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Modeling prismatic HTGRs with U.S. N.R.C advanced gas reactor evaluator (AGREE)

A core fluids and heat transfer model has been developed for the prismatic high temperature gas reactor in support of the US NRC Next Generation Nuclear Plant (NGNP) evaluation model. The core fluids modeling relies on a subchannel approach in which the primary coolant flow path through the core region and vertical in-core and ex-core gaps can be modeled as individual subchannels. These subchannels are connected together to represent a three dimensional reactor. An initial validation calculation for the core fluids model has been performed using data available in literature for bypass flow. The predicted bypass flow was within 2.6% of the value reported in the literature. The core level heat transfer model is based on a triangular finite volume method, where the base triangle is one sixth of the prismatic block. In order to improve the spatial accuracy at this level, a triangular refinement method was also implemented. The fuel compact temperature is calculated by a cylindrical conduction model which is implicitly coupled to the triangular core level model. The preliminary verification of the model was performed by comparing AGREE to a finite element code COMSOL by analyzing the MHTGR core heat transfer. Further verification and validation is currently an ongoing effort. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Method advancements for fuel assessments during seismic and LOCA events

The evaluation of fuel assembly structural responses of light-water reactors to seismic and LOCA excitations has received increased attention in the last five years. Real seismic events such as those that affected the Fukushima Daiichi and North Anna plants in 2011 have caused the industry to more closely examine our preparedness for seismic events. Furthermore, the review of design certifications for new plants has raised questions about the methods used to evaluate these events and is leading to revised guidance from regulators (e.g. US NRC Information Notice 2012-09). As a result, the industry is seeing fuel structural design margins based on current methods begin to erode for seismic and LOCA events. This paper will review points for consideration as the industry responds to these changes. To begin, it is worthwhile for the industry to understand the history and the critical thought behind the current methods such that improved criteria and methods can be formulated. This review identifies three known areas of weakness in the current framework for this methodology. First, a broader understanding of spacer grid behavior is needed. Spacer grid behavior in response to impact loads is of paramount importance, but the industry needs to re-frame our characterization of this behavior in order to focus on the actual critical safety function of this component. Secondly, despite guidance from the Standard Review Plan, the effects of irradiation, on spacer grid characteristics, in particular, must be considered. Thirdly, the area of fluid-structure-interaction may be the greatest frontier to conquer in this methodology and may provide our best possibility to recover eroded margins. However, fluid-structure-interactions must be cautiously evaluated and applied with conservatism. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Radioactive Waste Disposal Strategies within the US Army Corps of Engineers FUSRAP - 18328

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' (USACE) highest priority is the protection of human health and the environment and public and worker safety during the cleanup, transportation, and disposal of Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP) material. In addition to following all appropriate federal and state rules and regulations, the USACE has its own safety program that ensures that we are being protective. One aspect of the USACE FUSRAP is the radioactive waste disposal strategies that we must consider. The USACE will only dispose of FUSRAP material in a facility that is licenses/permitted to accept it. The estimated exposures to facility workers and members of the public from the permitted disposal of FUSRAP wastes is evaluated as part of this process. The USACE uses the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) process to study and remediate FUSRAP sites. An evaluation is performed to decide whether it is best to manage the waste on-site or off-site and the requirements for disposal. The action selected must be protective of human health and the environment and must comply with regulations. When making the decision, there are several other factors taken into consideration including cost of the disposal and whether the public and state agencies support the action. Prior to determining disposal options, wastes must first be characterized. This involves an evaluation of both site history and analytical data. Determining the proper disposal requirements and subsequent disposal option involves: Characterizing the waste as stated above. This is important because there are several regulatory agencies which may oversee management of the waste. The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the US Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA), the US Department of Transportation, and state hazardous waste and/or radiation protection agencies may all have varying degrees of involvement. Identifying disposal requirements. Certain wastes must be disposed at licensed radioactive waste disposal facilities. Wastes containing US EPA regulated hazardous waste must be disposed at permitted hazardous waste disposal facilities. Certain wastes must be disposed at facilities licensed/permitted for both radioactive and hazardous waste. Some lower activity wastes may be accepted for disposal at other types of landfills. Considering acceptance criteria of the disposal facility. Radionuclides and/or hazardous constituents in the waste, as well as physical and chemical form of the waste, are evaluated to ensure they meet the acceptance criteria of the receiving facility's license and/or permit. If they don't, another disposal location must be used. Considering the accessibility and location of the disposal facility. Some facilities are able to accept shipments only by truck and others can accept material via railcar as well. The distance to a disposal facility impacts the risk of transportation accidents and efficient use of project resources such as the number of trucks required to perform the transportation. These factors are also important in evaluating whether material can be cost effectively shipped to a disposal facility. Evaluating the compliance status of the receiving facility. It is not assumed that just because a facility has a license or permit that it is acceptable for the USACE' waste. Prior to selecting a facility for disposal of FUSRAP waste, a site visit, audit and consultation with the US EPA is required to determine whether there are any known relevant violations at the facility. Facilities that have violations that negatively impact the USACE or US EPA approval of the facility are not used for disposal of FUSRAP waste. Once a facility is selected. The USACE procures contracts, or utilizes existing contracts, to facilitate the transportation and disposal action. Additionally, the USACE continues to consult with US EPA routinely to confirm the compliance status of the facility. Considering state acceptance of wastes to a facility. The USACE seeks to obtain written authorization from the facility state regulator indicating the action is compliant with existing licenses, permits, laws, and regulations. Each of these factors is considered by the USACE in selecting a FUSRAP disposal location. The goal is to provide safe, cost effective disposal which is protective of human health and the environment and which complies with all regulatory requirements. These steps all feed in to the disposal strategy consideration that USACE must go through for our FUSRAP waste streams. There are a number of challenges in the process to include In order to achieve the Congressional mandate of completing cleanup work under FUSRAP in a more cost effective, timely manner, while assuring protection of public health and safety. USACE must determine all disposal options that are available for the types of waste at each FUSRAP site. As a solution, completion of a disposal strategy document can help ensure this goal is met and will foster consistency across the FUSRAP. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Software Dependability for Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems in Nuclear Power Plants - Lessons Learnt from a DOE Sponsored Project

This paper discusses the lessons learnt from a sponsored study undertaken under the sponsorship of the Department of Energy by a team of scientists at the Ohio State University in collaboration with Technology Resources and experts around the world. This paper makes recommendations for future research and studies based on these lessons learnt. The purpose of the research was to provide a software dependability quantification framework that would allow its evaluation along the software development life cycle for safety critical instrumentation and control systems (I and C) such as those found in nuclear power plants. A typical example of safety critical system is the reactor protection system. The research funded by the Department of Energy built on preliminary research carried out for the US NRC that had focused solely on software reliability quantification. Quantification of software dependability is important for safety critical I and C because the regulatory framework in use in the United States for nuclear power plants is risk informed. Quantification of risk requires quantification of all contributors to risk and those include instrumentation and control systems. The purpose of the study was to help developers of software-based I and C with an early evaluation of the potential risk an application would represent at different stages of the software development life cycle by building gates at the end of each life cycle phase. Life cycle phases of software development comprehend phases such as requirements, design, coding and test. The gates' function would be to stop development from moving forward if the assessed dependability objective for that phase were not met. Gates thresholds were to be defined based on measurements collected during the life cycle phase under evaluation and phases that preceded it and an understanding of the mechanisms that would lead to threatening the dependability objectives. The information contained in the gates would in addition help steer the development towards areas that needed improvement. The following are four high level conclusions to our study. First the study demonstrates a lack of consensus on mechanisms that will threaten the dependability attributes. This lack of consensus should be resolved. The lack of consensus appears for all measures to the exception of reliability. Second, measures should be developed for software availability and safety. Third, for all dependability attributes (with the exception of reliability) consistency of the measurement threads should evaluated and measurement-based development gates derived. Finally our ability to perform such type of research depends in a significant manner on access to vendor and/or utility data. The licensing environment and the first-of-a-kind nature of current software-based applications for nuclear I and C make it difficult to collect the relevant data. An approach which would either increase access to data by providing 'immunity' to the vendor or utility or the development of a software-based I and C for the sole purpose of data collection for research should be investigated. (authors)

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

A Study on Radionuclides Selection for DCGLs Development for Site Release of KRR Units 1 and 2 site in Korea - 20256

The selection of Derived Concentration Guideline Levels (DCGLs) in nuclear facilities decommissioning is important because they serve as criteria for site characterization and final status surveys. DCGLs should be derived for KAERI TRIGA Mark II and III research reactor site clearance and prior to the work, a radionuclides list for DCGLs consideration was created. Radionuclides selection for DCGLs was performed according to the procedure proposed by the US NRC based on the characterization survey related to the decommission site. By evaluating the dose contribution of each radionuclide using D and D computer code, radionuclides with a dose contribution fraction of 0.1% or more for the entire radionuclide were selected. As a result, the selected radionuclides were beta radionuclides H-3, C-14 and Sr-90 and gamma radionuclides Co-60, Cs-137, Eu-152 and Eu-154. The selected radionuclides can be presented for consultation with domestic regulatory agencies in the future and will be used as the technical base of DCGLs for the final status survey. (authors)

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

In-Vessel Retention of Molten Corium: Lessons Learned and Outstanding Issues

In-vessel retention (IVR) of core melt is a key severe accident management strategy adopted by some operating nuclear power plants and proposed for some advanced light water reactors (ALWRs). If there were inadequate cooling during a reactor accident, a significant amount of core material could become molten and relocate to the lower head of the reactor vessel, as happened in the Three Mile Island Unit 2 (TMI-2) accident. If it is possible to ensure that the vessel head remains intact so that relocated core materials are retained within the vessel, the enhanced safety associated with these plants can reduce concerns about containment failure and associated risk. For example, the enhanced safety of the Advanced 600 MWe Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) designed by Westinghouse (AP600), which relied upon External Reactor Vessel Cooling (ERVC) for IVR, resulted in the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (US NRC) approving the design without requiring certain conventional features common to existing Light Water Reactors (LWRs). However, it is not clear that the ERVC proposed for the AP600 could provide sufficient heat removal for higher-power reactors (up to 1500 MWe) without additional enhancements. This paper reviews efforts made and results reported regarding the enhancement of IVR in LWRs. Where appropriate, the paper identifies what additional data or analyses are needed to demonstrate that there is sufficient margin for successful IVR in high power thermal reactors.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

NDE and DE of PWSCC Found in the J-Groove Weld of a Removed-From-Service Control Rod Drive Mechanism

Studies conducted at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) in Richland, Washington focused on assessing the effectiveness of nondestructive examination (NDE) techniques for inspecting control rod drive mechanism (CRDM) nozzles and J-groove weldments. The primary objective of this work is to provide information to the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (US NRC) on the effectiveness of NDE methods as related to the in-service inspection of CRDM nozzles and J-groove weldments, and to enhance the knowledge base of primary water stress corrosion cracking (PWSCC) through destructive characterization of the CRDM assemblies. Two CRDM assemblies were removed from service, decontaminated, and then used in a series of laboratory NDE and DE measurements; this report addresses the following questions: 1) What did each NDE technique detect?, 2) What did each NDE technique miss?, 3) How accurately did each NDE technique characterize the detected flaws?, and finally 4) What were the basis for the NDE techniques performance? Two CRDM assemblies including the CRDM nozzle, the J-groove weld, buttering, and a portion of the ferritic head material were selected for this study. This paper focuses on a CRDM assembly that contained suspected PWSCC, based on in-service inspection data and through-wall leakage. The laboratory NDE measurements used to examine the CRDM assembly followed standard industry techniques for conducting in-service inspections of CRDM nozzles and the crown of the J-groove welds and buttering. These techniques included eddy current testing, time of flight diffraction ultrasound, and penetrant testing. In addition, other laboratory-based NDE methods were employed to conduct inspections of the CRDM assembly with particular emphasis on inspecting the J-groove weld and buttering. These techniques included volumetric ultrasonic inspection of the J-groove weld metal, visual testing via replicant material of the J-groove weld and high resolution photography of the J-groove weld crown and buttering. The results from these NDE studies were used to guide the development of the destructive characterization plan. The NDE studies found several crack-like indications. The NDE and DE studies determined that one of these was a through-weld radially-oriented PWSCC crack in the wetted surface of the J-groove weld, located at the transition point between the weld and the buttering. The crack was 6 mm long on the surface and quickly grew to 25 mm long at a depth of 8 mm, covering the length of the weld between the penetration tube and the carbon steel. The NDE studies found that only ET was able to detect the through-weld crack. The crack was oriented poorly for the ultrasonic testing, and was too tight for accurate PT or VT. The ET voltage response of the flaw was 30% that of a deep EDM notch. The DE performed on the crack consisted of slicing the crack into thin sections, polishing the sections, and then using optical and scanning electron microscopy (SEM) to characterize the crack. DE shows the crack was PWSCC and that it initiated on the wetted surface, grew and expanded through the weld metal, and exited into the annulus. The SEM examinations showed the crack followed the weld grain boundaries as it progressed through the weld. The crack was branched and discontinuous along its length.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Challenges and Capabilities for Inspection of Cast Stainless Steel Piping

Studies conducted at the Pacific N¬orthwest National Laboratory (PNNL) in Richland, Washington, have focused on developing and evaluating the reliability of nondestructive examination (NDE) approaches for inspecting coarse-grained, cast stainless steel reactor components. The objective of this work is to provide information to the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (US NRC) on the utility, effec¬tiveness and limitations of NDE techniques as related to the inservice inspec¬tion of primary system piping components in pressurized water reactors (PWRs). This paper describes results from recent assessments built upon early work with low frequency ultrasonic testing (UT) coupled with synthetic aperture focusing technique (SAFT) signal processing, and has subsequently evolved into an approach using low frequency phased array technology as applied from the outer diameter surface of the piping. In addition, eddy current examination as performed from the inner diameter surface of these piping welds is also reported. Cast stainless steel (CSS) pipe specimens were examined that contain thermal and mechanical fatigue cracks located close to the weld roots and have inside/outside surface geometrical conditions that simulate several PWR primary piping weldments and configurations. In addition, segments of vintage centrifugally cast piping were also examined to understand inherent acoustic noise and scattering due to grain structures and determine consistency of UT responses from different locations. The advanced UT methods were applied from the outside surface of these specimens using automated scanning devices and water coupling. The phased array approach was implemented with a modified instrument operating at low frequencies and composite volumetric images of the samples were generated with 500 kHz, 750 kHz, and 1.0 MHz arrays. Eddy current studies were conducted on the inner diameter surface of these piping welds using a commercially available instrument and a cross point probe design operating at a frequency of 250 kHz. Results from the laboratory studies indicate that 500 kHz phased array methods are capable of detecting flaws greater than 30% through-wall in the cast specimens. Length-sizing of flaws is possible, but no diffracted signals could be observed to support time-of-flight depth sizing. The work with eddy current examinations on the inner diameter surface indicate that, while certain cast austenitic microstructures provide excessive background noise due to permeability variations, surface-breaking flaws are quite easily detected. This work was sponsored by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission under Contract DE-AC06-76RLO 1830; NRC JCN Y6604; Mr. Wallace Norris, NRC Project Monitor.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Diversion Path Analysis: A Proposed Methodology to Develop an MC&A Approach for Liquid-Fueled Molten Salt Reactors

Nuclear material control and accounting (MC&A) is a critical element of both the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and US Department of Energy (DOE)’s domestic safeguards and security requirements. NRC licensees are required, under Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 74 to establish and maintain an MC&A program that captures and records the quantities and locations of special nuclear material (SNM) at the facility. Along with physical protection, MC&A is a key element of domestic nuclear material safeguards that enables the NRC to ensure that SNM is controlled and accounted for. SNM, per 10 CFR Part 74, refers to plutonium, 233 U, and uranium enriched in the isotope 233 U or 235 U, but does not include source material. Periodic physical inventories, coupled with material balance evaluations, are effective and demonstrated tools to account for and detect theft or diversion of SNM in facilities containing SNM in bulk material form (i.e., not in discrete, countable items). Historically in the United States, these types of facilities have included fuel fabrication, conversion, and enrichment facilities. In comparison, reactors have relied on item counting of assemblies and control of SNM while in containment (e.g., a sealed reactor pressure vessel) because, to date, reactor fuel has been in item form. In liquid-fueled molten salt reactors (MSRs), unlike traditional light water reactors (LWRs) or bulk facilities, bulk SNM quantities can change significantly during operation as a result of depletion and transmutation. This introduces challenges to the use of traditional periodic physical inventories and material balance evaluations to detect theft or diversion of SNM in reactors that use SNM in bulk material form. Liquid-fueled (i.e., salt-fueled) MSR facilities are MSRs that use SNM within a salt eutectic as the fuel. The SNM is in a bulk material form any time it is outside of fresh or spent fuel storage containers. Some examples of when SNM will be in bulk form in the facility are during addition of fuel to the reactor system, while fuel is circulating in operation, and while fuel is in a drain tank. Periodic physical inventories and material balance evaluations can likely be effectively applied to many portions of an MSR facility, including all areas where depletion and transmutation are not significantly changing the quantities of SNM within the control area. Within an MSR facility, this would include fresh fuel receipt and loading, waste streams that may contain SNM, irradiated fuel storage outside of the reactor core, and any irradiated fuel processing that may happen after SNM has been removed from the reactor. All of these process steps could rely on measurements of SNM quantities compared with documented inventories. Any discrepancies from predicted (i.e., book) inventories and measured inventories could be quantified as inventory differences, consistent with traditional MC&A guidance from the NRC (e.g., in NUREG-1065 Revision 2, NUREG-2159 Revision 1, and RG 5.29 Revision 2). Within the reactor system, additions and removals to the book inventory include depletion of the SNM (e.g., fission of 235 U), which complicates the use of physical inventories. SNM control, however, can also likely be effectively applied to detect theft of SNM throughout a liquid-fueled MSR facility. To complement these approaches, prior technical reports have identified that a diversion path analysis may be a useful, risk-informed, and performance-based tool to determine suitable elements of an MC&A approach for the reactor system within a liquid-fueled MSR facility.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

The Role of Indian Tribes in the Safe, Secure, and Routine Transportation of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste - 19463

Far too often federally recognized Indian Tribes are the last stakeholders invited to the table to discuss a particular issue with potentially wide-ranging impacts. Indian tribes were the first governments on this continent. With respect to the future transportation of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) or high-level radioactive waste (HLW), Indian tribes are potentially impacted in a myriad of ways: economics, cultural, environmental, health and safety. Yet few regulators fully understand and appreciate the legal and political standing of Indian tribes. This paper will examine the ways in which Indian tribes must be involved with the planning for safe, secure and routine SNF and HLW shipments and the ways in which the federal government is obligated to involve tribes. Indian tribes are similar to states in that they are responsible for the health and safety of its members (which they themselves define). Tribes, like states, make, implement, interpret, and enforce laws, and provide public services - healthcare, public education, social services, drug treatment, public safety and emergency management, transportation, managing natural resources, public housing, and environmental and cultural preservation. Many tribes also operate economic enterprises - manufacturing, farming, forestry, and gaming. The most basic principle of Indian law is the principle of 'sovereignty,' that is, an Indian tribe possesses all the powers of any sovereign state. Tribal governments are not subject to state or local jurisdiction but are subject to federal jurisdiction. The tribes enjoy a government-to-government relationship (and expectation) with the federal government (i.e., agencies, like the Department of Energy, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission). Of paramount concern to Indian tribes is the doctrine of Trust Responsibility, the general principle that the federal government's conduct 'in dealing with the Indians should therefore be judged by the most exacting fiduciary standards.' With respect to SNF/HLW this means that the federal government has an obligation (or a Trust Responsibility) to ensure that tribal people, lands and resources are protected. Equally important is the expectation that federal agencies will work with the Indian tribes on a government-to-government basis before undertaking any action with potential negative consequences on the tribe's people, land or resources. The concept of government-to-government consultation between Indian tribes and the United States is long standing and well recognized. As expressed in Executive Order 13175, 'Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments': 'Consultation - Each federal agency must have an accountable process to ensure meaningful and timely input by tribal officials in the development of regulatory policies that have tribal implications.' The purpose of consultation is to ensure that Indian tribes are consulted before government officials make decisions that may have an impact on their lives and territories. The three agencies involved with SNF and HLW transportation - the US Department of Transportation (DOT), the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and the US Department of Energy (DOE) - have had various degrees of success with respect to direct consultation with Indian tribes. Given that there is plenty of lead-time before the first shipments commence, there should be ample time to develop a strategy for ensuring that tribes are equal partners when planning and preparing for shipments of SNF and HLW to the first interim storage facility. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Memorandum of Understanding Between U.S. EPA Superfund and U.S. NRC

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Office of Superfund Remediation and Technology Innovation (OSRTI) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) are responsible for implementing the 'Memorandum of Understanding Between the Environmental Protection Agency and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission: Consultation and Finality on Decommissioning and Decontamination of Contaminated Sites'. This paper provides a brief overview of the origin of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), the major features of the MOU, and how the MOU has been implemented site specifically. EPA and NRC developed the MOU in response to direction from the House Committee on Appropriations to EPA and NRC to work together to address the potential for dual regulation. The MOU was signed by EPA on September 30, 2002 and NRC on October 9, 2002. The two agencies had worked on the MOU since March 2000. While both EPA and NRC have statutory authority to clean up these sites, the MOU provides consultation procedures between EPA and NRC to eliminate dual regulation. Under the MOU, EPA and NRC identified the interactions of the two agencies for the decommissioning and decontamination of NRC-licensed sites and the ways in which those responsibilities will be exercised. Except for Section VI, which addresses corrective action under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), this MOU is limited to the coordination between EPA, when acting under its CERCLA authority, and NRC, when a facility licensed by the NRC is undergoing decommissioning, or when a facility has completed decommissioning, and the NRC has terminated its license. EPA believes that implementation of the MOU between the two agencies will ensure that future confusion about dual regulation does not occur regarding the cleanup and reuse of NRC-licensed sites. NRC and EPA have so far exchanged MOU consultation letters on eight NRC-licensed sites. EPA has responded to each consultation request with a letter expressing its views on actions that NRC should consider that address the site-specific matter that triggered consultation. Over the course of consultations on the eight sites, there have been some reoccurring themes to EPA's views. Primarily, these are EPA: 1. Recommending that NRC consider selecting institutional controls to ensure that NRC's assumptions about future human exposure at the site are not exceeded. 2. Recommending that NRC consider using more site-specific information when conducting dose assessment modeling. 3. Recommending that NRC consider a flexible approach to groundwater protection that still ensures the public is not exposed to contamination levels over drinking water limits. 4. Recommending that NRC consider an approach similar to how EPA implements supplemental standards under 40 CFR 192 as an ARAR when the UMTRCA soil standard of 5 pCi/g is not being met.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Establishment of an Undergraduate Research and Training Program in Radiochemistry at Florida Memorial University, a Historically Black College or University (HBCU)

With the passing of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, the United States is experiencing for the first time in over two decades, what some refer to as the 'Nuclear Renaissance'. The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) recognizes this surge in application submissions and is committed to reviewing these applications in a timely manner to support the country's growing energy demands. Notwithstanding these facts, it is understood that the nuclear industry requires appropriately trained and educated personnel to support the growing needs of the nuclear industry and the US NRC. Equally important is the need to educate the next generation of students in nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear forensics and various aspects of homeland security for the national laboratories and the Department of Defense. From mechanical engineers educated and experienced in materials, thermal/fluid dynamics, and component failure analysis, to physicists using advanced computing techniques to design the next generation of nuclear reactor fuel elements, the need for new engineers, scientists, and health physicist has never been greater.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Predictive Bias and Sensitivity in NRC Fuel Performance Codes

The latest versions of the fuel performance codes, FRAPCON-3 and FRAPTRAN were examined to determine if the codes are intrinsically conservative. Each individual model and type of code prediction was examined and compared to the data that was used to develop the model. In addition, a brief literature search was performed to determine if more recent data have become available since the original model development for model comparison.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Lessons Learned From Public Outreach: Effective Incorporation of the Stakeholder Voice - 18447

The licensing process for any facility associated with nuclear power or aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle can be expected to encounter intense stakeholder interest, and often significant challenges. Over the last decade, staff of the Center for Nuclear Waste Regulatory Analyses (CNWRA{sup R}) at Southwest Research Institute{sup R} (SwRI{sup R}) provided comprehensive support to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for public outreach efforts across a wide variety of nuclear activities. Many of these projects included public involvement and consultation activities for compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), including scoping, public meetings, responding to public comments on draft documents, and holding small meetings with affected local, state, and tribal governments. In addition, we have supported NRC public outreach related to nuclear facility licensing activities (including the proposed repository at Yucca Mountain), rulemaking, and regulatory guidance development. This experience has offered us a broad view of the challenges faced by industry, regulators, and stakeholders. In the process, we have observed some best practices that lead to effective stakeholder communication. Communication about complex technical issues is challenging, particularly for societally controversial topics, such as civilian use of nuclear power and management of radioactive waste. Most commonly, we have observed a lack of mutual trust and respect among industry, regulators, and stakeholders that creates an atmosphere ripe for suspicion and misunderstanding. Stakeholders have, in public comments, criticized the lack of appropriate venues to raise concerns in which they feel they can get meaningful responses from the nuclear industry and regulators. Conversely, industry faces difficulty in reaching compromise with stakeholders, who sometimes misinterpret or misrepresent factual information. Within this contentious environment, regulators are constrained by their statutory framework, even as they are challenged to be more responsive, transparent, and fair to both stakeholders and industry. In spite of these obstacles, there are examples where feedback from stakeholders was heard and utilized. Because of successful collection of appropriate feedback, regulators became more adept at understanding the full range of perspectives from both industry and stakeholders, and subsequently did a better job at effectively incorporating feedback and communicating their decisions and findings in a clear and understandable way. Ultimately, the success of these examples was based on a measure of mutual respect, which was reached through effective communication and implementation of some best practices. These best practices include (i) outreach planning that is abundantly mindful of the various stakeholder points of view, site history, regional characteristics, and probable future and related actions, combined with advance identification of key stakeholders; (ii) development and distribution of information that facilitates public participation; and (iii) use of avenues by which stakeholders can provide meaningful and effective comments. Illustrative examples include (i) how concerns raised by stakeholders were heard by an applicant and resulted in a revised project proposal; (ii) use of a variety of interaction formats that incorporated input across a broad spectrum of stakeholders; (iii) utilizing stakeholder feedback received during scoping; and (iv) how a facility underestimated the impact of 'outsider' stakeholder voices that were in contrast to the known local community. By moving past the viewpoint that public outreach is a 'necessary evil' and engaging only to check a procedural box, each participant can benefit from mutually satisfactory and improved outcomes. (author)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

NEPA training is essential: it shouldn't just be for environmental staff - 15063

In times of increasing workloads and flat budgets, it is important that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) use available resources and techniques efficiently and effectively to achieve success in environmental reviews throughout the agency. By implementing a contract with Duke University, co-sponsored by the Council on Environmental Quality, to present courses near the NRC Headquarters in the Implementation of National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the NRC major program offices achieved success in training a large number of staff in NEPA in a timely and cost-effective manner. In addition, this training is positioning NRC staff to complete the Duke University graduate-level professional certificate in NEPA. (authors)

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Results of a Strategic Assessment of NRC's Low-Level Radioactive Waste Program

NRC recently completed a strategic assessment of its low-level radioactive waste (LLW) regulatory program. In this paper, we provide the results of this assessment - a prioritized list of activities for our LLW program in the next several years - along with a description of the circumstances that required us to undertake this assessment and the process we used. We obtained ideas from a wide variety of stakeholders on activities we could undertake, and we evaluated them in light of our overall strategic objectives for ensuring safety and security, as well as a number of other factors. We ranked 7 of the 20 activities evaluated as high priority. Their completion in the next several years will help to ensure that LLW will continue to be managed and disposed of safely and securely. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

High-Burnup BWR LOCA Burst Analysis Using High-Fidelity Multiphysics Simulations

The US nuclear industry is looking to improve on the operating economics of the current fleet of light-water reactors (LWRs). One way of achieving this is by operating fuel to higher burnup. In pressurized water reactors (PWRs), relaxing the current burnup limit will allow for cycle length extensions and power uprates; in boiling water reactors (BWRs) it may allow for improved fuel utilization and reduced feed assemblies, as well as more efficient power uprates and increased capacity factors that will support the Administration’s Executive Order to facilitate 5 GW of power uprates at existing nuclear facilities. However, one of the key limitations to operating fuel to higher burnup is the risk of fuel fragmentation, relocation, and dispersal (FFRD). Recognizing the high interest in extending burnup limits, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has issued Draft Regulatory Guide DG-1434, which defines an approach that would be acceptable to the NRC for addressing FFRD risk. The approach defined will require better understanding of the phenomena leading to FFRD as well as best-estimate simulation methods to understand FFRD risk in high-burnup cores. The Nuclear Energy Advanced Modeling and Simulation program is supporting the FFRD industry challenge problem through development of state-of-the-art, high-fidelity modeling and simulation LWR analysis capabilities; namely, the BISON fuel performance code and the VERA core simulator software. These tools, along with the US NRC TRACE system analysis code, have been utilized for analysis of FFRD risk in both PWR and BWR cores in recent years. The work documented in this report addresses the lack of high-fidelity research for BWRs and builds on a previous activity where the framework has been applied to Cycles 16 through 18 of Limerick Unit 1, a BWR/4, with introduction of 8 high-burnup lead use assemblies (HBLUAs) that were representative of the 8 HBLUAs loaded into Limerick Unit 2 in 2021. VERA was used in this previous activity to model rod-by-rod depletion in these cycles, and its solution was used to initialize a TRACE simulation of a large-break loss-of-coolant accident (LBLOCA) at the end of Cycle 18. In the work documented in this report, the TRACE model was improved by refining the core mesh and utilizing a new feature that allows for capturing the full 3D VERA power distribution in the model. This allows for a more detailed solution for setting BISON boundary conditions. Furthermore, the solutions from VERA and TRACE were used to set up and perform BISON simulations of about 1,000 rods sampled from the core, including all burnup levels. Utilizing two cladding burst models, it was shown that no fuel rods were predicted to burst during the postulated LBLOCA transient. Additionally, a sensitivity study was performed by artificially increasing linear heat rate during the postulated LBLOCA to identify parameters that correlate with rod burst susceptibility. Burnup, fission gas release, and hoop strain were all found to be positively correlated with rod burst susceptibility. Small-break loss-of-coolant accident (SBLOCA) analyses were also performed; these analyses predicted cladding temperature increases that were bounded by the LBLOCA cladding temperatures for all small break sizes studied for this plant. However, future refinements to the plant response assumptions during the SBLOCA could impact the predicted cladding response. Finally, a benchmark study was performed between CTF and TRACE for LOCA conditions to better qualify CTF for BWR LOCA modeling.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗