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Final Report: Multi-State Sharing Initiative

In 2003 a joint effort between the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the U.S. Department of Justice created state and metropolitan intelligence fusion centers. These fusion centers were an effort to share law enforcement, disaster, and terrorism related information and intelligence between state and local jurisdictions and to share terrorism related intelligence between state and local law enforcement agencies and various federal entities. In 2006, DHS commissioned the Oak Ridge National Laboratory to establish and manage a groundbreaking program to assist local, state, and tribal leaders in developing the tools and methods required to anticipate and forestall terrorist events and to enhance disaster response. This program, called the Southeast Region Research Initiative (SERRI), combines science and technology with validated operational approaches to address regionally unique requirements and suggest regional solutions with the potential for national application. In 2009, SERRI sponsored the Multistate Sharing Initiative (MSSI) to assist state and metropolitan intelligence fusion centers with sharing information related to a wider variety of state interests than just terrorism. While these fusion centers have been effective at sharing data across organizations within their respective jurisdictions, their organizational structure makes bilateral communication with federal entities convenient and also allows information to be further disbursed to other local entities when appropriate. The MSSI-developed Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) sharing system allows state-to-state sharing of non-terrorism-related law enforcement and disaster information. Currently, the MSSI SAR system is deployed in Alabama, Kentucky, Tennessee, and South Carolina. About 1 year after implementation, cognizant fusion center personnel from each state were contacted to ascertain the status of their MSSI SAR systems. The overwhelming response from these individuals was that the MSSI SAR system was an outstanding success and contributed greatly to the security and resiliency of their states. At least one state commented that SERRI's implementation of the MSSI SAR actually 'jump started' and accelerated deployment and acceptance of the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative (NSI). While all states were enthusiastic about their systems, South Carolina and Tennessee appeared to be the heaviest users of their respective systems. With NSI taking the load of sharing SARs with other states, Tennessee has redeployed the MSSI SAR system within Tennessee to allow SAR sharing between state and local organizations including Tennessee's three Homeland Security Regions, eleven Homeland Security Districts, and more than 500 police and sheriff offices, as well as with other states. In one success story from South Carolina, the Economy SAR System was used to compile similar SARs from throughout the state which were then forwarded to field liaison officers, emergency management personnel, and law enforcement officers for action.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

A modeling framework for investment planning in interdependent infrastructures in multi-hazard environments.

Currently, much of protection planning is conducted separately for each infrastructure and hazard. Limited funding requires a balance of expenditures between terrorism and natural hazards based on potential impacts. This report documents the results of a Laboratory Directed Research & Development (LDRD) project that created a modeling framework for investment planning in interdependent infrastructures focused on multiple hazards, including terrorism. To develop this framework, three modeling elements were integrated: natural hazards, terrorism, and interdependent infrastructures. For natural hazards, a methodology was created for specifying events consistent with regional hazards. For terrorism, we modeled the terrorist s actions based on assumptions regarding their knowledge, goals, and target identification strategy. For infrastructures, we focused on predicting post-event performance due to specific terrorist attacks and natural hazard events, tempered by appropriate infrastructure investments. We demonstrate the utility of this framework with various examples, including protection of electric power, roadway, and hospital networks.

Brown, Nathanael J. K.↗

Validation in the Absence of Observed Events

Here our paper addresses the problem of validating models in the absence of observed events, in the area of Weapons of Mass Destruction terrorism risk assessment. We address that problem with a broadened definition of “Validation,” based on “backing up” to the reason why modelers and decision makers seek validation, and from that basis re-define validation as testing how well the model can advise decision makers in terrorism risk management decisions. We develop that into two conditions: Validation must be based on cues available in the observable world; and it must focus on what can be done to affect that observable world, i.e. risk management. That in turn leads to two foci: 1.) the risk generating process, 2.) best use of available data. Based on our experience with nine WMD terrorism risk assessment models, we then describe three best use of available data pitfalls: SME confidence bias, lack of SME cross-referencing, and problematic initiation rates. Those two foci and three pitfalls provide a basis from which we define validation in this context in terms of four tests -- Does the model: … capture initiation? … capture the sequence of events by which attack scenarios unfold? … consider unanticipated scenarios? … consider alternative causal chains? Finally, we corroborate our approach against three key validation tests from the DOD literature: Is the model a correct representation of the simuland? To what degree are the model results comparable to the real world? Over what range of inputs are the model results useful?

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

US public perspectives on security

We report findings from a national Internet survey and a subset of questions administered by telephone in mid-2011 on public assessments of contemporary and emerging interstate nuclear threats, support for strategic arms control, and preferences for responding to limited nuclear attacks on the United States. Additionally, we analyze public views of the threat of terrorism, including cyber attacks, assessments of progress in the struggle against terrorism, and preferences for responding to an act of radiological terrorism against the United States. Also, we report findings from an Internet survey and a subset of questions administered by telephone among the American public in mid-2011 on US energy and environmental security. Key areas of investigation include public views on energy requirements, preferences for energy sources, energy conservation versus development, energy independence, implications of events at Fukushima, Japan, for US public support of nuclear generation, preferences for managing used nuclear fuel, and trust in nuclear risk assessments from government and other public sources. Where possible, findings from each survey are compared with previous surveys in this series for analyses of trends.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Dirty bomb source term characterization and downwind dispersion: Review of experimental evidence

Dirty bombs are considered one of the easiest forms of radiological terrorism, a form of terrorism based on the deliberate use of radiological material to cause adverse effects in a target population. One U.S. Government official has even described a dirty bomb attack as “all but inevitable”. While people in the vicinity of the blast may experience acute radiation effects, people downwind may unknowingly be contaminated by the radioactive airborne particulate and face increased long-term cancer risk. The likelihood of increased cancer risk depends on the radionuclide used and its specific activity, its aerosolization potential, the particle sizes generated in the blast, and where a person is with respect to the detonation. Different studies have reported that plausible radionuclides for dirty bomb include 60 Co, 90 Sr, 137 Cs, 192 Ir, 241 Am based on their availability in commercial sources as well as safeguards, the amount needed for adverse health effects, previous mishandling of radionuclides and malicious uses. In order to have increased long-term cancer risk, the radionuclide would have to deposit inside the body by entering the respiratory tract and then possibly migrate to other organs or bones (ground shine is not considered in this paper because areas affected by the event will likely become inaccessible). This implies that the particles will have to be smaller than 10 μm to be inhaled. Experiments involving the detonation of dirty bombs have shown that particles or droplets smaller than 10 μm are generated, independently from the initial radionuclide or its state (e.g., powder, solution). Atmospheric tests have shown that in unobstructed terrain, the radionuclide laden cloud can travel kilometers downwind even for relatively small amounts of explosives. Furthermore, buildings in the path of the cloud can change the dose rate. For instance, in one experiment with a single building, the dose rate was 1–2 orders of magnitude lower behind the obstacle compared to its front face. For people walking around, the amount of particulate deposited on them and inhaled will depend on their path relative to the cloud, resulting in the counterintuitive result that the closer people may actually not be the ones more at risk because they could simply miss the bulk of the cloud in their wandering. In summary, the long-term cancer risk for people caught in a dirty bomb cloud away from the detonation requires considering where and when the people are, which radionuclide was used, and the layout of the obstacles (e.g., buildings, vegetation) in the path of the cloud.

63 RADIATION, THERMAL, AND OTHER ENVIRON. POLLUTAN↗

Laser ablation spectrometry for studies of uranium plasmas, reactor monitoring, and spent fuel safety

Nuclear security is one of the defining challenges of our time. Nuclear threats range from deliberate dispersal of radioactive material to contaminate the vital infrastructure to diversion and smuggling of special nuclear material for clandestine nuclear programs and nuclear terrorism, respectively. There is an associated need to develop and sustain the nuclear forensics capabilities, which requires the understanding of complex processes that occur in plasmas of nuclear materials. The area of nuclear safety has seen a resurgence of public interest, and there is a concomitant need to safely store used nuclear fuel and detect structural material failure in nuclear power systems, especially in innovative reactor designs envisioned for future adoption. Laser-produced plasmas are complicated extreme environments that can generate intense and rich, highly specific signatures of nuclear and radiological materials, which can then be explored in a wide range of applications. They include interdiction and rapid detection of nuclear materials, including their isotopic composition, detection over long distances, laboratory simulation of weapons effects, monitoring the condition of structural materials in dry cask storage containers, and novel instrumentation for nuclear power systems. We present a compilation of recent representative examples of the application of laser spectroscopy, and laser-induced breakdown spectroscopy in particular, to nuclear safety and security problems. A case is made that spectroscopic techniques based on laser-produced plasmas offer complementary, and sometimes unique, capabilities that motivate the continued exploration of their efficient production and understanding of the signatures they produce

(020.3260) Isotope shifts, (140.3440) Laser-induce↗

A Geographic Information Science (GISc) Approach to Characterizing Spatiotemporal Patterns of Terrorist Incidents in Iraq, 2004-2009

As terrorism on all scales continues, it is necessary to improve understanding of terrorist and insurgent activities. This article takes a Geographic Information Systems (GIS) approach to advance the understanding of spatial, social, political, and cultural triggers that influence terrorism incidents. Spatial, temporal, and spatiotemporal patterns of terrorist attacks are examined to improve knowledge about terrorist systems of training, planning, and actions. The results of this study aim to provide a foundation for understanding attack patterns and tactics in emerging havens as well as inform the creation and implementation of various counterterrorism measures.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Partial defect verification of spent fuel assemblies by PDET: Principle and field testing in Interim Spent fuel Storage Facility (CLAB) in Sweden

Here, the need for the development of a credible method and instrument for partial defect verification of spent fuel has been emphasized over a few decades in the safeguards communities as the diverted spent fuel pins can be the source of nuclear terrorism or devices. The need is increasingly more important and even urgent as many countries have started to transfer spent fuel to so called "difficult-to-access" areas such as dry storage casks, reprocessing or geological repositories. Partial defect verification is required by IAEA before spent fuel is placed into "difficult-to-access" areas. Earlier, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) has reported the successful development of a new, credible partial defect verification method for pressurized water reactor (PWR) spent fuel assemblies without use of operator data, and further reported the validation experiments using commercial spent fuel assemblies with some missing fuel pins. The method was found to be robust as the method is relatively invariant to the characteristic variations of spent fuel assemblies such as initial fuel enrichment, cooling time, and burn-up. Since then, the PDET system has been designed and prototyped for 17×17 PWR spent fuel assemblies, complete with data acquisition software and acquisition electronics. In this paper, a summary description of the PDET development followed by results of the first successful field testing using the integrated PDET system and actual spent fuel assemblies performed in a commercial spent fuel storage site, known as Central Interim Spent fuel Storage Facility (CLAB) in Sweden will be presented. In addition to partial defect detection initial studies have determined that the tool can be used to verify the operator declared average burnup of the assembly as well as intra-assembly bunrup levels.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Improvised Nuclear Device Response Training Materials

Nuclear terrorism is a very real threat to the American people. The best way to prepare for, and respond to, terrorist events is to plan for them ahead of time. Research done at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) has already been conducted on what will happen following the detonation of a low-yield, ground-level nuclear device. Even though this knowledge exists, many cities have not begun to prepare for nuclear terrorism events. This project took the scientific research presentations and publications developed at LLNL and turned them into training materials that use clear language without scientific terminology, and can be easily understood by response personnel. These materials model and analyze the detonation of an Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) in a major metropolitan area. The information contained in these materials explains that survival after the detonation of an IND is possible, and seeks to inform readers on various topics related to the detonation of an IND. Creation of these materials required an understanding of the research behind IND response planning, including building protection factors, radiological fallout, weather patterns and understanding how emergency response happens in an urban environment. The result is a suite of training modules for instructors and students: Fallout, Prompt Effects, Response and Shelter-Evacuation Strategies. These modules are designed so that they may be taught as a combined, full course, or taken as individual modules. Upon completion of an individual module, or the entire set, a person will have a greater understanding, and increased background knowledge, on topics related to a small-scale nuclear attack. These training modules are intended to give an overview of topics necessary to understand what will happen after detonation of an IND and provide suggestions and strategies for response and evacuation. They are not intended to provide a substitute to local, regional, state and national response planning for a nuclear attack. These guides were designed with the intent to act as guidelines and starting points for further extensive planning by all levels of government. By gaining an overview of IND related topics, there is a hope that response planning officials will realize the importance of planning as well as the survivability of such an event with proper planning.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Biosecurity management recommendations for rinderpest laboratories

Rinderpest is a virus that can affect cattle and other even toes ungulates; evidence of outbreaks from over 10,000 years ago highlights the potential impact of this virus. During the 18th century, Rinderpest caused huge losses in cattle throughout Europe. Starting in the mid 1900’s vaccination efforts seemed feasible and work was initiated to vaccinate large populations of cattle. Walter Plowright received numerous awards for updating the Rinderpest vaccine which many believed would be the key to eradication. Vaccination of the disease lead to a massive drop in outbreaks and the last confirmed case of Rinderpest in Asia was in 2000 and in Africa in 2001.1 At this point, Rinderpest has been declared eradicated from nature. However, stocks of the virus are still in many laboratories.2 Rinderpest was investigated as a biological weapon agent during the Second World War. However, following WWII, rinderpest was not considered a high risk as a biological weapon as there was no direct military advantage. Now, with the concern of the use of biological agents as weapons in acts of terrorism, concern regarding rinderpest has resurfaced. Since the eradication of this virus, cattle populations are highly susceptibility to the virus and the economic impacts would be significant. This paper will discuss the specific nature of the terrorism risks associated with rinderpest; and based upon those risks provide recommendations regarding biosecurity management. The biosecurity management measures will be defined in a manner to align with the CWA 15793: the laboratory biorisk management document.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

Forensic Analysis of Terrorist Counter-Financing to Combat Nuclear Proliferation

The single greatest threat to U.S. homeland security remains the proliferation of nuclear weapons, especially among terrorists and other non-state actors who are not governed by the Non-Proliferation Treaty. One of the most important tools for combating terrorism among such rogue actors is counter-financing. Without funding, terrorists cannot acquire, maintain, or deploy nuclear weapons. According to the official report of the 9/11 Commission, counter-financing could have prevented the attacks of September 11, 2001. Unfortunately, no single country can defeat global terrorism. Successful counter-financing requires significant international cooperation. Since 2001, the United States and the European Union, despite vastly different approaches to intelligence gathering, have shared information through the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (TFTP). That shared information allows authorities to trace suspicious transactions, identify culprits, and map out global terrorist networks. The TFTP successfully thwarted a 2011 plot to assassinate the Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the U.S. and multiple threats during the 2012 Summer Olympics in London; it also aided in the investigation of the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing. That program is necessary but not sufficient. To strengthen our ability to detect and disrupt terrorist plotting and prevent nuclear proliferation, we must expand and coordinate two additional transnational measures: (1) the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT), a standardized global messaging network for financial institutions to quickly, accurately, and securely send and receive money transfer instructions, and (2) International Bank Account Numbers (IBAN) to identify individual accounts involved in international transactions. Both initiatives were incompletely adopted in the wake of 9/11, but most global banks use one or neither. More fully implementing and coordinating these two systems would allow for coherent information sharing, an essential tool for combating money laundering and terrorist financing, verifying sanctions against rogue nations and non-state actors, tracking nuclear proliferation networks, and protecting dual-use materials. These steps can save lives without interfering with state sovereignty or individual rights. The specter of nuclear threat is real and constant. This paper will provide forensic analysis of the most effective financial tools and policies to combat that threat, placing special emphasis on multinational and public-private cooperation.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Strategic Stability in South Asia: An Indian?s Perspective.

The security environment in South Asia has been marked by instability for several decades. The foremost causes of regional instability are the nuclear weapons-cum-missile development program of China, North Korea and Pakistan, the strident march of Islamist fundamentalism, the diabolical nexus between narcotics trafficking and terrorism, the proliferation of small arms and the instability inherent in the rule of despotic regimes. Instability on the Indian sub-continent is manifested, first and foremost, in the continuing conflict in Afghanistan, its tense relations with Iran and the Central Asian Republics (CARs); Pakistan’s struggle against the Taliban, the emerging fissiparous tendencies in Balochistan and Pakhtoonkhwa, the rise of Jihadi Islam and what some fear is Pakistan’s gradual slide towards becoming a ‘failed state’ despite some economic gains in the last five years. Also symptomatic of an unstable and uncertain security environment in the South Asian region are what some see as Sri Lanka’s inability to find a lasting solution to its internal challenges; the potential for Bangladesh’s gradual emergence as the new hub of Islamist fundamentalist terrorism and its struggle for economic upliftment to subsistence levels; the continuing negative impact of Maoist insurgency on Nepal’s fledgling democracy; the simmering discontent in Tibet and Xinjiang and what some see as a low-key uprising against China’s regime; and, the Myanmar peoples’ nascent movement for democracy. In all these countries, socio-economic development has been slow and, consequently, per capita income is alarmingly low. Transborder narcotics trafficking – the golden triangle lies to the east of South Asia and the golden crescent to its west – and the proliferation of small arms, make a potent cocktail. Ethnic tensions and fairly widespread radicalization, worsened by the advent of the vicious ideology of the Islamic state, add further to regional instability.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Report of a Workshop on Nuclear Forces and Nonproliferation Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, DC November 30, 2017

At a time which some view as the end of the post-Cold War era, geopolitics is increasingly fluid, complex and dangerous, including Russian and Chinese modernization of their nuclear and conventional forces nuclear and their increasingly aggressive foreign policies; North Korean nuclear and missile tests and provocations; Iran’s missile tests, regional ambitions and support for terrorism; Syria’s civil war and use of chemical weapons; and the growing global threat of Islamic terrorism. In this new security environment, potential adversaries are emboldened. Allies are reacting to more concrete and tangible threats. They are demanding greater assurances and, in some cases, questioning the credibility of the guarantees we offer and debating the pursuit of nuclear arms in ways we have not seen since the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was created.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Radiological Exposure Devices (RED) Technical Basis for Threat Profile

Facilities that manufacture, store or transport significant quantities of radiological material must protect against the risk posed by sabotage events. Much of the analysis of this type of event has been focused on the threat from a radiological dispersion device (RDD) or "dirty bomb" scenario, in which a malicious assailant would, by explosives or other means, loft a significant quantity of radioactive material into a plume that would expose and contaminate people and property. Although the consequences in cost and psychological terror would be severe, no intentional RDD terrorism events are on record. Conversely, incidents in which a victim or victims were maliciously exposed to a Radiological Exposure Device (RED), without dispersal of radioactive material, are well documented. This paper represents a technical basis for the threat profile related to the risk of nefarious use of an RED, including assailant and material characterization. Radioactive materials of concern are detailed in Appendix A.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

National Security Science and Technology Initiative: Air Cargo Screening

The non-intrusive inspection (NII) of consolidated air cargo carried on commercial passenger aircraft continues to be a technically challenging, high-priority requirement of the Department of Homeland Security's Science and Technology Directorate (DHS S&T), the Transportation Security Agency and the Federal Aviation Administration. The goal of deploying a screening system that can reliably and cost-effectively detect explosive threats in consolidated cargo without adversely affecting the flow of commerce will require significant technical advances that will take years to develop. To address this critical National Security need, the Battelle Memorial Institute (Battelle), under a Cooperative Research and Development Agreement (CRADA) with four of its associated US Department of Energy (DOE) National Laboratories (Oak Ridge, Pacific Northwest, Idaho, and Brookhaven), conducted a research and development initiative focused on identifying, evaluating, and integrating technologies for screening consolidated air cargo for the presence of explosive threats. Battelle invested $8.5M of internal research and development funds during fiscal years 2007 through 2009. The primary results of this effort are described in this document and can be summarized as follows: (1) Completed a gap analysis that identified threat signatures and observables, candidate technologies for detection, their current state of development, and provided recommendations for improvements to meet air cargo screening requirements. (2) Defined a Commodity/Threat/Detection matrix that focuses modeling and experimental efforts, identifies technology gaps and game-changing opportunities, and provides a means of summarizing current and emerging capabilities. (3) Defined key properties (e.g., elemental composition, average density, effective atomic weight) for basic commodity and explosive benchmarks, developed virtual models of the physical distributions (pallets) of three commodity types and three explosive benchmarks combinations, and conducted modeling and simulation studies to begin populating the matrix of commodities, threats, and detection technologies. (4) Designed and fabricated basic (homogeneous) commodity test pallets and fabricated inert stimulants to support experiments and to validate modeling/simulation results. (5) Developed/expanded the team's capabilities to conduct full-scale imaging (neutron and x-ray) experiments of air cargo commodities and explosive benchmarks. (6) Conducted experiments to improve the collection of trace particles of explosives from a variety of surfaces representative of air cargo materials by means of mechanical (air/vibration/pressure), thermal, and electrostatic methods. Air cargo screening is a difficult challenge that will require significant investment in both research and development to find a suitable solution to ensure the safety of passengers without significantly hindering the flow of commodities. The initiative funded by Battelle has positioned this group to make major contributions in meeting the air cargo challenge by developing collaborations, developing laboratory test systems, improving knowledge of the challenges (both technical and business) for air cargo screening, and increasing the understanding of the capabilities for current inspection methods (x-ray radiography, x-ray backscatter, etc.) and potential future inspection methods (neutron radiography, fusion of detector modalities, advanced trace detection, etc.). Lastly, air cargo screening is still an issue that will benefit from collaboration between Department of Energy Laboratories and Battelle. On January 7, 2010, DHS Secretary Napolitano joined White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs and Assistant to the President for Counterterrorism and Homeland Security John Brennan to announce several recommendations DHS has made to the President for improving the technology and procedures used to protect air travel from acts of terrorism. (This announcement followed the 25 Dec'09 Delta/Northwest Airlines Flight 253 terror attack.) Secretary Napolitano outlined five recommendations DHS will pursue to enhance the safety of the traveling public. One of the five recommendations, read as follows: 'Establish a partnership on aviation security between DHS and the Department of Energy and its National Laboratories in order to develop new and more effective technologies to deter and disrupt known threats and proactively anticipate and protect against new ways by which terrorists could seek to board an aircraft.' In conclusion, it appears very timely that Battelle and its DOE lab partners initiated a serious collaboration on the air cargo topic, and that we should continue to work toward future collaboration in response to the government's needs.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Enhancing Nuclear and Radiological Security in Polarized Times: Safeguarding Against Extremist Insider Threats

Domestic violent extremism has been on the rise in recent years, fueled by growing political polarization, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the spread of misinformation online. This concerning trend raises an important question: has this increase in extremist violence manifested in more incidents involving radioactive or nuclear (RN) materials and a corresponding security concern? To explore this question, we analyzed existing data on events involving chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear materials over time. Specifically, we examined the rate of RN-related incidents, the targets of these events, and the ideologies motivating the perpetrators by using the Violent Non-State Actor Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Event Database from the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Our analysis aimed to determine whether the broader rise of violent extremism has translated to an elevated risk of attacks involving RN materials. Results of the analysis revealed that there was no clear increase in events involving RN material in the dataset. However, given the rarity of these events, this conclusion does not indicate that such a trend might not appear in coming years if violent extremism continues to rise. To address the potential risk presented by violent extremism, in addition to quantifying the frequency of RN events, we also reviewed traits that could make organizations more susceptible to insider threats from radicalized employees. Focusing on the literature around counterproductive workplace behavior, we identified organizational characteristics that might increase the risk of malicious acts committed by radicalized insiders. These risk factors include abusive leadership, situational constraints, and organizational injustice. Finally, using these organizational risk characteristics, we discuss interventions that organizations with RN material can take to reduce their risk of attacks stemming from violent extremism while still protecting individual rights to privacy and civil liberties. Overall, this article provides an overview of the intersections between rising domestic extremism, insider threats, and risks posed by RN materials. We present current data on trends and patterns in this space as well as practical guidance for organizational resilience.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

NUCLEAR INCIDENT CAPABILITIES, KNOWLEDGE & ENABLER LEVERAGING

The detonation of a 10 Kiloton Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) is a serious scenario that the United States must be prepared to address. The likelihood of a single nuclear bomb exploding in a single city is greater today than at the height of the Cold War. Layered defenses against domestic nuclear terrorism indicate that our government continues to view the threat as credible. The risk of such an event is further evidenced by terrorists desire to acquire nuclear weapons. The act of nuclear terrorism, particularly an act directed against a large population center in the United States, will overwhelm the capabilities of many local and state governments to respond, and will seriously challenge existing federal response capabilities. A 10 Kiloton IND detonation would cause total infrastructure damage in a 3-mile radius and levels of radiation spanning out 3,000 square miles. In a densely populated urban area, the anticipated casualties would be in excess of several hundred thousand. Although there would be enormous loss of life, housing and infrastructure, an IND detonation is a recoverable event. We can reduce the risk of these high-consequence, nontraditional threats by enhancing our nuclear detection architecture and establishing well planned and rehearsed plans for coordinated response. It is also important for us to identify new and improved ways to foster collaboration regarding the response to the IND threat to ensure the demand and density of expertise required for such an event is postured and prepared to mobilize, integrate, and support a myriad of anticipated challenges. We must be prepared to manage the consequences of such an event in a deliberate manner and get beyond notions of total devastation by adopting planning assumptions around survivability and resiliency. Planning for such a scenario needs to be decisive in determining a response based on competencies and desired outcomes. It is time to synthesize known threats and plausible consequences into action. Much work needs to be accomplished to enhance nuclear preparedness and to substantially bolster and clarify the capacity to deploy competent resources. Until detailed plans are scripted, and personnel and other resources are postured, and exercised, IND specific planning remains an urgent need requiring attention and action. Although strategic guidance, policies, concepts of operations, roles, responsibilities, and plans governing the response and consequence management for the IND scenario exist, an ongoing integration challenge prevails regarding how best to get capable and competent surge capacity personnel (disaster reservists) and other resources engaged and readied in an up-front manner with pre-scripted assignments to augment the magnitude of anticipated demands of expertise. With the above in mind, Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) puts science to work to create and deploy practical, high-value, cost-effective nuclear solutions. As the Department of Energy's (DOE) applied research and development laboratory, SRNL supports Savannah River Site (SRS) operations, DOE, national initiatives, and other federal agencies, across the country and around the world. SRNL's parent at SRS also employs more than 8,000 personnel. The team is a great asset that seeks to continue their service in the interest of national security and stands ready to accomplish new missions. Overall, an integral part of the vision for SRNL's National and Homeland Security Directorate is the establishment of a National Security Center at SRNL, and development of state of the science capabilities (technologies and trained technical personnel) for responding to emergency events on local, regional, or national scales. This entails leveraging and posturing the skills, knowledge and experience base of SRS personnel to deliver an integrated capability to support local, state, and federal authorities through the development of pre-scripted requests for assistance, agreements, and plans. It also includes developing plans, training, exercises, recruitment strategies, and processes to establish a 1,000 plus person nuclear disaster workforce capable of providing surge capacity support that can be deployed in part or in all.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Status Update on the NCRP Scientific Committee SC 5-1 Report: Decision Making for Late-Phase Recovery from Nuclear or Radiological Incidents - 13450

In August 2008, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued its final Protective Action Guide (PAG) for radiological dispersal device (RDD) and improvised nuclear device (IND) incidents. This document specifies protective actions for public health during the early and intermediate phases and cleanup guidance for the late phase of RDD or IND incidents, and it discusses approaches to implementing the necessary actions. However, while the PAG provides specific guidance for the early and intermediate phases, it prescribes no equivalent guidance for the late-phase cleanup actions. Instead, the PAG offers a general description of a complex process using a site-specific optimization approach. This approach does not predetermine cleanup levels but approaches the problem from the factors that would bear on the final agreed-on cleanup levels. Based on this approach, the decision-making process involves multifaceted considerations including public health, the environment, and the economy, as well as socio-political factors. In an effort to fully define the process and approach to be used in optimizing late-phase recovery and site restoration following an RDD or IND incident, DHS has tasked the NCRP with preparing a comprehensive report addressing all aspects of the optimization process. Preparation of the NCRP report is a three-year (2010-2013) project assigned to a scientific committee, the Scientific Committee (SC) 5-1; the report was initially titled, Approach to Optimizing Decision Making for Late- Phase Recovery from Nuclear or Radiological Terrorism Incidents. Members of SC 5-1 represent a broad range of expertise, including homeland security, health physics, risk and decision analysis, economics, environmental remediation and radioactive waste management, and communication. In the wake of the Fukushima nuclear accident of 2011, and guided by a recent process led by the White House through a Principal Level Exercise (PLE), the optimization approach has since been expanded to include off-site contamination from major nuclear power plant accidents as well as other nuclear or radiological incidents. The expanded application under the current guidance has thus led to a broadened scope of the report, which is reflected in its new title, Decision Making for Late-Phase Recovery from Nuclear or Radiological Incidents. The NCRP report, which is due for publication in 2013, will substantiate the current DHS guidance by clarifying and elaborating on the processes required for the development and implementation of procedures for optimizing decision making for late-phase recovery, enabling the establishment of cleanup goals on a site-specific basis. The report will contain a series of topics addressing important issues related to the long-term recovery from nuclear or radiological incidents. Special topics relevant to supporting the optimization of the decision-making process will include cost-benefit analysis, radioactive waste management, risk communication, stakeholder interaction, risk assessment, and decontamination approaches and techniques. The committee also evaluated past nuclear and radiological incidents for their relevance to the report, including the emerging issues associated with the Fukushima nuclear accident. Thus, due to the commonality of the late-phase issues (such as the potential widespread contamination following an event), the majority of the information pertaining to the response in the late-phase decision-making period, including site-specific optimization framework and approach, could be used or adapted for use in case of similar situations that are not due to terrorism, such as those that would be caused by major nuclear facility accidents or radiological incidents. To ensure that the report and the NCRP recommendations are current and relevant to the effective implementation of federal guidance, SC 5-1 has actively coordinated with the agencies of interest and other relevant stakeholders throughout the duration of the project. The resulting report will be an important resource to guide those involved in late-phase recovery efforts following a nuclear or radiological incident. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗