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At least 73 records · Page 4

Building on the Iran Deal: Steps Toward a Middle Eastern Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone

Approved unanimously by the UN Security Council on July 20, the agreement, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, aims "to ensure that Iran's nuclear program will be exclusively peaceful" and thus to reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation. Other states in the Middle East, especially Egypt and Saudi Arabia, are planning to establish their own nuclear power programs during the period that the Iran deal is expected to be in force. Furthermore, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action provides an unprecedented opportunity for an international effort to make progress toward a Middle Eastern nuclear-weapon-free zone, possibly as part of WMD-free zone in that region. In building on the foundation created by that agreement, the measures proposed here constitute the essential technical steps toward a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Although it is unlikely that such a zone can be established anytime soon, it should be possible to make progress on a number of the building blocks for it.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Novel application of neutrinos to evaluate U.S. nuclear weapons performance

There is a growing realization that neutrinos can be used as a diagnostic tool to better understand the inner workings of a nuclear weapon. Robust estimates demonstrate that an Inverse Beta Decay (IBD) neutrino scintillation detector built at the Nevada Test Site with a 1000-ton active target mass at a standoff distance of 500 m would detect thousands of antineutrino events per nuclear test. This would provide less than 4% statistical error on the measured antineutrino rate and 5% error on antineutrino energy. Extrapolating this to an error on the test device explosive yield requires knowledge from evaluated nuclear databases, non-equilibrium fission rates, and assumptions on internal neutron fluxes. Initial calculations demonstrate that the total number of neutrinos emitted per fission in the first 10 3 s after a short pulse of 239 Pu fission is about a factor of two less than that from Pu fissioning under steady state conditions. Furthermore, there are significant energy spectral differences as a function of time after the pulse that must be considered. These and other model dependencies will be discussed in the paper. In the absence of nuclear weapons testing, many of the technical and theoretical challenges of a full nuclear test could be mitigated with a low cost smaller scale 20 ton fiducial mass IBD demonstration detector placed near a pulsed reactor. Potential reactors include the Texas A&M University TRIGA 1 GW–10 ms pulsed facility or the Sandia Annular Core Research Reactor. The short duty cycle and repeatability of pulses would provide critical real environment testing and measurements, which would be valuable for planning a possible real test shot in the future. Furthermore, the antineutrino rate as a function of time data would provide unique constraints on fission databases and model assumptions. Finally, there are impactful science drivers such as sensitive searches for ∼1 eV 2 sterile neutrinos and ∼MeV scale axions.

72 PHYSICS OF ELEMENTARY PARTICLES AND FIELDS↗

Seaborne Delivery Interdiction of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

Over the next 10-20 years, the probability of a terrorist attack using a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) on the United States is projected to increase. At some point over the next few decades, it may be inevitable that a terrorist group will have access to a WMD. The economic and social impact of an attack using a WMD anywhere in the world would be catastrophic. For weapons developed overseas, the routes of entry are air and sea with the maritime vector as the most porous. Providing a system to track, perform a risk assessment and inspect all inbound marine traffic before it reaches US coastal cities thereby mitigating the threat has long been a goal for our government. The challenge is to do so effectively without crippling the US economy. The Portunus Project addresses only the maritime threat and builds on a robust maritime domain awareness capability. It is a process to develop the technologies, policies and practices that will enable the US to establish a waypoint for the inspection of international marine traffic, screen 100% of containerized and bulk cargo prior to entry into the US if deemed necessary, provide a palatable economic model for transshipping, grow the US economy, and improve US environmental quality. The implementation strategy is based on security risk, and the political and economic constraints of implementation. This article is meant to provide a basic understanding of how and why this may be accomplished.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Uncrackable code for nuclear weapons

Mark Hart, a scientist and engineer in Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory's (LLNL) Defense Technologies Division, has developed a new approach for ensuring nuclear weapons and their components can't fall prey to unauthorized use. The beauty of his approach: Let the weapon protect itself. "Using the random process of nuclear radioactive decay is the gold standard of random number generators," said Mark Hart. "You’d have a better chance of winning both Mega Millions and Powerball on the same day than getting control of IUC-protected components."

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

The ephemeral and the enduring: Trajectories of disappearance for the scientific objects of American Cold War nuclear weapons testing

Here, the historical material culture produced by American Cold War nuclear weapons testing includes objects of scientific inquiry that can be generally categorized as being either ephemeral or enduring. Objects deemed to be ephemeral were of a less substantial nature, being impermanent and expendable in a nuclear test, while enduring objects were by nature more durable and long-lasting. Although all of these objects were ultimately subject to disappearance, the processes by which they were transformed, degraded, or destroyed prior to their disappearing differ. Drawing principally upon archaeological theory, this paper proposes a functional dichotomy for categorizing and studying the historical trajectories of nuclear weapons testing technoscience artifacts. In examining the transformation patterns of steel towers and concrete blockhouses in particular, it explores an associated loss of scientific method that accompanies a science object's disappearance.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Code Analyses Supporting PIE of Weapons-Grade MOX Fuel

The U.S. Department of energy has decided to dispose of a portion of the nation's surplus weapons-grade plutonium by reconstituting it into mixed oxide (MOX) fuel and irradiating the fuel in commercial power reactors. Four lead test assemblies (LTAs) were manufactured with weapons-grade mixed oxide (WG-MOX) fuel and irradiated in the Catawba Nuclear Station Unit 1, to a maximum fuel rod burnup of ~47.3 GWd/MTHM. As part of the fuel qualification process, five rods with varying burnups and initial plutonium contents were selected from one assembly and shipped to the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) for hot cell examination. ORNL has provided analytical support for the post-irradiation examination (PIE) of these rods via extensive fuel performance modeling which has aided in instrument settings and PIE data interpretation. The results of these fuel performance simulations are compared in this paper with available PIE data.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Why is weapons grade plutonium more hazardous to work with than highly enriched uranium?

Highly Enriched Uranium and Weapons grade plutonium have assumed positions of dominant importance among the actinide elements because of their successful uses as explosive ingredients in nuclear weapons and the place they hold as key materials in the development of industrial use of nuclear power. While most chemists are familiar with the practical interest concerning HEU and WG Pu, fewer know the subtleties among their hazards. In this study, a primer is provided regarding the hazards associated with working with HEU and WG Pu metals and oxides. The care that must be taken to safely handle these materials is emphasized and the extent of the hazards is described. The controls needed to work with HEU and WG Pu metals and oxides are differentiated. Given the choice, one would rather work with HEU metal and oxides than WG Pu metal and oxides.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Preliminary study on weapon grade uranium utilization in molten salt reactor miniFUJI

Preliminary study on weapon grade uranium utilization in 25MWth and 50MWth of miniFUJI MSR (molten salt reactor) has been carried out. In this study, a very high enriched uranium that we called weapon grade uranium has been employed in UF{sub 4} composition. The {sup 235}U enrichment is 90 - 95 %. The results show that the 25MWth miniFUJI MSR can get its criticality condition for 1.56 %, 1.76%, and 1.96% of UF{sub 4} with {sup 235}U enrichment of at least 93%, 90%, and 90%, respectively. In contrast, the 50 MWth miniFUJI reactor can be critical for 1.96% of UF{sub 4} with {sup 235}U enrichment of at smallest amount 95%. The neutron spectra are almost similar for each power output.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Integrating nuclear weapons stockpile management and nuclear arms control to enable significant stockpile reductions

In his 2009 Prague speech and the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, President Barack Obama committed the United States to take concrete steps toward nuclear disarmament while maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent. There is an inherent tension between these two goals that is best addressed through improved integration of nuclear weapons objectives with nuclear arms control objectives. This article reviews historical examples of the interaction between the two sets of objectives, develops a framework for analyzing opportunities for future integration, and suggests specific ideas that could benefit the nuclear weapons enterprise as it undergoes transformation and that could make the future enterprise compatible with a variety of arms control futures.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Dose Coefficient Calculation for Use in Dosimetry Assessment of a Fission-Based Weapon

In the event of a fission-based weapon or improvised nuclear device (IND) detonation, dose coefficients can be harnessed to provide dose assessments for defense, emergency preparedness, and consequence management, as well as to prospectively inform the assessment of radiation biomarkers and development of medical prophylaxis countermeasures for defense and homeland security stakeholders and decision-makers. Although dose coefficients have previously been calculated for this group, they would apply specifically to the studied population, the 1945 Japanese cohort, after which their anthropomorphic computational phantoms were modeled. For this reason, applications to other populations may be limited, and instead, an assessment of a more standardized population is desired. We employed a series of computational human phantoms representing international reference individuals: UF/NCI voxel phantom series containing newborn, 1-, 5-, 10-, 15-, and 35-year-old males and females. Irradiation of the phantoms was simulated using the Monte Carlo N-Particle transport code to determine organ dose coefficients under four idealized irradiation geometries at three distances from the detonation hypocenter at Hiroshima and Nagasaki using DS02 free-in-air prompt neutron and photon fluence spectra. Through these simulations, age-specific dose coefficients were determined for individual organs. Various articulated PIMAL stylized phantoms were simulated as well to estimate the effect of body posture on dose coefficients and determine the effect of posture on dosimetric estimation and reconstruction. Results additionally demonstrate that 137 Cs and the Watt fission spectra are not ideal general surrogate sources for fission weapons, which may be considered for experimental testing of medical countermeasures. Supplementary data provided tabulates the compilation of organ dose-rate coefficients in this study.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Gas analysis for LANL weapons surveillance

Gas analysis is performed at LANL as one part of weapons surveillance conducted to identify stockpile aging concerns and to predict the lifetime of weapon components and materials. These analyses include gas dissolved in and evolved from polymeric materials. Radiolysis and thermal decomposition of polymers are examples of processes which lead to gas production. These are accessed using canister aging studies with gas analysis typically performed using gas chromatography and gas chromatography/mass spectrometry. More recently we have developed methods to measure dissolved gases in polymeric materials suspect in the failure of potting materials. This talk provides a brief overview of recent work.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

User Guide for the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center Dust Cloud Calculator V.1.0

The Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center (AFNWC) Dust Cloud Calculator is a Java™ application that can calculate the dust loading and radiation dose for an aircraft or cruise missile flying through a dust cloud created by a nuclear detonation. The dust cloud model is based upon the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) dust cloud and fallout model. The AFIT model uses a combination of algorithms from the Weapons System Evaluation Group (WSEG) model 10 fallout code, the Defense Land Fallout Interpretive Code (DELFIC), and algorithms developed at AFIT to calculate the nuclear dust cloud.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Using Modeling and Simulation to Complement Testing for Increased Understanding of Weapon Subassembly Response.

As part of Sandia’s nuclear deterrence mission, the B61-12 Life Extension Program (LEP) aims to modernize the aging weapon system. Modernization requires requalification and Sandia is using high performance computing to perform advanced computational simulations to better understand, evaluate, and verify weapon system performance in conjunction with limited physical testing. The Nose Bomb Subassembly (NBSA) of the B61-12 is responsible for producing a fuzing signal upon ground impact. The fuzing signal is dependent upon electromechanical impact sensors producing valid electrical fuzing signals at impact. Computer generated models were used to assess the timing between the impact sensor’s response to the deceleration of impact and damage to major components and system subassemblies. The modeling and simulation team worked alongside the physical test team to design a large-scale reverse ballistic test to not only assess system performance, but to also validate their computational models. The reverse ballistic test conducted at Sandia’s sled test facility sent a rocket sled with a representative target into a stationary B61-12 (NBSA) to characterize the nose crush and functional response of NBSA components. Data obtained from data recorders and high-speed photometrics were integrated with previously generated computer models in order to refine and validate the model’s ability to reliably simulate real-world effects. Large-scale tests are impractical to conduct for every single impact scenario. By creating reliable computer models, we can perform simulations that identify trends and produce estimates of outcomes over the entire range of required impact conditions. Sandia’s HPCs enable geometric resolution that was unachievable before, allowing for more fidelity and detail, and creating simulations that can provide insight to support evaluation of requirements and performance margins. As computing resources continue to improve, researchers at Sandia are hoping to improve these simulations so they provide increasingly credible analysis of the system response and performance over the full range of conditions.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

New Predictive Capabilities for Nuclear Weapons in Composite Fires

The prevalence of flammable carbon-based composite airframe materials and their use in high-temperature nuclear weapon re-entry systems requires analysts to address the abnormal thermal environment hazards associated with composite material fires. These fires tend to burn very differently than conventional fuel fires, usually burning less intensely, but much longer. This could lead to challenges in understanding margins in classic safety themes. The technical challenges in modeling the phenomena associated with these new types of fires are considerable, but new models have been developed. Their predictions have been compared with well-documented measurements of a vertical porous burner fire, known as a "wall fire" (a "wall-fire" validation simulation is reflected in the figures below). These measurements were conducted at FMGlobal, a mutual insurance company with a strong fire risk management program, as part of an ongoing collaboration between Sandia and FMGlobal. To date, the "wall-fire" scenario has been set up and initial model assessments with grid refinement studies have been conducted focusing on mesh resolutions suitable for full weapon system simulations. This work will continue with further verification and validation tasks assessing the predictions of the new model. Future work will address specific aspects of the wall models that are lacking in their predictive ability.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Strategic Weapons in the 21st Century: Understanding the New U.S. Policy Context (Meeting Summary)

The annual Strategic Weapons in the 21st Century (SW21), co-hosted by Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories (LANL, LLNL), brought together a diverse group of about two hundred experts from the three United States nuclear weapons labs, U.S. federal government and military, think tanks, universities, and foreign partners to share perspectives on important issues in strategic deterrence. All remarks and discussion were on a non-attribution basis. The objectives of this year’s event were: To understand the new policies and approaches of the Trump administration; To understand areas of continuity and change with previous Nuclear Posture Reviews and the challenges of implementation; To better understand domestic and foreign reactions; To characterize and assess implications for the U.S. nuclear enterprise.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Nuclear Weapon Culture

Presentation Overview: Nuclear Weapon Culture; Nuclear Weapon Culture; Manhattan Project Secrecy & Intelligence; Pre-Hiroshima & Nagasaki; Surety; Propaganda; Living in the Nuclear Age

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Nuclear Weapon Security DOD Perspective

Presentation Overview: Nuclear Weapon Security DOD Perspective; DOD and DOE Nuclear Security Policy Standards; Weapon Secure Storage Methods; Modes of Transportation: DOD and DOE; Security Breeches; Basic Security Classification Practices

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗