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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS1989

Planetary protection issues for sample return missions

Planetary protection (PP) issues for both a comet nucleus sample return (CNSR) mission and a Mars rover sample return (MRSR) mission are discussed, with special attention given to the PP requirements for such missions, the exobiology science objectives for the CNSR and MRSR missions, and a qualitative PP risk assessment for both mission types. A set of contamination control procedures for both missions is presented, which identify procedures for each of the mission phases (i.e., the prelaunch, launch, sample handling, transit vehicle, and earth return). Recommendations for further research and technology development are discussed.

Devincenzi, D. L.↗
NASA NTRS1995

Designing planetary protection into the Mars observer mission

Planetary protection has been an important consideration during the process of designing the Mars Observer mission. It affected trajectory design of both the interplanetary transfer and the orbits at Mars; these in turn affected the observation strategies developed for the mission. The Project relied mainly on the strategy of collision avoidance to prevent contamination of Mars. Conservative estimates of spacecraft reliability and Martian atmosphere density were used to evaluate decisions concerning the interplanetary trajectory, the orbit insertion phase at Mars, and operations in orbit at Mars and afterwards. Changes in the trajectory design, especially in the orbit insertion phase, required a refinement of those estimates.

Sweetser, T. H.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Final Report of the COSPAR Meeting Series on Knowledge Gaps in Planetary Protection for Crewed Missions to Mars

The international scientific community has, through a Committee on Space Research (COSPAR) meeting series, participated in a seven-year review of knowledge gaps in planetary protection for crewed missions to Mars. This meeting series first identified a prioritized list of knowledge gaps that, if addressed, would permit development of an implementable planetary protection policy for the initial crewed Mars mission. Next, a consideration of the available venues (ground, LEO, deep space, planetary surfaces) yielded a roadmap of potential future investigations needed to close the knowledge gaps. Finally, the meeting series evaluated topic-specific measurements that are essential to establishing the figures of merit needed for hardware engineering design requirements. The three main topic threads considered within the meeting series were: microbial and human health monitoring; natural transport of terrestrial biological contamination on Mars, and; technologies and operations for contamination control (of spacecraft systems). Participants at the meeting series included engineers, scientists, managers and various subject matter experts from space agencies, academic and research institutions, commercial companies, and other government departments. This paper provides a detailed summary review of the findings of the meeting series, including descriptions of the basis for each of the figures of merit (where they were identified), and considerations of how planetary protection implementation and policy for crewed missions may progress from the current state of the art.

J Andy Spry↗
NASA NTRS2015

Planetary Protection Knowledge Gaps for Human Extraterrestrial Missions: Workshop Report

This report on Planetary Protection Knowledge Gaps for Human Extraterrestrial Missions summarizes the presentations, deliberations and findings of a workshop at NASA Ames Research Center, March 24-26, 2015, which was attended by more than 100 participants representing a diverse mix of science, engineering, technology, and policy areas. The main objective of the three-day workshop was to identify specific knowledge gaps that need to be addressed to make incremental progress towards the development of NASA Procedural Requirements (NPRs) for Planetary Protection during human missions to Mars.

Race, Margaret S.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Planetary Protection Compliance of NASA Missions Past, Present and Future

NASA monitors its spacecraft from a planetary protection (PP) perspective, to ensure contin-ued compliance with planetary protection requirements. This report to COSPAR on previous, ongoing and future missions will describe the issues and considerations regarding the PP im-plementation and compliance status of each mission, with changes noted as appropriate from previous reports. Missions not described in other presentations will be covered, including (but not limited to): Mars Odyssey, Mars Exploration Rovers, Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter, Escape and Plasma Acceleration and Dynamics Explorers (EscaPADE), Juno, New Horizons, Parker Solar Probe, Artemis I and its secondary payloads, and NASA partnered missions.

James Benardini↗
NASA NTRS2022

Planetary protection assessment of radioisotope thermoelectric generator (RTG)-powered landed missions to ocean worlds: application to Enceladus

Landed missions to icy worlds with a subsurface liquid water ocean must meet planetary protection requirements, and ensure a sufficiently small likelihood of any microorganism-bearing part of the landed element reaching the ocean. A higher bound on this likelihood is set by the potential for radioisotope thermoelectric generator (RTG) power sources, the hottest possible landed element, to melt through the ice shell and reach the ocean. Here, we quantify this potential as a function of three key parameters: surface temperature, ice shell thickness (i.e., heat flux through the shell), and thickness of a porous (insulating) snow or regolith cover. Although the model we describe can be applied to any ocean world, we present results in the context of a landed mission concept to the south polar terrain of Saturn’s moon Enceladus. In this particular context, we discuss planetary protection considerations for landing site selection. The likelihood of forward microbial contamination of Enceladus’ ocean by an RTG-powered landed mission can be made sufficiently low to not undermine compliance with planetary protection policy.

Marc Neveu↗
NASA NTRS1989

Planetary protection and back contamination control for a Mars rover sample return mission

A commitment to avoid the harmful contamination of outer space and avoid adverse changes in the environment of the earth has been long reflected in NASA's Planetary Protection policy. Working under guidelines developed by the Committee on Space Research (COSPAR), NASA has implemented the policy in an interactive process that has included the recommendations of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences. Measures taken to prevent the contamination of earth during the Apollo missions were perhaps the most visible manifestations of this policy, and provided numerous lessons for future sample return opportunities. This paper presents the current status of planetary protection policy within NASA, and a prospectus on how planetary protection issues might be addressed in relation to a Mars Rover Sample Return mission.

Rummel, John D.↗
NASA NTRS2015

A Massively Parallel Bayesian Approach to Planetary Protection Trajectory Analysis and Design

The NASA Planetary Protection Office has levied a requirement that the upper stage of future planetary launches have a less than 10(exp -4) chance of impacting Mars within 50 years after launch. A brute-force approach requires a decade of computer time to demonstrate compliance. By using a Bayesian approach and taking advantage of the demonstrated reliability of the upper stage, the required number of fifty-year propagations can be massively reduced. By spreading the remaining embarrassingly parallel Monte Carlo simulations across multiple computers, compliance can be demonstrated in a reasonable time frame. The method used is described here.

parallel computing↗
NASA NTRS2018

Spores, Viable Organisms, and other Tribulations in Planetary Protection Requirements for Mars and Europa

This presentation is being presented to the 15th Annual International Planetary Probe Workshop. Some of the topics of discussion will include a Brief History of Planetary Protection, U.S. Signatory to United Nations Outer Space Treaty (OST), COSPAR Panel on Planetary Protection, Validating Science and Protecting Earth's Biosphere, Viking-Level Bioload Is Still the Gold Standard, Provisions for Robotic Extraterrestrial Missions, Temporary Assay Labs, A Viable Organism Is One That Can Replicate, Non-Nominal Landing in a Special Region, Mars 2020 Category IVb, Europa and Enceladus.

Pratt, Lisa M.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

ISS External Microorganisms: A Planetary Protection Payload Ready-for-Flight

Before NASA or COSPAR is able to set planetary protection requirements for crewed missions to locations like Mars there are a number of critical knowledge gaps that must be addressed (1). One of the most important knowledge gaps is an understanding of microbial leakage from crewed habitats and space suits. Current ECLSS (Environmental Control and Life Support System) and PLSS (Portable Life Support System) requirements do not include any provisions to control microbes that may escape along with vented or leaked gasses. The current generation of NASA space suits can leak at rates as high as 100 cm3/min. during nominal operation (2). ISS (International Space Station) intentionally vents atmospheric gases like CO2to maintain habitable conditions for the crew. Furthermore, every time an airlock is used for EVA (extravehicular activity) there is an accompanying release of internal atmosphere. Since it is not possible to sterilize a crewed mission, it is important that we understand what if any microbes are entrained in these vented and leaked products. It is also important to understand if these microbes can survive on exterior surfaces. Recent sampling of the Russian segments of ISS suggest that bacteria and fungi from inside ISS may be capable of surviving on external surfaces (3). NASA has developed an aseptic sampling tool for use during EVA and plans to collect samples from vents on ISS to build on these results. The results of this work will be used to develop planetary protection requirements for vented and leaked gasses from crewed volumes.

M S Bell↗
NASA NTRS2015

Planetary Protection Knowledge Gaps for Human Extraterrestrial Missions Workshop Booklet - 2015

Although NASA's preparations for the Apollo lunar missions had only a limited time to consider issues associated with the protection of the Moon from biological contamination and the quarantine of the astronauts returning to Earth, they learned many valuable lessons (both positive and negative) in the process. As such, those efforts represent the baseline of planetary protection preparations for sending humans to Mars. Neither the post-Apollo experience or the Shuttle and other follow-on missions of either the US or Russian human spaceflight programs could add many additional insights to that baseline. Current mission designers have had the intervening four decades for their consideration, and in that time there has been much learned about human-associated microbes, about Mars, and about humans in space that has helped prepare us for a broad spectrum of considerations regarding potential biological contamination in human Mars missions and how to control it. This paper will review the approaches used in getting this far, and highlight some implications of this history for the future development of planetary protection provisions for human missions to Mars. The role of NASA and ESA's planetary protection offices, and the aegis of COSPAR have been particularly important in the ongoing process.

Fonda, Mark L.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

The Planetary Protection Strategy of the Earth Return Orbiter–Capture, Containment & Return System in the Context of the Mars Sample Return Campaign

The Mars Sample Return Campaign aims at bringing back to Earth the rock and atmospheric samples that the rover Perseverance has started to collect on the surface of Mars with the goal of analyzing them in a facility built specifically for this purpose to answer questions about the habitability of Mars. The Campaign consists of several missions, including the Earth Return Orbiter–Capture, Containment & Return System (ERO-CCRS), which will capture the samples previously put in Martian orbit, contain them in redundant containers to ensure that no unsterilized particles are released, and return them to Earth through a parachute-less entry vehicle. Both NASA and ESA policies address the United Nations’ Outer Space Treaty by addressing potential harm from material returned from solar system bodies beyond the Earth-Moon system. In the conduct of Mars Sample Return, the two agencies have agreed to apply approaches consistent with their own standards to campaign elements each provides. This work presents the overall strategy for both forward and backward planetary protection for the ERO-CCRS mission. Specifically, for forward planetary protection, CCRS is not required to meet specific bioburden requirements as a Category III mission provided the ERO (1) meets orbital lifetime requirements during orbiter operations and (2) any elements jettisoned at Mars meet orbital lifetime requirements. CCRS is required to be built in ISO-8 or better cleanrooms and, by agreement with ERO, be compatible with direct bioburden verification methods. For backward planetary protection, the overall approach includes building robust, highly reliable systems to prevent inadvertent release of unsterilized Mars material through redundant containment vessels and particle transport analyses. Ongoing work to define verification approaches and quantify containment assurance levels for specific sample return systems will also be discussed, along with how those data will inform launch approval for ERO-CCRS.

Giuseppe Cataldo↗
NASA NTRS2003

Planetary protection and the search for life beneath the surface of Mars

The search for traces of extinct and extant life on Mars will be extended to beneath the surface of the planet. Current data from Mars missions suggesting the presence of liquid water early in Mars' history and mathematical modeling of the fate of water on Mars imply that liquid water may exist deep beneath the surface of Mars. This leads to the hypothesis that life may exist deep beneath the Martian surface. One possible scenario to look for life on Mars involves a series of unmanned missions culminating with a manned mission drilling deep into the Martian subsurface (approximately 3Km), collecting samples, and conducting preliminary analyses to select samples for return to earth. This mission must address both forward and back contamination issues, and falls under planetary protection category V. Planetary protection issues to be addressed include provisions stating that the inevitable deposition of earth microbes by humans should be minimized and localized, and that earth microbes and organic material must not contaminate the Martian subsurface. This requires that the drilling equipment be sterilized prior to use. Further, the collection, containment and retrieval of the sample must be conducted such that the crew is protected and that any materials returning to earth are contained (i.e., physically and biologically isolated) and the chain of connection with Mars is broken. c2002 COSPAR. Published by Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

NASA Discipline Exobiology↗
NASA NTRS2010

In Situ Biological Contamination Studies of the Moon: Implications for Future Planetary Protection and Life Detection Missions

NASA and ESA have outlined visions for solar system exploration that will include a series of lunar robotic precursor missions to prepare for, and support a human return to the Moon, and future human exploration of Mars and other destinations. One of the guiding principles for exploration is to pursue compelling scientific questions about the origin and evolution of life. The search for life on objects such as Mars will require that all spacecraft and instrumentation be sufficiently cleaned and sterilized prior to launch to ensure that the scientific integrity of extraterrestrial samples is not jeopardized by terrestrial organic contamination. Under the Committee on Space Research's (COSPAR's) current planetary protection policy for the Moon, no sterilization procedures are required for outbound lunar spacecraft, nor is there yet a planetary protection category for human missions. Future in situ investigations of a variety of locations on the Moon by highly sensitive instruments designed to search for biologically derived organic compounds would help assess the contamination of the Moon by lunar spacecraft. These studies could also provide valuable "ground truth" data for Mars sample return missions and help define planetary protection requirements for future Mars bound spacecraft carrying life detection experiments. In addition, studies of the impact of terrestrial contamination of the lunar surface by the Apollo astronauts could provide valuable data to help refine future Mars surface exploration plans for a human mission to Mars.

Glavin, Daniel P.↗
NASA NTRS2010

In Situ Biological Contamination Studies of the Moon: Implications for Planetary Protection and Life Detection Missions

NASA and ESA have outlined visions for solar system exploration that will include a series of lunar robotic precursor missions to prepare for, and support a human return to the Moan, and future human exploration of Mars and other destinations, including possibly asteroids. One of the guiding principles for exploration is to pursue compelling scientific questions about the origin and evolution of life. The search for life on objects such as Mars will require careful operations, and that all systems be sufficiently cleaned and sterilized prior to launch to ensure that the scientific integrity of extraterrestrial samples is not jeopardized by terrestrial organic contamination. Under the Committee on Space Research's (COSPAR's) current planetary protection policy for the Moon, no sterilization procedures are required for outbound lunar spacecraft, nor is there a different planetary protection category for human missions, although preliminary C SPAR policy guidelines for human missions to Mars have been developed. Future in situ investigations of a variety of locations on the Moon by highly sensitive instruments designed to search for biologically derived organic compounds would help assess the contamination of the Moon by lunar spacecraft. These studies could also provide valuable "ground truth" data for Mars sample return missions and help define planetary protection requirements for future Mars bound spacecraft carrying life detection experiments. In addition, studies of the impact of terrestrial contamination of the lunar surface by the Apollo astronauts could provide valuable data to help refine future: Mars surface exploration plans for a human mission to Mars.

Glavin, Daniel P.↗
NASA NTRS2016

Forward Modeling of Ceres' Gravity Field for Planetary Protection Assessment

The Dawn spacecraft arrived at the dwarf planet Ceres in early 2015 after a two and a half-year cruise in deep space after departing Vesta. The nominal plan for Dawn included successively lower science orbits, the last of which is called the Low Altitude Mapping Orbit that also serves as the disposal orbit after the end of mission. Prior to Dawn’s arrival at Ceres, it was identified that Dawn would have to meet planetary protection requirements at Ceres by remaining on a stable orbit for 20 years past the end of the mission. With little a priori knowledge on Ceres’ interior we analyzed what gravitational perturbations influence the long-term dynamical evolution of Dawn around Ceres and validated that the gravitational model of Ceres with the then-current best estimate of the density distribution model does not exceed the permissible bounds. The forward modeling of gravity fields from various shape models and density distribution was deemed valid to satisfy the planetary protection guidelines. This analysis was further confirmed after a new shape model based on the actual optical images was created. The gravity field as measured in the High Altitude Mapping Orbit also fits within the bounds of gravitational field studied pre-arrival at Ceres to substantiate our methodology used to satisfy the planetary protection requirement.

Takahashi, Yu↗
NASA NTRS1996

Planetary protection, legal ambiguity and the decision making process for Mars sample return

As scientists and mission planners develop planetary protection requirements for future Mars sample return missions, they must recognize the socio-political context in which decisions about the mission will be made and pay careful attention to public concerns about potential back contamination of Earth. To the extent that planetary protection questions are unresolved or unaddressed at the time of an actual mission, they offer convenient footholds for public challenges in both legal and decision making realms, over which NASA will have little direct control. In this paper, two particular non-scientific areas of special concern are discussed in detail: 1) legal issues and 2) the decision making process. Understanding these areas is critical for addressing legitimate public concerns as well as for fulfilling procedural requirements regardless whether sample return evokes public controversy. Legal issues with the potential to complicate future missions include: procedural review under National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA); uncertainty about institutional control and authority; conflicting regulations and overlapping jurisdictions; questions about international treaty obligations and large scale impacts; uncertanities about the nature of the organism; and constitutional and regulatory concerns about quarantine, public health and safety. In light of these important legal issues, it is critical that NASA consider the role and timing of public involvement in the decision making process as a way of anticipating problem areas and preparing for legitimate public questions and challenges to sample return missions.

NASA Discipline Number 59-10↗