Status of the NERVA program.
NERVA program, reactor and nonnuclear component development, full-scale testing, engine program, facilities and materials research
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NERVA program, reactor and nonnuclear component development, full-scale testing, engine program, facilities and materials research
HT-9, a ferritic-Martensitic steel, has attracted significant interest as a structural and cladding material for a variety of high dose nuclear component applications. This study examines the tensile properties of a HT-9 fuel assembly duct from the fast flux test facility, FFTF. The duct, from the Advanced Core Oxide-3 (ACO-3) irradiation test, was subjected to fast neutron irradiation exposure ranging from 3 dpa above the core top to nearly 155 dpa near the core mid-plane, spanning a temperature range from 382 °C at the lower end to 504 °C at the top. Due to the combination of thermal and neutron flux gradients along the core height. This yields a variety of irradiation damage processes which depend on core location. Tensile properties of specimens extracted at different positions along the height of the irradiated duct were measured at 25 °C, 200 °C and near their in-core irradiation temperature. The results show temperature has a greater impact than dose on post-irradiation strength and ductility. Two irradiation temperature regimes were determined, below irradiation temperatures of 420 °C irradiation hardening increases as irradiation temperature decreases, and above that temperature relatively minor changes are observed in tensile properties. These results are discussed in terms of expected microstructural changes, indicating that dislocation content is a strong contributor in these findings.
This project will demonstrate a multi-hazard time-dependent probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) approach for nuclear facilities considering aging-related deterioration of structures. A generic pressurized water reactor (PWR) reactor subjected to seismic mainshock-aftershock sequences considering the aging of the containment structure will be used as a case study to demonstrate the multi-hazard PRA approach. Using advanced modeling and simulation, seismic mainshock-aftershock fragility functions will be simulated for the containment structure considering aging effects. A multi-hazard PRA model for a generic PWR reactor will be built to quantify the multi-hazard core damage frequency (CDF) and large early release frequency (LERF) with explicit time-dependent modeling of event sequences. To date, the cascading impacts of multi-hazards are not adequately accounted for in the PRA models for nuclear facilities. In addition, for both initial and periodic evaluation of facilities to withstand natural phenomena hazards (NPH), deterioration of the SSCs due to aging and other effects is not adequately considered. By advancing multi-hazard considerations accounting for aging effects, this project will contribute to improved understanding of the safety of aging nuclear facilities. Project outcomes such as the multi-hazard CDF and LERF will also allow facility owners to optimize upgrade and retrofit protocols. This project is divided into two components: (1) advanced modeling and simulations; and (2) multi-hazard PRA. For the first component, Idaho National Laboratory’s (INL) Multi-hazard Analysis for STOchastic time-DOmaiN phenomena (MASTODON) and BlackBear codes will be used to simulate the seismic response and damage of a containment structure under cascading mainshock-aftershock sequences with aging effects. Uncertainties related to the seismic inputs, material parameters, and environmental factors such as temperature and humidity will be identified and propagated to the fragility functions. These fragility functions, which consider aging effects, will be time dependent. The second component will take the fragility information from the first component to build a multi-hazard time-dependent PRA model starting from a generic PWR model to evaluate the multi-hazard CDF and LERF and characterize the associated consequences. For this component, OpenPRA Web Application and SAPHIRE code will be used. Events such as the Fukushima Daiichi accident have highlighted the importance of considering the cascading impacts of multi-hazards for PRA. Moreover, many of the reactors in the current nuclear fleet in the United States (US) are already operating well beyond their initially planned design life, and applications for further extensions to operating licenses are being considered. Therefore, considering multi-hazard effects and aging deterioration in the NPH risk assessment process will contribute to the safety of both existing and future nuclear facilities. Outcomes of this project will thus directly benefit the standards DOE-STD-1020-16 and DOE-HDBK-1224-18.
The purpose of this document is to update and formally document decommissioning plans for the Microreactor Applications Research Validation and Evaluation (MARVEL) microreactor after two years of operational testing. The operational testing consists of 3 continuous days of operation followed by 4 days of non-operation. This plan is also based on the assumption that all MARVEL fuel will be transported to long-term intermediate storage at the CPP-603 used fuel storage facility, sodium-potassium (NaK) coolant can be disposed as Class B radioactive waste and that the balance of the reactor primary components can be disposed of at an available disposal facility.
To support the on-going nuclear thermal propulsion effort, a state-of-the-art non nuclear experimental test setup has been constructed to evaluate the performance characteristics of candidate fuel element materials and geometries in representative environments. The facility to perform this testing is referred to as the Nuclear Thermal Rocket Element Environment Simulator (NTREES). This device can simulate the environmental conditions (minus the radiation) to which nuclear rocket fuel components will be subjected during reactor operation. Test articles mounted in the simulator are inductively heated in such a manner so as to accurately reproduce the temperatures and heat fluxes which would normally occur as a result of nuclear fission and would be exposed to flowing hydrogen. Initial testing of a somewhat prototypical fuel element has been successfully performed in NTREES and the facility has now been shutdown to allow for an extensive reconfiguration of the facility which will result in a significant upgrade in its capabilities
To support the on-going nuclear thermal propulsion effort, a state-of-the-art non nuclear experimental test setup has been constructed to evaluate the performance characteristics of candidate fuel element materials and geometries in representative environments. The facility to perform this testing is referred to as the Nuclear Thermal Rocket Element Environment Simulator (NTREES). This device can simulate the environmental conditions (minus the radiation) to which nuclear rocket fuel components will be subjected during reactor operation. Test articles mounted in the simulator are inductively heated in such a manner so as to accurately reproduce the temperatures and heat fluxes which would normally occur as a result of nuclear fission and would be exposed to flowing hydrogen. Initial testing of a somewhat prototypical fuel element has been successfully performed in NTREES and the facility has now been shutdown to allow for an extensive reconfiguration of the facility which will result in a significant upgrade in its capabilities. Keywords: Nuclear Thermal Propulsion, Simulator
To support the on-going nuclear thermal propulsion effort, a state-of-the-art non nuclear experimental test setup has been constructed to evaluate the performance characteristics of candidate fuel element materials and geometries in representative environments. The facility to perform this testing is referred to as the Nuclear Thermal Rocket Element Environment Simulator (NTREES). This device can simulate the environmental conditions (minus the radiation) to which nuclear rocket fuel components will be subjected during reactor operation. Prototypical fuel elements mounted in the simulator are inductively heated in such a manner so as to accurately reproduce the temperatures and heat fluxes which would normally occur as a result of nuclear fission in addition to being exposed to flowing hydrogen. Recent upgrades to NTREES now allow power levels 24 times greater than those achievable in the previous facility configuration. This higher power operation will allow near prototypical power densities and flows to finally be achieved in most prototypical fuel elements.
The Lewis Research Center of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration proposes to build a nuclear research reactor which will be located in the Plum Brook Ordnance Works near Sandusky, Ohio. The purpose of this report is to inform the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards of the U. S. Atomic Energy Commission in regard to the design Lq of the reactor facility, the characteristics of the site, and the hazards of operation at this location. The purpose of this research reactor is to make pumped loop studies of aircraft reactor fuel elements and other reactor components, radiation effects studies on aircraft reactor materials and equipment, shielding studies, and nuclear and solid state physics experiments. The reactor is light water cooled and moderated of the MTR-type with a primary beryllium reflector and a secondary water reflector. The core initially will be a 3 by 9 array of MTR-type fuel elements and is designed for operation up to a power of 60 megawatts. The reactor facility is described in general terms. This is followed by a discussion of the nuclear characteristics and performance of the reactor. Then details of the reactor control system are discussed. A summary of the site characteristics is then presented followed by a discussion of the larger type of experiments which may eventually be operated in this facility. The considerations for normal operation are concluded with a proposed method of handling fuel elements and radioactive wastes. The potential hazards involved with failures or malfunctions of this facility are considered in some detail. These are examined first from the standpoint of preventing them or minimizing their effects and second from the standpoint of what effect they might have on the reactor facility staff and the surrounding population. The most essential feature of the design for location at the proposed site is containment of the maximum credible accident.
Several net-zero scenario evaluations predict a rapid ramp up of nuclear energy in the coming decades. If this materializes, it will most likely strain the supply chains associated with the potential advanced reactor concepts awaiting deployment. To help assess the current and potential capacities of the various advanced reactor supply chains, the Gateway for Accelerated Innovation in Nuclear (GAIN) conducted a survey of companies able to produce components for advanced reactors in the near future (namely for sodium, gas-cooled, and molten salt reactors). Using an aggressive nuclear deployment scenario, the objective was to assess the ability of the various supply chains to meet the considerable demand projections for certain key components (vessels, heat exchangers, pumps, graphite, and sensors) and identify potential challenges. While individual companies were unable to meet the most optimistic nuclear deployment rate projections, it was found that on aggregate, a United States-based supply chain projected that expansion could be ramped up to meet a larger future demand of these components. However, meeting projected demand for several more complex items (namely gas or salt heat exchangers) was found to be more challenging. Deploying new reactors at scale necessitates the production of more and more supply chain components, requiring a ramp up in production. Supply chain companies were surveyed, and respondents appeared less able to meet short term demand (next year) versus longer-term demand projections (5 and 10 years). This reflects the need to obtain orders with adequate lead times (can range from 3 to 30 months). Future demand will need to be met by expanding existing capacity. These expansions will require suppliers to raise capital or secure other types of support (federal loans or grants) to invest in facilities, equipment, and workforce. Individual suppliers indicated financial investments could be in the range of $\$ $100 million to $\$ $1 billion for their own facilities (depending on the type of facility). The biggest risk, according to respondents, related to general uncertainties surrounding the future nuclear industry and whether the potential demand projections will materialize into real demand that is actionable from a business perspective. Businesses do not seem willing to take investments risks without clear orders. If businesses are not able to invest to expand the supply, it will either delay the deployment of advanced nuclear technology, or the supply chain will be met by suppliers outside of the United States. This report only focuses on the domestic supply chain’s ability to meet the various projections stipulated here for the specific assessed components (vessels, heat exchangers, pumps, graphite, and sensors). The report does not cover all reactor designs or all components that may ultimately be needed for any one reactor design. It also does not address whether any specific aspect of the supply chain will be cost competitive in the global market, nor how potential state-backed entities could affect the expansion of a United States-based supply chain. The largest challenges in ramping up capacity among respondents appear to be workforce related. This includes workforce availability, experience, training, and turnover. In addition to facility investment, suppliers will also need to invest heavily in long-term workforce training to meet production goals. This issue is not nuclear-specific, and the expansion of any supply chain will likely face similar challenges. While suppliers evaluated expected normal business demand from other markets outside of nuclear, it is possible that other market segments could expand more than predicted and compete for the same suppliers. One potential market that may compete for the same supplier resources is the United States military, as many of these suppliers support both the commercial nuclear sector as well as the Navy with reactors and components. In summary, suppliers in the United States believe that there is a way to increase production in order to begin meeting the demand which will exist for advanced reactors—as long as appropriate investments can be made in the supply chain in an appropriate timeframe. Based on the capacity projections and lead times, investment will be needed to meet the 5-year and 10-year production targets. Therefore, if significant nuclear deployment is to occur in the 2030s, investment and ramp up of the advanced nuclear supply chain will need to begin in the near future for the United States to successfully deploy these advanced reactors with domestic supply chains.
The Activated Materials Laboratory (AML) will be a new radiological facility at the Advanced Photon Source (APS) in Argonne National Laboratory (ANL), adjacent to the high-energy x-ray microscopy (HEXM) beamline in the long beamline building (LBB) constructed under the APS-upgrade (APS-U) project. The AML is a centralized facility to facilitate the safe conduct of experiments on activated materials at the APS. This report provides an overview of the status of the AML as a Nuclear Science User Facilities (NSUF) partner user facility in preparation for the general user access in 2025 upon the commissioning of the APS-U beamlines. The AML's scope, functionality and components are detailed. The NSUF partner beamlines’ commissioning status in the post-APS-U era is provided, along with the AML’s operational updates and operational plan.
This report provides a comprehensive assessment of physical security modeling and simulation tools available for use in the vulnerability assessment (VA) process for nuclear facilities. It outlines the historical evolution of VA methodologies, emphasizing the transition from traditional layer-based approaches to a more holistic framework that integrates detection probabilities directly into combat simulations. The document details the critical components of the VA process, including the characterization of targets, threats, and protective measures, as well as the development of adversary scenarios that reflect both insider and outsider threats. It highlights the importance of performance assurance programs, emphasizing the need for continuous evaluation and testing of security systems to ensure their effectiveness against evolving threats. Additionally, the report discusses the significance of utilizing accredited modeling and simulation tools in accredited areas to accurately represent adversary actions and the corresponding responses of protective forces. By establishing a systematic approach to VA, this document aims to enhance the overall security posture of nuclear facilities, ensuring compliance with regulatory standards while effectively mitigating risks associated with potential adversarial actions.
The Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Transient Reactor Test Facility (TREAT) Fuel Motion Monitoring System (FMMS) is a diagnostic tool used to visualize the movement and location of fuel within the nuclear reactor during transient experiments. TREAT is designed to test the behavior of nuclear fuel under accident conditions, such as a rapid power increase. The TREAT FMMS, also referred to as the “hodoscope” because of the system’s massive steel collimator component, is located on the North beam port of the reactor. While the FMMS system is capable of incorporating a total of 360 sensors, initial refurbishment efforts resulted in a array of 96 fast neutron detectors. This initial array was configured to provide a narrow (2 channels) full-length view of experiment vessels with an extended 4-channel–wide region in the center of the array capable of providing a full view of all initially planned experiments. Planning and efforts to expand the FMMS array began immediately following the restart of TREAT. An additional 96 detectors were evaluated, characterized, and prepared for installation at TREAT during the summer of 2018. Unfortunately, funding reductions forced the project towards a 5-year hiatus. In October of 2023 funding from the Department of Energy’s Nuclear Science User Facilities enabled the expansion to recommence. This report serves to document the activities performed to expand the FMMS detector array to 192 channels in order to provide a broader view of the larger and more sophisticated test capsules currently planned for future irradiation in the TREAT reactor. This expansion also included doubling the data acquisition capability, addressing the new heat load on the system, and synchronizing the time for all digital components.
Nuclear power plants (NPP) have thousands of digital assets throughout their facility. Typically, NPPs have asset and configuration management programs that capture the make, model, and version of a component. This information, however, usually only includes first- or second-tier components and does not capture the complete enumeration of software components and their dependencies within operational technology (OT) equipment. As seen with recent cyberattacks, this level of detail is insufficient for identifying if and where an exploitable vulnerability exists within a facility. A software bill of materials (SBOM) provides this detailed enumeration. Further, integrating SBOMs with vulnerability data sources and vulnerability attestation reports can provide improved awareness leading to better cyber risk management and incident response. Preferably, SBOMs are provided by the supplier; however, when an NPP already owns a device, it is less likely they will have a supplier provided-SBOM. Fortunately, SBOMs can be generated on installed digital assets. This paper provides an introduction to the U.S. Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy paper titled “Towards Software Bill of Materials in the Nuclear Industry,” which describes the SBOM ecosystem and provides a suggested approach to methodically and seamlessly integrate an SBOM program in an NPP.
The development of a new ASTM standard for evaluating the corrosion resistance of additive manufactured (AM) stainless steel (SS) 316H in chloride molten salts is critical for the use of these materials in extreme environments such as molten salt reactors (MSRs). This report pertains to a work package of the Advaned Materials and Manufacturing Technologies (AMMT) developing a systematic methodology to link changes in AM fabrication parameters, namely surface finishing, porosity, microstructure, and chemical heterogeneity, to corrosion performance in NaCl-MgCl2 salt, a proposed secondary coolant for MSRs. During Fiscal Year 2024, Idaho National Laboratory investigators in the AMMT program, utilized SS316H bars, fabricated with laser bed powder fusion at Los Alamos National Laboratory, to establish and optimize the workflow for evaluating these process-to-performance relationships. Standard practices for specimen preparation were established using these specimens, with particular focus on descaling and sectioning methods that align with ASTM guidelines. A comprehensive experimental design for static corrosion testing was developed, with pre- and post-exposure analysis utilizing optical microscopy and scanning electron microscopy. So far standard descaling techniques were optimized, one static corrosion test was conducted on the LANL AM SS316H specimens, and pre- and post-corrosion practices were established. In addition, the work package yielded a review paper on corrosion testing gaps for AM materials in nuclear applications and submitted a proposal for a rapid-turnaround experiment to the Nuclear Science User Facilities Program to investigate the combined effects of proton irradiation and corrosion on AM SS316H. This work package establishes a foundation for evaluating processing-to-performance relationships for AM SS316H in harsh conditions, contributing to the safe and efficient design of components for next-generation nuclear reactors. The creation of a standardized methodology and the generation of relevant publications and future research pathways represent significant strides towards integrating AM materials into critical applications where corrosion resistance is paramount.
The DOE National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) is an integrated technical program for maintaining the safety, security, and reliability of the U.S. nuclear stockpile. The SSP incorporates nuclear test data, computational modeling and simulation, and experimental facilities to advance understanding of nuclear weapons. The suite of data analyzed comes from activities including previous nuclear tests, stockpile surveillance, experimental research, and development and engineering programs. This integrated national program requires the continued use of experimental facilities and the computational capabilities to support the SSP missions. These component parts, in addition to an appropriately scaled production capability, enable NNSA to support stockpile requirements. The ultimate goal of the SSP, and thus of the Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASC) program, is to ensure that the U.S. maintains a safe, secure, and effective strategic deterrent. The ASC program is a cornerstone of the SSP, providing simulation capabilities and computational resources to support the annual stockpile assessment and certification process, study advanced nuclear weapons design and manufacturing processes, analyze accident scenarios and weapons aging, and provide the tools to enable stockpile Life Extension Programs (LEPs) and the resolution of Significant Finding Investigations (SFIs). This work requires a balance of resources, including technical staff, hardware, simulation software, and computer science solutions. The ASC program focuses on increasing the predictive capabilities in a three-dimensional (3D) simulation environment while maintaining support to the SSP. The Program continues to improve its unique tools for understanding and solving progressively more difficult stockpile problems (sufficient resolution, dimensionality, and scientific details), and quantifying critical margins and uncertainties. Resolving each issue requires increasingly difficult analyses because the aging process has progressively moved the stockpile further from the original test base. While the focus remains on the U.S. nuclear weapons program, where possible, the Program also enables the use of high-performance computing (HPC) and simulation tools to address broader national security needs, such as foreign nuclear weapon assessments and nuclear counterterrorism. The 2022 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) calls for NNSA to “deliver a modern, adaptive nuclear security enterprise based on an integrated strategy for risk management, production-based resilience, science and technology innovation, and workforce initiatives.” Furthermore, “NNSA will establish a Science and Technology Innovation Initiative to accelerate the integration of science and technology (S&T) throughout its activities.” Executing this strategy necessitates the continued emphasis on developing and sustaining high-quality scientific and engineering staff, as well as supporting computational and experimental capabilities. These components constitute the foundation of the nuclear weapons program. The continued success of the SSP and LEPs is predicated upon the ability to credibly certify the stockpile, without a return to underground nuclear tests (UGTs). Shortly after the nuclear test moratorium entered into force in 1992, the Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative (ASCI) was established to provide an extensive simulation capability to underpin stockpile certification. While computing and simulation have always been essential to the success of the nuclear weapons program, the program goal of ASCI was to execute NNSA’s vision of using these tools in support of the stockpile stewardship mission. The ASCI program was essential to the successful demonstration of the SSP, providing critical nuclear weapons simulation and modeling capabilities. ASCI officially evolved into the ASC program in fiscal year (FY) 2005, but the mission remains essentially the same: provide the simulation and computational capabilities that underpin the ability to maintain a safe, secure, effective nuclear weapon stockpile, without returning to underground nuclear testing. The capabilities that the ASC program provides at the national laboratories play a vital role in the nuclear security enterprise and are necessary for fulfilling the stockpile stewardship and life extension requirements outlined for NNSA. The Program develops modern simulation tools that provide insights into stockpile aging issues, provide the computational and simulation tools that enable designers and analysts to certify the current stockpile and life-extended nuclear weapons, and inform the decision-making process when any modifications in nuclear warheads or the associated manufacturing processes are deemed necessary. Furthermore, ASC is enhancing the predictive simulation capabilities that are essential to evaluate weapons effects, design experiments, and ensure test readiness. The ASC program continues to improve its unique tools to solve stockpile problems— with a focus on sufficient resolution, dimensionality, and scientific detail—to enable Quantification of Margins and Uncertainties (QMU) and to resolve the increasingly difficult analyses needed for stockpile stewardship. The needs of the Stockpile Management and Production Modernization programs (formerly Directed Stockpile Work) also drive the requirements for simulation and computational resources. These requirements include planned LEPs, stockpile support activities, and mitigation efforts against the potential for technical surprise. All of the weapons within the current stockpile are in some stage of the life extension process. The simulation and computational capabilities are crucial for successful execution of these life extensions and for ensuring NNSA can certify these life-extended weapons without conducting a UGT.
Nuclear fuel cycle aqueous separation processes desire improved real-time material characterization and process monitoring techniques; gamma coincidence spectroscopy has the potential to meet this need in these high throughput and high radiation environments based on its ability to reduce background noise, thereby enhancing detection limits and improving isotopic identification accuracy. A detector array composed of three CdTe detectors was designed to surround a chemical processing pipe in a reprocessing facility and evaluate the feasibility of passively assaying the nuclear materials flowing though this measurement point. This array uses commercial off the shelf components that are radiation hard and highly efficiency at low energies relevant to actinide photon signatures. Detector efficiency characterizations, coincidence detection, and potential configuration improvements are presented here.
The Proliferation Resistance Optimization Program (PRO-X) has been established by the NNSA to provide a framework for evaluating and integrating proliferation resistance into nuclear reactor system (core, fuel, and auxiliary facilities) designs that also maintain the safety and peaceful use missions of those systems. The research reactor (PRO-RR) area is the component of PRO-X that supports the program objectives by applying state-of-the-art analysis methods to research reactor systems. This report details the results of using a defined set of analytical tools to evaluate the neutronics, thermal hydraulics and proliferation risk characteristics of a set of parametric cores based on a generic 10 MW materials test reactor that uses a plate-type low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. The analysis shows that by suitable adjustment of the core size, reflector configuration and power level, mission performance and safety margins can be maintained or improved while reducing the potential for production of special nuclear material.
The US fusion community has coalesced around the goal of building an FPP as described by the National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM). In addition to demonstrating the viability of the technologies necessary to operate such a plant, including demonstration of net energy and electricity production, NASEM found that a “fusion pilot plant will need to demonstrate the ability to efficiently perform remote maintenance and replacement in support of the design of a power plant, taking into account details of the consequences of the fusion environment, such as material activation and tritium retention in components.” Current designs of fusion demonstration reactors do usually foresee a regular exchange of their first wall modules, including the tritium breeding blankets. In the European Power Plant Conceptual Studies, it is assumed that a fusion reactor will need to change its divertor every 2 years and its first wall blanket module every 5 to 6 years to reach acceptable availability. Underlying this capability are remote-handling technologies to keep the outage for the exchange of these components short. There are many uncertainties in the remote-handling schemes, and most schemes are at a preconceptual level at best. In addition, the exchange of these components would either produce an enormous rad-waste stream or would require an enormous refurbishment activity with huge cost-prohibitive hot-cells. Past Fusion Nuclear Science Facility (FNSF) preconceptual studies have led to hot cell dimensions of an unbelievable size, likely costing tens of billions of dollars. Already at The Way (previously International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor, ITER), hot-cells have become cost-prohibitive, demanding redesigns of the ITER first wall to reduce the toxic rad-waste/inventory. In this in-situ PFC repair project, a concept for a long-life, maintainable first wall module concept is developed and tested. This first wall concept relies on innovative remote handling to repair the first wall modules in-situ, avoiding costly refurbishments outside of the tokamak vessel. This approach was highlighted in the Fusion Energy Sciences Advisory Committee (FESAC) report on Transformative Enabling Capabilities for Efficient Advance Toward Fusion Energy. In general, the damage of the first wall armor is due to particle and radiation exposures. Load conditions vary from one fusion reactor design to another. In tokamaks, first wall Plasma Facing Components (PFCs) are exposed to far-Scrape-Off-Layer plasma fluxes, electromagnetic radiation, energetic CX neutrals, and potentially runaway electron beams. Protecting the first wall to the worst-case load conditions would require the design of a very thick first wall armor. Transient heat and particle fluxes due to disruptions or edge localized modes can lead to excessive heat loads resulting potentially in melting PFCs down to the cooling channel. Catastrophic events like these need to be avoided by appropriate disruption mitigation systems. However, failure of these systems will still put a first wall at an unacceptable risk. Hence, a first wall design needs to accommodate the occasional transient heat loads by introducing sacrificial limiters, which will absorb these transients.