations so they provide increasingly credible analysis of the system response and performance over the full range of conditions.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2020

New Predictive Capabilities for Nuclear Weapons in Composite Fires

The prevalence of flammable carbon-based composite airframe materials and their use in high-temperature nuclear weapon re-entry systems requires analysts to address the abnormal thermal environment hazards associated with composite material fires. These fires tend to burn very differently than conventional fuel fires, usually burning less intensely, but much longer. This could lead to challenges in understanding margins in classic safety themes. The technical challenges in modeling the phenomena associated with these new types of fires are considerable, but new models have been developed. Their predictions have been compared with well-documented measurements of a vertical porous burner fire, known as a "wall fire" (a "wall-fire" validation simulation is reflected in the figures below). These measurements were conducted at FMGlobal, a mutual insurance company with a strong fire risk management program, as part of an ongoing collaboration between Sandia and FMGlobal. To date, the "wall-fire" scenario has been set up and initial model assessments with grid refinement studies have been conducted focusing on mesh resolutions suitable for full weapon system simulations. This work will continue with further verification and validation tasks assessing the predictions of the new model. Future work will address specific aspects of the wall models that are lacking in their predictive ability.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2018

Strategic Weapons in the 21st Century: Understanding the New U.S. Policy Context (Meeting Summary)

The annual Strategic Weapons in the 21st Century (SW21), co-hosted by Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories (LANL, LLNL), brought together a diverse group of about two hundred experts from the three United States nuclear weapons labs, U.S. federal government and military, think tanks, universities, and foreign partners to share perspectives on important issues in strategic deterrence. All remarks and discussion were on a non-attribution basis. The objectives of this year’s event were: To understand the new policies and approaches of the Trump administration; To understand areas of continuity and change with previous Nuclear Posture Reviews and the challenges of implementation; To better understand domestic and foreign reactions; To characterize and assess implications for the U.S. nuclear enterprise.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2020

Nuclear Weapon Culture

Presentation Overview: Nuclear Weapon Culture; Nuclear Weapon Culture; Manhattan Project Secrecy & Intelligence; Pre-Hiroshima & Nagasaki; Surety; Propaganda; Living in the Nuclear Age

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2020

Nuclear Weapon Security DOD Perspective

Presentation Overview: Nuclear Weapon Security DOD Perspective; DOD and DOE Nuclear Security Policy Standards; Weapon Secure Storage Methods; Modes of Transportation: DOD and DOE; Security Breeches; Basic Security Classification Practices

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2021

Weapons Active Repository for Radiographs and Film (WARF) [Slides]

NSRC’s lineages dates to the Technical Library formed by J. Robert Oppenheimer in 1943 as part of the Manhattan Project. Houses 75+ years of nuclear weapons research, designs, procedures, reports, etc. This is the largest collection of nuclear weapons information anywhere in the nation.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗
DOE OSTI2022

Of Clouds and Craters: The Incredible Story of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Testing

This report provides brief descriptions of US Nuclear weapons testing between 1945 and 1992. Editor's note: The United States’ last full-scale nuclear weapons test was conducted 30 years ago on Sept. 23, 1992. Divider was a Los Alamos test and took place in Nevada. It was the nation’s 1,054th nuclear test over a 47-year period.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2022

Weapon Systems Risk-Assessment Tool Review

To anticipate, and potentially mitigate, future problems in aging weapon systems, four unique riskassessment techniques were analyzed, including root-cause analysis tools, six-sigma problemsolving approaches, and lean six-sigma tools. Identifying the most efficient process, or tool, is crucial for successful application to current and future weapon systems, subsystems, and components. The following processes were reviewed: Fault Tree Analysis, Failure Modes and Effects Analysis, Bow-Tie Analysis, and Hazard and Operability Study. A systematic assessment was performed to determine the most desirable method, and included investigating qualitative versus quantitative characteristics, scope, process durations, advantages, and limitations. Presented results will outline the study findings and further illustrate a capacity to identify future issues and/or concerns, and ultimately, reduce risk.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
NASA NTRS1990

Time-optimal Aircraft Pursuit-evasion with a Weapon Envelope Constraint

The optimal pursuit-evasion problem between two aircraft including a realistic weapon envelope is analyzed using differential game theory. Six order nonlinear point mass vehicle models are employed and the inclusion of an arbitrary weapon envelope geometry is allowed. The performance index is a linear combination of flight time and the square of the vehicle acceleration. Closed form solution to this high-order differential game is then obtained using feedback linearization. The solution is in the form of a feedback guidance law together with a quartic polynomial for time-to-go. Due to its modest computational requirements, this nonlinear guidance law is useful for on-board real-time implementation.

Menon, P. K. A.↗
NASA NTRS2011

Holographic Weapons Sight as Crew Optical Alignment Sight

Crew Optical Alignment Sights (COAS) are used by spacecraft pilots to provide a visual reference to a target spacecraft for lateral relative position during rendezvous and docking operations. NASA s Orion vehicle, which is currently under development, has not included a COAS in favor of automated sensors, but the crew office has requested such a device be added for situational awareness and contingency support. The current Space Shuttle COAS was adopted from Apollo heritage, weighs several pounds, and is no longer available for procurement which would make re-use difficult. In response, a study was conducted to examine the possibility of converting a commercially available weapons sight to a COAS for the Orion spacecraft. The device used in this study was the XPS series Holographic Weapon Sight (HWS) procured from L-3 EOTech. This device was selected because the targeting reticule can subtend several degrees, and display a graphic pattern tailored to rendezvous and docking operations. Evaluations of the COAS were performed in both the Orion low-fidelity mockup and rendezvous simulations in the Reconfigurable Operational Cockpit (ROC) by crewmembers, rendezvous engineering experts, and flight controllers at Johnson Space Center. These evaluations determined that this unit s size and mounting options can support proper operation and that the reticule visual qualities are as good as or better than the current Space Shuttle COAS. The results positively indicate that the device could be used as a functional COAS and supports a low-cost technology conversion solution.

Merancy, Nujoud↗
NASA NTRS2005

Diagnosis and Prognosis of Weapon Systems

The Prognostics Framework is a set of software tools with an open architecture that affords a capability to integrate various prognostic software mechanisms and to provide information for operational and battlefield decision-making and logistical planning pertaining to weapon systems. The Prognostics NASA Tech Briefs, February 2005 17 Framework is also a system-level health -management software system that (1) receives data from performance- monitoring and built-in-test sensors and from other prognostic software and (2) processes the received data to derive a diagnosis and a prognosis for a weapon system. This software relates the diagnostic and prognostic information to the overall health of the system, to the ability of the system to perform specific missions, and to needed maintenance actions and maintenance resources. In the development of the Prognostics Framework, effort was focused primarily on extending previously developed model-based diagnostic-reasoning software to add prognostic reasoning capabilities, including capabilities to perform statistical analyses and to utilize information pertaining to deterioration of parts, failure modes, time sensitivity of measured values, mission criticality, historical data, and trends in measurement data. As thus extended, the software offers an overall health-monitoring capability.

Nolan, Mary↗
DOE OSTI2013

TRACKING SURPLUS PLUTONIUM FROM WEAPONS TO DISPOSITION

Supporting nuclear nonproliferation and global security principles, beginning in 1994 the United States has withdrawn more than 50 metric tons (MT) of government-controlled plutonium from potential use in nuclear weapons. The Department of Energy (DOE), including the National Nuclear Security Administration, established protocols for the tracking of this "excess" and "surplus" plutonium, and for reconciling the current storage and utilization of the plutonium to show that its management is consistent with the withdrawal policies. Programs are underway to ensure the safe and secure disposition of the materials that formed a major part of the weapons stockpile during the Cold War, and growing quantities have been disposed as waste, after which they are not included in traditional nuclear material control and accountability (NMC&A) data systems. A combination of resources is used to perform the reconciliations that form the basis for annual reporting to DOE, to U.S. Department of State, and to international partners including the International Atomic Energy Agency.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗