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At least 73 records · Page 4

Spatiotemporal Distribution of {sup 241}Am in the Vicinity of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant - 19543

Environmental monitoring around nuclear facilities is essential for characterizing the baseline conditions that are critical for identifying releases and quantifying their effects, should they occur, and for assessing post-closure performance. The spatiotemporal distribution and transport behavior of {sup 241}Am in the vicinity of a deep geologic repository for transuranic waste were assessed using data spanning the pre-operational phase to the present, including an accidental radionuclide release in 2014. The {sup 241}Am background values of 0.027±0.109 μBq/m{sup 3} (aerosols), and 0.061±0.065 Bq/kg (soil), as well as the {sup 241}Am/{sup 239+240}Pu ratios of 0.41±0.06 (aerosols) and 0.38±0.04 (soil), are similar to global fallout values. Pre-operations concentrations of {sup 241}Am show a strong seasonal dependence, attributed to resuspension of soils contaminated by global fallout, with no contribution from the upwind Project Gnome site ({sup 241}Am/{sup 239+240}Pu =0.24±0.08). During the 2014 accidental release, aerosol concentrations of {sup 241}Am briefly increased to 115.2 μBq/m{sup 3} at an onsite monitoring station, and 81.4 μBq/m{sup 3} at a station ∼1 km downwind of the exhaust shaft, changing the {sup 241}Am/{sup 239+240}Pu from ∼0.37 to ∼10. However, some four years later, conditions have returned to background. Almost 90% of the {sup 241}Am inventory is the 0-5 cm soil layer and there is no evidence of concentrations above regulatory standards, or that can be attributed to waste disposal operations. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

A Rapid Sequential Separation Method for Determination of Actinides and TENORM in Fracking Wastes - 20223

With recent advances in unconventional drilling technology in the US and around the world, the risks of environmental contamination and exposure due to technologically enhanced naturally occurring radioactive materials (TENORM) from fracking wastes have also surfaced. Although the Permian Basin (southeastern New Mexico, western Texas) has long been a modest producer of oil, the advent of fracking technology a decade ago turned it into hot property for producers. A 2018 assessment of undiscovered, technically recoverable continuous oil and gas resources by the U.S. Geological Survey estimates an average 46.3 billion barrels of oil and 281 trillion cubic feet of gas. This is likely to increase the use of unconventional drilling and TENORM generation. TENORM concentrations in oil and gas exploration and production waste can be several hundred to several thousand times higher than background TENORM concentrations. Both the thorium and uranium decay chains contribute to airborne radionuclides arising from the radon gas escaping the ground and subsequently decaying as airborne particulates. Additionally, radon decay products {sup 210}Pb and {sup 210}Po can build up in scale on the internal surfaces of oil and gas handling pipes and in sludge in refineries, becoming potential inhalation and ingestion hazards for workers. Furthermore, southeastern NM is also home to world's only licensed and operating transuranic nuclear waste repository, the DoE's Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). Plutonium isotopes ({sup 239+240}Pu) and {sup 241}Am, are expected to account for more than 99% of the total radioactivity scheduled for disposal in the WIPP repository. Thus, an improved understanding of the environmental fate and transport of TENORM, liberated by unconventional drilling, is essential to assess how best to protect individuals and the environment. In this context, accurate measurement of TENORM and actinides in environmental and biological samples is essential. In this presentation, a new sequential method for the separation and pre-concentration of actinides (Pu, Am, Np) and TENORM (Po, U and Th) derived from oil and gas exploration is proposed. The TEVA method involves a rapid co-precipitation step to remove matrix interferences from the samples, followed by plutonium oxidation state adjustment to Pu (IV) and an incubation period of ∼ 1 hour at 50-60 deg. C to allow the resultant Po (II) to oxidize into Po(IV). The polonium, neptunium, thorium and plutonium are then separated on a TEVA column, while americium and uranium are separated on a TRU column. After separation, the alpha counting source was prepared by micro-precipitation with copper sulfide (CuS) for polonium and neodymium fluoride (NdF{sub 3}) for actinides. The efficiency and reliability of the procedures were tested by analyzing filter, drinking water and frack sand samples. The method is simple, robust and can be performed quickly with excellent removal of interferences, high chemical recovery and very good alpha peak resolution. (authors)

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Passive Time Coincidence Measurements with HEU and DU Metal Castings

A Department of Energy sponsored Oak Ridge National Laboratory/Y-12 National Security Complex program of passive time coincidence measurements has been initiated at Y-12 to evaluate the ability to determine the presence of high enriched uranium (HEU) and distinguish it from depleted uranium (DU). This program uses the Nuclear Materials Identification System (NMIS) without an active interrogation source. Previous passive NMIS measurements with Pu metal and Pu oxide have been successful in determining the Pu mass, assuming a known 240Pu content. The spontaneous fission of uranium metal is considerably lower than Pu and measurements of this type have been performed at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. This work presents results of measurements of HEU and DU metal castings using moderated 3He detectors.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

MC{sup 2}-3/DIF3D Analysis of the ZPPR-15 Axial Expansion Experiments

The Zero Power Physics Reactor (ZPPR) fast critical facility at the Argonne National Laboratory-West (ANLW) site in Idaho was built in 1969 to obtain neutron physics information necessary for the design of fast breeder reactors. The ZPPR-15 phases A through D were part of a series of cores intended to model a 330 MWt Integral Fast Reactor (IFR) concept. The ZPPR-15 assembly consisted of an inner core zone, an outer core zone of higher fissile content, a thin radial blanket and a thick steel reflector. The inner and outer core zones were of approximately equal volumes. The core zones simulated a sodium-cooled, metal-fueled fast reactor with approximately 10 wt.% zirconium in the target fuel composition. Phases A and B simulated an equilibrium cycle UPu-Zr fuel core where plutonium created in the blankets was sufficient to negate the need for enriched {sup 235}U feedstock. Phase D simulated a beginning of life U-Zr fuel core with enriched uranium fuel although approximately 10% of the fuel in the outer zone of the Phase D core was plutonium because {sup 240}Pu was required to provide a neutron source for the modified source multiplication technique used for many reactivity worth measurements such as sodium void worth in ZPPR. Phase C simulated the intermediate state between beginning of life and equilibrium cycle conditions with 50% enriched uranium fuel and 50% plutonium fuel in the inner and outer core zones. These configurations represent the various stages of reactor operating conditions. Phase A did not contain zirconium (metal fuel is typically alloyed with Zr) while Phases B, C and D did contain zirconium although the limited plate inventory restricted the zirconium zone to the inner core zone. This set of experiments was performed between April 1985 and July 1986 and focused on validation of both the concept and modeling. In each phase, there were multiple loadings for sub-critical, critical, and with regard to this manuscript, axial expansion worth measurements. Combined, these cores can be used to assess the accuracy of physics codes and evaluated cross section data for IFR concept reactors. This paper presents a recent effort that was made on retrieving validation data from the ZPPR-15 experiments and on deterministic modeling and analysis using MC{sup 2}-3/DIF3D for code validation. Axial expansion experiments and ZPPR-15D loading 206 were selected for this analysis. An explicit modeling of the axial expansion (introduction of gaps between sections of drawer) of ZPPR-15D loading 206 yielded a 32% over-prediction in the worth of the axial expansion with the MC2-3/DIF3D models. This indicates a consistent bias between ZPPR-15B and ZPPR-15D with regard to the deterministic modeling of the experiments. As part of future work, we intend on investigating whether the cross section processing or homogenization model is to blame, but we note with such small changes in k-effective in a large model, it is rather difficult to obtain zero errors as is typical for other worth measurements. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Post-Closure Environmental Sampling and Inspection at the Amchitka Island, Alaska, Site - 17251

In the 1960's and early 1970's, three underground nuclear tests were conducted on Amchitka Island, Alaska. In 1965, the US Department of Defense-in conjunction with the US Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)-conducted the first of these nuclear tests, Long Shot, to provide data that would improve US capabilities for detecting underground nuclear explosions. In 1969, AEC conducted the second test, Milrow, to explore the feasibility of detonating a much larger device. In 1971, AEC conducted the third test, Cannikin, which was the largest underground test ever conducted by the US. The Long-Term Surveillance Plan (LTSP) for the Amchitka, Alaska, Site details how the US Department of Energy Office of Legacy Management (LM) intends to fulfill its mission to protect human health and the environment at and around the Amchitka Island site. The LTSP calls for monitoring to be performed every 5 years, at least during the initial phase of the project. The purpose of the monitoring is to develop a baseline of activity concentrations for selected radionuclides in biota, water, and soil, both on Amchitka Island and at the reference location on Adak Island, approximately 322 kilometers (200 miles) northeast of Amchitka. In addition to the environmental monitoring activities, seven mud pit caps that contain diesel-contaminated soils are inspected. The plan for biological and water sampling (both seawater and freshwater) during the May 2016 sampling event was developed through close coordination with the primary stakeholders, including the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation, the Aleutian Pribilof Islands Association, and the US Fish and Wildlife Service. The environmental sampling in 2016 is a continuation of LM's evaluation of Amchitka Island's environment. Previous results from similar monitoring programs in 2004 and 2011 indicate that the environment is not being impacted by radionuclide migration and uptake from the underground nuclear testing conducted beneath Amchitka Island; consequently, subsistence and commercial-catch seafood is safe for human consumption. The collection of biota samples (rockfish, Irish lords, greenling, and rockweed) for cesium-134 ({sup 134}Cs), cesium-137 ({sup 137}Cs), plutonium-239 ({sup 239}Pu), plutonium-240 ({sup 240}Pu), and freshwater and seawater samples for {sup 134}Cs, {sup 137}Cs, and tritium ({sup 3}H) was the primary objective of the 2016 sampling effort. Rockfish, Irish lords, and greenling are resident, nonmigratory fish species that spend their entire life cycle in the marine environment, and rockweed is an inter-tidal species that may concentrate cesium. The seawater samples were collected primarily to determine if leakage from the Long Shot detonation could be detected and, secondarily, to compare with the background seawater samples collected from Adak Island. Cesium isotopes are also being analyzed to better understand the potential impact that the Fukushima-Daiichi release might have on the Amchitka and Adak environments. The target detection limits used for the 2016 sampling are lower than those used in previous studies. The lower detection limits make it possible for LM to delineate background activity levels for the radionuclides of interest. Data from the 2016 sampling event go beyond assessing food safety and focus on detecting leakage from the underground nuclear explosions. Additionally, the baseline activity concentrations obtained for the reference area (Adak Island) will enable identification of quantitative statistical trends in the results of future sampling programs. Sampling programs conducted in 2021 and beyond will have an objective to assess the statistical trends of radioactivity levels in the Amchitka Island environment. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Measuring SNM Isotopic Distributions using FRAM

The first group of slides provides background information on the isotopic composition of plutonium. It is shown that 240 Pu is the critical isotope in neutron coincidence/multiplicity counting. Next, response function analysis to determine isotopic composition is discussed. The isotopic composition can be determined by measuring the net peak counts from each isotope and then taking the ratio of the counts for each isotope relative to the total counts for the element. Then FRAM (Fixed energy Response function Analysis with Multiple efficiencies) is explained. FRAM can control data acquisition, automatically analyze newly acquired data, analyze previously acquired data, provide information on the quality of the analysis, and facilitate analysis in unusual situations (non-standard energy calibrations, gamma rays from non-SNM isotopes, poor spectra (within limits)).

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Application of wavelet scaling function expansion continuous-energy resonance calculation method to MOX fuel problem

More and more MOX fuels are used in all over the world in the past several decades. Compared with UO{sub 2} fuel, it contains some new features. For example, the neutron spectrum is harder and more resonance interference effects within the resonance energy range are introduced because of more resonant nuclides contained in the MOX fuel. In this paper, the wavelets scaling function expansion method is applied to study the resonance behavior of plutonium isotopes within MOX fuel. Wavelets scaling function expansion continuous-energy self-shielding method is developed recently. It has been validated and verified by comparison to Monte Carlo calculations. In this method, the continuous-energy cross-sections are utilized within resonance energy, which means that it's capable to solve problems with serious resonance interference effects without iteration calculations. Therefore, this method adapts to treat the MOX fuel resonance calculation problem natively. Furthermore, plutonium isotopes have fierce oscillations of total cross-section within thermal energy range, especially for {sup 240}Pu and {sup 242}Pu. To take thermal resonance effect of plutonium isotopes into consideration the wavelet scaling function expansion continuous-energy resonance calculation code WAVERESON is enhanced by applying the free gas scattering kernel to obtain the continuous-energy scattering source within thermal energy range (2.1 eV to 4.0 eV) contrasting against the resonance energy range in which the elastic scattering kernel is utilized. Finally, all of the calculation results of WAVERESON are compared with MCNP calculation. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Expanded Intercomparison of Nuclear Data Libraries Using Jupiter and Jupiter High-240 Experiments

There is a limited availability of plutonium experiments with sensitivity to lead in the ICSBEP (International Handbook of Evaluated Criticality Safety Benchmark Experiments) Handbook. The Jupiter and Jupiter High-240 experiments were performed at the National Criticality Experiments Research Center as a collaborative effort between Los Alamos National Laboratory and the Japan Atomic Energy Agency to assess lead void coefficients in a plutonium-lead system containing weapons- and reactor-grade plutonium, respectively. Concurrent with benchmark development, an intercomparison of calculations using different nuclear data libraries has been performed to assess the usability of the experimental data for nuclear data adjustment in a “softer-that-fast” neutron energy spectrum. Eigenvalue calculations using MCNP with the ENDF/B-VIII.0 and TENDL-2021 nuclear data libraries calculate closest to the benchmark values for Jupiter. Calculations using JENDL-5 and ENDF/B-VIII.1 match best with the Jupiter High-240 values. Lead void worth calculations using the various nuclear data libraries are all within 3σ of their respective measured values. Perturbation studies between ENDF/B-VIII.0 and ENDF/B-VIII.1 demonstrate an approximate increase in calculated eigenvalues for the Jupiter series experiments by ~240 pcm for plutonium (mostly 239 Pu) and ~120 pcm for lead accompanied by a decrease contributed by ~113 pcm for copper and ~13 pcm for stainless steel. Nuclear data sensitivities and uncertainties investigated using Whisper show slightly lower sensitivity to scatter than a lead-reflected plutonium sphere but greater sensitivity to neutron capture. The sensitivities between Jupiter and Jupiter High-240 for lead are very similar for both ENDF/B-VIII.0 and ENDF/B-VIII.1 nuclear data. These benchmarks are more sensitive to neutron capture in lead than other plutonium benchmark experiments and would be useful for both lead and 240 Pu validation. In conclusion, with the high degree of compensating effects between copper, lead, and plutonium cross sections, additional isolated Pb-Pu and Cu-Pu benchmarks would be beneficial in improving these nuclear data.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Plutonium isotope ratio variations in North America

Historically, approximately 12,000 TBq of plutonium was distributed throughout the global biosphere by thermo nuclear weapons testing. The resultant global plutonium fallout is a complex mixture whose {sup 240}Pu/{sup 239}Pu atom ratio is a function of the design and yield of the devices tested. The average {sup 240}Pu/{sup 239}Pu atom ratio in global fallout is 0.176 + 014. However, the {sup 240}Pu/{sup 239}Pu atom ratio at any location may differ significantly from 0.176. Plutonium has also been released by discharges and accidents associated with the commercial and weapons related nuclear industries. At many locations contributions from this plutonium significantly alters the {sup 240}Pu/{sup 239}Pu atom ratios from those observed in global fallout. We have measured the {sup 240}Pu/{sup 239}Pu atom ratios in environmental samples collected from many locations in North America. This presentation will summarize the analytical results from these measurements. Special emphasis will be placed on interpretation of the significance of the {sup 240}Pu/{sup 239}Pu atom ratios measured in environmental samples collected in the Arctic and in the western portions of the United States.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Neutron Resonance Transmission Analysis (NRTA): Initial Studies of a Method for Assaying Plutonium in Spent Fuel

Neutron Resonance Transmission Analysis (NRTA) is an analytical technique that uses neutrons to assay the isotopic content of bulk materials. The technique uses a pulsed accelerator to produce an intense, short pulse of neutrons in a time-of-flight configuration. These neutrons, traveling at different speeds according to their energy, can be used to interrogate a spent fuel (SF) assembly to determine its plutonium content. Neutron transmission through the assembly is monitored as a function of neutron energy (time after the pulse), similar to the way neutron cross-section data is often collected. The transmitted neutron intensity is recorded as a function of time, with faster (higher-energy) neutrons arriving first and slower (lower-energy) neutrons arriving later. The low-energy elastic scattering and absorption resonances of plutonium and other isotopes modulate the transmitted neutron spectrum. Plutonium content in SF can be determined by analyzing this attenuation. Work is currently underway at Idaho National Laboratory, as a part of United States Department of Energy's Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), to investigate the NRTA technique and to assess its feasibility for quantifying the plutonium content in SF and for determining the diversion of SF pins from assemblies. Preliminary results indicate that NRTA has great potential for being able to assay intact SF assemblies. Operating in the 1-40 eV range, it can identify four plutonium isotopes (239, 240, 241, & 242Pu), three uranium isotopes (235, 236, & 238U), and six resonant fission products (99Tc, 103Rh, 131Xe, 133Cs, 145Nd, and 152Sm). It can determine the areal density or mass of these isotopes in single- or multiple-pin integral transmission scans. Further, multiple observables exist to allow the detection of material diversion (pin defects) including fast-neutron and x-ray radiography, gross-transmission neutron counting, plutonium resonance absorption analysis, and fission-product resonance absorption analysis. Initial benchmark modeling has shown excellent agreement with previously published experimental data for measurements of individual SF pins where plutonium assays were experimentally demonstrated to have a precision of better than 3%.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Fissile Material Stockpile Declarations and Cooperative Nuclear Archaeology

With the beginning of the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union quickly began to produce fissile material (plutonium and highly enriched uranium, HEU) for military purposes on an industrial scale. By the mid-1950s, both countries were already making ton-quantities of fissile material per year to supply their growing nuclear arsenals. They were soon joined by the United Kingdom (1951), France (1955), China (1964), and Israel (1965)—and later by India, Pakistan, and finally North Korea. By the time most of these production efforts ended in the early 1990s, the global stockpile of military fissile material had reached fantastic levels. While the combined global nuclear weapon inventory had peaked at about 64,000 in 1986,1 the military fissile-material stockpile ultimately reached almost 2200 tons (240 tons of plutonium and 1960 tons of highly enriched uranium), which is sufficient to make about 200,000 simple nuclear weapons.2 Since the end of the Cold War, almost 700 tons of highly enriched uranium have been down-blended and other material is now reserved for naval fuel. Overall, the military material available for weapon purposes today is sufficient for more than 150,000 weapons (Figure 1).

Glaser, Alexander↗

Reference material manufacture and certification for the AVNG

Testing and demonstration of any radiation measurement system requires the use of appropriate radioactive sources. An attribute measurement system (A VNG) was developed and fabricated at the Russian Federal Nuclear Center, VNIIEF, Russia, under contract with LANL, USA. The A VNG detects neutron and gamma radiation signatures and compares the data analysis results with the specified threshold values for three unclassified attributes; plutonium is present or absent, plutonium mass is greater than or less than the specified threshold value and plutonium isotopic ratio 240 Pu to 239 Pu) is greater than or less then the threshold value. A set of reference materials (RMs) was specially manufactured for the A VNG with masses and isotopic ratios above and below the selected thresholds. The set of RMs was certified in compliance with the Russian metrological requirements. The RMs were used to debug and test the A VNG and to demonstrate the A VNG operation to an American delegation in June 2009. In this presentation, we will describe the various steps in the manufacture and certification of these RM sources.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

The Potential of Plutonium as a Fuel in Near-Thermal Burner Reactors

Here, the influence of plutonium as a fuel constituent on burner reactor behavior is examined. Both the SM-1 and the Shippingport seed lattices are investigated. It is found that the decrease in the effective absorption cross section of Pu 240 with fuel burnup gives the plutonium the characteristic of a self-compensating fuel, thereby leading to the extension of core life with minimum shim control requirements. The illustrated behavior is similar to that which was previously shown to be possible for converter-type reactors.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Improving Effective Mass Estimations in Pu-Metal Annuli

Determining the effective mass of 240 Pu in a plutonium metal item can be achieved through a number of destructive and non-destructive assay techniques. However, these techniques have one or more shortcomings. These include the need for large quantities of plutonium, long measurement time, or lack of sufficient accuracy. While efforts have been made to mitigate these issues by estimating 240 Pu quantities through neutron coincidence counting techniques, these estimates are subject to systematic bias, and their estimates are not well characterized when other factors of the annulus’ physical form and composition are accounted for. In this work, we expand upon these non-destructive assay techniques via the implementation of random forest machine learning models, which produce correction functions that augment and improve the effective mass estimates derived from classical leakage multiplication, singles, doubles, and triples multiplicity counting equations.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Calibration of a Passive Neutron Counter with {sup 242}Pu Standards - 16450

At the Los Alamos National Laboratory TA 55 facility, a large quantity of Heat Source (HS) and MT42 (primarily {sup 242}Pu) has been designated for disposal as TRU waste. The waste, to be packaged in either 55 gal drums or Pipe Overpack Containers (POCs), is scheduled to be assayed with the TA 55 HENC 3 system. The system is owned and operated by the Nuclear Waste Partnership (NWP) under a contract with the Carlsbad DoE field office. The HENC 3 is a combined passive neutron/gamma assay system. The neutron component of the system was previously calibrated up to 21.9 g of {sup 240}Pu effective. This corresponds to approximately 9 g of typical HS plutonium and 13 g of MT42 waste. In order to reduce packaging efforts and radiation dose for waste handling personnel, LANL has requested an increase in the HENC 3 calibration limit to approximate the maximum allowable shipping and storage limits for TRU waste. To increase the limits, NWP has obtained the use of well characterized MT42 source materials. The sources, developed and owned by LANL, range from to 5 g to 200 g of plutonium enriched to 86.6% {sup 242}Pu. Using these sources in combination, multiple measurements were performed with both 55-gal drums and POCs to determine their suitability for extending the neutron calibration range of the system. The results of the measurements were (1) compared to the existing calibration for consistency and (2) used to extend the calibration range to 307 g of {sup 240}Pu effective. This report will discuss the elements of the neutron component of the HENC 3 system, the calibration extension effort, problems encountered, and the results of the measurements. As a result of the extension, HS and MT42 materials can be assayed in 55-gal drums and POCs up to their allowable shipping limits. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Testing the AVNG

An attribute measurement system (AMS) measures a number of unclassified attributes of potentially classified material. By only displaying these unclassified results as red or green lights, the AMS protects potentially classified information while still generating confidence in the measurement result. The A VNG implementation that we describe is an AMS built by RFNC - VNIIEF in Sarov, Russia. The AVNG detects neutron and gamma radiation signatures and displays the three unclassified attributes of 'plutonium presence,' 'plutonium mass > 2 kg,' and 'plutonium isotopic ratio ({sup 240}Pu to {sup 239}Pu) < 0.1.' Prior to demonstration to a joint US/Russian audience, the overall operation and thresholds of the AVNG were tested using a number of multi-kg plutonium reference material (RM) sources manufactured for this purpose. As the AVNG was designed to incorporate an open mode (where all radiation data was displayed) as well as a secure mode (where only the red/green attribute lights were visible), the AVNG was tested in both modes. We will present data from these tests using unclassified plutonium RM sources as well as detector test results obtained using smaller calibration sources.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

The efficacy of denaturing actinide elements as a means of decreasing materials attractiveness

This study considers the concept of denaturing as applied to the actinide elements present in spent fuel as a means to reduce materials attractiveness. Highly attractive materials generally have low values of bare critical mass, heat content, and dose. To denature an attractive element, its spent-fuel isotopic composition (isotopic vector) is intentionally modified by introducing sufficient quantities of a significantly less attractive isotope to dilute the concentration of a highly attractive isotope so that the overall attractiveness of the element is reduced. The authors used FOM (Figure of Merit) formula as the material attractiveness metric for their parametric determination of the attractiveness of the Pu and U. Materials attractiveness needs to be considered in three distinct phases in the process to construct a nuclear explosive device (NED): the acquisition phase, processing phase, and utilization phase. The results show that denaturing uranium with {sup 238}U is actually an effective means of reducing the attractiveness. For uranium with a large minority of {sup 235}U, a mixture of 80% {sup 238}U to 20% {sup 235}U is required to reduce the attractiveness to low. For uranium with a large concentration of {sup 233}U, a mixture of 88% {sup 238}U to 12% {sup 233}U is required to reduce the attractiveness to low. The results also show that denaturing plutonium with {sup 238}Pu is less effective than denaturing uranium with {sup 238}U. Using {sup 238}Pu as the denaturing agent would require 80% or more by mass in order to reduce the attractiveness to low. No amount of {sup 240}Pu is enough to reduce the plutonium attractiveness below medium. The combination of {sup 238}Pu and {sup 240}Pu would require approximately 70% {sup 238}Pu and 25% {sup 240}Pu by mass to reduce the plutonium attractiveness to low.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

A priori precision estimation for neutron triples counting

The nondestructive assay of Plutonium bearing items for criticality, safety, security, safeguards, inventory balance, process control, waste management and compliance is often undertaken using correlated neutron counting. In particular Multiplicity Shift Register analysis allows one to extract autocorrelation parameters from the pulse train which can, within the framework of a simple interpretational model, be related to the effective {sup 240}Pu spontaneous fission mass present. The effective {sup 240}Pu mass is a weighted sum of the {sup 238}Pu, {sup 240}Pu and {sup 242}Pu masses so if the relative isotopic composition of the Pu can be established from the measured {sup 240}Pu effective mass one can estimate the total Pu mass and also the masses of the individual isotopes, example the fissile species {sup 239}Pu and {sup 241}Pu. In multiplicity counting three counting rates are obtained. These are the Singles, Doubles and Triples rates. The Singles rate is just the gross, totals or trigger rate. The Doubles and Triples rates are calculated from factorial moments of the observed signal triggered neutron multiplicity distributions following spontaneous fission in the item and can be thought of as the rate of observed coincident pairs and coincident triplets on the pulse train. Coincident events come about because the spontaneous fission and induced fission chains taking place in the item result in bursts of neutrons. These remain time correlated during the detection process and so retain information, through the burst size distribution, about the Pu content. In designing and assessing the performance of a detector system to meet a given goal it is necessary to make a priori estimates of the counting precision for all three kinds of rates. This is non-trivial because the counting does not obey the familiar rules of a Poissonian counting experiment because the pulse train has time correlated events on it and the train is sampled by event triggered gates that may overlap. For Singles and Doubles simple approximate analytical empirical rules for how to estimate the variance have been developed guided by theory and refined by experiment. However, for Triples no equivalent rules have been put forward and tested until now. In this work we propose an analytical expression, the CSH relation, for the variance on the Triples count and exercise it against experimental data gathered for Pu items measured in the Los Alamos National Laboratory's Epithermal Neutron Multiplicity Counter (ENMC). Preliminary results are encouraging and reasonable agreement with observation, considered fit for scoping studies, is obtained. We have also looked at the behavior using Monte Carlo simulations. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗