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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 73 records · Page 4
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2013

Identifying, Visualizing, and Fusing Social Media Data to Support Nonproliferation and Arms Control Treaty Verification: Preliminary Results

While international nonproliferation and arms control verification capabilities have their foundations in physical and chemical sensors, state declarations, and on-site inspections, verification experts are beginning to consider the importance of open source data to complement and support traditional means of verification. One of those new, and increasingly expanding, sources of open source information is social media, which can be ingested and understood through social media analytics (SMA). Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) is conducting research to further our ability to identify, visualize, and fuse social media data to support nonproliferation and arms control treaty verification efforts. This paper will describe our preliminary research to examine social media signatures of nonproliferation or arms control proxy events. We will describe the development of our preliminary nonproliferation and arms control proxy events, outline our initial findings, and propose ideas for future work.

social media, arms control, nonproliferation↗
DOE OSTI2018

CRITERIA FOR COMPARATIVE EVALUATIONS OF TREATY VERIFICATION MONITORING SYSTEMS

In 2017, a team of subject matter experts from across the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) national laboratory developed a framework to assess and compare monitoring systems implemented to support treaty verification. Drawing on principles and techniques from multi-criteria decision making, the project team developed a set of evaluation criteria to serve as a decision support tool to understand and evaluate competing options. These criteria, which focus on monitoring systems designed to maintain chain of custody, were developed to be unambiguous, independent from each other, collectively exhaustive, measurable (whether this is quantitative or by a systematic subjective evaluation) and to help identify and prioritize factors of importance considering the perspectives of both a Host and Monitor. When used in the evaluation of options, criteria help to create a consistent framework that can assist in selecting the optimal solution among a set of competing alternatives.

decision making, Arms Control, decision analysis, ↗
DOE OSTI2022

Experimental demonstration and modeling of a robotic neutron detector with spectral and directional sensitivity for treaty verification

International safeguards and arms control agreements often require labor-intensive, intrusive onsite inspections to perform verification tasks. The ability to localize a neutron source and/or characterize a neutron field may be imperative for identifying anomalies. We are interested in the role of autonomous mobile robots, which, if designed properly, may be more effective and efficient and less intrusive than their human counterparts. Toward developing such a capability, we, for this study, have constructed the N-SpecDir Bot, comprised of three boron-coated straw detectors azimuthally-distributed within a cylinder of high-density polyethylene, which is mounted on an omni-directional robotic platform. Our N-SpecDir Bot is specifically designed to provide spectral and directional sensitivity, in addition to gross counts, by utilizing the signals from the three detectors. The detection system has been extensively characterized by MCNP modeling, which has been benchmarked to experiments conducted at the Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory. We demonstrate the spectral and directional sensitivity experimentally and in simulation, and provide a simple yet robust method for directional measurements.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2014

Xenon monitoring and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

How do you monitor (verify) a CTBT? It is a difficult challenge to monitor the entire world for nuclear tests, regardless of size. Nuclear tests 'normally' occur underground, above ground or underwater. Setting aside very small tests (let's limit our thinking to 1 kiloton or more), nuclear tests shake the ground, emit large amounts of radioactivity, and make loud noises if in the atmosphere (or hydroacoustic waves if underwater)

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2014

Nuclear proliferation and testing: A tale of two treaties

Despite progress in reducing stockpiles after the end of the Cold War, the disturbing actions of some nations could spread nuclear weapon capabilities and enlarge existing arsenals.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2016

The history and outlook for seismic monitoring of nuclear explosions in the context of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

Modern methods of nuclear-explosion monitoring are vastly more capable than they were when underground nuclear testing began in the late 1950s, in part because a cycle of improvements in explosion monitoring in the 1960–80 period led to improvements in monitoring for earthquakes and other phenomena, which then led to a general growth in monitoring assets that in turn has been applied back to explosion monitoring. Practical experiences in nuclear-explosion monitoring, acquired during the era of active testing prior to finalization of the CTBT text in 1996, laid the basis for monitoring in support of this arms-control initiative. This article elaborates on the future of nuclear-test-monitoring technology, which can build upon an additional and remarkable growth of general monitoring assets that began in the 1990s, largely unrelated to the specifics of nuclear-test monitoring. A new cycle of improvements in earthquake monitoring is likely to improve monitoring for explosions. While it is not easy to quantify the degree of monitoring improvement afforded by such new assets, an example from North Korea indicates the improvement can be substantial.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2016

A CZT-based radioxenon detection system in support of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

Here in this work, a prototype radioxenon detection system was designed, developed and tested at Oregon State University to study the response of CdZnTe (CZT) detectors to xenon radioisotopes for monitoring nuclear explosions. The detector utilizes two coplanar CZT detectors and measures xenon radioisotopes through beta-gamma coincidence detection between the two detection elements. The CZT-based detection system offers excellent energy resolution and background count rate compared with scintillator-based beta-gamma coincidence detectors currently in operation at the IMS stations. In this paper, we briefly discuss the detector design and report our recent measurement results with 131mXe, 133mXe, and 133Xe produced in the TRIGA reactor at OSU.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2016

Present and future potential of krypton-85 for the detection of clandestine reprocessing plants for treaty verification

Burnup calculations are applied to determine the amount of krypton-85 that is produced during the irradiation of nuclear fuel. Since krypton-85 is most likely released into the atmosphere during reprocessing to separate plutonium, atmospheric transport modeling is used to calculate the worldwide distribution of krypton-85 concentrations stemming from emissions from declared reprocessing plants. Our results are the basis for scenarios in which emissions from clandestine reprocessing facilities have to be detected against various background levels. We conclude that today’s background imposes heavily on the ability to detect small and medium plutonium separation rates; only high separation rates of 1 SQ per week and higher have a chance to be detected with feasible outlay. A fixed network of monitoring stations seems too costly; instead the high number of samples that are required rather calls for mobile sampling procedures, where air samples are collected at random locations over the world and are analyzed in regional laboratories for their krypton-85 concentration. Furthermore, it is argued that krypton-85 emissions from declared reprocessing activities have to be significantly lowered to enable a worldwide verification of the absence of even smaller clandestine reprocessing. For each scenario the number of samples that have to be taken for probable detection is calculated.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2018

International challenge to model the long-range transport of radioxenon released from medical isotope production to six Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty monitoring stations

After performing a first multi-model exercise in 2015 a comprehensive and technically more demanding atmospheric transport modelling challenge was organized in 2016. Release data were provided by the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organization radiopharmaceutical facility in Sydney (Australia) for a one month period. Measured samples for the same time frame were gathered from six International Monitoring System stations in the Southern Hemisphere with distances to the source ranging between 680 (Melbourne) and about 17,000 km (Tristan da Cunha). Participants were prompted to work with unit emissions in pre-defined emission intervals (daily, half-daily, 3-hourly and hourly emission segment lengths) and in order to perform a blind test actual emission values were not provided to them. Despite the quite different settings of the two atmospheric transport modelling challenges there is common evidence that for long-range atmospheric transport using temporally highly resolved emissions and highly space-resolved meteorological input fields has no significant advantage compared to using lower resolved ones. As well an uncertainty of up to 20% in the daily stack emission data turns out to be acceptable for the purpose of a study like this. Model performance at individual stations is quite diverse depending largely on successfully capturing boundary layer processes. No single model-meteorology combination performs best for all stations. Moreover, the stations statistics do not depend on the distance between the source and the individual stations. Finally, it became more evident how future exercises need to be designed. Set-up parameters like the meteorological driver or the output grid resolution should be pre-scribed in order to enhance diversity as well as comparability among model runs.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗
DOE OSTI2017

Active neutron and gamma-ray imaging of highly enriched uranium for treaty verification

The detection and characterization of highly enriched uranium (HEU) presents a large challenge in the non-proliferation field. HEU has a low neutron emission rate and most gamma rays are low energy and easily shielded. To address this challenge, an instrument known as the dual-particle imager (DPI) was used with a portable deuterium-tritium (DT) neutron generator to detect neutrons and gamma rays from induced fission in HEU. We evaluated system response using a 13.7-kg HEU sphere in several configurations with no moderation, high-density polyethylene (HDPE) moderation, and tungsten moderation. A hollow tungsten sphere was interrogated to evaluate the response to a possible hoax item. First, localization capabilities were demonstrated by reconstructing neutron and gamma-ray images. Once localized, additional properties such as fast neutron energy spectra and time-dependent neutron count rates were attributed to the items. For the interrogated configurations containing HEU, the reconstructed neutron spectra resembled Watt spectra, which gave confidence that the interrogated items were undergoing induced fission. The time-dependent neutron count rate was also compared for each configuration and shown to be dependent on the neutron multiplication of the item. This result showed that the DPI is a viable tool for localizing and confirming fissile mass and multiplication.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2019

A Cryptographic Escrow for Treaty Declarations and Step-by-Step Verification

The verification of arms-control and disarmament agreements requires states to provide declarations, including information on sensitive military sites and assets. There are important cases, however, where negotiations of these agreements are impeded because states are reluctant to provide any such data, because of concerns about prematurely handing over militarily significant information. To address this challenge, we present a cryptographic escrow that allows a state to make a complete declaration of sites and assets at the outset and commit to its content, but only reveal the sensitive information therein sequentially. Combined with an inspection regime, our escrow allows for step-by-step verification of the correctness and completeness of the initial declaration so that the information release and inspections keep pace with parallel diplomatic and political processes. We apply this approach to the possible denuclearization of North Korea. Such approaches can be applied, however, to any agreement requiring the sharing of sensitive information.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2012

Nuclear test ban treaty verification: Improving test ban monitoring with empirical and model-based signal processing

In this approach, small scale-length medium perturbations not modeled in the tomographic inversion might be described as random fields, characterized by particular distribution functions (e.g., normal with specified spatial covariance). Conceivably, random field parameters (scatterer density or scale length) might themselves be the targets of tomographic inversions of the scattered wave field. As a result, such augmented models may provide processing gain through the use of probabilistic signal sub spaces rather than deterministic waveforms.

42 ENGINEERING↗