Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “REACTOR CONTROL SYSTEMS”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 73 records · Page 4

Diversity Strategies to Mitigate Postulated Common Cause Failure Vulnerabilities

This paper describes an approach to establish effective mitigating strategies that can resolve potential common-cause failure (CCF) vulnerabilities in instrumentation and control (I&C) systems at nuclear power plants. A particular objective in the development of these strategies, which consist of combinations of diversity attributes and their associated criteria, is to address the unique characteristics of digital technology that can contribute to CCF concerns. The research approach employed to establish diversity strategies involves investigation of available documentation on diversity usage and experience from nuclear power and non-nuclear industries, capture of expert knowledge and lessons learned, determination of common practices, and assessment of the nature of CCFs and compensating diversity attributes. The resulting diversity strategies address considerations such as the effect of technology choices, the nature of CCF vulnerabilities, and the prospective impact of each diversity type. In particular, the impact of each attribute and criterion on the purpose, process, product, and performance aspects of diverse systems are considered.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 35, No. 2, July-December 1994]

Nuclear Safety is a journal that covers significant issues in the field of nuclear safety. Its primary scope is safety in the design, construction, operation, and decommissioning of nuclear power reactors worldwide and the research and analysis activities that promote this goal, but it also encompasses the safety aspects of the entire nuclear fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing and handling, and nuclear waste disposal, the handling of fissionable materials and radioisotopes, and the environmental effects of all these activities. Table of Contents for this issue follows. GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 179 Consideration of Postaccident Consequences in the Determination of Safety Objectives for Future Nuclear Power Plants in France, D. Queniart, A. Sugier, and J. Lochard; ACCIDENT ANALYSIS: 187 Nuclear Safety Research: The Phebus FP Severe Accident Experimental Program, P. von der Hardt, A. V. Jones, C. Lecomte, and A. Tattegrain; 205 Containment Performance Analysis of the Advanced Neutron Source Reactor at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, S. H. Kim, R. P. Taleyarkhan, and V. Georgevich; 213 Assessment of Fission Product Deposits in the Reactor Coolant System: The DEVAP Program, G. Le Marois and M. Megnin; 222 Erratum to “A Review of the Available Information on the Triggering Stage of a Steam Explosion," Vol. 35, No. 1, CONTROL AND INSTRUMENTATION: 223 Effects of Normal Aging on Calibration and Response Time of Nuclear Plant Resistance Temperature Detectors and Pressure Sensors, H. M. Hashemian; DESIGN FEATURES: 235 Defense in Depth Against the Hydrogen Risk—A European Research Program, F. Fineschi; ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS: 246 Technical Note: A Preliminary Analysis of the Risks to Hong Kong Resulting from Potential Accidents of Daya Bay Nuclear Power Plant, Z. Shi and X. Wei; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 253 Reactor Shutdown Experience, Compiled by J. W. Cletcher; SPECIAL SECTION ON TMI-2 VESSEL INVESTIGATION PROJECT: 256 Three Mile Island—New Findings 15 Years After the Accident A. M. Rubin and E. Beckjord; 269 Relocation of Molten Material to the TMI-2 Lower Head, J. R. Wolf, D. W. Akers, and L. A. Neimark; 280 Insight Into the TMI-2 Core Material Relocation Through Examination of Instrument Tube Nozzles, L. A. Neimark; 288 Physical and Radiochemical Examinations of Debris from the TMI-2 Lower Head, D. W. Akers and B. K. Schuetz; 301 Results of Metallographic Examinations and Mechanical Tests of Pressure Vessel Samples from the TMI-2 Lower Head, D. R. Diercks and G. E. Korth; 313 Margin-to-Failure Calculations for the TMI-2 Vessel, J. Rempe, L. Stickler, S. Chavez, G. Thinnes, R. Witt, and M. Corradini; U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION INFORMATION AND ANALYSES: 328 1993 Accident Sequence Precursor (ASP) Program Results, L. N. Vanden Heuvel, J. W. Cletcher, D. A. Copinger, J. W. Minarick, B. W. Dolan, and P. D. O’Reilley; RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 339 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides, D. S. Queener; 345 Proposed Rule Changes as of June 30, 1994; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 234 Thirty-First Annual Meeting of the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements; 356 1995 International Incineration Conference; 358 Fifth International Controls and Instrumentation Conference; 359 ANS International Topical Meeting on Safety of Operating Reactors; 359 Fifth International Conference on Nuclear Criticality Safety; 360 International Conference on Probabilistic Safety Assessment Methodology and Applications; 351 The Authors; 357 Reviewers of Nuclear Safety, Vol. 35.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Dynamic attack surfaces in nuclear power plants - 162

In this paper, we will summarize a group of architectural principles that inform the development of secure control system architectures, followed by a methodology that allows designers to understand the attack surface of components and subsystems in a way that supports the integration of these surfaces into a single attack surface. We will then show how this methodology can be used to analyze the control system attack surface from a variety of threats, including knowledgeable insiders. We close the paper with an overview of how this approach can be folded into a more rigorous mathematical analysis of the system to define the system's security posture. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Spurious actuations in digital instrumentation and control systems - evaluation framework - 137

When a digital Instrumentation and Control (I and C) system or its associated components produce an unintended operation, it is known as a spurious actuation. Spurious actuations could lead to unnecessary challenges to safety equipment, challenge the ability of safety systems to provide their intended functions, or place the plant in an un-analyzed state. There is arguably a lack of clear and sufficient regulatory guidance for assessing spurious actuations. In an attempt to address this guidance gap, this paper provides a generic framework for evaluating spurious actuations in digital I and C systems, components, or supporting systems that are important to safety. The framework provides a methodology for: (1) defining the scope of the evaluation including supporting assumptions; (2) providing options for excluding a spurious actuation from the evaluation; (3) assessing the potential consequences from the assessed spurious actuations; and, (4) defining a high-level acceptance criteria. The methodology discussed by this paper is not to be construed as a requirement, regulation, or acceptable guidance by either domestic or international regulators; instead, it is intended to serve as a potential foundation or technical basis to be used for developing clear and sufficient regulatory guidance for assessing spurious actuations in digital I and C systems. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Aeroassisted orbital transfer vehicle control technology

The focus of this control has been to develop the control technology required to identify the sophistication required for the Aeroassisted Orbital Transfer Vehicle (AOTV) control system. An angle of attack, bank angle command control technique has been developed which uses either on-off thruster or proportional thruster. An angle of attack adaptive controller was included to minimize the reactor control system (RCS) usage due to payload center of gravity uncertainties. The guidance and control techniques were verified using a detail six degrees-of-freedom simulation. Mission sensitivity was developed for uncertainties in the entry state, mass properties, atmosphere, aerodynamic, and sensor.

Langehough, M. A.↗

Impacts of common cause failure regulatory requirements on protection system architectures - 304

Regulatory-based design considerations for potential common cause failures (CCF) in digital instrumentation and control (I and C) systems have evolved over time and have impacted the development of protection system I and C architectures. The single failure criterion used to be the main design driver for a protection system I and C architecture and resulted in the familiar four-fold and three-fold system architectures. The single failure criterion has now been replaced by the conservative assumptions associated with digital CCF concerns (i.e., assumed digital CCF coincident with an anticipated operational transient or postulated accident) which are classified as 'beyond design basis events' by regulatory authorities. It is unusual for a beyond design basis event to be the controlling factor for a safety system design but that is now the reality for I and C system designers. The preferred regulatory solution is to introduce diversity into I and C system designs to guard against the general concern of digital CCF. However, the lack of clear criteria on how to define sufficient diversity (i.e., how much, what kind, and whether it is linked to identified digital CCF vulnerabilities) had led to more complex I and C architectures. The trend has been towards lengthy and more difficult reviews for the treatment of digital CCF vulnerabilities and I and C system architectures because of the subjective definition of digital CCF vulnerabilities and the lack of clear acceptance criteria for diversity strategy. Improvement in the treatment of digital CCF is needed to reverse the trend of increased I and C system architecture complexity and longer regulatory reviews. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Computer Security for I and C Systems at Nuclear Facilities - 116

Cyber-attacks on Instrumentation and Control (I and C) systems may jeopardize the safety and security of nuclear facilities by contributing to sabotage or aiding in the unauthorized removal of nuclear material. The effects of cyber-attacks on I and C systems important to safety to safety may result in a wide range of consequences, such as a temporary loss of process control or unacceptable radiological consequences. Public awareness of cyber-attacks that affect I and C systems may also undermine confidence in the safety and security of nuclear facilities. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) recognizes the need for the guidance on the protection of I and C systems that provide safety, security, or auxiliary functions at nuclear facilities from cyber-attacks. To meet this need, The IAEA has developed a new Nuclear Security Series publication with the provisional title Computer Security of Instrumentation and Control Systems at Nuclear Facilities which builds upon and expands the guidance published in Nuclear Security Series No. 17 Computer Security at Nuclear Facilities (2011) . This publication will be formally released in 2017 as Technical Guidance and will be the second international consensus publication dedicated to Computer Security at Nuclear Facilities. It was developed in parallel with the new IAEA Nuclear Safety publications providing recommendations on I and C systems at research reactors (RR) and nuclear power plants (NPP) . The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of this publication and its application. The paper will also discuss its relation to other IAEA Nuclear Security Series (NSS) publications on computer security. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Supervisory Control System for Multi-Modular Advanced Reactors

The proposed supervisory control system (SCS) may provide considerable benefits to advanced small modular reactors, including reduced plant staffing, optimized maintenance activities, greater plant availability, and higher operating efficiency. The SCS makes risk-informed decisions based on (1) a probabilistic assessment of the likelihood of success given the status of the plant/systems and component health, and (2) a deterministic assessment between plant operating parameters and reactor protection parameters to prevent unnecessary trips and challenges to plant safety system—one measure of SCS success. The probabilistic portion of the decision-making engine of the SCS is based on the control actions associated with an advanced liquid-metal reactor (ALMR) Power Reactor, Innovative, Small Module (PRISM). Within the SCS, the probabilistic assessment provides a ranking of viable control actions; however, certain instructions generated by the probabilistic model only include an abstract notion of action without specifications. For instance, one instruction may be to reduce power without specifying how much reduction is needed. The prognostic/diagnostic models incorporate the health of components into the decision-making process. Once the control options are identified and ranked based on the likelihood of success, the SCS transmits the options to the deterministic portion of the platform. The performance-based system models assess and rank each of the probabilistically identified control actions by taking into account the physical behavior (current and projected) of the system. The performance-based decision making module receives inputs from the probabilistic decision-making module and the ERM module to generate a single solution. Interfaces to these modules are defined later in the section. A utility theory algorithm factors into the decision making by estimating the distance from and approach to a trip setpoint for each control option. If the magnitude of a negative utility value increases rapidly as the system approaches the trip setpoint, that option is not likely to be the preferred option. This can lead to a re-ranking of the control options. The SCS then transmits a control signal(s) to a component or system and informs the operator of actions taken based on the action chosen. The SCS successfully coupled probabilistic and performance-based system models to arrive at optimal control decisions based on the actual status of the plant and components. The automatic, autonomous, and real-time performance requirements for a control system were met by the SCS. The value of coupling probabilistic and performance-based system models was demonstrated by the re-ranking of control options based on the use of a utility algorithm. The use of ERM monitors provides added value to the SCS as demonstrated by the re-ranking of control options based on a components degraded state.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Model-based verification of I and C specifications - 184

In the field of nuclear I and C (Instrumentation and Control), the late detection of errors in the specifications and the design of I and C has a strong impact in terms of time and money. The early verification in the V cycle of I and C functions is a key issue to capture inconsistencies and errors before the implementation and on-site tests. EDF, in the framework of the collaborative project CONNEXION, has investigated methods based on simulation to formalize I and C requirements and to evaluate them at the conceptual and basic design phases. Behavioral models of the physic parts of the system and I and C functions, described as functional diagrams, are co-simulated in an integration environment based on the FMI (Functional Mockup Interface) standard. In this specific environment, test scenarios are performed on these models. These scenarios are defined on the basis of a high level model of the studied system that takes into account the states to cover (in normal and degraded situations). Requirements, once formalized, are translated into observers that evaluate their fulfillment during the simulations. Simulation logs are then a tool for the designer to analyze the causes of the possible non-fulfillment of requirements and to fix the corresponding errors in the specifications. The proposed methodology enables to detect errors in the specifications of I and C functions, to generate automatically functional test scenarios taking into account the coverage of the requirements and all the different operational modes of the system. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Human factors and modeling methods in the development of control room modernization concepts - 315

Control room modernization is one of the most challenging and complex upgrade projects that a nuclear power plant can undertake. It can even have a bigger impact on operations than, for example, turbine replacement. The challenges of migrating an analog control system to a distributed control system are already well known and a number of nuclear utilities have embarked upon various levels of effort to upgrade some of the systems in the control room. When planning for control room upgrades, plants have to deal with a multitude of engineering and operational impacts. This will inevitably include several human factors considerations, including physical ergonomics of workstations, viewing angles, lighting, seating, new communication requirements, and new concepts of operation. In helping nuclear power utilities to deal with these challenges, the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) has developed human factors design and evaluation methods to be used in the development of an end-state control room concept and to manage the various phases of the upgrade life cycle. This included interactive sessions with operators in INL's Human System Simulation Laboratory, and three-dimensional modeling to visualize control board changes. To make the various upgrade phases as concrete and as visible as possible, the end-state concept includes a set of visual representations of the control room before and after various upgrade phases to provide the context and a framework within which to consider the various options in the upgrade. This includes the various control systems, human-system interfaces to be replaced, and possible changes to operator workstations. This paper describes how this framework helps to ensure an integrated and cohesive outcome that is consistent with human factors engineering principles and also provide substantial improvement in operator performance. The paper further describes the application of this integrated approach in the strategic modernization program at a nuclear power plant where legacy systems are upgraded to advanced digital technologies through a systematic process that links human factors principles to the systems engineering process. This approach results in an integrated control room architecture beyond what is possible for individual subsystem upgrades alone. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Common cause failure (CCF): a path to quantitative success - 134

In the development of I and C systems for nuclear plants it is critical to validate a defense in depth strategy through a thorough and complete reliability analysis program. An emerging issue is how to define and use a quantitative estimation of CCF in a system analysis. Industry standards provide insight but not necessarily a comprehensive approach. One solution is to leverage existing modeling techniques with a unique insertion of CCF probabilities. A relatively simple approach will be provided using reliability block diagrams. Three specific areas that will be explored include: 1. Definition of hardware CCF; 2. Quantitative estimation in a simple system; 3. Quantitative estimation in a complex system. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

A dynamic model of once-through steam generator (OTSG) for prototypical advanced reactor - 374

new design of Small Modular Reactor, the Prototypical Advanced Reactor (PAR), features two sodium primary systems each connected to dedicated steam generators (SGs) and sharing a balance of plant (BOP) system. PAR adopts once-through steam generators (OTSG) for its compact structure. The existence of superheated steam in a OTSG improves turbine design by eliminating the need of bulky moisture separator in SG. The two cores and SGs' design enable PAR to adjust power flexibly, as a result, introduce more challenges to the control. Therefore, a fast simulation model with high accuracy OTSG model is needed. In this paper, a dynamic model is built for OTSG of PAR based on the conservation of mass, momentum, and energy. The OTSG is simulated as lumped pipe and divided into subcooled, evaporating, and superheated regions by moving boundaries. SIMULINK is adopted to this OTSG simulation to be merged into existing PAR system models easily. The steady state results show that key parameters are rational. The 5% step increase of feedwater enthalpy transient demonstrates that the model is capable to respond to the perturbations. Since the basic laws and algebraic method used in this paper are suitable for other fluids, the model can be easily applied to any other OTSG. Future work will also focus on model optimization, merging and improved control. The final aim is to perform full scope realtime simulations for PAR under normal operational transients. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Toward biologically inspired self healing digital embedded devices: BIO-SymPle - 388

One of the more interesting concepts being postulated for next gen power plants, is the notion of highly resilient and survivable I and C systems. While resilience and survivability are 'cross system attributes', resilience and robustness will rely on highly robust and fault resilient devices as a foundation. This paper presents a new self-healing digital I and C architecture inspired by the operation of two biological concepts: human immune system and embryonic stem cells. The purpose of this research is look at different bio-inspired paradigms for organizing system functions so that they become inherently resilient due to device organization and behaviors. Our current proposed approach (called BIO-SymPle) is organized in two levels: critical service layer, which is providing the intended service of critical application, and healing layer, that supervises the operation of all repair mechanisms. To facilitate coordination, organized behavior among cells we employ network-based topology structures which is comprised of four active cells, four pre-generated redundant cells, and one embryonic stem cell. Collectively, the ensemble represents the building block that executes the local functionality based on the expression for DNA genetic codes stored inside each cell. The four bio-operational active cells are protected by their neighboring spare cells that imitate how white blood cells are distributed around the antigens in their locations. Ultimately, the proposed multi-layer architecture is able to cover a significant number of coincident faults and we believe architectures like BIO-SymPLe can positively impact the next generation digital I and C system. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Common Cause Failure Mitigation Experience on Digital I and C System in NPP

CCF is failures of redundant or separate structures, systems, or components due to a shared root cause. The CCF includes those are resulted from severe environments, design errors, calibration and maintenance errors, and consequential failures. In addition, digital I and C systems can be vulnerable to CCF caused by software errors or software developed logic, which could defeat the redundancy achieved by the hardware architecture. Therefore, diversity and defense in-depth (D3) has become an important issue to overcome the CCF of the safety I and C system. The U.S. NRC has established regulatory guidance addressing a method for assessing D3 provided by the safety I and C system architecture at a NPP. This method enables determination of whether vulnerabilities to CCF have been adequately addressed. The guidance is included in BTP 7-19 and Chapter 7 of NUREG-0800. The regulatory guidance provides a methodology for designing diversity. APR1400 establishes the mitigating strategies that consider the characteristics of digital I and C system that contribute to the potential for CCF. The diversity strategies consist of a combination of diversity attributes and associated criteria to address potential CCF vulnerabilities in digital safety I and C system. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

SymPLe 1131: A novel architectural solution for the realization of verifiable digital I and C systems and embedded digital devices - 387

One of the main reasons for the increasing popularity of FPGAs in embedded systems and digital I and C systems is that they provide many of the advantages from both hardware and software components. FPGAs provide configurability approaching that of SW, while at the same time delivering deterministic behavior of pure hardware solutions. However, with regard to Software Common Cause Failures (CCF), the use of FPGAs in digital I and C platforms should not be seen as plug-in remedy for reduction or elimination of CCF. To address CCF, we argue that it is not enough to manage the complexity of an I and C device or system, but we must also have the ability to constrain complexity (as needed) and rigorously reason about execution and device functionality. This paper presents the work done regarding an FPGA overlay architecture called SymPLe. SymPLe is designed to reduce the gap between software and hardware approaches for digital I and C systems and increases deterministic behavior and verifiability of the application, architecture and safety-critical system while reasoning about CCF. (authors)

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

IEC 62859: A new international standard on the coordination between safety and cybersecurity for nuclear I and C systems - 160

Cybersecurity requirements and controls for digital I and C systems are increasingly added to well-established safety-oriented provisions. Interactions and potential side-effects are possible and must be mastered, taking into account the nuclear I and C system specificities as well as their normative and regulatory contexts. The new international standard IEC 62859 'Nuclear power plants - Instrumentation and control systems - Requirements for coordinating safety and cyber security' aims to optimize the integration of cybersecurity provisions in nuclear I and C architecture and systems, to prevent conflicts between safety and cybersecurity provisions, and to aid the identification and the leveraging of the potential synergies between safety and cybersecurity. The paper presents the structure and the key aspects of this standard. IEC 62859 is structured along three main sections: one dealing with the overall I and C architecture, a second one focusing on the system level, a third one dealing with organizational and procedural issues. The paper also discusses related work in the nuclear industry, and in other sectors. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗