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At least 73 records · Page 4
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2024

Delayed Critical Highly Enriched Uranium Metal Cylinders with Thin Graphite Top and Bottom Reflectors

Nine 7, 11, and 15 in. diam highly enriched uranium (HEU, 93.15 wt % 235 U) metal cylinders were assembled on the vertical assembly machine in the Oak Ridge Critical Experiments Facility (ORCEF) and had 1, 2, or 3 in. thick HLM graphite reflectors on the top and bottom. The experiments, which were performed between April 3, 1970, and February 18, 1971, used 23 operational days at ORCEF. Before those experiments were carried out, unreflected and unmoderated, graphite- and polyethylene-reflected, and polyethylene-moderated HEU metal cylinders had been assembled to obtain delayed criticality at ORCEF in the 1960s and reported by the International Criticality Safety Benchmark Evaluation Project (ICSBEP) at the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA)*. The data from the nine critical experiments are acceptable for use as criticality safety benchmark experiments for the NEA’s ICSBEP once the uncertainty analysis is completed. Based on previous ICSBEP benchmarks with HEU metal at ORCEF, the uncertainties in k eff are expected to be as low as ±0.0004.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Examination of Digital-Delay Rossi-$\alpha$ for 252 Cf-Driven Highly Enriched Uranium Using Organic Scintillators

Neutron noise techniques constitute several analysis methods applicable to non-destructive assay. One technique is the Rossi-α method to calculate the prompt neutron decay constant (α) or its inverse, the prompt neutron period (1/α), for assemblies of fissionable material. This work evaluates a high-data-throughput measurement at the National Criticality Experiments Research Center (NCERC) with organic scintillators measuring a subcritical assembly of highly enriched uranium (HEU) metal (93% 235 U). The assembly comprises hemi shells stacked together to form fully closed shells and is driven by a Cf source at the center. The assembly is a total of 59.85 kg HEU and a k eff of 0.99, according to MCNP6.2 KCODE simulations. Measurements were acquired with a three-by-four array of 5.08-cm-diameter by 5.08-cm-length trans-stilbene crystals 166 cm from the assembly center. Two types of coincident binning methods are used to build the Rossi-α distribution of coincident neutron detections: A) type 1 binning, also known as any-and-all forward time differences, and B) type 1 binning with a digital-delay technique that is analogous to Orndoff’s use of delay cabling in early Rossi-alpha measurements. Method B) disregards same-detector coincidences and once all nearest time coincidences are collected between all detectors after a trigger, a time delay of 0.75 µs is implemented. The measured prompt neutron decay constants for both techniques are calculated from single exponential fits and the two methods are compared. Method A) shows an apparent timing discontinuity near 500 ns time differences. This timing discontinuity interferes with the fitting method used to calculate the prompt neutron decay constant. Method B) mitigates the artificial timing discontinuity and removes the disagreement of the fit. Future work will model the time-dependent detector response to discern why this timing discontinuity occurs, discern how Method B) reduces the amplitude of this timing discontinuity, and apply this method to critical assembly measurements to ultimately confirm the recommendation to use Method B) for high-data-throughput measurements.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2021

Massachusetts Institute of Technology Reactor LEU Fuel Element Flow Test Conceptual Design – Hydraulic Reactor Design Parameters

The Massachusetts Institute of Technology Reactor (MITR-II, also referred to as MITR) is one of six U.S. high performance research reactors (USHPRR), including one critical facility, that is actively collaborating with the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Material Management and Minimization (M 3 ) Reactor Conversion Program to convert to the use of low-enriched uranium (LEU, < 20 wt% 235 U) fuel. The MIT Nuclear Reactor Laboratory has been working with the USHPRR Reactor Conversion (RC) Pillar at Argonne National Laboratory to perform fuel element design and fuel cycle performance analyses, steady-state thermal hydraulics safety analyses, and accident safety analyses in preparation for the conversion of MITR and support a preliminary Safety Analysis Report (SAR) for conversion to LEU fuel.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Analysis of FRAM Measurements to Establish Methodology Uncertainty

Qualification measurements were performed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) on a variety of measurement standards. These measurements will be used to qualify the Fixed-Energy, Response Function Analysis with Multiple Efficiency (FRAM) code with a high purity germanium (HPGe) detector for use at ORNL. Measured items include uranium isotopic standards, U 3 O 8 line sources, and a uranium tetrafluoride source. The 235 U enrichment was estimated using the FRAM isotopic analysis software for each source and compared with the declared isotopic values.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2022

On the Uranium and Plutonium Nuclear Data Evaluations [Slides]

This presentation provides overviews of uraniums, 233 U and 235 U, plutonium research including motivations, current status in ENDF/B-VIII.0, the inclusion of sub-thermal data, and the inclusion of LANL ratio capture-to-fission data. Additionally, the preliminary fit of Mosby’s data as reported, fluctuating neutron multiplicities, uncertainty in evaluated libraries, and experimental effects are also presented. The presentation concludes by providing a summary of plans for the U and Pu evaluation work.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Technical Evaluation of Accelerated Basin De-Inventory Material Addition to Sludge Batch 11 (Rev. 1)

The Accelerated Basin De-inventory (ABD) program involves discarding spent nuclear fuel that is currently stored in L-Basin to the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) for vitrification. The first ABD discards will occur during the preparation of Sludge Batch (SB) 11. Savannah River Mission Completion has requested that the Savannah River National Laboratory assess the technical gaps related to the increased gadolinium poisoning requirement and the impacts of performing the Low Temperature Aluminum Dissolution (LTAD) process in Tank 51 with H-Canyon discards present. The following summarizes the evaluation of the impacts of increasing the quantity of gadolinium (and related topics) from what was previously evaluated in the SRNL studies of gadolinium-poisoned ABD material solubility, the overall ABD flowsheet review, and increasing the fissile mass loading in glass: 1) Based on literature surveys, there is no indication that organic interactions with gadolinium will be significant at the high pH (typically >13) conditions of the Concentration, Storage, and Transfer Facilities. Any interactions of gadolinium with organics in DWPF are not expected to adversely impact DWPF or downstream facilities. Thus, there is little-to-no residual risk from organic interactions with gadolinium [Gap closed]; 2) Adding depleted uranium to ABD material, targeting 235 U enrichment of 4.90% within each transfer window, will mitigate potential impacts from an increase in soluble 235 U enrichment during sludge washing and LTAD. The plan to take advantage of previous transfers and allow 235 U enrichment of >5% during the final transfer window carries a risk that Tank 51 supernate will have a 235 U enrichment of >5%, which should be evaluated for acceptance; 3) Increasing the gadolinium mass ratio to 3.0:1 Gd: 235 U(eq SLU ) should lead to the same or higher partitioning of gadolinium into the solid phase within the DWPF Chemical Process Cell, resulting in both liquid and solid phases with expected partitioning of Gd consistent with the prior solubility study [Gap closed for SB11]; 4) There are no expected impacts on DWPF melt temperature and melter operations due to the minimal ~0.2 weight percent (wt%) increase in Gd concentration relative to previous sludge batches [Gap closed for SB11]; 5) As observed previously, Gd is expected to enter the off-gas system via physical entrainment, but at a slightly higher concentration than what was observed for SB9 melter off-gas pluggage deposits (0.07 wt%) [Gap closed for SB11] ; 6) There are no expected impacts on DWPF recycle or the Recycle Collection Tank glycolate destruction process. [Gap closed for SB11]; 7) Gd is projected to be a trace component in the SB11 glass (<0.5 wt%) and can be ignored for process control. Trace components do not significantly impact glass durability, thus the conclusions of the previous Product Consistency Test evaluation at a fissile mass loading of 2,500 g fissile/m3 glass still applies to SB11. The ~0.1 wt% increase in Gd2O3 concentration relative to the previous study will not impact the predictability of SB11 glass with the DWPF Product Composition Control System (PCCS) models for durability or the acceptability of glass according to the Waste Acceptance Product Specifications (WAPS) criterion for product consistency [Gap closed for SB11]; 8) No additional Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedure testing is necessary for SB11 and the hazardous waste specification of the SB11 DWPF waste form is unchanged after the addition of the ABD stream [Gap closed for SB11]. The following summarizes the evaluation of the impacts of adding two-thirds of the ABD material to Tank 51 prior to LTAD: 1) The addition of two-thirds of the ABD increases overall aluminum mass from 1.39×10 4 kg to 1.64×10 4 kg (15.5% ABD Al). The form of the insoluble portion of the Al resulting from ABD addition should be the more readily dissolved Al(OH) 3 and amorphous forms. The portion of the ABD aluminum that is processed by LTAD is expected to be completely soluble, thus requiring that less of the boehmite in the sludge be dissolved to reach the same Al target in the SB. [Gap closed for SB11]; The expected LTAD impact on other components, as related primarily to the components in ABD, are discussed. Gd is expected to remain insoluble during LTAD and not impact the solubility of other components. [Gap closed for SB11]; The addition of two-thirds of the ABD increases overall projected SB11 uranium mass from 4,740 kg to 13,100 kg (63% ABD U) and the projected plutonium mass from 86.0 kg to 89.5 kg (3.9% ABD Pu). The addition of all of the ABD increases overall projected SB11 uranium mass from 4,740 kg to 16,100 kg (70% ABD U) and the projected plutonium mass from 86.0 kg to 90.4 kg (5.3% ABD Pu). The 235 U enrichment will be ≤5%. The fissile uranium will be adequately poisoned by Gd and the fissile Pu will be adequately poisoned by Fe from the sludge. [Gap closed for SB11]; There is a low risk that ABD addition will impact the rheology or pumpability of the slurry. There is a low but higher risk of ABD addition prior to LTAD impacting the settling rate; Based on the evaluation of adding two-thirds of the ABD material and all of the ABD material prior to the LTAD process, there is no volume or mass limit that would need to be imposed on ABD additions prior to LTAD. [Gap closed for SB11]. Revision 1 of this report addresses a variation on the ABD additions and LTAD strategy where sodium hydroxide additions for LTAD may be performed intermittently or concurrently with an ABD addition window. The proposed change does not alter the conclusions of this evaluation.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2025

Model ages of three uranium metal CRMs and implications for radiochronometry data interpretation

In this study, we report 230 Th/ 234 U and 231 Pa/ 235 U model ages in three uranium metal certified reference materials with distinct production histories and isotopic compositions ranging from depleted to highly enriched (CRMs 112-A, 115, and 116-A). Here, our results provide the first model age values for these materials using multiple radiochronometers, which can be used as reference values for quality control of radiochronometry measurements performed during nuclear forensic investigations. Furthermore, we evaluate the model ages in the context of available production records for the materials, which provides insight into the processes that may impact radiochronometry systems during uranium metal production.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗
DOE OSTI2025

A new HALEU isotopic certified reference material

Candidate certified reference material (CRM) U196 was prepared by gravimetrically mixing and dissolving NNSA NRMP CRM 112-A (natural uranium metal) and CRM 116-A (highly enriched 93.2% 235 U metal) to achieve a high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) isotopic abundance reference material. CRM U196 will be certified for the 233 U/ 238 U, 234 U/ 238 U, 235 U/ 238 U, and 236 U/ 238 U ratios. Gravimetrically determined uranium isotope amount ratios and values derived from the isotope data were calculated from the buoyancy corrected mass data and from certified values for the metal CRMs used to create the solution. The 235 U isotope amount fraction (·100) and expanded uncertainty is 19.5846 ± 0.0028. For attribute verification, total evaporation and modified total evaporation isotope ratio measurements were performed. In conclusion, the reference material is to be distributed as a unit containing 5 mg uranium as dry uranyl nitrate.

High-assay low-enriched uranium↗
DOE OSTI2024

Radiological Characterization of Uranium Decay Products in LEU U-10Mo Before and After Heat Treatment

Fuel for the U.S. high-performance research reactor fleet is undergoing significant development as the United States moves away from using highly enriched uranium dispersion fuels. The proposed fuel is a high-density, low-enriched uranium (LEU, 19.75 wt% U 235) alloyed with ten weight percent molybdenum fuel (known as LEU U 10Mo). The LEU U 10Mo fuel samples studied in this report were made by down-blending highly enriched uranium with a master alloy, which is cast from molybdenum rods and depleted uranium, via vacuum induction melting and then casting.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Delayed Critical and Subcritical Experiments with Polyethylene Moderated Unreflected Thin 15 in. Diameter HEU Metal Plates

The thin ~15 in. diameter highly enriched uranium (HEU) metal plates were assembled to delayed criticality at the Oak Ridge Critical Experiments Facility (ORCEF) in 1969 with various thicknesses of polyethylene (varying from 1/16 to 2$\frac{3}{8}$ inches) between uranium metal plates. The average 235 U enrichment was 93.27 wt. %. These unreflected critical configurations contained 4$\frac{2}{3}$ to 20$\frac{5}{6}$ thin 15 in. diameter HEU metal plates (on loan from Los Alamos National Laboratory [LANL] and shipped to Oak Ridge National Laboratory [ORNL] on June 3, 1969). Depending on the thickness of polyethylene, the enriched uranium masses varying from 28,053 to 135,148 grams. Fractional plate sections consisted of the appropriate number of 60° pie sections. In addition to the measurement at delayed criticality, subcritical measurements were also performed by the inverse kinetic rod drop method. Prompt neutron decay constant measurements were also performed by the Rossi alpha and randomly pulsed neutron method using a time-tagged spontaneous fission californium neutron source; these are briefly reported here. At the time of these measurements in 1969, the thin HEU metal plates were in near-pristine condition with extremely little oxidation, allowing better descriptions of the uranium plates than the use of these plates in a heavily oxidized and deteriorated condition in recent reflected benchmark experiments at the LANL facility at the Nevada Test Site with these same thin highly enriched uranium metal plates. This report documents the experimental information for the measurements performed so that later researchers can perform the required uncertainty and calculational analyses and documentation to use these data for an International Nuclear Criticality Safety Benchmark Evaluation Program (ICSBEP) or a Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) benchmark. Data from the experiments described should be acceptable for use as criticality safety benchmark experiments for the ICSBEP and the NEA nuclear criticality safety benchmark program once the uncertainty analysis on the measured neutron multiplication factors is completed. Additional data—such as the dimensional inspection reports, uranium isotopic information, and other relevant particulars—should be retrieved from the Y-12 Plant or LANL and incorporated in the final ICSBEP benchmark. Based on previous ICSBEP benchmarks with this enriched uranium metal at ORCEF, the uncertainties in $k_{eff}$ could be as low as ± 0.0002 for some configurations. Other experiments with smaller-diameter than 15 in. diameter HEU metal plates have been benchmarked in HEU-METFAST-001. The prompt neutron time decay measurements could be the basis for an International Reactor Physics Benchmark Program. Preparation of the present report is part of an effort at ORNL to document more than 15 undocumented critical and subcritical experiments enumerated in ORNL/TM-2019/18 and performed by ORNL at ORCEF and other US Department of Energy critical experiments facilities using more than 500 operational days of critical facility time. This work for this report publication was supported by the Nuclear Criticality, Radiation Transport and Safety NCSP Program at ORNL.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Results from a controlled depleted uranium metal casting experiment designed to investigate nuclear Forensic Radiochronometry Signatures

The accurate interpretation of uranium metal 230 Th/ 234 U and 231 Pa/ 235 U radiochronometry model ages requires an understanding of how uranium parent nuclides and decay progeny ( 230 Th and 231 Pa) behave during uranium metal casting. In order to directly measure the spatial distribution of 230 Th and 231 Pa in uranium metal before and after vacuum induction melting (VIM), Los Alamos National Laboratory identified uranium metal feedstock, characterized the metal feedstock, conducted a controlled casting experiment of an approximately 120 kg uranium metal rod, and characterized the cast metal. Herein this study presents radiochronometry results and quantified 230 Th and 231 Pa VIM separation factors from bulk uranium.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗
DOE OSTI2020

Two Delayed Critical 15-Inch-Diameter Interacting Enriched (93.14) Uranium Metal Cylinders without Moderator and Reflector

This report documents very accurately the configuration and the materials for experiments with two unmoderated, unreflected, interacting, coaxial, highly enriched, 15-in.-diameter, uranium metal cylinders performed at the Oak Ridge Critical Experiments Facility (ORCEF) in May to Aug 1963 and described in logbook E-19 and E -20 associated with experiments in the East cell of ORCEF. Measurements were also performed in April and May of 1965 and described in logbooks E-22 and E-23 The information is sufficiently accurate that it can be used as the basis for preparation of benchmarks for International Criticality Safety Benchmark Program (ICSBEP) at Idaho National laboratory. The thickness of the cylinders was varied and the spacing between them was adjusted to achieve a delayed critical configuration. The average enrichment of the uranium metal was 94.14 wt. % 235 U. The heights of the 15-in.-diameter, equal-height cylinders varied from 1-5/8 to 3.0-inches. All interacting cylinders were assembled coaxially with their flat faces parallel and their combined masses varied between 182 and 325 kilograms of HEU metal. The data from these 12 experiments described would be acceptable for use as criticality safety benchmark experiments for the ICSBEP and EURATOM’s Nuclear Energy Agency nuclear criticality safety benchmark program, once the uncertainty analysis is completed. Based on previous ICSBEP benchmarks with this enriched uranium metal at ORCEF, it is expected that the uncertainties in k eff could be as low as ± 0.0002.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Credible Criticality Safety Margin in the 30B Package with LEU+ UF 6 and Hypothetical Water Ingress

The commercial nuclear industry is pursuing advancements in fuel and reactor design that increase the uranium enrichment above 5 wt. % 235 U. These advancements will necessitate the ability to transport bulk quantities of UF 6 at increased enrichments. Currently, the 30B cylinder is the primary container used by the industry for UF 6 storage and transportation and has a long history of successful shipments. This container can support up to 2,277 kg of UF 6 at a maximum enrichment of 5 wt. % 235 U. Previous evaluations have assessed the potential impact of criticality safety for 30B transport at higher enrichments but assumed moderator intrusion would not require evaluation. Although current regulations allow for the exception of moderator intrusion for UF 6 packages through the design and quality control of the package content, this exception is limited to enrichments up to 5 wt. % 235 U. Thus, an investigation of moderator intrusion into a 30B cylinder should be performed. Moderator intrusion into a 30B cylinder is a unique condition for criticality safety evaluation in transportation because of the violent chemical reactions that occur between UF 6 and H 2 O. The resulting intrusion is strongly dependent on the breach size, breach location, breach interface solid/ullage of the UF 6 content, the UF 6 distribution (which is temperature dependent), and temperature/pressure conditions which are dynamic in accident conditions. Additionally, the complexity of the HF-UO 2 F 2 -H 2 O interface that occurs during the event can influence the potential solubility of uranium in the system, as well as influence the amount of UF 6 reaction with H 2 O. With the operating experience from Orano Federal Services LLC, the UF 6 chemical expertise from Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), and the criticality safety expertise from ORNL, this paper evaluates the neutronic conditions (i.e., k eff ) that apply the understood chemistry and experimental conditions that occur during moderator intrusion of a breached 30B cylinder under postulated accidents. This report examines the historical evaluations of UF 6 transport and expands these evaluations for the enrichments expected for nuclear industry advancement. These simulations primarily feature a homogeneous mixture of UF 6 and H 2 O as an infinite media system and as a sphere with water reflection given an impurity limit of 0.5 wt. % UF 6 . This report demonstrates that this H/U limit is valid up to 8 wt. % enrichment for both H 2 O and HF as the moderating mixture. The water-reflected homogeneous mixed spheres evaluated demonstrate the amount of safety margin applied by restricting the 30B cylinder impurity limit to 0.5 wt. %. Additionally, this report evaluates moderator ingress scenarios of a 30B cylinder. The 30B cylinder simulations vary the cylinder orientation, the mass of UF 6 in the system, the mass of H 2 O in the system, and how much H 2 O has reacted with UF 6 . The moderator ingress of a 30B cylinder was evaluated for the water-reflected homogeneous mixed spheres to demonstrate the amount of safety margin applied by restricting the 30B cylinder impurity limit to 0.5 wt. %. These simulations are standard practice and are independent of the UF 6 -H 2 O reaction. This work also explored more complex simulations that layer the H 2 O over the UF 6 , which incorporates the amount of reacted UF 6 as a separate layer and considers solubility limits of UO 2 F 2 in H 2 O as it is produced. This approach is intended to simulate the postulated event of a large hairline crack occurring on a submerged cylinder. Finally, this work considers the potential of H 2 O mixing into the UF 6 solid heterogeneously using a sponge-like model. The water ingress into the UF 6 is treated as random size spheres, and the reaction products form into a layer over the spheres.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Post irradiation examination of a uranium-zirconium hydride TRIGA fuel element

Low-enriched (LEU) U-ZrH fuel, with a 235 U content less than 20% of the total uranium, is being evaluated for possible use in different types of reactors, including space nuclear systems, light water reactors (LWRs) and micro-reactors. As a result, it is beneficial to better understand the macrostructural and microstructural changes that occur in this fuel during irradiation. This paper reports the results of the post irradiation examination of an LEU U-ZrH fuel element (30 wt.% U, <20% 235 U) using neutron radiography, precision gamma scanning, chemical analysis, optical metallography and scanning electron microscopy combined with energy dispersive spectroscopy and wavelength dispersive spectroscopy, where the fuel element was irradiated in a Training, Research, Isotope, General Atomics (TRIGA) reactor. Results of microstructural characterization indicated some dehydriding and cracking of the U-ZrH fuel occurred during irradiation; an axial and radial burnup gradient existed in the fuel during irradiation, as measured by gamma scanning and chemical analysis; negligible microstructural changes transpired during irradiation, based on comparison of irradiated and as-fabricated U-ZrH fuel microstructures; and, negligible, fission product-rich, phases could be resolved in a U-ZrH fuel that was irradiated to a calculated 20% depletion of 235 U.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Measured Reaction Rate Ratios of 235 U, 238 U, 237 Np, 239 Pu Samples in the PFUNS 235 U Prompt Fission Neutron Spectrum Criticality Experiment

The Prompt Fission Uranium Neutron Spectrum experiment, an experiment to reduce uncertainties in the high energy tail of the 235 U prompt fission spectrum, achieved success by performing two separate irradiations measuring approximately 40 different IRDFF-II reactions total using over 20 different foil materials at the National Criticality Experiments Research Center in February 2024. The criticality experiment utilized a set of highly enriched uranium hemispherical shells of increasing diameters with a large void in the center where the samples were located. The focus of this work is the first of two PFUNS irradiations focused on irradiating two of each fission foils, one bare and one cadmium covered, along with metal activation foils containing reaction products with short half-lives, such as indium, iron, and gold along with nickel fluence monitors. This work focuses on presenting the initial reaction rate ratio results of the fission foils from the aforementioned first irradiation to assist in nuclear data validation of those species in a nearly pure 235 U prompt fission neutron spectrum and compares to the Lady Godiva and Flattop-25 historic experiments at the Los Alamos Critical Experiments Facility. Future work will combine fission foil and metallic activation foil reaction rate ratio results from both the first and second higher power irradiation and reaction rates for a final spectral adjustment.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2026

The Role of Nuclear Data Sensitivities in Prompt α-Eigenvalue Predictions of Delayed Critical Benchmarks

Alpha (α) eigenvalues, which describe the logarithmic time derivative of the neutron population in a multiplying system, are integral to time-dependent behavior and diagnostic applications. However, uncertainties in the evaluated nuclear data can significantly impact the accuracy of transport simulations for such quantities. This work explores the use of machine learning models to predict two key outputs, α-eigenvalues and keff bias, using input features derived from α-eigenvalue sensitivities to nuclear data. The criticality safety benchmark models used in this study come from the International Handbook of Evaluated Criticality Safety Benchmark Experiments. Three models, random forest, XGBoost, and NGBoost, are trained on both energy-resolved and energy-summed α sensitivities. For the α-eigenvalue bias prediction, NGBoost achieved the highest R 2 (0.9476) using energy-resolved features, while XGBoost performed best using summed sensitivities. In contrast, when predicting the keff bias, all the models showed moderate predictive capability (best R 2 ≈ 0.72), as the mapping from the static α-sensitivities to the static keff bias was less direct. SHAP (SHapley Additive exPlanations) analysis was used to interpret the model predictions. Across both prediction tasks, the features associated with neutron capture [H-1 (n, γ)], uranium scattering reactions (such as 235 U elastic/inelastic), and actinide capture/fission reactions (such as 239 Pu and 234 U) were consistently identified as the most impactful. This highlights the key role of specific nuclear reactions and energy ranges in shaping both time-dependent and steady-state criticality behavior. These results demonstrated that α-sensitivities, despite being computed for time-dependent metrics, can provide valuable insights for predicting both α-eigenvalues and the keff bias. Moreover, machine learning models offer a promising pathway for uncovering important nuclear data dependencies and guiding future data evaluation efforts.

Nuclear data↗
DOE OSTI2020

Technical Basis for the International Export of Handheld Spectroscopy Detectors

The international export of handheld spectroscopy detectors by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to partner states will provide state regulatory authorities and nuclear material owners a way to improve accountancy for accidental gains of nuclear material, including the provision of reports to the IAEA, in order to meet their safeguards agreements. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards agreements for non-nuclear weapons states requires accountancy for all nuclear material. As defined in Article XX of the IAEA statute, nuclear material includes source materials: "uranium containing the mixture of isotopes occurring in nature," and special fissionable material: "plutonium-239; uranium-233; uranium enriched in the isotopes 235 or 233". For IAEA Member States to meet their requirements under comprehensive safeguards agreements (CSA), safeguards are to be applied on "all source or special fissionable material," which "includes all nuclear material subject to IAEA safeguards". Therefore, accidental gains and losses of nuclear material must be reported to the IAEA. An accidental gain occurs when a state unexpectedly adds nuclear material to their inventory by various means such as seizing smuggled material or the discovery of legacy items previously unaccounted for. The material type and quantity must be added to the State's inventory by updating domestic records and then communicated to the IAEA.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2022

Uranium Oxide Elutriation at Higher Flow Rates and Longer Times

This work supports the recovery of high-assay low-enriched uranium (i.e., U enriched in 235 U to >5% and <20%) from used nuclear fuel. One step includes elutriating triuranium octoxide (U 3 O 8 ) from a fluidized bed of alumina (Al 2 O 3 ) that fills the main reaction chamber. The experiments outlined in this report assessed the effects of the time and flow rate on the elutriation of U 3 O 8 powder from the reaction vessel. Testing at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) was performed in a one-fourth scale experimental apparatus based on a pilot-scale system, which is the Material Recovery Pilot Plant (MRPP) at Idaho National Laboratory (INL). The experimental system comprises a supply of pressurized nitrogen (N 2 ), a gas heater, the reaction vessel, a knock-out pot, and a water trap where elutriated particles are collected for sampling. An Al 2 O 3 fluidized bed is contained within the reaction vessel. A bed of Al 2 O 3 with a nominal size of 180 µm and U 3 O 8 with a nominal size of 7 µm was fluidized at 2 different flow rates so the U 3 O 8 physically separated from the bed. The apparatus was simple and had no valves or sharp bends downstream from the reactor. The flow exited the reactor through a side port at the top. The flow passed through a knock-out vessel before the flow was passed through a bubbler to capture the U 3 O 8 . Seven tests were completed with U 3 O 8 using an elutriating gas of N 2 heated to 200°C. Tests were performed with bed loadings that comprise 25.0 g of U 3 O 8 , or 3.6 wt% of the bed mass. Except for one test performed at 12 SLPM, the gas flow rate through the bed for the other experiments was set at 10 SLPM as measured by the mass flow meter. Linear velocities through the bed were calculated as 28 and 34 cm/s, or 0.9 and 1.1 ft·s -1 . The duration of the tests ranged from 20 to 180 min, and one test had a flow cycled between 0 and 5 SLPM every 5 min for 40 min. The testing successfully demonstrated elutriation of U 3 O 8 from the fluidized bed as up to a 100% of the U 3 O 8 was transferred out of the bed. The removal of U 3 O 8 had a logarithmic dependence on flow rate. The design changes made the apparatus easier to clean, and the mass balances were better than those used in previous studies. Some elutriated Al 2 O 3 collected in the tubing that connected the reactor to the knock-out pot, but the amount of Al 2 O 3 was minimal for 10 SLPM. The flow at 12 SLPM showed considerable transport of Al 2 O 3 bed material into the reaction-vessel headspace and the transfer line to the knock-out pot.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗