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Resolving Issues Regarding Disposal of Safeguarded Nuclear Materials: Concepts for Near Surface and Intermediate Depth Disposal sites

This document presents two case studies on nuclear waste disposal to explore the safeguards challenges and potential solutions present under each scenario. Both involve the disposal of nuclear materials, either for waste containing safeguarded nuclear materials or waste where safeguards on the nuclear materials have been previously terminated. The first case study is that of a low-level waste (LLW) repository that is situated near the surface. This facility will accept safeguarded nuclear materials for disposal. Examples of this type of activity are rare, but the potential for more facilities of this type is very possible as States become more comfortable with considering safeguards measures in perpetuity on deep geological repositories. The second study extends this to the case of terminated wastes at an intermediate depth disposal site. In this case, the reasons why terminated nuclear materials could be found in these disposal facilities and how obligations under the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) and Additional Protocol (AP) are met when the disposed waste items are intermediate level waste (ILW) or high-level waste (HLW).

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Lessons Learned from the Development of an Example Precision Information Environment for International Safeguards

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is interested in increasing capabilities of IAEA safeguards inspectors to access information that would improve their situational awareness on the job. A mobile information platform could potentially provide access to information, analytics, and technical and logistical support to inspectors in the field, as well as providing regular updates to analysts at IAEA Headquarters in Vienna or at satellite offices. To demonstrate the potential capability of such a system, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) implemented a number of example capabilities within a PNNL-developed precision information environment (PIE), and using a tablet as a mobile information platform. PNNL’s safeguards proof-of-concept PIE intends to; demonstrate novel applications of mobile information platforms to international safeguards use cases; demonstrate proof-of-principle capability implementation; and provide “vision” for capabilities that could be implemented. This report documents the lessons learned from this two-year development activity for the Precision Information Environment for International Safeguards (PIE-IS), describing the developed capabilities, technical challenges, and considerations for future development, so that developers working to develop a similar system for the IAEA or other safeguards agencies might benefit from our work.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗

Crossroads of Nonproliferation and Safeguarding Technologies for Implementation in Molten Salt Reactors

Idaho National Laboratory (INL) recently conducted a workshop endorsed by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) under the auspices of the Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation R&D (DNN R&D) Office's Safeguards Portfolio. The workshop's primary objective was to foster an engaging dialogue among researchers, with a specialized emphasis on the safeguards pertaining to molten salt reactors. At INL, the installation of the state-of-the-art Molten Salt Thermophysical Examination Capability (MSTEC) is underway. This shielded argon glovebox facility, designed for both irradiated and non-irradiated actinide materials, represents the cutting edge of research infrastructure. MSTEC is poised to serve as a pivotal research platform in the realm of molten salt technology, with significant implications for safeguards applications. Participants of the workshop had the opportunity to tour the facilities, including the site where MSTEC is being installed, as well as to observe the INL's molten salt and pyroprocessing research hot cells. The event featured insightful presentations delving into molten salt chemistry and the MSTEC project. Each participating laboratory contributed to the discourse with presentations on their respective research efforts addressing safeguards in relation to molten salt reactors. The workshop culminated with a generative brainstorming session, where participants shared their thoughts on strategic integration with partner agencies, aiming to synergize efforts in advancing the field of nuclear safeguards.

11 - NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Global Survey of the Concepts and Understanding of the Interfaces Between Nuclear Safety, Security, and Safeguards

There is increasing global discourse on how the elements of nuclear safety, security, and safeguards can be most effectively implemented in nuclear power programs. While each element is separate and unique, they must nevertheless all be addressed in a country’s laws and implemented via regulations and in facility operations. This topic is of particular interest to countries that are currently developing the infrastructure to support nuclear power programs. These countries want to better understand what is required by these elements and how they can manage the interfaces between them and take advantages of any synergies that may exist. They need practical examples and guidance in this area in order to develop better organizational strategies and technical capacities. This could simplify their legal, regulatory, and management structures and avoid inefficient approaches and costly mistakes that may not be apparent to them at this early stage of development. From the perspective of IAEA International Safeguards, supporting Member States in exploring such interfaces and synergies provides a benefit to them because it acknowledges that domestic safeguards in a country do not exist in a vacuum. Instead, it relies on a strong State System of Accounting and Control that is in turn dependent on a capable and independent regulatory body as well as a competent operator and technical staff. These organizations must account for and control nuclear material, communicate effectively, and manage and transmit complete and correct information to the IAEA in a timely manner. This, while in most cases also being responsible for the safety and security of their facilities. Seeking efficiencies in this process benefits international safeguards and nonproliferation. This paper will present the results of a global survey of current and anticipated approaches and practices by countries and organizations with current or future nuclear power programs on how they are implementing, or planning to implement, safety, security, and safeguards in their programs. The idea is to capture current knowledge and thinking on this topic and to identify common themes in organizations and management. It will also document the most commonly held ideas and perception (and misperceptions) of what it means to manage interfaces and take advantage of synergies for operating nuclear facilities and those that are building their infrastructures. It is desired that the results of this paper will inform the current discourse on this topic with some quantitative data and identify any general trends in understanding.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Safeguards Modeling for Advanced Nuclear Facility Design.

Future nuclear fuel cycle facilities will see a significant benefit from considering materials accountancy requirements early in the design process. The Material Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies (MPACT) working group is demonstrating Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD) for a notional electrochemical reprocessing facility as part of a 2020 Milestone. The idea behind SSBD is to consider regulatory requirements early in the design process to provide more optimized systems and avoid costly retrofits later in the design process. Safeguards modeling, using single analyst tools, allows the designer to efficiently consider materials accountancy approaches that meet regulatory requirements. However, safeguards modeling also allows the facility designer to go beyond current regulations and work toward accountancy designs with rapid response and lower thresholds for detection of anomalies. This type of modeling enables new safeguards approaches and may inform future regulatory changes. The Separation and Safeguards Performance Model (SSPM) has been used for materials accountancy system design and analysis. This paper steps through the process of designing a Material Control and Accountancy (MC&A) system, presents the baseline system design for an electrochemical reprocessing facility, and provides performance metrics from the modeling analysis. The most critical measurements in the electrochemical facility are the spent fuel input, electrorefiner salt, and U/TRU product output measurements. Finally, material loss scenario analysis found that measurement uncertainties (relative standard deviations) for Pu would need to be at 1% (random and systematic error components) or better in order to meet domestic detection goals or as high as 3% in order to meet international detection goals, based on a 100 metric ton per year plant size.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Far-field Wireless Energy Harvesting for Increased Safeguards Equipment Battery Life.

Modern unattended safeguards equipment (e.g. seals) incorporates many low-power electronic circuits, which are typically powered by expensive and toxic lithium thionyl chloride (LiSOCL2) batteries. The limited life of these batteries necessitates their periodic replacement. This replacement must be performed before total battery discharge to avoid potential loss of continuity of knowledge. Thus, the effective battery capacity becomes significantly less than the actual usable capacity. Additionally, such maintenance is a radiological hazard to personnel, as well as a monetary burden to a safeguards inspectorate. Energy harvesting, a commercially available technology, could extend the operational life of batterypowered equipment to achieve significant efficiencies for safeguards deployments. Energy harvesting is the scavenging and storage of ambient energy sources, such as solar, thermal, and kinetic for use in lowpower electronic applications. While the amount of scavenged energy per unit time may be small, it most often comes from a source that will not be depleted throughout the deployment of the harvesting device. The best-known energy harvesters are solar panels and wind turbines. Recently, far-field wireless energy harvesting has become a commercially available option. Far-field wireless energy harvesting provides consistent, predictable, and un-tethered power over distances up to 50 feet. This process converts radio frequency (RF) energy, both intentionally emitted and ambient, into usable direct current (DC) power. Incorporating far-field wireless energy harvesting into safeguards equipment can significantly extend the equipment’s battery life and perhaps make it indefinite. Furthermore, additional functionality can be added to safeguards equipment without lowering its operational life expectancy. This paper explores the benefits and drawbacks of integrating far-field wireless energy harvesting into a chosen safeguards seal: the Remotely Monitored Sealing Array (RMSA). Specifically, it examines the performance of a commercially available RF harvesting system from Powercast, as well as commercial and custom antenna solutions.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗

Sandia National Laboratories Early Career University Faculty Mentoring Program in International Safeguards

Recent years have seen a significantly increased focus in the areas of knowledge retention and mentoring of junior staff within the U.S. national laboratory complex. In order to involve the university community in this process, as well, an international safeguards mentoring program was established by Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) for early career university faculty. After a successful experience during 2019, the program continued into 2020 to include two new faculty members who were paired with SNL subject matter experts based on the topic of their individual projects: one to work on advanced laboratory work for physics, technology, and policy of nuclear safeguards and nonproliferation, and the other to look at machine learning applied to international safeguards and nonproliferation. There is a two-pronged purpose to the program: fostering the development of educational resources available for international safeguards and exploring new research topics stemming from the exchange of mentor and mentee. Further, the program as a whole allows for junior faculty members to establish and expand a relationship network within international safeguards. In addition, programs such as this build stronger connections between the academic and the national laboratory community. Thanks to the junior faculty members that now have new connections into the laboratory community and potential for collaboration projects with the laboratories in the future, safeguards knowledge can actually increase far beyond just individually engaging students using this new and efficient avenue.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗

Cybersecurity Assessment Methodology for International Safeguards

International nuclear safeguards are technical measures implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to verify the correctness and completeness of declarations made by States about their nuclear activities. The systems used to verify such activities include electronic and digital hardware and software components capable of data collection, processing, analysis, storage and transmission. Despite increasing efforts to protect digital systems against unauthorized access or attack through cybersecurity measures, these systems are not immune to cyber exploitation that could compromise their integrity or reliability. Previous versions of these systems did not include capabilities that exist today, such as BluetoothTM and GPS. The inclusion of these new capabilities, as well as new data processing and storage mechanisms, adds new attack vectors and opportunities for adversaries to exploit the devices that did not previously exist. As mentioned in the above referenced Cybersecurity for Safeguards study, cyber-domain vulnerabilities present risks to the equipment used to perform the international nuclear safeguards mission. The IAEA has produced guidance on the protection of nuclear facilities and their computer systems against cyber threats, but these documents do not specifically address the risks to safeguards or safeguards equipment. In response, the U.S. Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) Office of International Nuclear Safeguards/Safeguards Technology Development (NA-241) sponsored Sandia National Laboratories (Sandia, SNL) and the Idaho National Laboratory (Idaho, INL) to conduct a one-year study to evaluate cyber related vulnerabilities in safeguards equipment and develop recommendations for the mitigation of any identified risks.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

International Safeguards and the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory

Established in 1965, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory’s (PNNL) strong technical ties and shared heritage with the nearby U.S. Department of Energy Hanford Site were central to the early development of expertise in nuclear fuel cycle signatures, separations chemistry, plutonium chemistry, environmental monitoring, modeling and analysis of reactor systems, and nuclear material safeguards and security. From these Hanford origins, PNNL has grown into a multi-program science and engineering enterprise that utilizes this diversity to strengthen the international safeguards regime. Today, PNNL supports the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in its mission to provide assurances to the international community that nations do not use nuclear materials and equipment outside of peaceful uses. PNNL also serves in the IAEA’s Network of Analytical Laboratories (NWAL) by providing analysis of environmental samples gathered around the world. PNNL is involved in safeguards research and development activities in support of many U.S. Government programs such as the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) Office of Research and Development, NNSA Office of Nonproliferation and Arms Control, and the U.S. Support Program to IAEA Safeguards. In addition to these programs, PNNL invests internal resources including safeguards-specific training opportunities for staff, and laboratory-directed research and development funding to further ideas that may grow into new capabilities. This paper and accompanying presentation highlight some of PNNL’s contributions in technology development, implementation concepts and approaches, policy, capacity building, and human capital development, in the field of international safeguards.

Olsen, Khris B.↗

Using Deep Machine Learning to Conduct Object-Based Identification and Motion Detection on Safeguards Video Surveillance

Video surveillance is one of the core monitoring technologies used by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Department of Safeguards at safeguarded nuclear facilities worldwide. Current IAEA image-review software has functions for scene-change detection, black image detection and missing scene analysis, but their capabilities are not optimum. The current workflow for the detection of safeguards relevant events heavily depends on inspectors’ laborious visual examination of surveillance videos, which is a time-consuming process and prone to errors. To improve the accuracy of the process and reduce inspectors’ burden, the paper proposes using deep machine learning to detect objects of interest in video streams and to conduct object-based motion detection. The hypothesis of this work is that deep machine learning will reduce the burden on inspectors and reduce errors by automatically locating and identifying objects of interest in video streams. Objects of interest include casks and fuel assemblies that are typically monitored by inspectors. The algorithm being developed in this work is based on a computationally efficient deep machine learning algorithm – You Only Look Once (YOLO) – but is further devised to address specific challenges related to the operation of nuclear facilities. The developed model (which is called YOLO-NSG – YOLO for Nuclear Safeguards) is evaluated with data sets collected at the test facilities at Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL). The initial focus of the research is for application at safeguarded nuclear reactors, such as pressurized heavy-water reactors, where video surveillance is broadly deployed, but can be extended to other use cases of nuclear safeguards. The detailed structure of YOLO-NSG model is introduced and the test results are reported in the paper.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Validation of gamma-ray detection techniques for safeguards monitoring at natural uranium conversion facilities

Recent IAEA circulars and policy papers have sought to implement safeguards when any purified aqueous uranium solution or uranium oxides suitable for isotopic enrichment or fuel fabrication exists. Under the revised policy, IAEA Policy Paper 18, the starting point for nuclear material under safeguards was reinterpreted, suggesting that purified uranium compounds should be subject to safeguards procedures no later than the first point in the conversion process. In response to this technical need, a combination of simulation models and experimental measurements were employed to develop and validate concepts of nondestructive assay monitoring systems in a natural uranium conversion plant (NUCP). In particular, uranyl nitrate (UO 2 (NO 3 ) 2 ) solution exiting solvent extraction was identified as a key measurement point (KMP), where gamma-ray spectroscopy was selected as the process monitoring tool. The Uranyl Nitrate Calibration Loop Equipment (UNCLE) facility at Oak Ridge National Laboratory was employed to simulate the full-scale operating conditions of a purified uranium-bearing aqueous stream exiting the solvent extraction process in an NUCP. Nondestructive assay techniques using gamma-ray spectroscopy were evaluated to determine their viability as a technical means for drawing safeguards conclusions at NUCPs, and if the IAEA detection requirements of 1 significant quantity (SQ) can be met in a timely way. This work investigated gamma-ray signatures of uranyl nitrate circulating in the UNCLE facility and evaluated various gamma-ray detector sensitivities to uranyl nitrate. These detector validation activities include assessing detector responses to the uranyl nitrate gamma-ray signatures for spectrometers based on sodium iodide, lanthanum bromide, and high-purity germanium detectors. The results of measurements under static and dynamic operating conditions at concentrations ranging from 10–90 g U/L of natural uranyl nitrate are presented. A range of gamma-ray lines is examined, including attenuation for transmission measurement of density and concentration. It was determined that transmission-corrected gamma-ray spectra provide a reliable way to monitor the 235 U concentration of uranyl nitrate solution in transfer pipes in NUCPs. Furthermore, existing predictive and analysis methods are adequate to design and realize practical designs. The 137 Cs transmission source employed in this work is viable but not optimal for 235 U densitometry determination. Validated simulations assessed the viability of 133 Ba and 57Co as alternative densitometry sources. All three gamma-ray detectors are viable for monitoring natural uranium feed; although high-purity germanium is easiest to interpret, it is, however, the least attractive as an installation instrument. Overall, for monitoring throughput in a facility such as UNCLE, emulating the uranium concentration and pump speeds of the Springfields conversion facility in the United Kingdom, an uncertainty of less than 0.17% is required in order to detect the diversion of 1 SQ of uranyl nitrate through changes in uranium concentration over an accountancy period of one year with a detection probability of 50%. As a result, calibrated gamma-ray detection systems are capable of determining the concentration of uranium content in NUCPs, it is only in combination with verifiable operator declarations and supporting data, such as flow rate and enrichment, that safeguards conclusions can be drawn.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Fiscal Year 2014 Annual Report on BNLs Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Human Capital Development Activities

Brookhaven National Laboratory’s (BNL’s) Nonproliferation and National Security Department contributes to the National Nuclear Security Administration Office of Nonproliferation and International Security Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) through university engagement, safeguards internships, safeguards courses, professional development, recruitment, and other activities aimed at ensuring the next generation of international safeguards professionals is adequately prepared to support the U.S. safeguards mission. This report is a summary of BNL s work under the NGSI program in Fiscal Year 2014.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Safeguards by Design Challenge

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) defines Safeguards as a system of inspection and verification of the peaceful uses of nuclear materials as part of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. IAEA oversees safeguards worldwide. Safeguards by Design (SBD) involves incorporation of safeguards technologies, techniques, and instrumentation during the design phase of a facility, rather that after the fact. Design challenge goals are the following: Design a system of safeguards technologies, techniques, and instrumentation for inspection and verification of the peaceful uses of nuclear materials. Cost should be minimized to work with the IAEA’s limited budget. Dose to workers should always be as low are reasonably achievable (ALARA). Time is of the essence in operating facilities and flow of material should not be interrupted significantly. Proprietary process information in facilities may need to be protected, thus the amount of information obtained by inspectors should be the minimum required to achieve the measurement goal. Then three different design challenges are detailed: Plutonium Waste Item Measurement System, Marine-based Modular Reactor, and Floating Nuclear Power Plant (FNPP).

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Exploratory study on potential safeguards applications for shared ledger technology

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is responsible for providing credible assurance that countries are meeting their obligations not to divert or misuse nuclear materials and facilities for non-peaceful purposes. To this end, the IAEA integrates information about States’ nuclear material inventories and transactions with other types of data to draw its safeguards conclusions. As the amount and variety of data and information has increased, the IAEA’s data acquisition, management, and analysis processes have greatly benefited from advancements in computer science, data management, and cybersecurity during the last 20 years. Despite these advancements, inconsistent use of advanced computer technologies as well as political concerns among certain IAEA Member States centered on trust, transparency, and IAEA authorities limit the overall effectiveness and efficiency of IAEA safeguards. As a result, there is an ongoing need to strengthen the effectiveness and efficiency of IAEA safeguards while improving Member State cooperation and trust in the safeguards system. These chronic safeguards needs could be met with some emerging technologies, specifically those associated with the digital currency bitcoin.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Material Protection, Accounting and Control Technologies (MPACT) Implementation Plan: Lab-Scale Demonstration of Advanced Safeguard and Security Systems

The Materials Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies (MPACT) campaign is working towards the goal of developing and demonstrating the next generation of nuclear materials management for the peaceful use of civilian nuclear energy. A major milestone of the campaign is the “Lab-scale demonstration of an advanced safeguards and security system,” due in 2020. This implementation plan describes how tools developed in the MPACT campaign will be used to meet this milestone. These tools consist of instrumentation and devices as well as computer software for modelling, simulation and integration of data and information for safeguard and security analysis. The plan is focused on demonstrating an advanced safeguard and security systems for electrochemical processing plants, but also identifies activities needed to address advanced reactor, aqueous processing and other advanced fuel cycle facilities. A key component to achieving the 2020 milestone is the development of a virtual distributed test bed that incorporates the instruments, data, analysis tools, and models currently under development and provides a framework to link and normalize the data in a way that simulates a facility, including uncertainty quantification. This virtual distributed test bed will integrate computer simulated facilities that make up a fuel cycle of interest, with distributed test beds located in actual operating facilities and laboratories. The MPACT campaign recently issued roadmaps for both Modelling & Simulation and Advanced Integration which address this component, and activities necessary to achieve the 2020 milestone. Research, development and testing of specific technologies have been supported by the MPACT campaign in coordination with other DOE-NE and DOE-NNSA programs. These technologies provide the essential data needed by the safeguard and security systems, and feed into the data analysis and facility models. This plan will identify these technologies, their current status and activities needed to demonstrate the technologies at the laboratory scale. Wherever possible, test of technologies in field conditions using suitable nuclear materials will be used to define performance. Where necessary, surrogate materials and/or simulation will be used to provide useful information for the demonstration. When completed, the 2020 milestone will provide a demonstration of advanced safeguard and security technologies, including advanced modelling, simulation and analysis approaches, applied to electrochemical processing. It will also identify applications of the technology and approaches in other advanced fuel cycle and reactor concepts.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Identifying Challenges in Safeguards for Metallic Fuel Fabrication Facilities

As new advanced reactors gain popularity, there is an increasing interest in metallic fuel fabrication for fast reactors. While metallic fuels themselves are not a new idea, as many of the first reactors employed metallic fuels, new designs, compositions, and fabrication methods are appearing throughout the nuclear community. As the interest grows and facilities are constructed, both domestic and international safeguards will need to be heavily involved to support safeguards-by-design (SBD) measures from the start. This work compiles a review of historical and modern fuel types and fabrication methods, fabrication processes, safeguards gaps, and potential safeguards solutions. Metallic nuclear fuel types have been around for many decades and were included in some of the first reactors including the Experimental Breeder Reactor (EBR)-I and -II, the Fermi 1 reactor, the Integral Fast Reactor (IFR), and the Dounreay Fast Reactor (DFR). These reactors used various compositions including pure uranium (U) metal, U-zirconium (Zr) alloys, plutonium (Pu)-aluminum (Al) alloys, U-fissium (Fs) alloys, U-Pu-Zr alloys, and U-molybdenum (Mo) alloys [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]. These small alloying additions are included to improve the material properties of the pure U metal. The alpha-phase U (stable below 661C) suffers elongation in one direction causing grain boundary cracking and increasing creep rate due to irradiation growth, thermal cycling, and preferential crystal orientation. It is ideal to utilize the gamma-phase U (typically stable above 769C) by adding small amounts of alloying elements such as Zr or Mo to stabilize this phase down to room temperature [3]. Additionally, some research has been focused on U with transuranic (TRU) elements present, typically coming from the used fuel recycling process. Including these elements in fast reactor fuel can aid in the reduction of nuclear waste by burning minor long-lived actinides. However, the additions of TRU elements can cause concerns to arise when trying to fabrication or safeguard metallic fuels. A typical metallic fuel element is shown in Figure 1. Sodium is added into the cladding to create a thermal bond between the fuel slug and cladding wall. The fuel slug is then inserted and the end plug is welded on to the top of the fuel element. A gas plenum is left to create a headspace for gaseous fission products to escape rather than continue to build in the fuel itself [1, 5]. Other fuel element geometries exist as well, such as the Lightbridge twisted cruciform geometry shown in Figure 2 [6]. This design allows for better cooling performance and provides room for fuel rod swelling without impacting the fuel rod diameter. There are many different fabrication methods for metallic fuels, which is one of the many benefits of these fuel types. Many of these fabrication methods are relatively easy and cost-efficient. The most popular fabrication method is injection casting, sometimes called vacuum induction melting (VIM), shown in Figure 3 [4, 8, 9, 7, 10]. This method was largely used for EBR-II fuel fabrication. The injection casting system is contained inside of a vessel consisting of a Y2O3-coated graphite crucible surrounded by an induction coil with ZrO2-coated quartz molds suspended above the crucible. The fuel feedstock is placed inside of the graphite crucible and melted using the induction furnace. The induction furnace utilizes a dual frequency with the high frequency melting the feedstock and the low frequency causing stirring of the melted feedstock to form a homogeneous mixture. The mixture is heated to approximately 1600C in an argon environment. The vessel is evacuated and then the quartz molds are lowered into the graphite crucible containing the molten metal and the vessel is repressurized to inject the metal fuel upwards into the molds. The molds are removed and then shattered to release the fuel slugs. This fabrication method was used to fabricate 39,000 metallic fuel pins for EBR-II. While injection casting has been the most common metallic fuel fabrication method throughout the decades, many other methods have been explored including low-pressure gravity casting, microwave casting, continuous casting, centrifugal casting, coextrusion, and many others [11, 12, 8, 13, 14, 15]. Some of these methods aim to mitigate challenges that arise with americium (Am) volatilization during the casting process for TRU-containing fuel feedstocks, an issue with injection casting. Coextrusion is one of the methods explored at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) and has been utilized for the initial fabrication tests of Lightbridge's unique fuels, as well as other metallic fuels with cladding coextruded. In this process, large billets are formed and machined and then inserted into a molten salt bath for approximately 30 minutes. The billets are then loaded into the extrusion press and extruded. This process can be seen in Figure 4 [15].

11 - NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Sensitivity analysis of high resolution gamma-ray detection for safeguards monitoring at natural uranium conversion facilities

Under the policies proposed by recent International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) circulars and policy papers, implementation of safeguards exists when any purified aqueous uranium solution or uranium oxides suitable for isotopic enrichment or fuel fabrication exists. Under IAEA Policy Paper 18, the starting point for nuclear material under safeguards was reinterpreted, suggesting that purified uranium compounds should be subject to safeguards procedures no later than the first point in the conversion process. In response to this technical need, a combination of simulation models and experimental measurements were employed in previous work to develop and validate gamma-ray nondestructive assay monitoring systems in a natural uranium conversion plant (NUCP). In particular, uranyl nitrate (UO 2 (NO 3 ) 2 ) solution exiting solvent extraction was identified as a key measurement point (KMP). Passive nondestructive assay techniques using high resolution gamma-ray spectroscopy were evaluated to determine their viability as a technical means for drawing safeguards conclusions at NUCPs, and if the IAEA detection requirements of 1 significant quantity (SQ) can be met in a timely manner. Building upon the aforementioned previous validation work on detector sensitivity to varying concentrations of uranyl nitrate via a series of dilution measurements, this work investigates detector response parameter sensitivities to gamma-ray signatures of uranyl nitrate. The full energy peak efficiency of a detection system is dependent upon the sample, geometry, absorption, and intrinsic efficiency parameters. Perturbation of these parameters translates into corresponding variations of the 185.7 keV peak area of the 235 U in uranyl nitrate. Such perturbations in the assayed signature impact the quality or versatility of the safeguards conclusions drawn. Given the potentially high throughput of uranyl nitrate in NUCPs, the ability to assay 1 SQ of material requires uncertainty «1%. Accounting for material self-shielding properties, pipe thickness, and source-detector orientation is instrumental in determining the robustness of gamma-ray detection in the process monitoring of uranyl nitrate in NUCPs. Monte Carlo models and ray-tracing models were employed to determine the sensitivity of the detected 185.7 keV photon to self-shielding properties, pipe thickness, and source-detector geometry. Considering the implementation of the detection of 1 SQ, diversion of 1 SQ becomes essentially undetectable given the systematic uncertainty, in addition to considerations such as propagating uncertainties due to pipe offset/position, as well as minor variations in pipe thickness. Consequently, pipe thickness was the most sensitive variable in affecting full energy efficiency of the 185.7 keV signature peak with up to 8% variation in efficiency for ±0.5 mm changes in Schedule 40 304L stainless steel piping. Furthermore, computation of the attenuation correction factor of the uranyl nitrate solution [CF(AT) (i.e. εsample)] using Parker's method using with the approximation for the geometrical factor κ≈π/4 was validated through experimental, Monte Carlo and ray-tracing calculations for a uranyl nitrate filled transfer pipe segment. Furthermore, quantifying sensitivity in detector position, as well as voiding effects due to bubbly flow or laminar flow with an air gap in the uranyl nitrate becomes increasingly important as considerations from (static) design-scale measurements translate into (dynamic) field operations tests.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

A literature review of pyroprocessing safeguards

Pyroprocessing is a promising technology for reprocessing used nuclear fuel (UNF) from light water reactors (LWR) and sodium fast reactors (SFR). With the advancement of fast reactors with projects from companies such as TerraPower, the prospects of pyroprocessing are more promising than ever before, as fast reactors can consume all actinides, not just uranium and plutonium. Before pyroprocessing can be implemented commercially, pre-existing safeguards used for aqueous reprocessing must be adapted for pyroprocessing. Safeguards, as determined by both the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), are discussed in this review as guidelines for approaches used in both domestic and international reprocessing plants. The implementation of safeguards in aqueous reprocessing was then reviewed based on the experience from existing aqueous facilities. The experimental pyroprocessing facilities were identified as pyroprocessing plants in the design stage with one operating exception of the Fuel Conditioning Facility (FCF). The safeguard methods implemented or designed for each and the accompanying challenges of utilizing existing safeguards in pyroprocessing are considered and a summary of applicable approaches is included.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗