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At least 73 records · Page 4
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2023

Examining the potential for detecting simultaneous noble gas and aerosol samples in the international monitoring system radionuclide network

The purpose of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is to establish a legally binding ban on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions. The Preparatory Commission for the CTBT Organization (CTBTO PrepCom) is developing the International Monitoring System (IMS) that includes a global network of 80 stations to monitor for airborne radionuclides upon entry into force of the CTBT. All 80 radionuclide stations will monitor for particulate radionuclides and at least half of the stations will monitor for radioxenon. The airborne radionuclide monitoring is an important verification technology both for the detection of a radionuclide release and in the determination of whether the release event originates from a nuclear explosion as opposed to an industrial use of nuclear materials. Nuclear power plants and many medical isotope production facilities release radioxenon into the atmosphere. Low levels of a few particulate isotopes, such as iodine, may also be released. Detections of multiple isotopes are useful for screening the radionuclide samples for relevance to the Treaty. This paper examines the anticipated joint detections in the IMS of noble gas and particulate isotopes from underground nuclear explosions where breaches in the underground containment vents from low levels to up to 1% of the radionuclide inventory of the resulting fission products to the atmosphere. Detection probabilities are based on 844 simulated release events spaced out at 17 release locations and one year in time. Six different release (venting) scenarios, including two fractionated scenarios, were analyzed. When ranked by detection probability, 11 particulate isotopes and one noble gas isotope ( 133 Xe) appear in the top 20 isotopes for all six release scenarios. Using the 11 particulate isotopes and the one noble gas isotope, the IMS has nearly the same detection probability as when 45 particulate and 4 noble gas isotopes are used. Thus, a limited list of relevant radionuclides may be sufficient for treaty verification purposes. The probability that at least one particulate and at least one radioxenon isotope would be detected in the IMS from the release events ranged from 0.15 to 0.86 depending on the release scenario.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2024

Impacts of future nuclear power generation on the international monitoring system

Many countries are considering nuclear power as a means of reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and the IAEA (IAEA, 2022) has forecasted nuclear power growth rates up to 224% of the 2021 level by 2050. Nuclear power plants release trace quantities of radioxenon, an inert gas that is also monitored under international agreements as a signature of nuclear weapons tests. To better understand how nuclear energy growth (and resulting Xe emissions) could affect this global nonproliferation architecture, we modeled daily releases of radioxenon isotopes used for nuclear explosion detection in the International Monitoring System (IMS) that is part of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty: 131m Xe, 133 Xe, 133m Xe, and 135 Xe to examine the change in the number of radioxenon detections as compared to the 2021 detection levels. If a 40-station IMS network is used, the detections of 133 Xe in 2050 would range from 82% for the low-power scenario to 195% for the high-power scenario, compared to the detections in 2021. If an 80-station IMS network is used, the detections of 133 Xe in 2050 would range from 83% of the 2021 detection rate for the low-power scenario to 209% for the high-power scenario. Essentially no detections of 131m Xe and 133m Xe are expected. The high growth scenario could lead to a six-fold increase in 135 Xe detections, but the total number of detections is still small (on the order of 1 detection per day in the entire network).

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Operational and Mission Highlights: A Monthly Summary of Top Achievements October 2022

On Sept. 26, Director Thom Mason signed the Laboratory’s annual assessment of four of the weapons systems in our nation’s nuclear stockpile: the B61 family of bombs and the W76, the W78 and the W88 warheads. Addressed to the secretary of energy, the secretary of defense and the chair of the Nuclear Weapons Council, this letter informs the president of the United States of our confidence that the stockpile remains safe, secure, and effective now and into the future as a result of our dedicated sustainment and modernization efforts.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2024

FY23 Laboratory Directed Research & Development Annual Report

At Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL), we put science to work to protect the environment and address nuclear security challenges. Through our transformative science and technology efforts, SRNL provides solutions to the Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Environmental Management (EM) for the safe cleanup of environmental legacy resulting from nuclear weapons development and government-sponsored nuclear energy research. SRNL also supports DOE’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) as it maintains the nation’s nuclear stockpile and reduces the threat of nuclear proliferation around the world. Investments through SRNL’s Laboratory Directed Research and Development (LDRD) program drive exploratory research foundational to advancements in mission critical technologies for EM, NNSA and other offices of DOE. Our LDRD program also provides meaningful development opportunities for the people central to innovation. Seven Laboratory Director’s Postdoctoral Research Fellows were supported by LDRD during fiscal year 2023. These named postdoctoral fellows are driving SRNL’s scientific and technical core competencies forward through their dedication to research and advancement of technologies. The LDRD program supports established researchers to explore new concepts, while fueling opportunities for the next generation of scientists to join the SRNL workforce, contributing to the global scientific community through scientific publications. Enjoy reading this Annual Report which summarizes the innovative science and engineering contributions of SRNL staff supported by the LDRD Program. Dr. Vahid Majid

Majidi, Vahid↗
DOE OSTI2023

Finding of Effect, And Mitigation Documentation for Building 23-620, Mercury, Area 23, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) plans to demolish Building 23-620 in the town of Mercury (Nevada State Historic Preservation Office [SHPO] Resource No. B15283), which is on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in Nye County, Nevada (see Figure 1). The purpose of the undertaking is related to the modernization of Mercury for future mission needs. The NNSA/NFO will implement this undertaking in accordance with the Programmatic Agreement between the National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office and the Nevada State Historic Preservation Officer Regarding Modernization and Operational Maintenance of the Nevada National Security Site, at Mercury in Nye County, Nevada, hereafter referred to as the Mercury PA. Building 23-620 was built in 1968 as office space for the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory (LASL), who worked on the design and engineering of nuclear weapons. In the 1990s, it became a maintenance facility for Reynolds Electrical & Engineering Company (REECo), and eventually, it became the Real Estate Services building in 2004. The town of Mercury and the immediate surrounding area have been formally determined eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places (National Register, NRHP) as the Mercury Historic District (MHD, SHPO Resource No. D230) under Criteria A and C for its importance in supporting nuclear testing and scientific research from 1951 through 1992. Building 23-620 was identified as a contributing element to the MHD in a 2018 architectural survey of the district (Reno et al.) and recorded on a Nevada Architectural Resource Assessment (ARA) form (Reno et al. 2017). Building 23-620 was also identified in Appendix C of the Mercury PA as a Category I contributing element, indicating that it might be individually eligible for the NRHP. It is a historic property for the purposes of compliance with Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) and subject to the stipulations of the Mercury PA. Mitigation Report: The purpose of this letter report is to submit documentation related to the mitigation of the demolition of Building 23-620 (Nevada State Historic Preservation Office [SHPO] Resource No. B15283) in the Mercury Historic District (MHD, SHPO Resource No. D230). This submission is intended to comply with the stipulations in the Programmatic Agreement between the National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office and the Nevada State Historic Preservation Officer Regarding Modernization and Operational Maintenance of the Nevada National Security Site, at Mercury in Nye County, Nevada, hereafter referred to as the Mercury PA.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2022

Data Mining of the Rocky Flats Library Archive for Plutonium Compatibility Studies

The objective of this project was to create a searchable database of plutonium compatibility studies from the Rocky Flats Archive. The Rocky Flats Plant was a manufacturing complex in Golden, Colorado that produced nuclear weapons. It primarily focused on producing plutonium pits, which were the cores of many nuclear implosion-type weapons. Because plutonium is an extremely reactive metal, avoiding the use of incompatible materials is imperative to avoid damaging the plutonium pit during its production. The Rocky Flats Plant had conducted extensive surveys of materials used in plutonium pit fabrication for their compatibility with plutonium.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
DOE OSTI2022

The Optics of Deterrence: How Science Assures the Nuclear Stockpile's Reliability In Lieu of Testing

When designing a product intended to perform a certain function and satisfy some set of criteria, the standard engineering method to assess its ability to perform is to test it. This nearly universal concept works consistently, assuring proper function and generally avoiding or mitigating the consequence of failure to within acceptable limits. What would happen if the product developers were told that they must continue to certify and validate the performance without testing it, that the landscape in which the product must serve its purpose is constantly evolving, and that the product in question is the United States’ nuclear weapons stockpile? This is the position the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) finds itself in; the reliability of the stockpile must be verified without actually testing it to see if it works as intended.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗
DOE OSTI2025

The Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test Facility Capability eXpansion (DCX) Strategy

This document details the strategy proposed to meet the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) requirement for the Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test (DARHT) Facility Sustainment and Modernization projects identified in multiple NNSA Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan (SSMP) reports to Congress [NNSA, 2020; 2021; 2022; 2023; 2024]. DARHT has become indispensable for the certification of the primaries of U.S. nuclear weapons since the current U.S. moratorium halted underground nuclear testing more than 30 years ago. However, aging facilities, evolving technology, and other issues are limiting or threatening the capability of DARHT to meet NNSA’s expanding mission needs now and into the future. This DARHT Capability eXpansion (DCX) strategy was developed to address NNSA needs by extending DARHT’s reliability and resilience, increasing the quality and quantity of DARHT data, and enabling hydrodynamic measurements in complex environments. The strategy can be implemented through integration of line-item projects, acquisition of major items of equipment, and other actions coordinated with the execution of the SSMP. This strategy document is intended for U.S. Government officials, particularly authorizers, appropriators, and program leaders. It may also be furnished to DARHT users, customers, collaborators, stakeholders, and visitors as needed

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2025

An Architectural Survey of the U12G Tunnel Historic District, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), in conjunction with the National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO), proposes to demolish six buildings and three storage areas located at the U12g Tunnel portal area in Area 12 of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). The buildings are 12-358 (Signal Vault); 12-201800 (Storage Quonset Hut); 12-202555 (Walker Shack); 12-868 (Pipe Assembly); 12-B100933 (Electrical Shop); 12-B100944 (Conference Room); and Storage Area 1; Storage Area 2; and Storage Area 3. The buildings and storage areas were selected for demolition as part of the DOE’s Real Property Efficiency Plan to reduce the footprint of unused and non-operational facilities on the NNSS. They are all vacant and have no proposed uses for current or upcoming NNSS missions. Demolition activities constitute an undertaking subject to review under Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) (54 United States Code [USC] § 306101) and its implementing regulations, 36 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 800. Identification efforts began with resources proposed for demolition in federal Fiscal Year (FY) 23. Four buildings were proposed to be demolished in FY23 (12-358, 12-868, 12-201800, and 12-202555). These buildings and the U12g Tunnel Historic District (SHPO No. D444) were recorded in Identification, Evaluation, and Finding of Adverse Effect for the Proposed Demolition of Five Buildings in Area 12, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada (Menocal et al. 2023). Identification efforts indicated three buildings (12-358, 12-201800, and 12-868) supported nuclear testing in the U12g Tunnel. The fourth building post-dated the use of U12g Tunnel for nuclear testing activities. The report recommended that three of the four buildings (12-358, 12-201800, 12-868) and the U12g Tunnel Historic District may be eligible for the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP). The report also found that the undertaking would have an adverse effect on the three buildings and on the historic district. The Nevada State Historic Preservation Office (SHPO) concurred with the report’s findings (Reed 2023). The U12g Tunnel was determined eligible as a historic district under the Secretary of the Interior’s (SOI) Significance Criterion A, at the local level, in the context of the Cold War as an underground testing environment for the development of nuclear weapons and to assess the effects of a nuclear explosion on materials and equipment with a period of significance from 1959 to 1971. It was also determined eligible under Significance Criterion C for embodying the distinctive characters of a horizontal tunnel complex used for nuclear testing and as a significant and distinguishable entity. The three buildings were determined to be contributing elements of the district. The undertaking was expanded with the addition of two buildings and three storage areas proposed to be demolished and located within U12g Tunnel Historic District in FY24. These five resources (12-B100933, 12-B100944, and Storage Areas 1, 2, and 3) were recorded in Supplemental Identification, Evaluation, and Finding of Effect for Additional Proposed Demolition at U12g Tunnel, Area 12, Nevada national Security Site, Nye County, Nevada (Brannan et al. 2024). Identification efforts indicated that the two buildings and Storage Area 1 supported nuclear testing in the U12g Tunnel. Storage Area 1 and Storage Area 2 post-dated the nuclear testing activities at U12g Tunnel and were not recommended as contributing elements to the district. The report also found that the undertaking would have an adverse effect on the newly identified buildings and one storage area and on the historic district. The SHPO concurred that the expanded undertaking would result in adverse effects to historic properties (Reed 2025). To resolve these adverse effects, NNSA/NFO, in consultation with the SHPO, is following standard mitigation as stipulated in the 2024 Programmatic Agreement DE-GM58-22NA25554 Among the U.S. Department of Energy and the Nevada State Historic Preservation Officer and the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation Concerning the Protection of Historic Properties on the Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada (hereafter referred to as the NNSS PA). The standard mitigation measures are outlined in Appendix D of the NNSS PA. As such, this architectural survey has been prepared in accordance with Appendix D of the NNSS PA and follows the report format outlined in Appendix F. It includes a historic context that describes the district’s origin, history, and support functions, its significance in the context of nuclear testing on the NNSS, and identifies contributing and non-contributing elements within the district. The report is accompanied by Architectural Resource Assessment (ARA) forms for individual resources and a Historic District Resource Assessment (HDRA) for the U12g Tunnel Historic District. In total, this architectural report identified 32 primary resources within the district boundary. Six of the primary resources were previously identified as contributing elements. An additional 17 resources are recommended as contributing elements to the district for a total of 23 contributing elements. The other nine resources identified are recommended as non-contributing elements to the district.

12-201800↗
DOE OSTI2025

Stockpile Stewardship and Nuclear Testing: A Technical Assessment

Since 1992, the United States has retained confidence in its nuclear weapon stockpile without performing any tests that produce nuclear yield. Instead, it has invested in a stockpile stewardship program (SSP) based on the same approach that was validated through fifty years of experience during the nuclear testing era. As the test moratorium continues and new information becomes available, it is both necessary and appropriate to periodically revisit the question of whether or not nuclear testing should resume. In a recent article by Dr. Mark Schneider, he asserts that the United States should return to nuclear testing to address the issues that negatively affect our country’s nuclear deterrent. A serious, technically informed evaluation of the most significant of the issues Dr. Schneider has raised is provided in this paper. The conclusion of this evaluation is that the strategy of a well-funded SSP coupled with rigorous assessments to identify if there is a specific need for a nuclear test is sound and cost-effective approach. Any decision otherwise needs to take into careful consideration all the classified SSP successes and data pertaining to the particular issues in question.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2025

Knowledge Transfer Program for International Nuclear Safeguards

Nuclear safeguards were first announced in 1945 by the U.S., Canadian and British governments as a means to exchange scientific information about peaceful uses of atomic energy and prevent the use of nuclear material for weapons. International nuclear safeguards, now under the provision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), serves to hold accountable the 140 member countries (States) that have entered into treaties and agreements against the spread of nuclear weapons. Most notably, the IAEA acts as a nuclear materials inspectorate under the global Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, brought about in 1968, that specifies commitments member States make to the world?s non-proliferation regime. The Office of International Nuclear Safeguards (OINS) is part of the National Nuclear Security Administration, a semi-autonomous agency within the U.S. Department of Energy. Within OINS, the Human Capital Development program recognizes the need to build workforce capacity and safeguards expertise. This includes supporting the education and training of younger generations working in international nuclear safeguards. One of the program?s main concerns is core competencies being lost to retirement or attrition and building knowledge retention pipelines from senior to new professionals. One identified core competency is knowledge gained by individuals who have completed IAEA assignments such as missions to member States to conduct safeguards inspections. Such individuals possess unique knowledge, and efforts are being put forth to effectively capture this knowledge within the national laboratories complex. To this end, we report findings from a one-year mentor-mentee knowledge retention program in which an international safeguards subject matter expert imparted knowledge and skills to a willing professional mentee. The knowledge and skills stem from the mentor?s multi-year assignment at the IAEA in Vienna, Austria.

98 - NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL↗
DOE OSTI2025

NCERC 2024 Highlights

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is entrusted with ensuring the safety, security, and reliability of the nation’s nuclear weapons stockpile while advancing programs aimed at reducing global nuclear proliferation. These critical mission objectives are achieved through the expertise of a highly skilled team of professionals. The operations at the National Criticality Experiments Research Center (NCERC) play a vital role in developing and enhancing knowledge and expertise in advanced nuclear technologies. NCERC supports a wide range of mission areas, including nuclear criticality safety, nuclear emergency response, and nuclear nonproliferation, safeguards, and arms control. It also provides support to the Department of Homeland Security, advances stockpile stewardship science, and delivers scientific expertise to other government agencies, such as NASA and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. NCERC conducts experiments utilizing diverse nuclear materials, from small neutron-emitting sources for testing radiation detection equipment to larger quantities of uranium and plutonium for criticality experiments. A cornerstone of NCERC's mission portfolio includes the operation of four critical mass assembly machines—Planet, Comet, Flattop, and Godiva-IV—which are instrumental in advancing nuclear science and ensuring the nation’s nuclear security objectives.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Senior Historian Alan Carr presents Lab-wide talk on testing-Nation’s last weapons test marks 30th anniversary

Join Senior Historian Alan Carr as he presents “Introduction to Nuclear Weapons Testing, 1945 to 1992” in commemoration of the 30th anniversary of the nation’s last full-scale nuclear test. Special guest retired Los Alamos test director Ron Cosimi will offer the opening remarks. Attendees will receive an original commemorative poster and can browse a new, temporary Divider test display.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2021

The Global Nonproliferation Regime: The NPT and Beyond

In the aftermath of WWII, the fear of nuclear war prompted the international community to confront the issue of nuclear proliferation. The global nonproliferation regime that exists today is comprised of a matrix of multilateral treaties, political commitments, and unilateral measures designed to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. It has evolved considerably since the dawn of the nuclear age. This presentation covers the origins of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), an introduction to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, a discussion of contemporary challenges and opportunities in the field, and an overview of the broader nonproliferation regime beyond the NPT.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2021

The Science of the Bomb

Uranium is a naturally occurring element with wo isotopes of interest – U238 and U235; U235 is useful for its ability to sustain a chain reaction; Chain reactions are the fundamental way that nuclear reactors work, as well as how bombs work; Enrichment of U235 is important for both nuclear energy as well as nuclear weapons; A safety focus is at the center of all nuclear operations in the United States

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗
DOE OSTI2023

Solving National Security Challenges [Slides]

In 1943, Los Alamos National Laboratory was founded with a single, urgent purpose: to build an atomic bomb. Today, LANL focuses on maintaining a strategic nuclear deterrent, developing technology, and using science and engineering to protect the nation's security. Our workers, facilities, and instruments detect nuclear weapons, facilities, and instruments; promote cooperation and diplomacy; and limit nuclear arms and the spread of nuclear materials, technology, and expertise.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2022

Experimental Procedure and Results for Contact Thermal Conductance Measurements performed during FY 2021

Weapons Test Engineering groups at LANL are responsible for testing and simulating weapon assemblies and subassemblies in support of qualification and certification of nuclear weapon systems. The complex nature of the assemblies themselves coupled with the loading environments, gives rise to low confidence and high uncertainties in the interpretation of both experimental and simulated results. In an effort to reduce these uncertainties, a project was started at LANL to perform focused and systematic experiments combined with simulations to increase confidence in both arenas. A key goal of the work performed under the Delivery Environments (DE) Testbeds to Reduce Uncertainties in Simulations and Tests TRUST program, focuses on identifying and minimizing sources of uncertainty associated with experimental and computational techniques. Specifically, with the above as motivation, a measurement procedure was developed by MST-8 to perform thermal conductivity measurements on cylinders of both similar and dissimilar metallic systems as a function of loading conditions and varying material interface morphologies between these components.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
DOE OSTI2022

ASC FY2023 Implementation Plan Revision 0

The DOE National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) is an integrated technical program for maintaining the safety, security, and reliability of the U.S. nuclear stockpile. The SSP incorporates nuclear test data, computational modeling and simulation, and experimental facilities to advance understanding of nuclear weapons. The suite of data analyzed comes from activities including previous nuclear tests, stockpile surveillance, experimental research, and development and engineering programs. This integrated national program requires the continued use of experimental facilities and the computational capabilities to support the SSP missions. These component parts, in addition to an appropriately scaled production capability, enable NNSA to support stockpile requirements. The ultimate goal of the SSP, and thus of the Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASC) Program, is to ensure that the U.S. maintains a safe, secure, and effective strategic deterrent.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗