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At least 73 records · Page 4

Magnetic Microcalorimeter Gamma Detectors with Ultra-High Energy Resolution. Final Report

The goal of this project was to build a commercially viable metallic microcalorimeter (MMC) g-spectrometer with an ultra-high energy resolution <50 eV for accurate non-destructive assay (NDA) of nuclear materials. Improved NDA simplifies and accelerates safeguards analyses in the nuclear fuel cycle and enhances capabilities to detect the diversion of nuclear materials for illicit purposes. High-resolution MMC g-spectrometers can also improve the accuracy of nuclear data that NDA is based on.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗

Magnetic Microcalorimeter Gamma Detectors with Ultra-High Energy Resolution - (Final Report)

The goal of this project was to build a commercially viable magnetic microcalorimeter (MMC) γ-spectrometer with an ultra-high energy resolution <50 eV for accurate non-destructive assay (NDA) of nuclear materials. Improved NDA simplifies and accelerates safeguards analyses in the nuclear fuel cycle and enhances capabilities to detect the diversion of nuclear materials for illicit purposes. High-resolution MMC γ-spectrometers can also improve the accuracy of nuclear data that NDA is based on.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Special Nuclear Material Hold-up Measurement

Facilities that process special nuclear material (SNM) generally have a variety of equipment, shielding, and nearby radiation sources, which can pose challenges when performing nondestructive analysis (NDA) within the facility, as shown in Figure 1. In this figure, the left image features two individuals performing a holdup measurement of a large duct at a posting, utilizing a detector probe attached to a yardstick to reduce some aspect of the measurement uncertainty. Note that the distance to the holdup within the pipe from the posting cannot be accounted for. The right image similarly features several individuals guiding a holdup measurement of a ducting pipe several meters overhead, by attaching a detector probe to a long handle and lining that up with a posting on the outside of the pipe. SNM processing begets SNM holdup, and this difficulty with accurate NDA can result in unaccounted accumulation of SNM holdup within a process or area. Normal SNM processing operations can accumulate holdup within filters, pumps, pipes, ducts, other equipment, and facility support systems, as demonstrated by Figure 2. It is important for deactivation and decommissioning (D&D) gloveboxes and their ancillary equipment, material accountability, criticality safety, facility operations, waste management, radiation safety, and security to accurately characterize the location, composition, and quantity of this holdup to minimize these associated risks and potential diversion pathways. Current NDA techniques for assay of holdup are expensive, time consuming, and have high uncertainty.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

A FLEXIBLE NONLINEAR DIFFUSION ACCELERATION METHOD FOR THE FIRST ORDER EIGENVALUE SN EQUATIONS DISCRETIZED WITH DISCONTINUOUS FEM

This work describes a Nonlinear Diffusion Acceleration (NDA) method for the first order SN equations that discretizes both the transport equation and the associated diffusion system using discontinuous finite elements; the diffusion system is solved on a potentially coarser mesh and with a coarser energy group structure than the SN equations. The developed method differs from current methods by allowing the SN and diffusion system to be discretized with arbitrary FEM bases and by using an additive update of the SN system. The benefit of this capability is extension of the stability region to optically thicker mesh cells and stability without the necessity to underrelax the iterative algorithm. The presented method introduces the notion of consistency of the SN and diffusion solutions and derives suitable definitions of the cross sections, drift vectors, and element face closures. The NDA equations are solved using a Picard iteration scheme. Numerical results are presented for the C5G7 benchmark problem highlighting the effectiveness of the methods when deployed with the diffusion system discretized on the same mesh as the SN system. Additional results are presented for cases where the diffusion system features a coarser mesh, coarser energy group structure, or both, demonstrating its stability and effectiveness in these cases. It is observed that the effectiveness of the NDA method reduces when reducing the resolution of the associated diffusion system.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Multigrid Algorithms with Projection and Prolongation over Elements of the Phase Space for K-Eigenvalue Transport Problems

This paper describes new multilevel acceleration methods for solving the multigroup neu- tron transport eigenvalue problems. These multilevel algorithms use different projection and prolongation operators in the phase space. The Nonlinear Diffusion Acceleration (NDA) method with multiple grids in energy is formulated with the prolongation oper- ator based on multiplication iterative correction and linear-in-energy mapping. Another multilevel NDA method uses the projection operator with coarsening in energy between the high-order transport and low-order NDA equations. The third algorithm is formu- lated with the partial-current based CMFD low-order equations and applies projection operators in space and energy. The numerical results are presented.

Cornejo, Luke↗

Commissioning of a GeoMelt Vitrification Plant at the Central Laboratory on the Sellafield Site - 17561

The National Nuclear Laboratory (NNL) and Kurion Veolia (Kurion) have installed a GeoMelt{sup R} In-Container Vitrification (ICV){sup R} radioactive waste treatment system in the Central Laboratory Active Rig Hall at Sellafield. This installation was completed in 2016. GeoMelt incorporates a range of patented and proprietary vitrification processing technologies that are configured in a variety of ways depending on the project and the waste. GeoMelt transforms hazardous chemical and radioactive wastes into an inert vitreous monolith. Hazardous organics are destroyed by pyrolysis and heavy metals and radionuclides are immobilized within the glass matrix where they are not preferentially leached into the environment. GeoMelt IVC produces a durable wasteform for a large variety of input wastes. The batch nature of the process which involves single-use refractory offers a wide range of process benefits over traditional vitrification technologies including: - a wide range of waste chemistries allowing high waste loadings; - compatibility with heterogeneous wastes including wastes with high metal content; - a technological simple solution without stirrers, bubblers, etc.; - No refractory corrosion concerns or melter drain failure scenarios; - Flexibility in glass chemistry and melter/disposal container configuration allows the wasteform to be specifically tailored to the storage or disposal site requirements. As part of the 2016 system commissioning at NNL's Central Laboratory, three demonstration melts were performed, one funded by Sellafield Ltd. and two by the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA). The first melt processed inactive soil with an inactive caesium tracer. The second melt processed inactive soil with a Cs-137 tracer. The third melt processed active waste soil from a variety of NDA nuclear licensed sites. The work conducted during commissioning was multi-purpose; it successfully demonstrated the benefits that the GeoMelt technology could bring to the UK NDA estate while performing equipment testing/troubleshooting and operator training. A significant benefit of the GeoMelt ICV technology is volume reduction for wastes which would otherwise experience a volume increase if encapsulated. Another benefit is the ability to treat difficult radioactive waste streams not amenable to encapsulation (e.g., reactive and/or organic wastes) with a very low energy consumption. The purpose of the first commissioning melt, Plant Performance Demonstration (PPD)-1, was to operate the GeoMelt system under typical conditions and to perform a post-melt mass balance of the caesium as a surrogate for Cs-137 in order to access retention of caesium in the final glass product. The melt processed a mixture of inactive soil obtained near the Sellafield site (as analogue for contaminated Sellafield soil), additives, and glass frit. An inactive caesium tracer was added to this melt as Cs{sub 2}CO{sub 3}. The purpose of the second commissioning melt, PPD-2, was to operate the GeoMelt system under typical conditions and to perform a post-melt activity balance using a Cs-137 tracer in order to assess retention of Cs-137 in the final glass product. Materials processed were inactive soil, glass frit, additives, and a radioactive caesium tracer (CsCl). The purpose of the third melt, Experiment-1 (EX-1) was to treat active waste and inactive waste simulant, as a demonstration of simultaneous processing of multiple waste streams. EX-1 consisted of processing active soil, Magnox sludge simulant, inactive soil, additives, and frit. The active soil used for this melt was obtained from the Hunterston A, Bradwell, Capenhurst, and Sellafield nuclear licensed sites. Since most soils are high in silica, the concept for this experiment was to use the active soils to provide glass formers while co-processing Magnox sludge simulant which does not contain glass formers. Beyond demonstration of capability areas of focus of this series of demonstrations included processing efficiency (kWh/kg treated) and caesium retention (%). This paper summarizes operations and results of the three melts. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Major Achievements of the Springfields Decommissioning Program - 16512

Since the 1940's, Springfields has manufactured fuel products for the UK's nuclear power stations and for international customers. The early operations were in support of the atomic weapons program, closely followed by fuel manufacture for electricity generation via the Magnox power stations commencing in the late 1950's. In 2005, responsibility for the assets and liabilities of Springfields was transferred to the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA). A new company, Springfields Fuels Limited, was created to run the site, which was managed and operated by Westinghouse Electric UK Ltd on the NDA's behalf. On April 1, 2010, Westinghouse entered into an agreement with the NDA for a long-term lease of the Springfields site, which transferred responsibility for the commercial fuel manufacturing business and Springfields Fuels Limited to Westinghouse. Today, the main Springfields activities include: - Oxide fuels for Advanced Gas-cooled and Light Water Reactors, as well as intermediate fuel products, such as powders, granules and pellets, - Manufacture of Uranium Hexafluoride (now in Care and Maintenance), - Processing and recovery of Uranium residues, - Decommissioning and demolition of redundant plants and buildings. Some 120 plant buildings and support facilities have been successfully decommissioned and demolished in the period 1996 to date. These range from 1940's buildings, subsequently converted for nuclear fuel manufacture, together with some of the formerly sealed chemical agent manufacture and storage facilities. Decommissioning of the now redundant Magnox manufacturing facilities is ongoing at Springfields without compromising the other site operations. Westinghouse is managing all activities related to the whole lifecycle, planning, design, safety case, radiation protection, Post Operational Clean Out (POCO), service diversions, characterization, decommissioning all phases through to ground remediation, waste disposal and agreed end states. Decommissioning of process plants starts with the removal of the majority of radiological activity or hazard contained within the plant. This is known as Post Operational Clean Out. Once this is complete, the plant may be dismantled. Work is scoped and defined within packages (at plant or cell level) to aid control and commercial monitoring as the decommissioning is progressed. This package approach also enables clean or lightly contaminated items to be removed separately to aid potential re-cycling and minimize decontamination and waste disposal costs. Westinghouse is further optimising work package delivery by planning parallel POCO and Decommissioning work phases within plant at a cell level to systematically remove redundant plant and reduce hazard earlier, whilst optimising use of both internal and external resources to reduce total project cost. Waste and Residues from all phases are disposed of via authorized disposal routes and in accordance with our environmental authorizations. On completion of decommissioning and removal of plant and equipment the building is re-assessed radiologically, categorized and appropriate remediation work progressed to render it safe for conventional demolition. The major elements of the success achieved to date can be attributed to the following elements: - Overall programme management with extensive experience of planning, cost, and risk management. Integration of the programme within a major commercial site without compromising safety or operations. - Complete site EHS management working within a complex regulatory framework including the Nuclear Site Licenses, Environmental Authorisations and Security requirements. - Avoiding safety complacency by use of rigorous and systematic process to emphasise safety over competing goals. Including structured use of Human Performance and Corrective Action and Learning processes. - Unique safety experiences attained through complex hazard reduction across a broad range of uranium manufacturing and chemical hazard/agent facilities. - Project leadership and excellence utilizing a core site team to deploy repeatable processes and safe practices to deliver complex scope within budget and schedule. - Optimised use of internal and external resources, with extensive use of Operating Experience to drive continuous improvement and problem resolution. - Management of Contractors from initial selection, pre-qualification, tender assessment and Performance using varied contract forms across delivery phases. - Use of Westinghouse expertise for safety case, waste management, uranium recovery, health physics and design. - Implementation of a work package to ensure gated discreet manageable packages. Underpinned by package specific method statements, with appropriate hold points to maintain management and control of the works. - Continuous local safety focus via safety planning, induction, plant specific training, proactive risk assessment, and a defined approach to decoupling operating plant safety cases enabling focussed and usable documentation. This paper will provide an overview of the latest decommissioning activities achieved on the Springfields site and will focus on best practices that allowed Westinghouse to maintain the program on time and on budget. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

The Strategic Benefit of Self Shielded Boxes for Storage and Disposal of Metallic Uranic Material-18141

Sellafield Ltd, on behalf of the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA), is responsible for the management of a number of facilities whose inventories include a range of metallic uranic material. Additional fuel and fuel bearing materials exist in the NDA estate, some of which are similar to the Sellafield-managed inventory and others present different management challenges. Whilst UK Government policy directs that some of these materials are assets and are therefore managed with eventual future use in mind, there remains a large quantity of material, principally either out-of-scope for reprocessing or which derives from legacy facilities, which is likely to be disposed of to a future Geological Disposal Facility (GDF). The majority of this material is stored under wet conditions to facilitate dose shielding and heat dissipation and will therefore require removal from wet storage, consolidation and conditioning, prior to transfer to GDF. In order to accelerate high hazard and risk reduction by sooner retrieval of legacy material from wetted storage, one of the legacy storage facilities has led technical work to develop the design of Self Shielded Boxes (SSBs) and to substantiate their use for interim storage of the materials in question. Use of the SSBs would represent a change of strategy on the Sellafield Site: historically, timescales for retrieval of material have been reliant upon a waste treatment and storage/disposal route being available. SSBs provide the opportunity to retrieve uranic materials from aging legacy storage facilities for immediate buffer storage, by decoupling the timing of retrieval from the availability of an onward route. An understanding was required of the scope for defining optimal routes for each metallic uranic fuel and fuel bearing material group for safe transport and storage commensurate with current final disposal assumptions and risks, taking into account international best practice. A study is underway to understand options for transfer of material into SSBs, buffer/interim storage locations, treatment/conditioning processes and transport to the GDF. This work forms the basis of a prioritised road-map for the development of routes for study material groups aligned with ongoing and existing planned technical work, which is a pre-requisite to strategy development. The ultimate output of the study will be identification of full life cycle management strategies for metallic uranic material from an enterprise perspective. The combination of this strategic work and ongoing technical work will underpin a series of decisions to divert sub-groups of uranic material away from currently assumed baseline routes in support of earliest practicable hazard and risk reduction. Hence, each decision will reduce the scope of a placeholder future uranic fuel treatment capability, which will diminish the associated British Pound 1 bn capital cost. To date, a technical case for interim storage of uranic material in SSBs has been substantiated for around two thirds of the study materials. The requirement for a new strategy at Sellafield was driven by technical development of SSBs in response to the needs of one programme, but this prompted the study into the potential utilisation of SSBs in order to derive benefit for the wider enterprise and across the NDA estate. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Bradwell - The first UK Nuclear Site to Enter Care and Maintenance - 18152

Magnox Ltd, a Cavendish Fluor company, is currently decommissioning twelve nuclear sites on behalf of the UK Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA). Ten of these sites are former Power Stations; the other two are closed Research and Development facilities. An overall strategy for decommissioning the Magnox sites has been agreed between Magnox and the NDA. For all but one of these sites the decommissioning strategy involves an extended quiescent period, known as Care and Maintenance (C and M), during which remaining radiological hazards reduce naturally through radioactive decay. After this quiescent period the sites will be restored to an agreed end state through further decommissioning and clearance work. Sites in C and M will not be permanently manned. They will be passively safe such that prompt action will not be required in response to an alarm or fault. Preparing a nuclear site for C and M involves several inter-related strands of work including definition of the intended physical configuration of the site during C and M (the C and M entry state), establishing a safety case to support that configuration, carrying out the physical works needed to deliver the C and M entry state, preparing arrangements and a team to manage the site during C and M and consolidating the knowledge and information needed to support C and M and final clearance of the site. To enter C and M there needs to be a carefully controlled transition of site, personnel and management system into the agreed C and M configuration. Bradwell, a site on the east coast of England, was selected as part of the overall decommissioning strategy for 'early' entry into C and M; Bradwell is scheduled to enter C and M in late 2018, several years in advance of the next scheduled site, with the intent of carrying learning forward from Bradwell to the subsequent sites. Bradwell is now in the final stages of preparation for C and M. Decommissioning commenced on completion of defueling in 2005. A clearly defined C and M entry state was established early in decommissioning and, through interaction with Regulators and internal and external stakeholders, developed as a shared target, thus providing certainty to the scope of the overall decommissioning project. The site has subsequently been systematically decommissioned to meet this target C and M entry state. All legacy waste has been retrieved and packaged into robust disposal containers, the reactor buildings have a new weather envelope, and much of the site is empty space with concrete hardstanding where facilities used to exist and bare rooms where plant used to operate. The remaining radiological and environmental hazards are not significant. During C and M, which is anticipated to last for 70 years, Bradwell will be managed remotely without the requirement for personnel to be present on site, with the possible exception of an ongoing security presence when the site first enters C and M. In terms of UK decommissioning, many of the projects undertaken at Bradwell were first of a kind. The company operates under a programmed organisational and delivery model, which will enable innovation and learning from Bradwell to be carried forward across the whole Magnox fleet. In addition to decommissioning tools and techniques, processes to manage decommissioning, optimise the C and M entry state to reduce the burden on the UK taxpayer and to transition a site into C and M have been developed. This, in addition to taking people from Bradwell and seeding them into Magnox and the broader UK nuclear industry, should help to provide long term cost savings and delivery efficiencies across the entire NDA estate. This paper describes the journey of Bradwell Site through decommissioning and into C and M, highlighting the innovation and challenges that have contributed to the success of delivering the first UK nuclear site into Care and Maintenance. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Delivering Business Benefit to UK Decommissioning through Collaborative Innovation - Approach and Technologies - 18539

The UK's nuclear energy programme, dating from the post-war years, has left a mixed legacy to the country: numerous prototype reactors, fuel-manufacturing plants, research centres, reprocessing plants and 11 power stations. The Sellafield site in west Cumbria houses more than 200 nuclear facilities and 1,000 buildings, making it one of the world's most complex environmental decommissioning challenges. Many 'never-done-before' projects are under way, which require substantial levels of R and D and innovative engineering approaches. One of the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority's (NDA) responsibilities is to ensure that the right level of R and D is carried out to enable progress on delivering the full decommissioning programme. Since 2010, NDA has been collaborating with Innovate UK, the UK government's innovation agency, to engage the supply chain and develop innovative technologies and services to support the NDA's mission and the growing international nuclear decommissioning market. The paper will provide an overview of the approach (e.g. open calls, briefing events, independent assessment, technology showcases) and the associated benefits (e.g. attracting new ideas, end-user engagement, increased supply chain collaboration). The paper also highlights selected technologies developed through the process. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

A flexible linear diffusion acceleration to k-eigenvalue neutron transport with SN discontinuous finite element method

In this paper, we derive a flexible linear diffusion acceleration (LDA) for k-eigenvalue neutron transport discretized with discontinuous finite element method (DFEM) and discrete ordinates(SN). This LDA is based on our two pieces of previous works: the flexible non linear diffusion acceleration (NDA) for DFEM-SN and LDA for k-eigenvalue neutron transport using pre-conditioned Jacobian-free Newton-Krylov with self-adjoint angular flux (SAAF), continuous finite element method(CFEM), and SN. We point out the differences between LDA and NDA for DFEM-SN and the difference between DFEM-SN and SAAF-CFEM-SN for LDA. Numerical tests are presented to compare the convergence behaviour of NDA and LDA. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Independent Review of Non-Destructive Assay for the K-25/K-27 D&D Project: November 30-December 3, 2004, Oak Ridge, TN

The DOE with concurrence from the D&D contractor has chartered an assessment of the methods and procedures used to obtain the original NDA results of holdup deposits at the K-25 and K-27 uranium gaseous diffusion facilities in Oak Ridge. The assessment has been performed by an external review team with the participation of the D&D contractor, DOE, and DOE/OR. This document is the final report for the assessment. The DOE provided the charter for this review. The review team spent a week in Oak Ridge attending meetings and participating in discussions with expert contractor staff. Substantial additional input for the review came from numerous written materials, unpublished and published. This final report of observations, findings, and recommendations in areas defined by the charter is based on information from the meetings, discussions, and documents. The assessment of the Review Team is that the DOE/OR and BJC approach in using historical NDA data for the D&D of K-25 and K-27 is appropriate and generally acceptable. Resolving issues, addressing findings, and implementing the recommendations documented in this report will reconcile specific technical concerns.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Development of MCNP Training Modules for Safeguards Practitioners [Abstract]

The Monte-Carlo N-Particle (MCNP) software developed at LANL is the most widely used neutron transport code in the world. It is an essential tool for a variety of applications including detector development and design, nuclear fuel burnup simulation, criticality safety, and nondestructive assay system optimization. For this reason, it is indispensable within the safeguards and materials control & accountability (MC&A) communities. Multiple MCNP training courses have been created and taught over the last several decades by the MCNP development team at LANL, however there are no existing courses that cover specialized topics considered fundamental to NDA and safeguards models. To fill this gap, the MCNP team and Safeguards Science and Technology group at LANL have co-created a set of training modules customized to meet the specialized needs of the safeguards and MC&A communities. The basic modules cover concepts such as NDA system optimization, He-specific and other capture tallies, and tools for improved theoretical understanding. An advanced module was also created to cover topics including variance reduction for active interrogation simulations, use of the LANL MCNPTools post-processor, PTRAC (particle tracking) and list-mode data simulations, and fuel burnup simulations. The training modules teach to the latest and most state-of-the-art MCNP features and tools released by the development team at LANL and are intended to be taught jointly by the developers and safeguards experts. Ultimately, we hope that creation of these modules will serve to capture and convey the safeguards modeling and MCNP expertise at LANL, and that we will be able to share the modules more broadly with the MC&A and safeguards communities.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Implementation of Microcalorimeter Array Technology for Safeguards of Nuclear Material

Safeguards of nuclear materials depends on both destructive and nondestructive assay (DA and NDA respectively). Ultra-high resolution microcalorimeter gamma spectroscopy has the potential to substantially reduce the performance gap between NDA and DA methods in determination of plutonium isotopic composition. This paper details the setup of a cryostat and microwave readout system for microcalorimeter gamma spectroscopy, the functionality of which has been successfully demonstrated.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

PWR and BWR spent fuel assembly gamma spectra measurements

A project to research the application of nondestructive assay (NDA) to spent fuel assemblies is underway. The research team comprises the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), embodied by the European Commission, DG Energy, Directorate EURATOM Safeguards; the Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company (SKB); two universities; and several United States national laboratories. The Next Generation of Safeguards Initiative–Spent Fuel project team is working to achieve the following technical goals more easily and efficiently than in the past using nondestructive assay measurements of spent fuel assemblies: (1) verify the initial enrichment, burnup, and cooling time of facility declaration; (2) detect the diversion or replacement of pins, (3) estimate the plutonium mass, (4) estimate the decay heat, and (5) determine the reactivity of spent fuel assemblies. This study focuses on spectrally resolved gamma-ray measurements performed on a diverse set of 50 assemblies [25 pressurized water reactor (PWR) assemblies and 25 boiling water reactor (BWR) assemblies]; these same 50 assemblies will be measured with neutron-based NDA instruments and a full-length calorimeter. Given that encapsulation/repository and dry storage safeguards are the primarily intended applications, the analysis focused on the dominant gamma-ray lines of 137 Cs, 154 Eu, and 134 Cs because these isotopes will be the primary gamma-ray emitters during the time frames of interest to these applications. This study addresses the impact on the measured passive gamma-ray signals due to the following factors: burnup, initial enrichment, cooling time, assembly type (eight different PWR and six different BWR fuel designs), presence of gadolinium rods, and anomalies in operating history. As a result, to compare the measured results with theory, a limited number of ORIGEN-ARP simulations were performed.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

An unattended verification station for UF 6 cylinders: Field trial findings

In recent years, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has pursued innovative techniques and an integrated suite of safeguards measures to address the verification challenges posed by the front end of the nuclear fuel cycle. Among the unattended instruments currently being explored by the IAEA is an Unattended Cylinder Verification Station (UCVS), which could provide automated, independent verification of the declared relative enrichment, 235 U mass, total uranium mass, and identification for all declared uranium hexafluoride cylinders in a facility (e.g., uranium enrichment plants and fuel fabrication plants). Under the auspices of the United States and European Commission Support Programs to the IAEA, a project was undertaken to assess the technical and practical viability of the UCVS concept. The first phase of the UCVS viability study was centered on a long-term field trial of a prototype UCVS system at a fuel fabrication facility. A key outcome of the study was a quantitative performance evaluation of two nondestructive assay (NDA) methods being considered for inclusion in a UCVS: Hybrid Enrichment Verification Array (HEVA), and Passive Neutron Enrichment Meter (PNEM). This paper provides a description of the UCVS prototype design and an overview of the long-term field trial. In conclusion, analysis results and interpretation are presented with a focus on the performance of PNEM and HEVA for the assay of over 200 “typical” Type 30B cylinders, and the viability of an “NDA Fingerprint” concept as a high-fidelity means to periodically verify that material diversion has not occurred.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Validation and demonstration of the AEFC as a practical safeguards tool for inventory verification

The Advanced Experimental Fuel Counter (AEFC) is a nondestructive assay (NDA) instrument designed to determine the residual fissile mass in irradiated fuel assemblies for safeguards verification purposes. This is done by actively interrogating an assembly with a neutron source and measuring the total (Singles) and correlated (Doubles) neutron count rates resulting from induced fissions in the irradiated nuclear fuel and relating those rates to the residual fissile mass using calibration curves. Comprehensive NDA measurements of the irradiated fuel inventory at Israeli Research Reactor 1 (IRR-1) were taken with the AEFC to validate a set of previously developed calibration curves. During the campaign, measurements were acquired of 32 standard fuel assemblies and three control assemblies in just nine days. This is a significant majority of the research reactor's irradiated fuel inventory and the largest data set gathered by the AEFC to date. Many of the fuel assemblies measured during the campaign had much shorter cooling times than those assemblies previously measured with the instrument. Calibration curves developed from previous AEFC deployments were used to determine the residual 235 U mass in the measured standard fuel assemblies. The results of the campaign demonstrated that the AEFC can be used to estimate the 235 U mass remaining in a large number of irradiated fuel assemblies with 1%–5% uncertainty in a reasonable amount of time despite operating in a high dose environment.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

A Weighted Least-Squares Transport Equation Compatible with Source Iteration and Voids

We present that second-order forms of the transport equation allow the use of continuous finite elements (CFEMs). This can be desired in multiphysics calculations where other physics require CFEM discretizations. Second-order transport operators are generally self-adjoint, yielding symmetric positive-definite (SPD) matrices, which allow the use of efficient linear algebra solvers with an enormous advantage in memory usage. Least-squares (LS) forms of the transport equation can circumvent the void problems of other second-order forms but are almost always nonconservative. Additionally, the standard LS form is not compatible with discrete ordinates method (SN) iterative solution techniques such as source iteration. A new form of the LS transport equation has recently been developed that is compatible with voids and standard SN iterative solution techniques. Performing nonlinear diffusion acceleration (NDA) using an independently differenced low-order equation enforces conservation for the whole system and makes this equation suitable for reactor physics calculations. In this context, “independent” means that both the transport and low-order solutions converge to the same scalar flux and current as the spatial mesh is refined, but for a given mesh, the solutions are not necessarily equal. In this paper we show that introducing a weight function into this LS equation improves issues with causality and can render our equation equal to the self-adjoint angular flux (SAAF) equation. Causality is a principle of the transport equation that states that information travels only downstream along characteristics. This principle can be violated numerically. We show how to limit the weight function in voids and demonstrate the effect of this limit on accuracy. Using the C5G7 benchmark, we compare our method to the SAAF formulation with a void treatment (SAAFτ) that is not self-adjoint and has a nonsymmetric coefficient matrix. Finallyl, we show that the weighted LS equation with NDA gives acceptable accuracy relative to the SAAFτ equation while maintaining a SPD system matrix.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗