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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2013

Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI): PNNL GTRI Convert Program (Program Management Plan)

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) strategic mission includes efforts to reduce and protect vulnerable nuclear and radiological material at civilian sites around the world. Converting research reactors from using highly enriched uranium (HEU) to low enriched uranium (LEU) was originally started in 1978 as the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors Program under the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Science. In 2004, the NNSA established the GTRI by combining five existing programs, including the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors Program, under one combined threat reduction initiative to focus on one common mission. Within this strategic mission, the GTRI has three goals that provide a comprehensive approach to achieving this mission: 1) convert research reactors from using HEU to LEU, 2) remove or dispose of excess nuclear and radiological materials, and 3) protect nuclear and radiological material from theft and sabotage. The GTRI Convert mission seeks to minimize and, to the extent possible, eliminate HEU in civilian applications throughout the world through the conversion of research reactors. Once that need is eliminated, remaining HEU fresh and spent fuel can be removed or disposed of by GTRI’s Remove activities. Attainment of the Convert objectives will permanently reduce the availability and affiliated transactions of HEU materials, thus eliminating a substantial threat to proliferation. GTRI’s Convert mission is comprised of two sub-programs: the GTRI Reactor Conversion Program and the Mo-99 Capability Development Project.

Cleary, Eugene J.↗
DOE OSTI2013

Safeguards inventory and process monitoring regulatory comparison

Detecting the theft or diversion of the relatively small amount of fissile material needed to make a nuclear weapon given the normal operating capacity of many of today’s running nuclear production facilities is a difficult task. As throughput increases, the ability of the Material Control and Accountability (MC&A) Program to detect the material loss decreases because the statistical measurement uncertainty also increases. The challenge faced is the ability of current accounting, measurement, and material control programs to detect small yet significant losses under some regulatory approaches can decrease to the point where it is extremely low if not practically non-existent at normal operating capacities. Adding concern to this topic is that there are variations among regulatory bodies as far as what is considered a Significant Quantity (SQ). Some research suggests that thresholds should be lower than those found in any current regulation which if adopted would make meeting detection goals even more difficult. This paper reviews and compares the current regulatory requirements for the MA elements related to physical inventory, uncertainty of the Inventory Difference (ID), and Process Monitoring (PM) in the United States Department of Energy (DOE) and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Rosatom of the Russian Federation and the Chinese Atomic Energy Agency (CAEA) of China. The comparison looks at how the regulatory requirements for the implementation of various MA elements perform across a range of operating capacities in example facilities.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2014

Nuclear Security: Target Analysis-rev

The objectives of this presentation are to understand target identification, including roll-up and protracted theft; evaluate target identification in the SNRI; recognize the target characteristics and consequence levels; and understand graded safeguards.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2014

Development and Demonstration of a Security Core Component

In recent years, the convergence of a number of trends has resulted in Cyber Security becoming a much greater concern for electric utilities. A short list of these trends includes: · Industrial Control Systems (ICSs) have evolved from depending on proprietary hardware and operating software toward using standard off-the-shelf hardware and operating software. This has meant that these ICSs can no longer depend on “security through obscurity. · Similarly, these same systems have evolved toward using standard communications protocols, further reducing their ability to rely upon obscurity. · The rise of the Internet and the accompanying demand for more data about virtually everything has resulted in formerly isolated ICSs becoming at least partially accessible via Internet-connected networks. · “Cyber crime” has become commonplace, whether it be for industrial espionage, reconnaissance for a possible cyber attack, theft, or because some individual or group “has something to prove.” Electric utility system operators are experts at running the power grid. The reality is, especially at small and mid-sized utilities, these SCADA operators will by default be “on the front line” if and when a cyber attack occurs against their systems. These people are not computer software, networking, or cyber security experts, so they are ill-equipped to deal with a cyber security incident. Cyber Security Manager (CSM) was conceived, designed, and built so that it can be configured to know what a utility’s SCADA/EMS/DMS system looks like under normal conditions. To do this, CSM monitors log messages from any device that uses the syslog standard. It can also monitor a variety of statistics from the computers that make up the SCADA/EMS/DMS: outputs from host-based security tools, intrusion detection systems, SCADA alarms, and real-time SCADA values – even results from a SIEM (Security Information and Event Management) system. When the system deviates from “normal,” CSM can alert the operator in language that they understand that an incident may be occurring, provide actionable intelligence, and informing them what actions to take. These alarms may be viewed on CSM’s built-in user interface, sent to a SCADA alarm list, or communicated via email, phone, pager, or SMS message. In recognition of the fact that “real world” training for cyber security events is impractical, CSM has a built-in Operator Training Simulator capability. This can be used stand alone to create simulated event scenarios for training purposes. It may also be used in conjunction with the recipient’s SCADA/EMS/DMS Operator Training Simulator. In addition to providing cyber security situational awareness for electric utility operators, CSM also provides tools for analysts and support personnel; in fact, the majority of user interface displays are designed for use in analyzing current and past security events. CSM keeps security-related information in long-term storage, as well as writing any decisions it makes to a (syslog) log for use forensic or other post-event analysis.

Turke, Andy↗
DOE OSTI2013

Decision Analysis Methods For the Analysis of Nuclear Terrorism Threats with Imperfect Information

Protection of commercial nuclear fuel cycles against adversary groups who may attempt to steal weapons-usable material is an issue of interest to the U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Energy. The wide array of potential nuclear fuel cycle configurations and the security measures that could be deployed to protect them pose a daunting system design problem. In general, there are billions of potential design configurations. Moreover, the design choices are not independent – the effectiveness of one design feature or security measure can affect the desirability of other design choices. To explore this issue, we develop a mixed-integer optimization problem that solves a complex decision tree to allocate security resources across a commercial nuclear fuel cycle configuration. A nominal UREX+ reprocessing facility is used to demonstrate how the model allocates resources across a particular fuel cycle facility and shows how the problem can be scaled up to include other facilities and design features in the fuel cycle. In our model, the defender first chooses a set of safeguards to implement in order to mitigate the risk of a terrorist theft from various unit operations in the reprocessing facility. The attacker observes the defender’s strategy choice and executes an attack to acquire material, including the possibility of declining to attack at all. The model considers the terrorist as an intelligent adversary with a set of attack strategies known to the defender. The strategic choices made by both the defender and attacker affect the probability of a successful attack by the terrorist and in turn affect the distribution of consequences to the defender. We use a decision tree to illustrate the interactions among costs, decisions, correlated uncertainties, and outcomes, and then show how to formulate the problem as a mixed-integer program with an equivalent solution. The novel features of our formulation include the following. First, as discussed above, we use a sequential game-theoretic formulation (a Stackelberg game). This formulation assumes the attacker can observe the defender’s actions before the attack is executed. Many previous game-theoretic studies have assumed attacker and defender act simultaneously without knowledge of the other’s strategy choice. We believe the sequential game formulation is more applicable for knowledgeable insider adversaries, the focus of this study. Second, we build on our previous work that has developed a methodology to reflect the correlation among probability distributions represented as discrete chance nodes in a decision tree. We illustrate how this methodology can be applied to two chance nodes in a decision tree that relate the quality of the materials that might be stolen or diverted by an adversary with the yield of a weapon that might be constructed from that material. In a decision tree, the dependence of the yield on the quality of the material could be modeled with conditional probabilities of the weapon yield given the quality of the materials obtained. For three outcome discretizations, this would require the assessment of nine conditional probabilities from domain experts as part of the model building effort. In contrast, our methodology will allow this same representation of the tree based on the assessment of the correlation between these two chance nodes by the experts, which we believe is a much easier and more reliable assessment task. The advantage of this approach increases as the number of dependent chance nodes grows in a decision tree representation of this problem. Third, we extend this approach to the approximation of the dependence between discrete binary events such as success or failure represented by binary chance nodes in a decision tree or in the special case of a probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) based on an event tree. This extension is a novel application in this domain, and uses Monte Carlo simulation to determine the appropriate conditional probabilities on the binary chance nodes when the number of correlated uncertainties is more than two. Fourth, we show how these decision trees or probability trees can be formulated and solved as equivalent integer programming (IP) problems. The advantages of the IP representation include the opportunity to use the computing power associated with powerful optimization solver algorithms available on high speed computers to solve very large versions of these trees, and the ability to include several such models of different facilities into a much larger IP with connecting constraints that represent budget restrictions, number of available inspection opportunities in a given time window, or other dependencies among these facilities. Policy makers can use the resulting model to inform their decisions about how to assess terrorism risk and to safeguard the commercial nuclear fuel cycle.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2014

Springfield Processing Plant* (A Hypothetical Facility) SPP, Entry Control Point and Vehicle Gate Access Control Post Order

This hypothetical order provides the requirements and instructions for the Springfield Processing Plant (SPP) Vehicle Gate and Entry Control Point (ECP) in the perimeter access building. The purpose of this post is to prevent the theft, sabotage or diversion of nuclear material (NM), control access and exit at the protected area, and to respond to emergencies according the SPP Guard Force (GF) Contingency Plan and as directed by a Guard Force Supervisor.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗
DOE OSTI2015

Progress to Date on Developing the NUSAM Methodology Document

The same basic steps occur when evaluating the physical protection of nuclear or radiological material in transport against theft or sabotage as are needed for protecting nuclear facilities and nuclear material in use or storage. There are some notable distinctions, however. There are limited layers of protection around material when in transport so that the analysis focuses more on scenario analysis than for fixed sites which may require formal path analysis if the facility has some complexity. In many respects, ground transportation security is more challenging than security at a fixed site. Operation in the public domain is frequently required and the same degree of access limitation is not possible as it is in a protected fixed site. Because of these differences, response force personnel in transit play a more dominant role in the security of a mobile system than they do for a fixed site. In all cases, however, the system time delay that is required to provide the response force the time to react must be provided primarily by transportation vehicle technology elements.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2012

Facility Measurements

Measurements are the basis of accounting for inventories and transfers and provide assurance that no nuclear material is missing. They provide information on quantities, isotopic composition and weight percent determination of nuclear material in given locations which is essential to determining category levels and protection requirements. Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) uses confirmatory and verification measurements to meet DOE requirements when moving or processing material on External Receipts, External Shipments, Internal Transfers, Processing, and Physical Inventories. This presentation provides details on what type of measurement is required based on several factors. These factors include but are not limited to Category of the Material, application of Tamper Indicating Devices (TID), application of the measurement, and graded safeguards. These elements are part of the overall MC&A program required to effectively control and account for nuclear materials. LANL depends on multiple organizations to take the measurements and monitor the controls of instruments required to have an effective program. The MC&A group does oversight and control of all standards and instruments. The NDA group manages the day-to-day measurement control activities and does NDA measurements while the operations people use balances in their day-to-day processing. Confirmatory and Verification measurements are used throughout the nuclear material life cycle to verify inventories and detect theft or diversion of nuclear materials.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2017

Probabilistic Multi-Hazard Assessment of Dry Cask Structures

systems the concrete shall not only provide shielding but insures stability of the upright canister, facilitates anchoring, allows ventilation, and provides physical protection against theft, severe weather and natural (seismic) as well as man-made events (blast incidences). Given the need to remain functional for 40 years or even longer in case of interim storage, the concrete outerpack and the internal canister components need to be evaluated with regard to their long-term ability to perform their intended design functions. Just as evidenced by deteriorating concrete bridges, there are reported visible degradation mechanisms of dry storage systems especially when high corrosive environments are considered in maritime locations. The degradation of reinforced concrete is caused by multiple physical and chemical mechanisms, which may be summarized under the heading of environmental aging. The underlying hygro-thermal transport processes are accelerated by irradiation effects, hence creep and shrinkage need to include the effect of chloride penetration, alkali aggregate reaction as well as corrosion of the reinforcing steel. In light of the above, the two main objectives of this project are to (1) develop a probabilistic multi-hazard assessment framework, and (2) through experimental and numerical research perform a comprehensive assessment under combined earthquake loads and aging induced deterioration, which will also provide data for the development and validation of the probabilistic framework.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
DOE OSTI2017

RCT: Module 2.08, Radiological Source Control, Course 8774

radioactive source is material used for its emitted radiation. Sources are sealed or unsealed and are classified as accountable or exempt. Radioactive sources are used for response checks, functional checks, and the calibration of instruments and monitors to traceable standards. To ensure the safety and welfare of all personnel, it is important to maintain control of radioactive sources to minimize the potential for the spread of contamination, unnecessary exposure to personnel, loss or theft, and improper disposal. This course will prepare the student with the skills necessary for RCT qualification by passing quizzes, tests, and the RCT Comprehensive Phase 1, Unit 2 Examination (TEST 27566) and will provide in-the-field skills.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2019

Automated Identification of Human Incursion

According to a CBS news report, on April 16, 2013 a San Jose, CA PG&E substation’s security fence was breached, and five transformers were damaged. The damaged transformers had a lead time of several months, leaving the electrical system with reduced capacity through the summer. With the increasing value of copper, the theft of copper electrical lines has also become an issue. Such occurrences highlight the vulnerability of our electrical grid and the need for greater security than fencing.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2019

Physical Security Model Development of an Electrochemical Facility.

Nuclear facilities in the U.S. and around the world face increasing challenges in meeting evolving physical security requirements while keeping costs reasonable. The addition of security features after a facility has been designed and without attention to optimization (the approach of the past) can easily lead to cost overruns. Instead, security should be considered at the beginning of the design process in order to provide robust, yet efficient physical security designs. The purpose of this work is to demonstrate how modeling and simulation can be used to optimize the design of physical protection systems. A suite of tools, including Scribe3D and Blender, were used to model up a generic electrochemical reprocessing facility. Physical protection elements such as sensors, portal monitors, barriers, and guard forces were added to the model based on best practices for physical security. One outsider theft scenario was examined with 4-8 adversaries to determine security metrics. This work fits into a larger Virtual Test Bed 2020 Milestone in the Material Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies (MPACT) program through the Department of Energy (DOE). The purpose of the milestone is to demonstrate how a series of experimental and modeling capabilities across the DOE complex provide the capabilities to demonstrate complete Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD) for nuclear facilities. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This work was funded by the Materials Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies (MPACT) working group as part of the Nuclear Technology Research and Development Program under the U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Energy.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2016

Magnetic Smart Tags (MaST) for Arms Control and Treaty Verification

The ability to track nuclear material is a challenge for resiliency of complex systems, e.g., harsh environments. RF tags, frequently used in national security applications, cannot be used for technological, operational, or safety reasons. Magnetic Smart Tags (MaST) is a novel tag technology based on magnetoelastic sensing that circumvents these issues. This technology is enabled by a new, cost-effective, batch manufacturing electrochemical deposition (ECD) process. This new advancement in fabrication enables multi-frequency tags capable of providing millions of possible codes for tag identification unlike existing theft deterrent tags that can convey only a single bit of information. Magnetostrictive 70% Co: 30% Fe was developed as the base alloy comprising the magnetoelastic resonator transduction element. Saturation magnetostriction, λ S , has been externally measured by the Naval Research Laboratory to be as high as 78 ppm. Description of a novel MEMS variable capacitive test structure is described for future measurements of this parameter.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2020

Integrating Data Sources for Improved Safeguards and Accountancy of Electrochemical Fuel Reprocessing Systems. Final Report

Electrochemical reprocessing (also commonly known as “pyroprocessing”) of used nuclear fuel is an alternative to aqueous reprocessing that confers a number of advantages, including the ability to process more recently-discharged fuel, smaller resultant waste volumes, and the lack of isolation of plutonium in the product stream. While electrochemical reprocessing systems have seen a significant research and development effort, nuclear safeguards and security of these systems remains under-developed, particularly given the significant differences in operating environment and process flowsheet compared with established aqueous methods. Objective 4 of DOE’s nuclear energy research and development activities in Nuclear Energy Research and Development Roadmap is: “Understand and minimize the risks of nuclear proliferation and terrorism.” Material Control & Accountancy (MC&A) programs at nuclear processing plants deter and detect theft and diversion of nuclear material by both outside and inside adversaries. Empirical modeling and data analytics of online measurements and state indicators can improve the timeliness of detection and reduce the uncertainty in accountancy measures. To support the development and demonstration of such methods, data are needed that capture expected measurement values collected throughout electrochemical reprocessing facilities. A review of the available literature of current research in measurements for electrochemical reprocessing systems identified twenty-two candidate measurement methodologies, which characterize fuel/salt composition, concentrations of various isotopes and elements, and operational parameters throughout the reprocessing facility. Four primary measurement methodologies have been simulated based on either physical simulations or empirical correlations: gamma emissions, neutron emissions, hybrid k-edge densitometry (HKED), and cyclic voltammetry. Initial investigation into the use of these measures for process monitoring and detection suggests the approach is viable and worthy of further investigation. This report summarizes efforts to generate signatures of key measurements during operation of electrochemical reprocessing facilities and initial investigation of data analytics to support process monitoring, diversion detection, and accountancy.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Counter Unmanned Aircraft System (CUAS) Implementation Storyline

This report is an FY21 Deliverable for NA-21.1, International Nuclear Security, WBS 21.1.1.1.4 Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems (CUAS), under C.1.4, Develop Suite of Engagement Materials and Tools for Country/Regional Teams. The responsibility for protecting nuclear assets is an immense challenge for governments. Policy changes based on geopolitics, instability of government regimes, and technological advances that facilitate theft of nuclear material all contribute to the enduring task of staying current with these and other threats. One of the recent threats to come along is the use of drones or Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) to circumvent traditional Physical Security Systems. There are significant resources invested on physical protection systems for securing nuclear assets, but many of these systems can now be bypassed by simply flying over these measures intended to guard against ground attacks. In recent years the threat increased to hostile groups to attack or surveil due to advances and availability of UAS platforms. It is now more urgent to implement systems and procedures to counter the UAS threat. The United States (U.S.) federal government granted authority to the Department of Energy (DOE) to implement a Counter UAS to protect nuclear assets. This document provides a very practical and transparent view of the trials, tribulations and challenges we encountered while implementing the first Counter-Unmanned Aircraft System (CUAS) Program in the DOE at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL).

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2020

Physical Security Model Development of an Electrochemical Facility

Nuclear facilities in the U.S. and around the world face increasing challenges in meeting evolving physical security requirements while keeping costs reasonable. The addition of security features after a facility has been designed and without attention to optimization (the approach of the past) can easily lead to cost overruns. Instead, security should be considered at the beginning of the design process in order to provide robust, yet efficient physical security designs. The purpose of this work is to demonstrate how modeling and simulation can be used to optimize the design of physical protection systems. A suite of tools, including Scribe3D and Blender, were used to model a generic electrochemical reprocessing facility. Physical protection elements such as sensors, portal monitors, barriers, and guard forces were added to the model based on best practices for physical security. Two theft scenarios (an outsider attack and insider diversion) as well as a sabotage scenario were examined in order to optimize the security design. Security metrics are presented. This work fits into a larger Virtual Facility Distributed Test Bed 2020 Milestone in the Material Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies (MPACT) program through the Department of Energy (DOE). The purpose of the milestone is to demonstrate how a series of experimental and modeling capabilities across the DOE complex provide the capabilities to demonstrate complete Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD) for nuclear facilities.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2019

In Recognition of Sandia's SCRM Program, Delivering Over 500 Subcontractor Risk Assessments in 2018

The globalization of modern supply chains has resulted in many new risks to Sandia's NW programs and mission. The potential impact of counterfeit products, tampering, theft, malicious software, poor manufacturing and/or development practices, and the influence of foreign governments has become more obvious as new threats and compromises continuously emerge. The Supply Chain Risk Management (SCRM) team was formed specifically to understand and address these risks. We were able to coalesce around these principles to develop and optimize an effective risk assessment process for critical suppliers, called Subcontractor Risk Assessments (SRAs). These elevated screening techniques are planned and delivered in a cost-effective way for Sandia's programs (no increase to purchasing burden rates) and also demonstrate due diligence to DOE/NNSA as a component of Sandia's overall SCRM strategy. SRAs are communicated in a concise 1-page format complete with recommendations as well as links to reference materials for those who require additional details about the SRA process and results.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2021

Treatment of uncertainties for security-related design aspects of advanced reactors when using a risk-informed licensing approach

Sabotage of nuclear plants and theft of special nuclear material are different from many other issues potentially affecting public health and safety, and some of those differences drive the content of the present report. A high-level indication of these differences is provided in the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s Safety Goal Policy. Promulgated in the mid-1980’s, when it had become reasonably clear that risk analysis had improved to the point where it was possible to understand the risks associated with plant operation, the Safety Goal Policy articulates qualitative safety goals and quantitative health objectives that are meant to guide regulatory and risk management activities, with the following key exceptions noted in the original policy statement: The possible effects of sabotage or diversion of nuclear material are also not presently included in the safety goals. At present there is no basis on which to provide a measure of risk on these matters. It is the Commission’s intention that everything that is needed will be done to keep these types of risks at their present very low level; and it is the Commission’s expectation that efforts on this point will continue to be successful. With these exceptions, it is the Commission’s intent that the risks from all the various initiating mechanisms be considered to the best of the capability of current evaluation techniques. The present report discusses extensions of classical risk management to address some of the special issues that arise in the context of security. Although the present emphasis is on physical security, some attention will be paid to cyber security. A particular focus of the report is on quantitative framework to manage and address uncertainties. This framework is demonstrated via a couple of hypothetical examples.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗