“Development of Fiber Optic Dry Cask Monitoring System to Enhance Safety and Security of Spent Fuel Transportation and Storage
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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.
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The energy sector is undergoing digital transformation which is to say more and more power generation assets have become automated and connected to the internet. The connected sensors can tap into plants to monitor the health of assets and manage fleets remotely. These are just some of the benefits digitalization is bringing to the power industry. Within a power plant, control systems are no longer concerned with one system or one piece of equipment, but rather whole fleet of assets inter-connected with smart sensors which have the function of continuously monitoring and transmitting real-time operational data to operators. These connected systems will form a part of the industrial internet of things (IIoT). The big data scenarios provide benefits of performing system prognostics and optimization which is a key selling point of power plant digitalization.
A fiber Bragg grating (FBG) security component for single-party and multi-party monitoring is provided. The security component includes an optical fiber having a plurality of Bragg gratings. The Bragg gratings provide a spectral response that is randomized based on the manufacture of the security component. For single-party use, the spectral response provides a reproducible spectral signature when interrogated with an optical signal. For multi-party use, each party applies a known optical interrogation signal to the security component and applies an external stress known only to the respective monitoring party. The resulting shift in the spectral signature is unique to each monitoring party, making it extremely difficult to successfully counterfeit the security component's response for all such parties.
A Sentry Remote Monitoring System (Sentry-RMS) is a stand-alone security system that provides detection, assessment, and communication of priority alarms as an additional means of thwarting internal and external threats to sites that maintain radiological material. The SEntry-RMS CommUnications and REsponse (Sentry-SECURE) platform is an optional feature of the Sentry-RMS that relays priority alarm information to the identified response stakeholders. Sentry-SECURE is hosted in a cloud environment that abstracts the data owner’s and data consumer’s platforms to allow for greater information sharing. This promotes situational awareness amongst authorized users and enables future innovation among modern response platforms. When securely architecting a cloud solution such as this, the use of design paradigms can be an effective tool to increase the accuracy and reliability of cyber- and information-security-related decisions made throughout the development process. This approach also supports the categorization of design considerations into three levels: industry concepts, project approaches, and data protections for digital processes. Industry concepts consist of the notional underpinnings that guide or motivate a security process, system, or design but often lack any tangible attributes. Project approaches represent decisions made during the design and development process to prioritize a solution, method, or practice above another that may provide a comparable functional output but lacks a desired security benefit. Data protections for digital processes represent the selection, integration, and implementation of specific controls for a given asset. This paper will explore specific examples of how Sentry-SECURE has been designed to account for considerations at each of these three levels, while balancing the operational intent of the platform with the security enhancements necessary to maintain data integrity, availability, and confidentiality.
This is the final report for a CEDS-funded project aimed at developing a new quantum technology for securing utility communication networks used to control and monitor electrical grid equipment. Securing these control networks represents a unique challenge as the performance of the security solution has a direct impact on the stability and reliability of the electrical grid. Traditional, software-based solutions - developed for information networks - are not suitable for utility control networks because they introduce latency, require burdensome maintenance and upgrades, are often incompatible with legacy equipment, and introduce operational complexity that reduces grid reliability. Consequently, many U.S. utilities do not use existing solutions and, instead, protect their critical control networks through the careful isolation and obscuration of their networked equipment. With more utilities embracing grid automation, the attack surface that utilities must defend from hackers has grown to an unmanageable size. To address this situation, Qubitekk and its partners proposed and developed a hardware-based solution that can secure critical control networks without negatively impacting grid performance. This new solution is based on quantum key distribution (QKD) techniques that guarantee secure key generation and distribution across a utility control network. Through deployment and field testing of a prototype QKD system, we have shown that this solution delivers long-term network security, is technically feasible to implement and maintain on a utility’s distribution substation network and does not negatively impact grid operations. In addition, the project has identified and solved key challenges associated with generating, transmitting, and measuring coherent photonic quantum states on a real-world fiber optic network. These additional findings are playing a critical role in advancing quantum networks for quantum computing applications. An overview of the QKD prototype development effort, field testing activities and results, and additional findings relevant to emerging quantum networks are presented in this report.
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Today we face an explosion of data generation, ranging from health monitoring to national security infrastructure systems. More and more systems are connected to the Internet that collects data at regular time intervals. These systems share data and use machine learning methods for intelligent decisions, which resulted in numerous real-world applications (e.g., autonomous vehicles, recommendation systems, and heart-rate monitoring) that have benefited from it. However, these approaches are prone to identity thief and other privacy related cyber-security attacks. So, how can data privacy be protected efficiently in these scenarios? More dedicated efforts are needed to propose the integration of privacy techniques into existing systems and develop more advanced privacy techniques to address the complex challenges of multi-system connectivity and data fusion. Therefore, we have introduced Privacy Algorithms in Systems (PAS) at CIKM which provides a venue to gather academic researchers and industry researchers/practitioners to present their research in an effort to advance the frontier of this critical direction of privacy algorithms in systems.
A technical guide to assist the nuclear industry in implementing cybersecurity continuous monitoring program. The guide walks through the steps to develop a cybersecurity continuous monitoring program and provides details relative to the nuclear industry. It also includes a series of examples of optional metrics to be used, and technologies that can be useful when implementing a continuous monitoring program.
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The overall goal of this project was to demonstrate and develop the usage of high-temperature (HT) harsh-environment (HE) wireless surface acoustic wave resonator (SAWR) sensor technology to promote reliable maintenance through condition-based maintenance (CBM) for field applications in harsh service conditions associated with power plant environments. The project aimed to advance the HT HE wireless SAWR sensor technology from TRL 5 to TRL 7. In addition to HT HE wireless temperature sensing, efforts were dedicated during this project to investigate, develop and increase the TRL from 3 to 5 for the following technologies: (a) HT HE strain sensors to address additional CBM monitoring needs, such as boiler tube mechanical / thermal stresses, which can provide early indications for boiler tube cracking and failure; and (b) HT aluminum nitride (AlN) and scandium aluminum nitride (ScAlN) based piezoelectric thin film fabrication and implementation of SAW sensors, with the goal of releasing the need to use single crystal piezoelectric materials for SAWRs and thus broaden possible technology applications to non-planar and harder to modify surfaces. To achieve the goals mentioned above, UMaine and its partner, Environetix Technologies Corporation, established partnerships with the following power plants: Longview Power (Maidsville, WV), a coal-fired power plant; Penobscot Energy Recovery Corp (PERC, Orrington, ME), a waste-to-energy power plant; and the UMaine Steam Plant (Orono, ME), an oil / natural gas power plant. To realize wireless HT HE SAWR sensor systems in these harsh service conditions, the University of Maine research team worked with Environetix and these power plants to define, design, fabricate, test and validate a mature prototype wireless temperature SAWR sensor system for boiler tube applications within the HT HE of the reheater pass damper chamber to directly and wirelessly monitor the temperature at eighteen independent boiler tube locations. The system included three levels, or “tiers”, of wireless communication to enable remote monitoring: Tier 1, the wireless link in the reheater pass damper chamber directly accessing the sensors on the boilers; Tier 2, the wireless local area network link, transmitting processed sensor information within the power plant to the Tier 3, a commercial wireless signal carrier company for secure remote data monitoring outside of the power plant. Regarding the wireless sensor system installed at Longview Power, temperature information from the boilers was continuously transmitted from the Longview boilers at Maidsville, WV, to Environetix headquarters, Orono, ME, over a 34 month period, when the system was finally decommissioned. Strain sensors and piezoelectric ScAlN thin film sensors were successfully installed on the exhaust duct at the UMaine Steam Power plant. The advances in wireless strain sensors and thin film piezoelectric film fabrication and testing were performed mostly in UMaine laboratories and field tested at the UMaine Steam Plant, due to its close proximity to UMaine/Environetix, access to the plant facility, and due to difficulties in accessing the other power plants during the COVID shut-down period. The project accomplished the TRL level increase of the targeted CBM technologies through the successful fabrication, installation, test, and validation of dedicated and commercial wireless sensor systems, utilizing the three different power plants. The outcomes of this project, including the wireless sensor data capability, are expected to yield an advance for CBM in harsh power plant environments. The reduction of maintenance costs, improved safety during plant operation, and increased power plant efficiency will lead to increased revenues (i.e., fewer forced outages) due to better process monitoring enabled by the wireless HT HE SAWR temperature sensor technology.
The rapid growth of the Internet of Things (IoT) and Edge Computing (EC) has brought significant conveniences to modern society but has also greatly expanded the cyber attack surfaces, particularly as these technologies are being increasingly integrated into critical systems such as power grids, healthcare, and smart homes. Here, to improve IoT/EC’s cybersecurity posture, we leveraged Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning (ML) by employing tinyML to monitor voluminous IoT data for cyber threats while addressing devices’ resource constraints, and utilizing Federated Learning (FL) to share local detection knowledge across the system while preserving privacy. Building on our three-layer architecture combining tinyML and FL to enhance autonomous cyber attack detection, this paper demonstrated that the architecture improves detection accuracy, reduces resource consumption, and enables lightweight, secure IoT device monitoring. These results were validated using the public N-BaIoT dataset as well as real IoT network traffic data collected under multiple attack scenarios from our testbeds. Additionally, we introduced an enhanced FL methodology with a novel preprocessing stage, including federated feature selection and global preprocessor construction, to address IoT/EC data heterogeneity. We developed a physical IoT testbed for attack simulations and data collection, implemented a tinyML-powered detector for realistic model validation, and also built a virtual testbed for scalable evaluations of FL models across diverse network environments.
DOE Order 458.1 requires that dose estimates consider contributions from all facilities. In the Y-12 Radiological Monitoring Plan (RMP), surface water is monitored at points that reflect individual facilities, as well as at points that reflect the combined contributions of all facilities. This monitoring plan does not consider other potential routes (i.e., airborne releases and food chains). Thus, a complete determination of total effective dose (TED) cannot be made based on this plan alone. The other routes from Y-12, and all routes from other DOE facilities on the Oak Ridge Reservation (e.g., Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) and The Heritage Center), must be considered in order to satisfy DOE Order 458.1 requirements. Determination of TED from all sites and pathways is done through the use of dose-assessment models and is documented in the Annual Site Environmental Report. This monitoring plan provides adequate monitoring goals for Y-12 surface water releases to provide input of sufficient sensitivity and accuracy to reliably determine the Y-12 surface water component of the TED. The routine radiological monitoring program is designed to monitor effluents at four types of locations: (1) treatment facilities, (2) other point and area source discharges, (3) instream locations, and (4) production building roof run-off. With this sampling and analysis program, data will be obtained on primary point sources as well as on locations that represent the composite of other potential sources. This plan will be reviewed periodically to determine necessary modifications to the sampling frequencies, parameters, and locations. Modifications, if any, will be based on the analysis of the previous data and its effectiveness in satisfying the objectives of this plan. Appendix A contains graphs of the sum of the DCS fractions for locations and frequencies contained in a previous version of this plan. The data was collected from January 2009 through December 2019. Each sample was analyzed, and each result was divided by the appropriate DCS to compute a DCS fraction. These fractions were summed for all isotopes. According to DOE –STD-1196-2011, the annual average of these sums should be below 1.
In recent years, systematic CO2 injection into geological reservoirs across the U.S. has gained traction as a strategy to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions. This approach necessitates precise monitoring to ensure secure containment, minimize risks, and optimize storage management. Our study leverages machine learning (ML) techniques to advance the understanding of CO2 injection processes, focusing on the Illinois Basin. Over a three-year injection period, we analyzed microseismic data, identifying 19 temporal intervals with significant bottom-hole pressure changes. By partitioning microseismic events into these intervals and estimating b-values, we revealed over 100 clusters of events related to fracture initiation or reactivation. Advanced spatial analysis highlighted horizontally-oriented fractures along the NNW-SSE axis. This quantification of fracture networks informs dynamic injection scheduling, work-over strategies, and risk assessments, enhancing carbon capture, utilization, and storage (CCUS) operations. Additionally, our methodology offers valuable insights for oil and gas operations and geothermal development, supporting fracture-based monitoring and risk mitigation.
Electric power system operators can manage distribution system reliability by coordinating end customer usage of distributed energy resources. The end customers in this regard are Service Provisioning Customers, who provide their energy resources to a Grid Service Provider, which in turn dispatches large aggregations of distributed energy resources to provide reliable service to the power system.The security of this system relies upon information protection mechanisms, as described in IEEE 2030.5. However, in addition to preventive security measures, a monitoring function is required to ensure trustworthiness. Trust models are a method to detect and respond to both expected and unexpected behavior. Different trust models are required for various types and characteristics of each situation. This paper will describe the topics that must be considered when developing a trust model as it applies to distributed energy resources. The major contribution of this paper is the creation and application of a Distributed Trust Model applied to distributed energy resources.
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