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At least 73 records · Page 4
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2020

Thermal Overloading Risk Mitigation With a Semi-Analytical Probabilistic Model on Branch Current

A semi-analytical formulation is presented in this paper for the probability computation of branch current in multiphase systems. The developed formula is derived based on the linear power flow model in rectangular coordinates. The system uncertainty injections can be renewable energy resources or loads and are modeled using a Gaussian mixture model (GMM). The developed formula can be used to compute the line current violation probability as well as integrate into optimal power flow problem as chance-constraint relaxation. Here, the proposed formula is first compared with the Matlab embedded numerical integration function to show its performance. Besides, the semi-analytical formula is validated and compared with the Monte Carlo simulation method using the IEEE 123-bus system, EPRI Ckt5, and Ckt7 systems.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
NASA NTRS2011

Space Shuttle Systems Engineering Processes for Liftoff Debris Risk Mitigation

This slide presentation reviews the systems engineering process designed to reduce the risk from debris during Space Shuttle Launching. This process begins the day of launch from the tanking to the vehicle tower clearance. Other debris risks (i.e., Ascent, and micrometeoroid orbital debit) are mentioned) but are not the subject of this presentation. The Liftoff debris systems engineering process and an example of how it works are reviewed (i.e.,STS-119 revealed a bolt liberation trend on the Fixed Service Structure (FSS) 275 level elevator room). The process includes preparation of a Certification of Flight Readiness (CoFR) that includes (1) Lift-off debris from previous mission dispositioned, (2) Flight acceptance rationale has been provided for Lift-off debris sources/causes (3) Lift-off debris mission support documentation, processes and tools are in place for the up-coming mission. The process includes a liftoff debris data collection that occurs after each launch. This includes a post launch walkdown, that records each liftoff debris, and the entry of the debris into a database, it also includes a review of the imagery from the launch, and a review of the instrumentation data. There is also a review of the debris transport analysis process, that includes temporal and spatial framework and a computational fluid dynamics (CFD) analysis. which incorporates a debris transport analyses (DTA), debris materials and impact tests, and impact analyses.

Mitchell, Michael↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Using Systems Engineering to Develop an Integrated Crew Health and Performance System to Mitigate Risk for Human Exploration Missions

New space exploration missions are currently being designed to take humanity beyond low Earth orbit (LEO) to cis-lunar space, the lunar surface, and eventually to Mars. These missions carry increased risks due to a number of factors, including distance from Earth, exposure to deep space hazards, reduced capacity and ability to resupply and evacuate, and increased communication delays. As distance from Earth grows and mission length increases, a growing proportion of mission risk can be attributed to the “human system.” Almost twenty years ago, the Institute of Medicine in the United States recommended the early and complete integration of the human system into the spacecraft and mission design process to mitigate this increased risk inherent in exploration missions. Exploration missions will require increasing levels of crew self-sufficiency that will challenge the current operational paradigms established in LEO. Enabling progressive Earth independence requires management of the increasingly complex interactions among spacecraft systems and integration of all the data and functions that affect human health and performance into one coordinated system –the Crew Health and Performance (CHP) system. This system is a critical spacecraft system that is analogous to other systems such as propulsion, guidance and navigation, or avionics. Design and integration of the CHP system requires the evidence-based merger of typically disparate disciplines such as medicine, human factors, and life support system design, using systems engineering (SE) practices. SE provides traceability of spacecraft requirements and enables reliable and repeatable trade space analysis of the many competing options for hardware and software to be included in the mission architecture. The approach described here enables spacecraft and mission designers to align the scope of a CHP system with mission specific requirements, decrease risk to the crew, and increase the probability of mission success.

Kerry McGuire↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Using Systems Engineering to Develop an Integrated Crew Health and Performance System to Mitigate Risk for Human Exploration Missions

New space exploration missions are currently being designed to take humanity beyond Low EarthOrbit (LEO) to cis-lunar space, the lunar surface, and eventually to Mars. These missions carryincreased risks due to a number of factors, including distance from Earth, exposure to deep spacehazards, reduced capacity and ability to resupply and evacuate, and increased communication delays.As distance from Earth grows and mission length increases, a growing proportion of overall missionrisk can be attributed to the “human system.” Almost twenty years ago, the Institute of Medicine in theUnited States recommended the early and complete integration of the human system into thespacecraft and mission design process to mitigate this increased risk inherent in exploration missions.Exploration missions will require increasing levels of crew self-sufficiency that will challenge thecurrent operational paradigms established in LEO. Enabling progressive Earth independence requiresmanagement of the increasingly complex interactions among spacecraft systems and integration of allthe data and functions that affect human health and performance into one coordinated system – theCrew Health and Performance (CHP) system. This system is a critical spacecraft system that isanalogous to other systems such as propulsion, guidance and navigation, or avionics. Design andintegration of the CHP system requires the evidence-based merger of typically disparate disciplinessuch as medicine, human factors, and physiological support system design, using systems engineering(SE) practices. The approach described here enables spacecraft and mission designers to align thescope of a CHP system with mission specific requirements, decrease risk to the crew, and increase theprobability of mission success.

Kerry Mcguire↗
NASA NTRS2010

Use of a Pathfinder Optical Telescope Element for James Webb Space Telescope Risk Mitigation

A Pathfmder of the James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) Optical Telescope Element is being developed to check out critical ground support equipment and to rehearse integration and testing procedures. This paper provides a summary of the baseline Pathfmder configuration and architecture, objectives of this effort, limitations of Pathfinder, status of its development, and future plans. Special attention is paid to risks that will be mitigated by Pathfmder.

Feinberg, Lee D.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Validation of Decompression Sickness Risk Mitigation Protocols for Planetary Spaceflight Missions

BACKGROUND: Apollo missions used a 100% O2 cabin atmosphere which effectively eliminated the risk of decompression sickness (DCS) during extravehicular activity (EVA) on the moon. NASA’s future missions to the moon and Mars are expected to use nitrox gas mixtures of up to 34% O2, 66% N2, which will reduce flammability risk compared with Apollo, but will necessitate Oxygen prebreathe prior to EVA to reduce DCS risk to acceptable levels. Prebreathe protocols used on the space shuttle and International Space Station are validated for microgravity EVAs, but the significantly increased risk of DCS during equivalent ambulatory EVAs make these protocols inapplicable to planetary EVA. An “exploration atmosphere” of 56.5 kPa (8.2 psia), 34% O2, 66% N2 has been recommended by NASA as a compromise that balances prebreathe duration, hypoxia, and flammability risk, assuming a 29.6 kPa (4.3 psi) spacesuit. However, this atmosphere may not be used for vehicles that do not support frequent EVA, and with commercial providers and international providers expected to provide landers, pressurized rovers, habitats, and spacesuits, different combinations of vehicle and spacesuit atmospheres are possible and will each require validated prebreathe protocols. OVERVIEW: Key components of a multi-year strategic roadmap include: 1) Establish hypobaric chamber facility capable of supporting 8-person EVA prebreathe validation tests at saturation atmospheres up to 36% O2; 2) validate an EVA physical workload simulation for use during prebreathe validation testing; 3) validate the recommended “exploration atmosphere” prebreathe protocol; 4) validate prebreathe protocols for additional atmospheric combinations that bound the most likely potential operating ranges of future vehicles and spacesuits; and 5) update DCS risk estimation models based on results of prebreathe validation studies. DISCUSSION: Details and data from completion of the first two steps of the strategic roadmap will be presented; the third step is currently underway, with pilot results provided in a companion presentation. Steps four and five will require a multi-year series of chamber tests; collaborations are being pursued.

Andrew F. J. Abercromby↗
DOE OSTI2024

Security constrained optimal power shutoff for wildfire risk mitigation

Abstract Electric grid faults are increasingly the source of ignition for major wildfires. To reduce the likelihood of such ignitions in high risk situations, utilities use preemptive de‐energization of power lines, commonly referred to as Public Safety Power Shutoffs (PSPS). Besides raising challenging trade‐offs between power outages and wildfire safety, PSPS removes redundancy from the network at a time when component faults are likely to happen. This may leave the network particularly vulnerable to unexpected line faults that may occur while the PSPS is in place. Previous works have not explicitly considered the impacts of these outages. To address this gap, the Security Constrained Optimal Power Shutoff problem is proposed which uses post‐contingency security constraints to model the impact of unexpected line faults when planning a PSPS. This model enables, for the first time, the exploration of a wide range of trade‐offs between both wildfire risk and pre‐ and post‐contingency load shedding when designing PSPS plans, providing useful insights for utilities and policy makers considering different approaches to PSPS. The efficacy of the model is demonstrated using the EPRI 39‐bus system as a case study. The results highlight the potential risks of not considering security constraints when planning PSPS and show that incorporating security constraints into the PSPS design process improves the resilience of current PSPS plans.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
NASA NTRS2003

Addressing software security risk mitigations in the life cycle

The NASA Office of Safety and Mission Assurance (OSMA) has funded the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) with a Center Initiative, 'Reducing Software Security Risk through an Integrated Approach' (RSSR), to address this need. The Initiative is a formal approach to addressing software security in the life cycle through the instantiation of a Software Security Assessment Instrument (SSAI) for the development and maintenance life cycles.

software tools↗
NASA NTRS2014

Middle Man Concept for In-Orbit Collision Risks Mitigation, CAESAR and CARA Examples

This paper describes the conjunction analysis which has to be performed using data provided by JSpOC. This description not only demonstrates that Collision Avoidance is a 2- step process (close approach detection followed by risk evaluation for collision avoidance decision) but also leads to the conclusion that there is a need for a Middle Man role. After describing the Middle Man concept, this paper introduces two examples with their similarities and particularities: the American civil space effort delivered by the NASA CARA team (Conjunction Assessment Risk Analysis) and the French response CAESAR (Conjunction Assessment and Evaluation Service: Alerts and Recommendations). For both, statistics are presented and feedbacks discussed. All together, around 80 satellites are served by CARA and/or CAESAR. Both processes regularly evolve in order either to follow JSpOC upgrades or to improve analysis according to experience acquired during the past years.

conjunction↗
NASA NTRS2021

NASA Engineering and Safety Center Technical Bulletin No. 19-01-1: Mitigating Risks of Single-Event Effects in Space Applications

Since most Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical (EEE) parts are intended for terrestrial applications, they are susceptible to a range of radiation threats in the space environment if the resulting effects are not properly characterized and mitigated. Even specially designed radiation-hardened parts may not be tolerant to all types of radiation effects. Radiation hardness is a multi-dimensional property of any part that describes intrinsic abilities to tolerate various radiation environments [1,2]. Effects to be concerned with include total ionizing dose, total non-ionizing dose, and single-event effects (SEE) – all of which depend on the mission, environment, application, and lifetime. Radiation effects concerns may be the same whether a EEE part is Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS), MIL-SPEC, or some other variant, all of which are susceptible to the same radiation threats [3]. SEE consequences range from recoverable faults to catastrophic failure. Like other random faults, SEE can be mitigated with informed circuit design practices at the device, card, and/or system level.

Single-event effects↗
NASA NTRS2010

Risk Mitigation Approach to Commercial Resupply to the International Space Station

In August 2006, NASA awarded Space Act Agreements (SAAs) for Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) under the Commercial Crew and Cargo Project Office at Johnson Space Center. One of the goals of the SAAs is to facilitate U.S. private industry demonstration of cargo transportation capabilities, ultimately achieving reliable, cost effective access to low-Earth orbit (LEO). Each COTS provider is required to complete International Space Stations (ISS) Integration activities, which includes meeting the physical and functional interfaces and interface requirements between the ISS and COTS vehicles. These requirements focus on the areas of risk to the ISS during rendezvous and proximity operations, as well as the integration operations while the COTS vehicle is berthed to the ISS. On December 23, 2008, NASA awarded Commercial Resupply Service (CRS) contracts to provide resupply services to the ISS, following the Shuttle retirement. In addition to performing any ISS Integration activities, NASA will be performing independent assessments of the launch vehicle and orbital vehicle to evaluate the readiness of the contractor to deliver NASA cargo safely to the ISS. This paper will address the activities NASA Centers, both JSC and KSC, in the oversight and insight function over commercial visiting vehicles to the ISS.

Koons, Diane S.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Large Vehicle Lunar Landing Surface Interaction and In-Situ Resource Based Risk Mitigation: Landing & Launch Pads

A key capability required for the exploration of planetary bodies is the ability to land on the surface. Previous work performed by NASA and other institutions has primarily focused on landing small spacecraft on planetary surfaces and the associated small-to-medium thrusters required for the soft landing. In the case of human exploration—particularly the establishment of long duration exploration and habitation outposts—the ability to land large landers, such as the SpaceX Starship, is necessary. These larger landing systems require the use of more powerful engines, with higher engine exhaust temperatures and higher landing loads. Understanding the excavation of material by the engines, as well as the potential for the landing legs to sink into the subsurface, is key in ensuring reliable and safe landings. A further improvement in landing reliability can be achieved by constructing landing / launch pads, especially with in-situ resources. Some material excavation by the plume is inevitable, leaving at least a portion of the surface scoured and uneven under the lander and ejecting regolith particles and rocks at very high velocities. One possible solution would be to robotically build landing / launch pads (ideally autonomously) at the destination using in-situ materials. In this case, the first one or few landers will need to land on unimproved surfaces at higher risk; however, they would bring the required equipment to build the landing pads with mostly local resources, thus increasing the reliability of safe landing for subsequent larger landers. A number of methods to build in-situ landing and launch pads have already been developed. These methods include no or some addition of required binder additives to the local regolith material, different processing approaches and result in varying landing pad strengths. A sub-scale rocket engine plume, was used to simulate some of the conditions of a landing on the Moon to assess the effectiveness of various materials for an in-situ built landing pad, The GO2/GCH4 rocket engine fired on 1m2 area coupons of representative pad materials. The results will allow continued development towards materials that satisfy the landing pad properties required for the effective risk reduction and increased reliability for landing people and equipment on the lunar surface. This work contained two parts: (1) computer modeling of a large rocket engine plume interacting with regolith on the Moon, using the Granular Gas Flow Solver (GGFS) provided by CFD Research Corporation as well as other computational fluid dynamics codes (CFD) such as Loci/CHEM. (2) Developing landing/launch pad materials that could be used for in-situ construction on the lunar surface in the future, to mitigate the calculated effects of a large vehicle rocket engine landing and launching on the Moon. The resulting computed values of plume impingement surface temperature, stagnation pressure, gas velocity, shear stress and heat flux were then matched as closely as possible in the Earth’s atmosphere in a sub-scale rocket engine GO2/CH4 test which was provided by Masten Space Systems in Mojave, California. The rocket engine was mounted on a test stand with vertical translation capabilities so that the landing operations of a lander could be simulated (Figure 1).The pad materials test coupons were placed at the surface of a large bin containing simulated lunar basalt regolith and subjected to a test firing as shown in Figure 2. The results of this testing will be presented with related findings, analysis and discussion.

Plume Surface Interaction↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Large Vehicle Lunar Landing Surface Interaction and In-Situ Resource Based Risk Mitigation: Landing & Launch Pads

A key capability required for the exploration of planetary bodies is the ability to land on the surface. Previous work performed by NASA and other institutions has primarily focused on landing small spacecraft on planetary surfaces and the associated small-to-medium thrusters required for the soft landing. In the case of human exploration—particularly the establishment of long duration exploration and habitation outposts—the ability to land large landers, such as the SpaceX Starship, is necessary. These larger landing systems require the use of more powerful engines, with higher engine exhaust temperatures and higher landing loads. Understanding the excavation of material by the engines, as well as the potential for the landing legs to sink into the subsurface, is key in ensuring reliable and safe landings. A further improvement in landing reliability can be achieved by constructing landing / launch pads, especially with in-situ resources. Some material excavation by the plume is inevitable, leaving at least a portion of the surface scoured and uneven under the lander and ejecting regolith particles and rocks at very high velocities. One possible solution would be to robotically build landing / launch pads (ideally autonomously) at the destination using in-situ materials. In this case, the first one or few landers will need to land on unimproved surfaces at higher risk; however, they would bring the required equipment to build the landing pads with mostly local resources, thus increasing the reliability of safe landing for subsequent larger landers. A number of methods to build in-situ landing and launch pads have already been developed. These methods include no, or some, addition of required binder additives to the local regolith material, different processing approaches and result in varying landing pad strengths. A sub-scale rocket engine plume, was used to simulate some of the conditions of a landing on the Moon to assess the effectiveness of various materials for an in-situ built landing pad, The GO2/GCH4rocket engine fired on a 1m2area coupons of representative pad materials. The results will allow continued development towards materials that satisfy the landing pad properties required for the effective risk reduction and increased reliability for landing people and equipment on the lunar surface. This work contained two parts: (1) computer modeling of a large rocket engine plume interacting with regolith on the Moon, using the Granular Gas Flow Solver (GGFS) provided by CFD Research Corporation as well as other computational fluid dynamics codes (CFD) such as Loci/CHEM. (2) Developing landing/launch pad materials that could be used for in-situ construction on the lunar surface in the future, to mitigate the calculated effects of a large vehicle rocket engine landing and launching on the Moon.

Lunar↗
NASA NTRS2000

Integrated Orbiter/International Space Station Air Quality Analysis for Post-Mission 2A.1 Risk Mitigation

Even under the assumption that all Orbiter and ISS elements would be operating as designed, condensation control and crewmember comfort were paramount issues preceding each of the ISS Missions 2A and 2A.1. However, crewmember discomfort during Mission 2A.1, in addition to evidence provided by flight data and observations, suggested that countermeasures would be necessary for future flights where the Orbiter provides primary control. A review of Space Shuttle Program (SSP) and International Space Station Program (ISSP) assumptions and analytical methods that describe ECLS transport phenomena was accomplished in order to ensure the veracity of future analyses. Subsequently, various analyses and interpretations of Mission 2A.1 flight data provided the necessary information to help understand the probable causes of the flight environment. With cooperation between the SSP and ISSP, countermeasures were devised for Mission 2A.2 that would likely improve the delivery of conditioned air by the Orbiter to the ISS as well as within the ISS elements.

RISK MANAGEMENT↗