ADVANCED PROCESS INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM FOR NEXT-GENERATION NUCLEAR REACTORS
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Decommissioning, dismantling and remote handling applications in nuclear facilities all require robotic solutions that are able to survive in radiation environments. Recently raised safety, radiation hardness and cost efficiency demands from both the nuclear regulatory and the society impose severe challenges in traditional methods. For example, in case of the dismantling of the Fukushima sites, solutions that survive accumulated doses higher than 1 MGy are mandatory. To allow remote operation of these tools in nuclear environments, electronics were used to be shielded with several centimeters of lead or even completely banned in these solutions. However, shielding electronics always leads to bulky and heavy solutions, which reduces the flexibility of robotic tools. It also requires longer repair time and produces extra waste further in a dismantling or decommissioning cycle. In addition, often in current reactor designs, due to size restrictions and the need to inspect very tight areas there are limitations to the use of shielding. A MGy radiation-hardened sensor instrumentation link developed by MAGyICS provides a solution to build a flexible, easy removable and small I and C module with MGy radiation tolerance without any shielding. Hereby it removes all these pains to implement electronics in robotic tools. The demonstrated solution in this poster is developed for ITER Remote Handling equipments operating in high radiation environments (>1 MGy) in and around the Tokamak. In order to obtain adequately accurate instrumentation and control information, as well as to ease the umbilical management, there is a need of front-end electronics that will have to be located close to those actuators and sensors on the remote handling tool. In particular, for diverter remote handling, it is estimated that these components will face gamma radiation up to 300 Gy/h (in-vessel) and a total dose of 1 MGy. The radiation-hardened sensor instrumentation link presented here, consists of multiple in-house developed, state-of-the-art building blocks. They have all been assessed and characterized up to a dose higher than 1 MGy. The first block in the signal chain is a smaller than 1 uV offset, low noise instrumentation amplifier that has a programmable gain between 8 and 256. This amplifier is followed by a high precision 16 bit ADC. Its main function is to digitize the amplified signal coming from the amplifier. The output of the ADC is a serial digital data stream. The next block is a 8 channel digital multiplexer. It converts the 8 digital data streams into 1 digital data stream. Hereby the instrumentation solution reduces the number of cables from 16 to 1 (8* 2 analogue differential signals). In addition, the multiplexer modules can be combined with other modules to reduce even further the number of cables. Every instrumentation solution requires a stable high precision voltage reference. Therefore also a bandgap reference has been developed and assessed under gamma irradiation. A low jitter, 10 MHz clock generator has been developed and qualified to clock the ADC and the multiplexer with high accuracy. Finally, an on-chip radiation-hard temperature sensor is also included. A complete remote, real-time test setup was prepared by MAGyICS in cooperation with Fusion for Energy to qualify the sensor instrumentation link at SCK-CEN. It is qualified by closely following the ESCC22900 space standard for electronics used in a radiation environment. The main benefit of the sensor instrumentation solution discussed here is that it can be directly employed in a MGy-level accumulated dose radiation environment, therefore it can digitize and multiplex sensor readout values early in the signal chain. Hereby the sensor values are not distorted by external interferences on the long transmission cable. Moreover it allows readout and digitize multiple low-bandwidth sensors ( pressure and temperature sensors, thermocouples, angular resolvers and LVDTs). Hence these instrumentation modules can be used to follow the trend of the digitalization in the nuclear industry. (authors)
Reliable instrumentation, information, and control (II&C) systems technologies are essential to ensuring safe and efficient operation of the U.S. light water reactor (LWR) fleet. These technologies affect every aspect of nuclear power plant (NPP) and balance-of-plant operations. In 1997, the National Research Council conducted a study concerning the challenges involved in modernization of digital instrumentation and control systems in NPPs. Their findings identified the need for new II&C technology integration.
Reliable instrumentation, information, and control (II&C) systems technologies are essential to ensuring safe and efficient operation of the U.S. light water reactor (LWR) fleet. These technologies affect every aspect of nuclear power plant (NPP) and balance-of-plant operations. In 1997, the National Research Council conducted a study concerning the challenges involved in modernization of digital instrumentation and control systems in NPPs. Their findings identified the need for new II&C technology integration.
Reliable instrumentation, information, and control (II&C) systems technologies are essential to ensuring safe and efficient operation of the U.S. light water reactor (LWR) fleet. These technologies affect every aspect of nuclear power plant (NPP) and balance-of-plant operations. In 1997, the National Research Council conducted a study concerning the challenges involved in modernization of digital instrumentation and control systems in NPPs. Their findings identified the need for new II&C technology integration.
Reliable instrumentation, information, and control (II&C) systems technologies are essential to ensuring safe and efficient operation of the U.S. light water reactor (LWR) fleet. These technologies affect every aspect of nuclear power plant (NPP) and balance-of-plant operations. In 1997, the National Research Council conducted a study concerning the challenges involved in modernization of digital instrumentation and control systems in NPPs. Their findings identified the need for new II&C technology integration.
Reliable instrumentation, information, and control (II&C) systems technologies are essential to ensuring safe and efficient operation of the U.S. light water reactor (LWR) fleet. These technologies affect every aspect of nuclear power plant (NPP) and balance-of-plant operations. In 1997, the National Research Council conducted a study concerning the challenges involved in modernizing existing analog-based instrumentation and controls with digital instrumentation and control systems in NPPs. Their findings identified the need for new II&C technology integration. The objective of these efforts is to develop, demonstrate, and support deployment of new digital II&C technologies for nuclear process control, enhance worker performance, and provide enhanced monitoring capabilities to ensure the continued safe, reliable, and economic operation of the nation’s NPPs. Digital II&C technologies are deployed in a number of power generation settings worldwide. Current instrumentation and human-machine interfaces in the nuclear power sector employ analog technologies. In other power generation sectors, analog technologies have largely been replaced with digital technologies. This is in part due to the manufacturing and product support base transitioning to these newer technologies. It also accompanies the transition of education curricula for I&C engineers to digital technologies. Consequently, product manufacturers refer to analog I&C as having reached the end of its useful service life. Although considered obsolete by other industries, analog I&C continues to function reliably, though spare and replacement parts are becoming increasingly scarce as is the workforce that is familiar with and able to maintain it. Analog I&C was also the predominant means used for process control in an era when human labor was more affordable, and maintaining an I&C technology base through a larger workforce conducting frequent rounds for surveillances, inspections, and tests was accepted in the nuclear power generation business model. Today’s power generation business climate is much different and II&C technologies are needed in the long run that are more highly automated and require less cost to operate and maintain, are as highly reliable as those used today, and will be familiar to a future work force. They should also enable performance gains for the utility so that they are not merely a sunken cost, as this would weigh heavily on the balance sheet at a time of particularly high cost competitiveness in electricity markets.
One of the main reasons for the increasing popularity of FPGAs in embedded systems and digital I and C systems is that they provide many of the advantages from both hardware and software components. FPGAs provide configurability approaching that of SW, while at the same time delivering deterministic behavior of pure hardware solutions. However, with regard to Software Common Cause Failures (CCF), the use of FPGAs in digital I and C platforms should not be seen as plug-in remedy for reduction or elimination of CCF. To address CCF, we argue that it is not enough to manage the complexity of an I and C device or system, but we must also have the ability to constrain complexity (as needed) and rigorously reason about execution and device functionality. This paper presents the work done regarding an FPGA overlay architecture called SymPLe. SymPLe is designed to reduce the gap between software and hardware approaches for digital I and C systems and increases deterministic behavior and verifiability of the application, architecture and safety-critical system while reasoning about CCF. (authors)
The power distribution estimation method based on the ex-core detectors, or PHOEBE, was demonstrated at Kyoto University Critical Assembly, KUCA. Generally, core monitoring systems use in-core neutron detectors. Since inside the core is a harsh environment, the maintainability and reliability of the detectors are deteriorated. On the other hand, the environment outside the core is milder: core monitoring by the ex-core detectors improves the maintainability and reliability especially for small modular reactors and micro-reactors. However, neutron information from the inner region of the core is lost at the ex-core detectors. To recover the information, the authors proposed to utilize the power correlation between the fuel regions. PHOEBE concept was demonstrated at KUCA with distorted power distributions simulated by control rod patterns. The relative power distribution estimated by PHOEBE agreed with that calculated by Monte Carlo simulation code MVP. PHOEBE approximately reproduced the trend of the distorted power distributions calculated by MVP code. By contrast, the case of without power correlation between fuel regions produced significant different power distributions. Therefore, the advantage of considering the power correlation between fuel regions was also demonstrated. (authors)
The development of small modular reactors (SMRs) and Generation-IV advanced reactor designs represents a promising future for nuclear energy. These next-generation reactors can support new applications for nuclear energy like hydrogen production, industrial heat generation, and water desalination in addition to electricity generation. Furthermore, SMRs and advanced reactors enable load-following operations, offer improved passive safety features, support lengthened refueling cycles, and provide spent fuel management capabilities. To date, there are no SMRs operating or under construction in the United States, but commercial operation of the first integral Pressurized Water Reactor (iPWR) SMR is expected by the mid-2020's with Generation-IV advanced reactors to follow a decade or two later. To facilitate the development and deployment of SMRs and advanced reactors, key instrumentation and control (I and C) system challenges must be addressed and existing nuclear grade I and C sensors will need to be adapted or new sensors developed. For example, traditional measurement techniques and maintenance strategies used in the current generation of light water reactors (LWRs) will be challenged by the inherent design characteristics of the iPWR. For Generation-IV reactors, conventional I and C sensors will not withstand prolonged exposure to the harsh environmental conditions of advanced reactors (e.g. elevated temperatures, corrosive coolants, increased radiation). This paper discusses the challenges associated with making primary system process measurements in next-generation reactors and includes a summary of work performed to evaluate existing and emerging sensor technologies for these systems. As importantly, the paper presents the initial test results of a prototype temperature sensor developed by Analysis and Measurement Services Corporation (AMS) for use in SMRs and advanced reactors. (authors)
Nuclear licensees are required to submit a documented justification of the safety of the plant and its systems to the local regulatory body. Developing this documentation is a hard task and requires a lot of effort from several stakeholders. It should be understandable, transparent, convincing and complete. Observations from the current practice indicate that the nuclear power industry would benefit from more structured, systematic and harmonized practices in engineering instrumentation and control (I and C) systems and justifying their safety. This paper describes recently recognized challenges in demonstrating the safety of digital I and C systems and suggests possible ways to solve them. Some of the proposed solutions are light improvements in the everyday documentation practices, working methods and utilization of computerized support tools, while others would involve fundamental changes in the design and documentation philosophy that are more demanding to implement. (authors)
In the last decade, 97% of the worldwide commercial nuclear reactors connected to the grid were Light Water Reactors (LWRs). LWRs are expected to stay the dominant type of nuclear reactors for the next few decades. Reliable and redundant safety systems are required in nuclear reactors to ensure safe operation and shutdown in abnormal conditions. These safety systems are actuated by the signals obtained from several sensors and instrumentation in and out of the reactor core. Research and Development (R&D) in advanced sensors and instrumentation has gained extra attention, particularly following the accident at the Three Mile Island Unit-2 (TMI-2). In LWRs, these sensors and instrumentation have shown a high level of maturity with long operating experience. Ensuring the compatibility of these sensors and instrumentation with advanced nuclear reactors (Generation IV) is necessary, particularly with the expected expansion of the nuclear industry in the next few decades. Nuclear Sensor and instrumentation technologies used in the current generation of LWRs were investigated. The compatibility of these technologies with advanced reactors was assessed by comparing the advanced reactors' environments with those of the currently operating reactors. In addition to that, the needed R&D for such technologies was highlighted. In comparison with the LWRs environment, it was shown that advanced reactor environments are expected to experience elevated temperatures, a fast neutron spectrum, and a harsh corrosion environment. It was demonstrated that R&D is required mainly for fixed in-core nuclear sensors and instrumentation, while it is not a priority for ex-core nuclear sensors and instrumentation.
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) encourages the use of probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) technology in all regulatory matters, to the extent supported by the state-of-the-art in PRA methods and data. Although much has been accomplished in the area of risk-informed regulation, risk assessment for digital systems has not been fully developed. The NRC established a plan for research on digital systems to identify and develop methods, analytical tools, and regulatory guidance for (1) including models of digital systems in the PRAs of nuclear power plants (NPPs), and (2) incorporating digital systems in the NRC's risk-informed licensing and oversight activities. Under NRC's sponsorship, Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) explored approaches for addressing the failures of digital instrumentation and control (I and C) systems in the current NPP PRA framework. Specific areas investigated included PRA modeling digital hardware, development of a philosophical basis for defining software failure, and identification of desirable attributes of quantitative software reliability methods. Based on the earlier research, statistical testing is considered a promising method for quantifying software reliability. This paper describes a statistical software testing approach for quantifying software reliability and applies it to the loop-operating control system (LOCS) of an experimental loop of the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) at Idaho National Laboratory (INL).
Abstract—The self-powered neutron detector (SPND) is a widely used flux monitor in thermal nuclear reactors. Although this is a mature technology, the current state of the art is tuned for a thermal neutron spectrum, so many of the devices currently in use lack sensitivity to fast neutrons. Because current in SPNDs is produced through nuclear reactions with the neutron flux inside a reactor, sensitivity in SPNDs is determined by the neutron cross section of the neutron-sensitive portion of the detector, termed the emitter. This neutron cross section drops by orders of magnitude between thermal and fast neutron energies for many emitters in currently used SPNDs, with a corresponding drop in current from the detector. This paper discusses efforts to develop a fast-spectrum self-powered neutron detector (FS-SPND) that is sensitive to neutrons with energies ranging from 0.025 eV up to 1 MeV. An in-depth analysis of Evaluated Nuclear Data File (ENDF)/B-VII.1 neutron-capture cross sections was performed, and four new materials were identified that are suitable emitter candidates for use in measuring fast neutrons. All four materials are stable mid-shell nuclei in the region between doubly magic 132Sn and 208Pb. Each candidate was simulated with the Geant4 Monte Carlo simulation toolkit to optimize overall detector efficiency.
The IES program has identified specific industries that are high priority for characterizing nuclear thermal integration. Foundational reference integration designs are needed both for research reference and communication with industry.
The core of any nuclear reactor presents a particularly harsh environment for sensors and instrumentation. The reactor core also imposes challenging constraints on signal transmission from inside the reactor core to outside of the reactor vessel. In this paper, an acoustic measurement infrastructure installed at the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR), located at Idaho National Laboratory, is presented. The measurement infrastructure consists of ATR in-pile structural components, coolant, acoustic receivers, primary coolant pumps (PCPs), a data acquisition system, and signal-processing algorithms. Intrinsic and cyclic acoustic signals generated by the operation of the PCPs are collected and processed. Finally, the characteristics of the intrinsic signal can indicate the process state of the ATR (such as reactor startup, reactor criticality, reactor attaining maximum power, and reactor shutdown) during operation (i.e., real-time measurement).
In the world of ever-advancing technology, Autonomous Systems (AS) find extensive application, bolstering functionalities of critical infrastructures such as nuclear power plants. These systems, however, are increasingly becoming a target for nefarious activities, namely through inference attacks, trojan attacks, and adversarial reprogramming. This paper delves into a comprehensive exploration of machine learning (ML)-driven autonomous control systems within advanced nuclear reactor designs, revealing the vulnerabilities and proposing strategies for defense against potential cyber-attacks. Advanced cyber-attacks against critical infrastructure and the energy sector are becoming more common. With the invention of autonomous control systems (ACS) within advanced nuclear reactor designs, system designers, reactor operators, and regulators must consider cybersecurity during the design and operational phases. This article provides a cyber threat assessment of machine learning (ML)- based digital twinning (DT) technologies in the context of advanced reactor ACS. A cyber-physical testbed was created to emulate nuclear reactor digital instrumentation and controls (I&C) and act as a basis for the ACS. The ACS was designed as two plant-level DTs predicting reactor malfunctions and determining control actions and two component-level DTs responsible for classifying component states and forecasting component inputs and outputs (I/O). Two duplicate ACS designs– one using a traditional ML framework and one using an automated ML (AutoML) framework– were created and tested against cyber-attacks on training data, real-time process data, and ML model architectures to determine their respective qualitative cyber-risk in terms of likelihood and impact. Both frameworks showed similar cyber-resilience against training, real-time, and ML architecture attacks, proving that neither is inherently more secure. Recommended safeguard and security measures are posed to system designers, reactor operators, and regulators to maintain the cybersecurity of ML-based DT technologies such as ACS, prompting a holistic view of shared responsibility for maintaining cyber-secure ML-based systems. As global reliance on generation III reactors begins to be critically assessed, the evolution towards advanced reactor systems utilizing digital instrumentation and controls (I&C) becomes not merely preferable, but essential. The integration of semi and fully autonomous control systems (ACS), powered by digital I&C and machine learning (ML)-based digital twinning (DT) technologies, emerges as a potent strategy to mitigate operations and maintenance costs, thereby enhancing the economic feasibility of novel reactor designs. However, with a staggering 500% and 380% increase in cyber-attacks reported against the energy sector by the United States Department of Energy (DoE) and the European Union respectively, a surge in cyber vulnerabilities specifically targeting the nuclear industry has been 2 markedly observed. Notable incidents, such as the W32.Ramnit spyware infiltration at the Gundremmingen nuclear power plant in Germany and the Dtrack spyware intrusion at the Kudankulam nuclear power plant in India, while not directly compromising core industrial control systems (ICS), underscore a compelling necessity to fortify cybersecurity protocols in safeguarding reactor systems against increasingly adept digital adversaries. In light of this, our investigation extends beyond conventional cybersecurity parameters, diving into the intricate web of potential vulnerabilities woven into ML-based DTs and ACS in advanced reactor systems. A crafted cyber-physical testbed and preliminary ACS were devised to act as a mirror, reflecting potential configurations of advanced reactor control designs. Moreover, this study is intertwined with a scrutinization of ML models, developed either through conventional, manually tuned methodologies or via automated means through AutoML, probing into their cyber-risk profiles within operational technology (OT) environments. Expanding on this, two distinct ACS blueprints were forged – one navigating through the corridors of traditional ML and the other traversing the path of AutoML – in an effort to holistically encapsulate the considerations pivotal to ML-based DT control system design. Employing the SANS Institute Industrial Control System (ICS) Kill Chain and the MITRE ATT&CK Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) framework, a structured analysis was conducted, launching three targeted attacks against the training dataset, real-time dataset, and ML models, therein dissecting the potential cyber-attack implications against both ML frameworks within an ACS milieu. It is essential to note that three distinct categories of attacks were conducted against both ACS configurations, each encompassing three distinct ML-based DTs, cumulating in a total of 18 varied attacks. This exploration extends into the realms of Autonomous System Inference, Trojan, and Adversarial Reprogramming Attack and Defense, unraveling vulnerabilities, and opportunities for fortified defenses against such intrusions, particularly where ML-driven technologies, and by extension, ACS, are deployed. Final recommendations, articulated through a lens of security, safeguard, and implementation considerations, are presented for both traditional and AutoML models, anchoring upon the existing knowledge landscape and ML-based DT modeling for ACS, and are offered as a beacon to guide the nuclear industry through the intricate cybersecurity challenges that lie ahead.
The Department of Energy and Idaho National Laboratory are restarting the TREAT (Transient Reactor Test facility) reactor and are interested in updating the reactor's instrumentation regarding the analysis of the test fuel. Optical fibers' ability to make distributed temperature measurements coupled with its small footprint makes optical fiber a viable candidate to monitor fuel performance in the TREAT reactor. In addition to TREAT reactor, the U.S. Department of Energy and nuclear reactor companies like TerraPower have shown interest in using distributed optically based instrumentation for nuclear instrumentation in Next-Gen reactors. The work presented in this paper focuses on optimizing commercial silica optical fiber so that it can survive the temperatures and radiation fluences of the TREAT reactor and Next-Gen reactors. Temperatures in the TREAT reactor can spike to around 900 - 1000 C and so the goal of this work is to optimize optical fiber to survive these temperatures.