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JSC Materials Laboratory Reproduction and Failure Analysis of Cracked Orbiter Reaction Control System Niobium Thruster Injectors

In April 2004 a Space Shuttle Orbiter Reaction Control System (RCS) thruster was found to be cracked while undergoing a nozzle (niobium/C103 alloy) retrofit. As a failure resulting from an in-flight RCS thruster burn-through (initiated from a crack) could be catastrophic, an official Space Shuttle Program flight constraint was issued until flight safety could be adequately demonstrated. This paper describes the laboratory test program which was undertaken to reproduce the cracking in order to fully understand and bound the driving environments. The associated rationale developed to justify continued safe flight of the Orbiter RCS system is also described. The laboratory testing successfully reproduced the niobium cracking, and established specific bounding conditions necessary to cause cracking in the C103 thruster injectors. Each of the following conditions is necessary in combination together: 1) a mechanically disturbed / cold-worked free surface, 2) an externally applied sustained tensile stress near yield strength, 3) presence of fluorine-containing fluids on exposed tensile / cold-worked free surfaces, and 4) sustained exposure to temperatures greater than 400 F. As a result of this work, it was concluded that fluorine-containing materials (e.g. HF acid, Krytox , Brayco etc.) should be carefully controlled or altogether eliminated during processing of niobium and its alloys.

Castner, Willard L.↗

The GRASP 3: Graphical Reliability Analysis Simulation Program. Version 3: A users' manual and modelling guide

Alternate definitions of system failure create complex analysis for which analytic solutions are available only for simple, special cases. The GRASP methodology is a computer simulation approach for solving all classes of problems in which both failure and repair events are modeled according to the probability laws of the individual components of the system.

Phillips, D. T.↗

Root Cause Correlation Analysis of Software Failures via Orthogonal Defect Classification and Natural Language Processing

Systems theoretic process analysis (STPA) is becoming an increasingly popular technique to assess how complex digital software systems can fail. Rather than defining failures by their observable failure events, which may be sparse especially for safety rated nuclear digital instrumentation and control systems (DI&C), failures are defined as postulated unsafe actions under specific contextual conditions. This permits a top-down analysis of system hazards and identifies whether imposed constraints and requirements can sufficiently address undesirable hazards. However, STPA is a qualitative approach at identifying inadequacies in the development process and cannot currently be used to quantify unsafe action likelihoods for probabilistic risk assessment. Therefore, in this work, we examine the root causes of software failure and explore whether a consistent correlation can be linked to specific unsafe action classes. We implement Lbl2Vec, an unsupervised document classification and retrieval algorithm, on a database of 4,096 software defect reports acquired from various open-source software systems. By analyzing sentence structure, embedded labels, and word vectors, we show that certain defect types positively correlate to specific unsafe action classes over others. The correlations developed can be used to estimate the failure probability of safety intended DI&C systems which provides a licensing basis for nuclear plant modernization efforts.

22 - GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Root Cause Correlation Analysis of Software Failures via Orthogonal Defect Classification and Natural Language Processing

Systems theoretic process analysis (STPA) is becoming an increasingly popular technique to assess how complex digital software systems can fail. Rather than defining failures by their observable failure events, which may be sparse especially for safety rated nuclear digital instrumentation and control systems (DI&C), failures are defined as postulated unsafe actions under specific contextual conditions. This permits a top-down analysis of system hazards and identifies whether imposed constraints and requirements can sufficiently address undesirable hazards. However, STPA is a qualitative approach at identifying inadequacies in the development process and cannot currently be used to quantify unsafe action likelihoods for probabilistic risk assessment. Therefore, in this work, we examine the root causes of software failure and explore whether a consistent correlation can be linked to specific unsafe action classes. We implement Lbl2Vec, an unsupervised document classification and retrieval algorithm, on a database of 4,096 software defect reports acquired from various open-source software systems. By analyzing sentence structure, embedded labels, and word vectors, we show that certain defect types positively correlate to specific unsafe action classes over others. The correlations developed can be used to estimate the failure probability of safety intended DI&C systems which provides a licensing basis for nuclear plant modernization efforts.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Service Life Extension of the Propulsion System of Long-Term Manned Orbital Stations

One of the critical non-replaceable systems of a long-term manned orbital station is the propulsion system. Since the propulsion system operates beginning with the launch of station elements into orbit, its service life determines the service life of the station overall. Weighing almost a million pounds, the International Space Station (ISS) is about four times as large as the Russian space station Mir and about five times as large as the U.S. Skylab. Constructed over a span of more than a decade with the help of over 100 space flights, elements and modules of the ISS provide more research space than any spacecraft ever built. Originally envisaged for a service life of fifteen years, this Earth orbiting laboratory has been in orbit since 1998. Some elements that have been launched later in the assembly sequence were not yet built when the first elements were placed in orbit. Hence, some of the early modules that were launched at the inception of the program were already nearing the end of their design life when the ISS was finally ready and operational. To maximize the return on global investments on ISS, it is essential for the valuable research on ISS to continue as long as the station can be sustained safely in orbit. This paper describes the work performed to extend the service life of the ISS propulsion system. A system comprises of many components with varying failure rates. Reliability of a system is the probability that it will perform its intended function under encountered operating conditions, for a specified period of time. As we are interested in finding out how reliable a system would be in the future, reliability expressed as a function of time provides valuable insight. In a hypothetical bathtub shaped failure rate curve, the failure rate, defined as the number of failures per unit time that a currently healthy component will suffer in a given future time interval, decreases during infant-mortality period, stays nearly constant during the service life and increases at the end when the design service life ends and wear-out phase begins. However, the component failure rates do not remain constant over the entire cycle life. The failure rate depends on various factors such as design complexity, current age of the component, operating conditions, severity of environmental stress factors, etc. Development, qualification and acceptance test processes provide rigorous screening of components to weed out imperfections that might otherwise cause infant mortality failures. If sufficient samples are tested to failure, the failure time versus failure quantity can be analyzed statistically to develop a failure probability distribution function (PDF), a statistical model of the probability of failure versus time. Driven by cost and schedule constraints however, spacecraft components are generally not tested in large numbers. Uncertainties in failure rate and remaining life estimates increase when fewer units are tested. To account for this, spacecraft operators prefer to limit useful operations to a period shorter than the maximum demonstrated service life of the weakest component. Running each component to its failure to determine the maximum possible service life of a system can become overly expensive and impractical. Spacecraft operators therefore, specify the required service life and an acceptable factor of safety (FOS). The designers use these requirements to limit the life test duration. Midway through the design life, when benefits justify additional investments, supplementary life test may be performed to demonstrate the capability to safely extend the service life of the system. An innovative approach is required to evaluate the entire system, without having to go through an elaborate test program of propulsion system elements. Evaluating every component through a brute force test program would be a cost prohibitive and time consuming endeavor. ISS propulsion system components were designed and built decades ago. There are no representative ground test articles for some of the components. A 'test everything' approach would require manufacturing new test articles. The paper outlines some of the techniques used for selective testing, by way of cherry picking candidate components based on failure mode effects analysis, system level impacts, hazard analysis, etc. The type of testing required for extending the service life depends on the design and criticality of the component, failure modes and failure mechanisms, life cycle margin provided by the original certification, operational and environmental stresses encountered, etc. When specific failure mechanism being considered and the underlying relationship of that mode to the stresses provided in the test can be correlated by supporting analysis, time and effort required for conducting life extension testing can be significantly reduced. Exposure to corrosive propellants over long periods of time, for instance, lead to specific failure mechanisms in several components used in the propulsion system. Using Arrhenius model, which is tied to chemically dependent failure mechanisms such as corrosion or chemical reactions, it is possible to subject carefully selected test articles to accelerated life test. Arrhenius model reflects the proportional relationship between time to failure of a component and the exponential of the inverse of absolute temperature acting on the component. The acceleration factor is used to perform tests at higher stresses that allow direct correlation between the times to failure at a high test temperature to the temperatures to be expected in actual use. As long as the temperatures are such that new failure mechanisms are not introduced, this becomes a very useful method for testing to failure a relatively small sample of items for a much shorter amount of time. In this article, based on the example of the propulsion system of the first ISS module Zarya, theoretical approaches and practical activities of extending the service life of the propulsion system are reviewed with the goal of determining the maximum duration of its safe operation.

Kamath, Ulhas↗

Statistical learning framework for safety and failure analysis of a DNN-based autonomous aircraft system

Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) and Machine Learning technology is increasingly used for safety-critical applications in the Aerospace domain. To ensure safe operations, the DNN and the system must undergo rigorous verification and validation, including advanced statistical analyses. Performance and safety of the DNN and system behavior must not only be analyzed for the nominal case, but under numerous off-nominal and failure cases. In this paper we will describe how our statistical learning framework SYSAI can efficiently perform such analyses using the tool’s unique combination of advanced learning modeling and statistical analysis techniques. SYSAI can effectively explore the high-dimensional state and failure space of the system under test; geometrical shape detection of safety regions and boundaries support explainability of the results to the designer. In this paper, we report experiments and results obtained with a vision-based DNN control system (ACT) that is capable of autonomously steering an aircraft down a runway.

Yuning He↗

Hubble Space Telescope meteoroid-debris protection analysis

A system level failure could occur if the Hubble Space Telescope's (ST) capability to operate as a facility on-orbit is critically reduced or when a significant reduction in the quality of science data is registered. Failure could occur if a meteoroid/debris impact damages a component of a major support subsystem or if a meteoroid/debris penetration causes straylight contamination in the light shield, forward shell, aft shroud, or through the aperture door. The ST was analyzed to find the probability of no critical penetration. This probability value was found to be 92.25% for a two-year service life. A straylight leakage repair technique was recommended for the aft shroud, the region found most likely to be critically penetrated. Fozar tape and multilayer insulation blankets are suggested as posible repair materials.

Horn, J.↗

GO/NO-GO - When is medical hazard mitigation acceptable for launch?

Medical support of spaceflight missions is composed of complex tasks and decisions that dedicated to maintaining the health and performance of the crew and the completion of mission objectives. Spacecraft represent one of the most complex vehicles built by humans, and are built to very rigorous design specifications. In the course of a Flight Readiness Review (FRR) or a mission itself, the flight surgeon must be able to understand the impact of hazards and risks that may not be completely mitigated by design alone. Some hazards are not mitigated because they are never actually identified. When a hazard is identified, it must be reduced or waivered. Hazards that cannot be designed out of the vehicle or mission, are usually mitigated through other means to bring the residual risk to an acceptable level. This is possible in most engineered systems because failure modes are usually predictable and analysis can include taking these systems to failure. Medical support of space missions is complicated by the inability of flight surgeons to provide "exact" hazard and risk numbers to the NASA engineering community. Taking humans to failure is not an option. Furthermore, medical dogma is mostly comprised of "medical prevention" strategies that mitigate risk by examining the behaviour of a cohort of humans similar to astronauts. Unfortunately, this approach does not lend itself well for predicting the effect of a hazard in the unique environment of space. This presentation will discuss how Medical Operations uses an evidence-based approach to decide if hazard mitigation strategies are adequate to reduce mission risk to acceptable levels. Case studies to be discussed will include: 1. Risk of electrocution risk during EVA 2. Risk of cardiac event risk during long and short duration missions 3. Degraded cabin environmental monitoring on the ISS. Learning Objectives 1.) The audience will understand the challenges of mitigating medical risk caused by nominal and off-nominal mission events. 2.) The audience will understand the process by which medical hazards are identified and mitigated before launch. 3.) The audience will understand the roles and responsibilities of all the other flight control positions in participating in the process of reducing hazards and reducing medical risk to an acceptable level.

Hamilton, Douglas R.↗

Spaceflight Ground Support Equipment Reliability & System Safety Data

Presented were Reliability Analysis, consisting primarily of Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), and System Safety Analysis, consisting of Preliminary Hazards Analysis (PHA), performed to ensure that the CoNNeCT (Communications, Navigation, and Networking re- Configurable Testbed) Flight System was safely and reliably operated during its Assembly, Integration and Test (AI&T) phase. A tailored approach to the NASA Ground Support Equipment (GSE) standard, NASA-STD-5005C, involving the application of the appropriate Requirements, S&MA discipline expertise, and a Configuration Management system (to retain a record of the analysis and documentation) were presented. Presented were System Block Diagrams of selected GSE and the corresponding FMEA, as well as the PHAs. Also discussed are the specific examples of the FMEAs and PHAs being used during the AI&T phase to drive modifications to the GSE (via "redlining" of test procedures, and the placement of warning stickers to protect the flight hardware) before being interfaced to the Flight System. These modifications were necessary because failure modes and hazards were identified during the analysis that had not been properly mitigated. Strict Configuration Management was applied to changes (whether due to upgrades or expired calibrations) in the GSE by revisiting the FMEAs and PHAs to reflect the latest System Block Diagrams and Bill Of Material. The CoNNeCT flight system has been successfully assembled, integrated, tested, and shipped to the launch site without incident. This demonstrates that the steps taken to safeguard the flight system when it was interfaced to the various GSE were successful.

Fernandez, Rene↗

Stress Analysis of B-52B and B-52H Air-Launching Systems Failure-Critical Structural Components

The operational life analysis of any airborne failure-critical structural component requires the stress-load equation, which relates the applied load to the maximum tangential tensile stress at the critical stress point. The failure-critical structural components identified are the B-52B Pegasus pylon adapter shackles, B-52B Pegasus pylon hooks, B-52H airplane pylon hooks, B-52H airplane front fittings, B-52H airplane rear pylon fitting, and the B-52H airplane pylon lower sway brace. Finite-element stress analysis was performed on the said structural components, and the critical stress point was located and the stress-load equation was established for each failure-critical structural component. The ultimate load, yield load, and proof load needed for operational life analysis were established for each failure-critical structural component.

Ko, William L.↗

Reaction control system helium pressure regulator filter failure

The failure analysis of the command module reaction control system helium pressure regulators revealed that the filter element end caps were bulged by the helium pressure surge during activation. Some end caps may bulge and also some wire separation may occur during command module reaction control system activations; however, system performance should not be affected. The reaction control system design is acceptable and no change in hardware, system, or activation procedures is required.

Source record↗

Sensor failure and multivariable control for airbreathing propulsion systems

A new sensor/actuator failure analysis technique for turbofan jet engines was developed. Three phases of failure analysis, namely detection, isolation, and accommodation are considered. Failure detection and isolation techniques are developed by utilizing the concept of Generalized Likelihood Ratio (GLR) tests. These techniques are applicable to both time varying and time invariant systems. Three GLR detectors are developed for: (1) hard-over sensor failure; (2) hard-over actuator failure; and (3) brief disturbances in the actuators. The probability distribution of the GLR detectors and the detectability of sensor/actuator failures are established. Failure type is determined by the maximum of the GLR detectors. Failure accommodation is accomplished by extending the Multivariable Nyquest Array (MNA) control design techniques to nonsquare system designs. The performance and effectiveness of the failure analysis technique are studied by applying the technique to a turbofan jet engine, namely the Quiet Clean Short Haul Experimental Engine (QCSEE). Single and multiple sensor/actuator failures in the QCSEE are simulated and analyzed and the effects of model degradation are studied.

Behbehani, K.↗

Hazards Analysis and Failure Modes and Effects Criticality Analysis (FMECA) of Four Concept Vehicle Propulsion Systems

The primary objective of this research effort is to identify failure modes and hazards associated with the concept vehicles and to perform functional hazard analyses (FHA) and failure modes and effects criticality analyses (FMECA) for each. Boeing also created a Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) for each of the concept vehicles, as the FTA contains the connectivity between systems and is an accepted, top-down method to analyze the safety of an air-vehicle. Conceptual design of notional powertrain configuration for each of four (4) NASA RVLT (Revolutionary Vertical Lift Technology) Concept Vehicles were developed in as much detail as was necessary to support the reliability and safety analysis for this project. Functional block diagrams from each of the conceptual powertrain configurations were created and used to order the FHA, FMECA, and FTA. Hazards were identified and the severity of each were categorized in the FHA for use in a follow-up FMECA. The FTA took inputs from the FMECA and the functional block diagrams to develop the connectivity and develop a quantitative architecture that could be used to perform sensitivity studies, as related to vehicle safety.Guidelines for reliability targets for both the air vehicle and the operation in the UAM (Urban Air Mobility) mission are discussed. An industry literature search was performed in order to assess gaps in existing government regulations and industry specifications. The industry literature search led to air-vehicle and operational reliability discussions, as related to Distributed Electric/Hybrid-Electric Propulsion (DE/HEP) system operating in the UAM role. A discussion of results and recommendations for future work is also provided.

Hazards Analysis↗

MOD-0A 200 kW wind turbine generator design and analysis report

The design, analysis, and initial performance of the MOD-OA 200 kW wind turbine generator at Clayton, NM is documented. The MOD-OA was designed and built to obtain operation and performance data and experience in utility environments. The project requirements, approach, system description, design requirements, design, analysis, system tests, installation, safety considerations, failure modes and effects analysis, data acquisition, and initial performance for the wind turbine are discussed. The design and analysis of the rotor, drive train, nacelle equipment, yaw drive mechanism and brake, tower, foundation, electricl system, and control systems are presented. The rotor includes the blades, hub, and pitch change mechanism. The drive train includes the low speed shaft, speed increaser, high speed shaft, and rotor brake. The electrical system includes the generator, switchgear, transformer, and utility connection. The control systems are the blade pitch, yaw, and generator control, and the safety system. Manual, automatic, and remote control are discussed. Systems analyses on dynamic loads and fatigue are presented.

Anderson, T. S.↗

The MOD-OA 200 kilowatt wind turbine generator design and analysis report

The project requirements, approach, system description, design requirements, design, analysis, system tests, installation safety considerations, failure modes and effects analysis, data acquisition, and initial performance for the MOD-OA 200 kw wind turbine generator are discussed. The components, the rotor, driven train, nacelle equipment, yaw drive mechanism and brake, tower, foundation, electrical system, and control systems are presented. The rotor includes the blades, hub and pitch change mechanism. The drive train includes the low speed shaft, speed increaser, high speed shaft, and rotor brake. The electrical system includes the generator, switchgear, transformer, and utility connection. The control systems are the blade pitch, yaw, and generator control, and the safety system. Manual, automatic, and remote control and Dynamic loads and fatigue are analyzed.

Andersen, T. S.↗

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 30, No. 3, July-September 1989]

Nuclear Safety is a review journal that covers significant developments in the field of nuclear safety. Its scope includes the analysis and control of hazards associated with nuclear energy, operations involving fissionable materials, and the products of nuclear fission and their effects on the environment. Primary emphasis is on safety in reactor design, construction, and operation; however, the safety aspects of the entire fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing, nuclear waste disposal, handling of radioisotopes, and environmental effects of these operations, are also treated. Table of Contents for this issue follows. GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 325 Safety of Framatome Advanced Nuclear Steam Supply Systems Designs by J. A. Charles and D. Lange, 333 Book Review of Nuclear Accidents: Intervention Levels for the Protection of the Public by H. B. Piper; ACCIDENT ANALYSIS: 335 Living PRA Computer Systems by S. C. Dinsmore and H.-P. Balfanz, 343 Summary of ICAP Assessments of RELAP5/MOD2 by W. E. Driskell and R. G. Hanson; CONTROL AND INSTRUMENTATION: 352 Thermal Performance Monitoring System at Maanshan Nuclear Power Plant by H.-J. Chao, Y.-P. Lin, G.-H. Jou, L.-Y. Liao, and Y.-B. Chen; DESIGN FEATURES: 358 Warning Systems for Nuclear Power Plant Emergencies by J. H. Sorensen and D. S. Mileti; WASTE AND SPENT FUEL MANAGEMENT: 371 Activities Related to Waste Management Compiled by E G. Silver; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 382 Steam Generator Tube Performance: Experience with Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Reactors During 1985 by O. S. Tatone and R. L. Tapping, 400 Systems Interaction Analyses: Concepts and Techniques (Part II) by M. D. Muhlheim and G. A. Murphy, 413 Reactor Shutdown Experience Compiled by J. W. Cletcher, 416 Operating U.S. Power Reactors Compiled by E G. Silver; RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 440 General Administrative Activities Compiled by E G. Silver, 460 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides by D. S. Queener, 466 Status of Power-Reactor Licensing Activities Compiled by E G. Silver, 470 Proposed Rule Changes as of Mar. 31, 1989; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 334 Proceedings Published, 351 CEC Seminar on Methods and Codes for Assessing the Off-Site Consequences of Nuclear Accidents, 357 Short Course on Multiphase Flow and Heat Transfer: Bases and Applications in A: The Nuclear Power Industry B: The Process Industries, 357 International Conference on Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management, 478 International Topical Meeting on the Safety, Status, and Future of Non-Commercial Reactors and Irradiation Facilities, 475 The Authors.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Efficient Contingency Analysis in Power Systems via Network Trigger Nodes

Modeling failure dynamics within a power system is a complex and challenging process due to multiple inter-dependencies and convoluted inter-domain relationships. Subject matter experts (SMEs) are interested in understanding these failure dynamics for reducing the impact from future disasters (i.e., losses or failures of power system components, such as transmission lines). Contingency analysis (CA) tools enable such ’what-if’ scenario analyses to evaluate the impacts on the power system. Analyzing all possible contingencies among N system components can be computationally expensive. An important step for performing CA is identifying a set of k ‘trigger’ components, which when failed initially can significantly impact the overall system by causing multiple failures. Currently SMEs focus on identifying these trigger components by running expensive simulations on all possible subsets, which quickly becomes infeasible. Hence finding a relevant set of trigger components (contingencies) rapidly to enable efficient and useful CA is crucial.In a collaboration between computer scientists and power system experts, we propose an efficient method for performing CA by exploiting network inter-dependencies in power system components. First, we construct a network with multiple electric grid infrastructure components and dependencies as connections among them. We reformulate the problem of finding a set of trigger components as a problem of identifying critical nodes in the network, which can cascade power failures through connected nodes and cause significant damage to the network. To guide the practical CA tools, we develop a network-based model with a probabilistic edge-weights setup using intricate domain rules. Then we conduct an empirical study on real power system data in the US for both regional and national levels. Firstly, we use power system datasets for the US to create a national-scale domain-driven model. Secondly, we demonstrate that network-based model outperforms the outputs from a real CA tool and show on average 25 × improved selection of contingencies, thereby showcasing practical benefits to the power experts.

Tabassum, Anika↗