SEARCH · Engineering Papers
Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.
Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.
What standard tests are required for commercializing a new PV module technology such as perovskite photovoltaics? This summary document provides answers in the areas of (1) quality assurance for manufacturing, (2) safety and reliability testing, and (3) performance characterization.
The Nondestructive Assay Program (NDAP) mission and vision is achieved by identifying and accomplishing a set of programmatic goals that correspond with eight broad technical program elements. The NDAP was created as a result of Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board Recommendation 2007-1, entitled “Safety-Related In Situ Nondestructive Assay of Radioactive Materials,” which emphasized the need to improve in situ measurements of radioactive material at US Department of Energy (DOE) defense nuclear facilities. An NDAP five-year plan will define tasks to accomplish specific goals identified in the NDAP mission and vision. This mission and vision is applicable for eight technical program elements: Hardware/Software Development, Algorithm Development and Nuclear Data, Uncertainty Quantification, Nuclear Materials, Staffing, Personnel, And Training, Data Management, Requirement and Standards, and Information Preservation and Dissemination. An additional program element is technical support, which provides daily execution management support for the NDAP, site scope, and deliverable tracking via site task managers, along with technical advisement and support from the technical support group. The NDAP mission and vision provides attributes with specific goals for each program element, and some goals benefit multiple program elements. The goals and attributes defined herein are implemented via an NDAP five-year execution plan that defines site work scope, budget, and deliverables, all of which are updated annually. The NDAP is designed to benefit nondestructive assay (NDA) needs to support DOE nuclear criticality safety programs, ensuring that NDA technology is sufficiently capable of guaranteeing the safety of those who handle, store, process, or transport fissionable materials in the complex. Especially important for the NDAP is to maximize capabilities to identify, characterize, and manage in situ fissile material deposits in process equipment to ensure nuclear criticality safety at processing facilities.
This document is intended to be a reference manual for the Appendix G Performance Rating Method (PRM) of ANSI/ASHRAE/IES Standard 90.1-2022 (Standard 90.1-2022). The PRM can be used to demonstrate compliance with the standard and to rate the energy efficiency of commercial and high-rise residential buildings with designs that exceed the requirements of Standard 90.1. Use of the PRM for demonstrating compliance with Standard 90.1 was a new feature of ANSI/ASHRAE/IES Standard 90.1-2016 (Standard 90.1-2016). The procedures and processes described in the PRM reference manual (PRM-RM) are designed to provide consistency and accuracy by filling in gaps and providing additional details needed by users of the PRM.
This document is intended to be a reference manual for the Appendix G Performance Rating Method (PRM) of ANSI/ASHRAE/IES Standard 90.1-2019 (Standard 90.1-2019). The PRM can be used to demonstrate compliance with the standard and to rate the energy efficiency of commercial and high-rise residential buildings with designs that exceed the requirements of Standard 90.1. Use of the PRM for demonstrating compliance with Standard 90.1 was a new feature of ANSI/ASHRAE/IES Standard 90.1-2016 (Standard 90.1-2016). The procedures and processes described in the PRM reference manual (PRM-RM) are designed to provide consistency and accuracy by filling in gaps and providing additional details needed by users of the PRM.
This presentation provides an overview of the licensing, permitting, and regulatory frameworks governing Battery Energy Storage Systems (BESS) across multiple international contexts. It outlines foundational permitting considerations - including safety standards, siting requirements, regulatory and environmental obligations, and interconnection processes - alongside typical pathways for installation, approval, and inspection. The presentation summarizes key technical standards such as NFPA 855 and IEEE guidelines, and emphasizes best practices for safe and effective deployment. A series of detailed case studies from South Africa, Chile, Mexico, Brazil, Costa Rica, Honduras, and the Dominican Republic illustrates how different countries structure approval authority, evaluate environmental impacts, and integrate BESS into national grid systems. The deck concludes with insights on emerging challenges, including evolving regulatory frameworks, financial viability, and the need for pricing mechanisms that accurately value storage services.
In this work, we present UV completions of the recently proposed number-changing Co-SIMP freeze-out mechanism. In contrast to the standard cannibalistic-type dark matter picture that occurs entirely in the dark sector, the 3 → 2 process setting the relic abundance in this case requires one Standard Model particle in the initial and final states. This prevents the dark sector from overheating and leads to rich experimental signatures. We generate the Co-SIMP interaction with a dark sector consisting of two scalars, with the mediator coupling to either nucleons or electrons. In either case, the dark matter candidate is naturally light : nucleophilic interactions favor the sub-GeV mass range and leptophilic interactions favor the sub-MeV mass range. Viable thermal models in these lighter mass regimes are particularly intriguing to study at this time, as new developments in low-threshold detector technologies will begin probing this region of parameter space. While particles in the sub-MeV regime can potentially impact light element formation and CMB decoupling, we show that a late-time phase transition opens up large fractions of parameter space. These thermal light dark matter models can instead be tested with dedicated experiments. We discuss the viable parameter space in each scenario in light of the current sensitivity of various experimental probes and projected future reach.
This living document describes required and recommended standards for data additions to the Livewire Data Platform (https://livewire.energy.gov/). Adherence to the standards described enables development of automated analysis and discovery tools for Livewire data and will facilitate development of future capabilities for delivering data that can be tailored to meet user needs.
Security Executive Agent Directive (SEAD) 3, Reporting Requirements for Personnel With Access to Classified Information or Who Hold a Sensitive Position, was implemented by the Director of National Intelligence in 2017. SEAD 3 establishes standardized reporting requirements for employees who have access to classified information/matter.
Rapidly growing interest in advanced and small modular reactor (A/SMR) technologies presents challenges as well as opportunities for implementing international safeguards and security. A/SMR deployments are expected to be more numerous, more geographically dispersed, and more varied in their designs, placing new demands on the data systems and analytical tools used to support oversight (Alberti et al., 2023; Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission et al., 2024). Because of this variability, the importance and reliance on data systems for A/SMR deployments is expected to be higher than for previous reactor generations. Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning (AI/ML) offer potential capabilities to address the high variability inherent in A/SMR technology. The beneficiaries of AI-assisted tools include facility operators, government regulators, IAEA inspectors, and A/SMR vendors. This report analyzes how AI/ML-assisted technologies can strengthen the implementation of IAEA safeguards and security measures. It also identifies AI-assisted tools to strengthen operator, facility, and regulator knowledge management practices and examines the potential risks AI/ML-based tools may introduce to IAEA safeguards and security efforts. It concludes with a set of hypothetical, standards-style requirements for AI/ML systems used in safeguards contexts, grounded in an inspector-centric view of system verification. Despite the potential benefits of AI/ML systems, understanding potential intentional and unintentional failure modes is critical for ensuring adequate protection of nuclear materials and facilities. Unique features of A/SMRs including sealed cores, remote and novel paradigms of operation, off-site reactor fabrication, novel fuel forms, and varied refueling requirements, introduce challenges for traditional safeguards technological approaches (Pensado et al., 2024; Federation of American Scientists, 2025). AI/ML systems deployed to address these challenges may introduce new risks requiring systematic evaluation rooted in both AI-specific risk frameworks, such as the NIST AI Risk Management Framework (NIST AI RMF), and established cyber risk management standards such as NIST SP 800-30 (National Institute of Standards and Technology [NIST], 2023; NIST, 2012).
ASER stands for the Annual Site Environmental Report and is the primary document that the U.S. Department of Energy uses to inform the public of environmental performance and conditions at SRS. • ASERs are required by U.S. Department of Energy to provide the public and stakeholders information on: – Environmental program performance – Site wide environmental monitoring and surveillance effectiveness – Compliance status with environmental standards and requirements • SRS published its first ASER in 1959
Endoscopes are crucial for assisting in surgery and disease diagnosis, including the early detection of cancer. The effective use of endoscopes relies on their optical performance, which can be characterized with a series of metrics such as resolution, vital for revealing anatomical details. The modulation transfer function (MTF) is a key metric for evaluating endoscope resolution. However, the 2020 version of the ISO 8600-5 standard, while introducing an endoscope MTF measurement method, lacks empirical validation and excludes opto-electronic video endoscopes, the largest family of endoscopes. Measuring the MTF of video endoscopes requires tailored standards that address their unique characteristics. This paper aims to expand the scope of ISO 8600-5:2020 to include video endoscopes, by optimizing the MTF test method and addressing parameters affecting measurement accuracy. We studied the effects of intensity and uniformity of image luminance, chart modulation compensation, linearity of image digital values, auto gain control, image enhancement, image compression and the region of interest dimensions on images of slanted-edge test charts, and thus the MTF based on these images. By analyzing these effects, we provided recommendations for setting and controlling these factors to obtain accurate MTF curves. Our goal is to enhance the standard’s relevance and effectiveness for measuring the MTF of a broader range of endoscopic devices, with potential applications in the MTF measurement of other digital imaging devices.
This project defined, developed, and tested the open standards-based requirements, engineering design and system integration of on and off-vehicle Vehicle-to-Grid technologies both on the grid and on the PEV, to assess their effectiveness in implementing the use cases that create value for the grid, which in turn, can be passed on to the ratepayers and the PEV owners. The project comprised of three key categories of work and four key sub-areas of work. The three key categories were: On-Vehicle V2G, Off-Vehicle V2G, and impact of V2G operation on the battery capacity degradation. The four key sub-areas of work under each of these categories were: defining requirements, implementing the technology, performing system integration testing, and estimating the value of each of the grid services under specific assumptions, on a per-vehicle and on an aggregated basis. The technical implementation demonstrated the validity of standards-based approach to grid integration that led to interoperability, in addition to assessing the operational details with grid constraints imposed at the transformer level. The technology implementation also identified the subtle gaps in the standards definition to close the feedback loop on the accuracy of the standards as written, which are being implemented as revisions to the appropriate protocols. The battery impacts assessment developed a test cycle that the batteries from a real PHEV were subjected to for both the mobility-only and mobility with V2G specific energy cycling. While the battery impact results show a clear incremental degradation in response to additional throughput for V2G application purposes, the amount of additional kWh that can be made available without exceeding the end-of-life capacity definition of the battery at its 10-year warranty period was found to be significant. Given that the PEV battery being exercised during testing was a PHEV battery (smaller energy capacity), and 44% of its usable energy (i.e., SOC) was utilized daily for V2G applications, the EVs with much larger batteries will fare much better, either in terms of extracting more value in terms of incremental kWh for V2G, or in terms of relative incremental degradation of the capacity through the battery lifespan. Further, this battery was the second-generation Lithium-Ion chemistry circa 2015, which is at least two generations ago. Continual improvements in electrochemistry and manufacturing techniques as well as on-board capacity will enable the future batteries to provide even more energy for non-mobility-related services. Finally, the valuation of V2G energy services at the premise, distribution, and the ISO/market level was carried out for both the on-vehicle and off-vehicle cases, to understand both the GHG mitigation and operational efficiency improvements in quantitative terms. The analysis indicates that between $\$400$ and $\$1400$ per year of total value to the grid can be realized. When netted of costs to implement V2G either on or off-vehicle, the net value is available to be shared between the ratepayers and the EV owners. Over the life of the EV, therefore, this value becomes significant and can easily provide both ratepayer and EV owner benefits more than the cost of the equipment, either on or off-board, in addition to providing GHG mitigation benefits both on the grid and on the mobility sides. For these benefits to accrue, the key learnings from both the on- and off-vehicle V2G parts of the project indicate the need for at-scale demonstrations through involvement of real EV owners to validate both the technical feasibility, interoperability, as well as real grid benefits by performing extensive data collection and analysis. This will help inform the grid planners, the program designs, and tariff designers, as well as automotive and equipment manufacturers how best to create their products to maximize grid, ratepayer, and EV owner value.
Managing the digitalization of increasingly diversity energy resources is a complex challenge for energy systems planners and managers. As the penetration of solar photovoltaics (PV) and other distributed renewable energy resources (DERs) expands, distributed energy resource management systems (DERMS) will play an increasingly important role in managing, monitoring, and controlling DERs as electric systems before more distributed, interconnected, and networked. However, the cybersecurity implications of DERMS deployments are not well understood today. A lack of understanding around the cybersecurity implications of DERMS deployments and variability in the security posture of DERMS vendors, owners, and operators could introduce new security risks to evolving electric power systems. This paper describes cybersecurity attack scenarios on DERMS, identifies related cybersecurity standards and guidelines, reviews the security features of state-of-the-art DERMS solutions, and offers cybersecurity guidance for DERMS vendors, owners, and operators to protect DERMS' unique capabilities. Standardizing cybersecurity requirements for DERMS could help improve the security of DERMS integrations and improve innovations that are more secure by design. The cybersecurity guidance found in this paper is intended to offer a unified approach and lay the foundation for future standardization of DERMS cybersecurity to reduce risk to the solar industry and other renewable energy stakeholders when integrating these technologies with electric power systems.
As the DER penetration level has risen significantly in recent times, parameter settings and configuration of installed DERs are having direct impact on local electric distribution utilities as well as bulk power systems during normal and abnormal grid conditions. On the other hand, all grid-connected DERs in the United States of America must conform to the interconnection requirements prescribed in the IEEE Std 1547-2018. Because of these reasons, it is crucial to understand the expected DER performance during abnormal grid conditions considering the requirements of the IEEE Std 1547-2018. The aim of this document is twofold: (1) to summarize requirements in IEEE Std 1547-2018 having direct implications in distribution network protection, and (2) to provide the reader with knowledge and information that will be required for users to apply the requirements specified. Since the focus of this document is on distribution network protection in the presence of DERs, it is assumed that the readers have basic understanding of distribution network protection as well as working principles of DERs. This document starts with a brief introduction on protection systems for distribution network followed by a discussion on the impact of DER on the protection systems. Current practices to provide network protection in the presence of DER is briefly discussed. The document then explores the DER performance requirements in IEEE Std. 1547-2018; especially on those related to distribution network protection. Section 6.1 in IEEE Std. 1547-2018 provides an overview of capabilities and control requirements for DER under abnormal operating conditions. This section also introduces abnormal operating performance categories I, II, III. The DER response to various types of faults and grid conditions such as short-circuit faults and open phase conditions are discussed in section 6.2 in the standard while requirements for coordination with the Area EPS reclosing scheme are provided in section 6.3. Section 6.4 in the IEEE Std 1547-2018 specifies requirements for mandatory voltage tripping and ride-through requirements during low and high voltage disturbances and section 6.5 specifies similar requirements for low and high frequency disturbances. IEEE Std. 1547 requires that the conformance of the DERs to IEEE Std 1547-2018 requirements should be verified in accordance with IEEE Std. 1547. 1. There are several parameters and settings of DERs that need to be properly selected for reliable operation during abnormal grid condition while applying the requirements of IEEE Std 1547-2018. Key decisions for proper selections of parameter and settings are: 1. Determination of required DER abnormal operating performance category, 2. Determination of DER response (shall trip) to abnormal voltages and 3. Determination of DER response (shall trip) to abnormal frequency.
This plan provides a high-level summary of environmental monitoring performed by various organizations within and around the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Site as required by U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Order 435.1, Radioactive Waste Management, and DOE Order 458.1, Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment, Guide DOE/EH-0173T, Environmental Regulatory Guide for Radiological Effluent Monitoring and Environmental Surveillance, and in accordance with 40 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 61, National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants. The purpose of these orders is to 1) implement sound stewardship practices that protect the air, water, land, and other natural and cultural resources that may be impacted by DOE operations, and 2) to establish standards and requirements for the operations of DOE and DOE contractors with respect to protection of the environment and members of the public against undue risk from radiation. This plan describes the organizations responsible for conducting environmental monitoring across the INL Site, the rationale for monitoring, the types of media being monitored, where the monitoring is conducted, and where monitoring results can be obtained. Detailed monitoring procedures, program plans, or other governing documents used by contractors or agencies to implement requirements are referenced in this plan. This plan covers all planned monitoring and environmental surveillance. Non-routine activities such as special research studies and characterization of individual sites for environmental restoration are outside the scope of this plan.
This document summarizes relevant approaches, research, models, and national examples for state utility regulators tasked with developing utility guidelines for risk-based resiliency planning. In 2021, the Oregon Legislature enacted a 100 percent clean electricity by 2040 standard that requires the Oregon Public Utility Commission (PUC) to oversee utility planning for aggressive clean energy deployment through Clean Energy Plans (House Bill 2021, Sec. 4). In addition to meeting emissions reductions targets, Clean Energy Plans must also: "Include a risk-based examination of resiliency opportunities that includes costs, consequences, outcomes, and benefits based on reasonable and prudent industry resiliency standards and guidelines established by the Public Utility Commission." This report will support the Oregon Public Utility Commission in developing resilience guidelines. Other state public utility commissions may also benefit from this research.
To satisfy the requirements of the United States Department of Energy (DOE) SLAC Site Office approved Site Compliance Plan for DOE Order 231.1B, “Environment, Safety and Health Reporting,” the Environment, Safety and Health Division (ES&H) of the SLAC National Accelerator Laboratory prepares an annual report describing its environmental programs and activities. This Annual Site Environmental Report: 2019 summarizes the SLAC National Accelerator Laboratory compliance with standards and requirements, describes the management and monitoring systems in place, and highlights significant accomplishments for the year.
To satisfy the requirements of the United States Department of Energy (DOE) SLAC Site Office approved Site Compliance Plan for DOE Order 231.1B (Change 1, 2012, “Environment, Safety and Health Reporting,” the Environment, Safety and Health Division (ES&H) of the SLAC National Accelerator Laboratory prepares an annual report describing its environmental programs and activities. This Annual Site Environmental Report: 2020 summarizes the SLAC National Accelerator Laboratory compliance with standards and requirements, describes the management and monitoring systems in place, and highlights significant accomplishments for the year.