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NASA NTRS2009

Technology Transfer Challenges: A Case Study of User-Centered Design in NASA's Systems Engineering Culture

The Upper Stage (US) section of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) Ares I rocket will require internal access platforms for maintenance tasks performed by humans inside the vehicle. Tasks will occur during expensive critical path operations at Kennedy Space Center (KSC) including vehicle stacking and launch preparation activities. Platforms must be translated through a small human access hatch, installed in an enclosed worksite environment, support the weight of ground operators and be removed before flight - and their design must minimize additional vehicle mass at attachment points. This paper describes the application of a user-centered conceptual design process and the unique challenges encountered within NASA's systems engineering culture focused on requirements and "heritage hardware". The NASA design team at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) initiated the user-centered design process by studying heritage internal access kits and proposing new design concepts during brainstorming sessions. Simultaneously, they partnered with the Technology Transfer/Innovative Partnerships Program to research inflatable structures and dynamic scaffolding solutions that could enable ground operator access. While this creative, technology-oriented exploration was encouraged by upper management, some design stakeholders consistently opposed ideas utilizing novel, untested equipment. Subsequent collaboration with an engineering consulting firm improved the technical credibility of several options, however, there was continued resistance from team members focused on meeting system requirements with pre-certified hardware. After a six-month idea-generating phase, an intensive six-week effort produced viable design concepts that justified additional vehicle mass while optimizing the human factors of platform installation and use. Although these selected final concepts closely resemble heritage internal access platforms, challenges from the application of the user-centered process provided valuable lessons for improving future collaborative conceptual design efforts.

Quick, Jason↗
NASA NTRS2015

Human System Risk Management for Space Flight

This brief abstract reviews the development of the current day approach to human system risk management for space flight and the development of the critical components of this process over the past few years. The human system risk management process now provides a comprehensive assessment of each human system risk by design reference mission (DRM) and is evaluated not only for mission success but also for long‐term health impacts for the astronauts. The discipline of bioastronautics is the study of the biological and medical effects of space flight on humans. In 1997, the Space Life Sciences Directorate (SLSD) initiated the Bioastronautics Roadmap (Roadmap) as the "Critical Path Roadmap", and in 1998 participation in the roadmap was expanded to include the National Space Biomedical Research Institute (NSBRI) and the external community. A total of 55 risks and 250 questions were identified and prioritized and in 2000, the Roadmap was base-lined and put under configuration control. The Roadmap took into account several major advisory committee reviews including the Institute of Medicine (IOM) "Safe Passage: Astronaut care for Exploration Missions", 2001. Subsequently, three collaborating organizations at NASA HQ (Chief Health and Medical Officer, Office of Space Flight and Office of Biological & Physical Research), published the Bioastronautics Strategy in 2003, that identified the human as a "critical subsystem of space flight" and noted that "tolerance limits and safe operating bands must be established" to enable human space flight. These offices also requested a review by the IOM of the Roadmap and that review was published in October 2005 as "A Risk Reduction Strategy for Human Exploration of Space: A Review of NASA's Bioastronautics Roadmap", that noted several strengths and weaknesses of the Roadmap and made several recommendations. In parallel with the development of the Roadmap, the Office of the Chief Health and Medical Officer (OCHMO) began a process in 2004 of evaluating the tolerance limits and safe operating bands called for in the Bioastronautics Strategy. Over the next several years, the concept of the "operating bands" were turned into Space Flight Human System Standards (SFHSS), developed by the technical resources of the SLSD at the NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC). These standards were developed and reviewed at the SLSD and then presented to the OCHMO for acceptance. The first set of standards was published in 2007 as the NASA‐STD‐3001, Volume 1, Crew Health that elaborated standards for several physiological areas such as cardiovascular, musculoskeletal, radiation exposure and nutrition. Volume 2, Human Factors, Habitability and Human Health was published in 2011, along with development guidance in the Human Integration Design Handbook (HIDH). Taken together, the SFHSS Volumes 1 and 2, and the HIDH replaced the NASA‐STD‐3000 with new standards and revisions of the older document. Three other changes were also taking place that facilitated the development of the human system risk management approach. In 2005, the life sciences research and development portfolio underwent a comprehensive review through the Exploration Systems Architecture Study (ESAS) that resulted in the reformulation of the Bioastronautics Program into Human Research Program (HRP) that was focused on appropriate mitigation results for high priority human health risks. The baseline HRP budget was established in August 2005. In addition, the OCHMO formulated the Health and Medical Technical Authority (HMTA) in 2006 that established the position of the Chief Medical Officer (CMO) at the NASA JSC along with other key technical disciplines, and the OCHMO became the responsible office for the SFHSS as noted above. The final change was the establishment in 2008 of the Human System Risk Board (HSRB), chaired by the CMO with representation from the HRP, SLSD management and technical experts. The HSRB then began to review all human system risks, established a comprehensive risk management and configuration management plan and data sharing policy. These major developments of standards, the HRP, the HMTA and a forum for review of human system risks (HSRB) facilitated the integration of human research, medical operations, systems engineering and many other disciplines in the comprehensive review of human system risks. The HSRB began a comprehensive review of all potential inflight medical conditions and events and over the course of several reviews consolidated the number of human system risks to 30 where the greatest emphasis is placed for investing program dollars for risk mitigation. The HSRB considers all available evidence from human research, medical operations and occupational surveillance in assessing the risks for appropriate mitigation and future work. All applicable DRMs (low earth orbit 6 and 12 months, deep space sortie for 30 days and 1 year, a one year lunar mission, and a planetary mission for 3 years) are considered as human system risks are modified by the hazards associated with space flight such as microgravity, exposure to radiation, distance from the earth, isolation and a closed environment. Each risk has a summary assessment representing the state of knowledge/evidence base for that risk, the available risk mitigations, traceability to the SFHSS and program requirements, and future work required. These data then can drive coordinated budgets across the HRP, the International Space Station, Crew Health and Safety and Advanced Exploration System budgets. These risk assessments were completed for 6 DRMs in December of 2014 and serve as the baseline for which subsequent research and technology development and crew health care portfolios can be assessed. The HSRB will review each risk at least annually and especially when new information is available that must be considered for effective risk mitigation. The current status of each risk can be reported to program management for operations, budget reviews and general oversight of the human system risk management program.

Davis, Jeffrey↗
NASA NTRS2014

A Historical Analysis of Crane Mishaps at Kennedy Space Center

Cranes and hoists are widely used in many areas. Crane accidents and handling mishaps are responsible for injuries, costly equipment damage, and program delays. Most crane accidents are caused by preventable factors. Understanding these factors is critical when designing cranes and preparing lift plans. Analysis of previous accidents provides insight into current recommendations for crane safety. Cranes and hoists are used throughout Kennedy Space Center to lift everything from machine components to critical flight hardware. Unless they are trained crane operators, most NASA employees and contractors do not need to undergo specialized crane training and may not understand the safety issues surrounding the use of cranes and hoists. A single accident with a crane or hoist can injure or kill people, cause severe equipment damage, and delay or terminate a program. Handling mishaps can also have a significant impact on the program. Simple mistakes like bouncing or jarring a load, or moving the crane down when it should go up, can damage fragile flight hardware and cause major delays in processing. Hazardous commodities (high pressure gas, hypergolic propellants, and solid rocket motors) can cause life safety concerns for the workers performing the lifting operations. Most crane accidents are preventable with the correct training and understanding of potential hazards. Designing the crane with human factors taken into account can prevent many accidents. Engineers are also responsible for preparing lift plans where understanding the safety issues can prevent or mitigate potential accidents. Cranes are widely used across many areas of KSC. Failure of these cranes often leads to injury, high damage costs, and significant delays in program objectives. Following a basic set of principles and procedures during design, fabrication, testing, regular use, and maintenance can significantly minimize many of these failures. As the accident analysis shows, load drops are often caused or influenced by human factors. Therefore, proper training and understanding of crane safety throughout the workforce is critical. It is important that the engineers designing the cranes, lift planners preparing the lift plans, operators performing the lifts, and training officers conducting the operator training all understand the problems that can happen with cranes and how to ensure the safety of the workforce and equipment being lifted.

Materials Handling↗
NASA NTRS2008

Human Rating Requirements for NASA's Constellation Program

NASA s Constellation Program (CxP) will conduct a series of human space expeditions of increasing scope, starting with missions supporting the International Space Station and expanding to encompass the Moon and Mars. Although human-rating is an integral part of all CxP activities throughout their life cycle, NASA Procedural Requirements document NPR 8705.2B, Human-Rating Requirements (HRR) for Space Flight Systems, defines the additional processes, procedures, and requirements necessary to produce human-rated space systems that protect the safety of crew members and passengers on these NASA missions. In order to be in compliance with 8705.2B the CxP must show appropriate implementation or progression toward the HRR, or justification for an exception. Compliance includes an explanation of how the CxP intends to meet the HRR, analyses to be performed to determine implementation; and a matrix to trace the HRR to CxP requirements. The HRR requires the CxP to establish a human system integration team (HSIT), consisting of astronauts, mission operations personnel, training personnel, ground processing personnel, human factors personnel, and human engineering experts, with clearly defined authority, responsibility, and accountability to lead the human-system integration. For example, per the HRR the HSIT is involved in the evaluation of crew workload, human-in-the-loop usability evaluations, determining associated criteria, and in assessment of how these activities influenced system design. In essence, the HSIT is invaluable in CxP s ability to meet the three fundamental tenets of human rating: the process of designing, evaluating, and assuring that the total system can safely conduct the required human missions; the incorporation of design features and capabilities that accommodate human interaction with the system to enhance overall safety and mission success; and the incorporation of design features and capabilities to enable safe recovery of the crew from hazardous situations.

Berdich, Debbie↗
NASA NTRS1993

A white paper: NASA virtual environment research, applications, and technology

Research support for Virtual Environment technology development has been a part of NASA's human factors research program since 1985. Under the auspices of the Office of Aeronautics and Space Technology (OAST), initial funding was provided to the Aerospace Human Factors Research Division, Ames Research Center, which resulted in the origination of this technology. Since 1985, other Centers have begun using and developing this technology. At each research and space flight center, NASA missions have been major drivers of the technology. This White Paper was the joint effort of all the Centers which have been involved in the development of technology and its applications to their unique missions. Appendix A is the list of those who have worked to prepare the document, directed by Dr. Cynthia H. Null, Ames Research Center, and Dr. James P. Jenkins, NASA Headquarters. This White Paper describes the technology and its applications in NASA Centers (Chapters 1, 2 and 3), the potential roles it can take in NASA (Chapters 4 and 5), and a roadmap of the next 5 years (FY 1994-1998). The audience for this White Paper consists of managers, engineers, scientists and the general public with an interest in Virtual Environment technology. Those who read the paper will determine whether this roadmap, or others, are to be followed.

Null, Cynthia H.↗
NASA NTRS2009

A Summary of NASA and USAF Hypergolic Propellant Related Spills and Fires

Several unintentional hypergolic fluid related spills, fires, and explosions from the Apollo Program, the Space Shuttle Program, the Titan Program, and a few others have occurred over the past several decades. Spill sites include the following government facilities: Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Johnson Space Center (JSC), White Sands Test Facility (WSTF), Vandenberg Air Force Base (VAFB), Cape Canaveral Air Force Station (CCAFS), Edwards Air Force Base (EAFB), Little Rock AFB, and McConnell AFB. Until now, the only method of capturing the lessons learned from these incidents has been "word of mouth" or by studying each individual incident report. The root causes and consequences of the incidents vary drastically; however, certain "themes" can be deduced and utilized for future hypergolic propellant handling. Some of those common "themes" are summarized below: (1) Improper configuration control and internal or external human performance shaping factors can lead to being falsely comfortable with a system (2) Communication breakdown can escalate an incident to a level where injuries occur and/or hardware is damaged (3) Improper propulsion system and ground support system designs can destine a system for failure (4) Improper training of technicians, engineers, and safety personnel can put lives in danger (5) Improper PPE, spill protection, and staging of fire extinguishing equipment can result in unnecessary injuries or hardware damage if an incident occurs (6) Improper procedural oversight, development, and adherence to the procedure can be detrimental and quickly lead to an undesirable incident (7) Improper materials cleanliness or compatibility and chemical reactivity can result in fires or explosions (8) Improper established "back-out" and/or emergency safing procedures can escalate an event The items listed above are only a short list of the issues that should be recognized prior to handling hypergolic fluids or processing vehicles containing hypergolic propellants. The summary of incidents in this report is intended to cover many more issues than those listed above.

Nufer, Brian M.↗
NASA NTRS2003

Columbia Accident Investigation Board. Volume One

The Columbia Accident Investigation Board's independent investigation into the February 1, 2003, loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia and its seven-member crew lasted nearly seven months. A staff of more than 120, along with some 400 NASA engineers, supported the Board's 13 members. Investigators examined more than 30,000 documents, conducted more than 200 formal interviews, heard testimony from dozens of expert witnesses, and reviewed more than 3,000 inputs from the general public. In addition, more than 25,000 searchers combed vast stretches of the Western United States to retrieve the spacecraft's debris. In the process, Columbia's tragedy was compounded when two debris searchers with the U.S. Forest Service perished in a helicopter accident. This report concludes with recommendations, some of which are specifically identified and prefaced as 'before return to flight.' These recommendations are largely related to the physical cause of the accident, and include preventing the loss of foam, improved imaging of the Space Shuttle stack from liftoff through separation of the External Tank, and on-orbit inspection and repair of the Thermal Protection System. The remaining recommendations, for the most part, stem from the Board's findings on organizational cause factors. While they are not 'before return to flight' recommendations, they can be viewed as 'continuing to fly' recommendations, as they capture the Board's thinking on what changes are necessary to operate the Shuttle and future spacecraft safely in the mid- to long-term. These recommendations reflect both the Board's strong support for return to flight at the earliest date consistent with the overriding objective of safety, and the Board's conviction that operation of the Space Shuttle, and all human space-flight, is a developmental activity with high inherent risks.

SPACE SHUTTLE COLUMBIA↗
NASA NTRS2016

NASA Human System Risk Assessment Process

NASA utilizes an evidence based system to perform risk assessments for the human system for spaceflight missions. The center of this process is the multi-disciplinary Human System Risk Board (HSRB). The HSRB is chartered from the Chief Health and Medical Officer (OCHMO) at NASA Headquarters. The HSRB reviews all human system risks via an established comprehensive risk and configuration management plan based on a project management approach. The HSRB facilitates the integration of human research (terrestrial and spaceflight), medical operations, occupational surveillance, systems engineering and many other disciplines in a comprehensive review of human system risks. The HSRB considers all factors that influence human risk. These factors include pre-mission considerations such as screening criteria, training, age, sex, and physiological condition. In mission factors such as available countermeasures, mission duration and location and post mission factors such as time to return to baseline (reconditioning), post mission health screening, and available treatments. All of the factors influence the total risk assessment for each human risk. The HSRB performed a comprehensive review of all potential inflight medical conditions and events and over the course of several reviews consolidated the number of human system risks to 30, where the greatest emphasis is placed for investing program dollars for risk mitigation. The HSRB considers all available evidence from human research and, medical operations and occupational surveillance in assessing the risks for appropriate mitigation and future work. All applicable DRMs (low earth orbit for 6 and 12 months, deep space for 30 days and 1 year, a lunar mission for 1 year, and a planetary mission for 3 years) are considered as human system risks are modified by the hazards associated with space flight such as microgravity, exposure to radiation, distance from the earth, isolation and a closed environment. Each risk has a summary two-page assessment representing the state of knowledge/evidence of that risk, available risk mitigations, traceability to the Space Flight Human System Standards (SFHSS) and program requirements, and future work required. These data then can drive coordinated budgets across the Human Research Program, the International Space Station, Crew Health and Safety and Advanced Exploration System budgets to provide the most economical and timely mitigations. The risk assessments were completed for the 6 DRMs and serve as the baseline for which subsequent research and technology development and crew health care portfolios can be assessed. The HSRB reviews each risk at least annually or when new evidence/information is available that adds to the body of evidence. The current status of each risk can be reported to program management for operations, budget reviews and general oversight of the human system risk management program.

Francisco, D.↗
NASA NTRS2014

The Nuclear Cryogenic Propulsion Stage

Nuclear Thermal Propulsion (NTP) development efforts in the United States have demonstrated the technical viability and performance potential of NTP systems. For example, Project Rover (1955 - 1973) completed 22 high power rocket reactor tests. Peak performances included operating at an average hydrogen exhaust temperature of 2550 K and a peak fuel power density of 5200 MW/m3 (Pewee test), operating at a thrust of 930 kN (Phoebus-2A test), and operating for 62.7 minutes in a single burn (NRX-A6 test). Results from Project Rover indicated that an NTP system with a high thrust-to-weight ratio and a specific impulse greater than 900 s would be feasible. Excellent results were also obtained by the former Soviet Union. Although historical programs had promising results, many factors would affect the development of a 21st century nuclear thermal rocket (NTR). Test facilities built in the US during Project Rover no longer exist. However, advances in analytical techniques, the ability to utilize or adapt existing facilities and infrastructure, and the ability to develop a limited number of new test facilities may enable affordable development, qualification, and utilization of a Nuclear Cryogenic Propulsion Stage (NCPS). Bead-loaded graphite fuel was utilized throughout the Rover/NERVA program, and coated graphite composite fuel (tested in the Nuclear Furnace) and cermet fuel both show potential for even higher performance than that demonstrated in the Rover/NERVA engine tests.. NASA's NCPS project was initiated in October, 2011, with the goal of assessing the affordability and viability of an NCPS. FY 2014 activities are focused on fabrication and test (non-nuclear) of both coated graphite composite fuel elements and cermet fuel elements. Additional activities include developing a pre-conceptual design of the NCPS stage and evaluating affordable strategies for NCPS development, qualification, and utilization. NCPS stage designs are focused on supporting human Mars missions. The NCPS is being designed to readily integrate with the Space Launch System (SLS). A wide range of strategies for enabling affordable NCPS development, qualification, and utilization should be considered. These include multiple test and demonstration strategies (both ground and in-space), multiple potential test sites, and multiple engine designs. Two potential NCPS fuels are currently under consideration - coated graphite composite fuel and tungsten cermet fuel. During 2014 a representative, partial length (approximately 16") coated graphite composite fuel element with prototypic depleted uranium loading is being fabricated at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). In addition, a representative, partial length (approximately 16") cermet fuel element with prototypic depleted uranium loading is being fabricated at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC). During the development process small samples (approximately 3" length) will be tested in the Compact Fuel Element Environmental Tester (CFEET) at high temperature (approximately 2800 K) in a hydrogen environment to help ensure that basic fuel design and manufacturing process are adequate and have been performed correctly. Once designs and processes have been developed, longer fuel element segments will be fabricated and tested in the Nuclear Thermal Rocket Element Environmental Simulator (NTREE) at high temperature (approximately 2800 K) and in flowing hydrogen.

Houts, Michael G.↗
NASA NTRS2011

Launch Vehicle Demonstrator Using Shuttle Assets

The Advanced Concepts Office at NASA's George C. Marshall Space Flight Center undertook a study to define candidate early heavy lift demonstration launch vehicle concepts derived from existing space shuttle assets. The objective was to determine the performance capabilities of these vehicles and characterize potential early demonstration test flights. Given the anticipated budgetary constraints that may affect America's civil space program, and a lapse in U.S. heavy launch capability with the retirement of the space shuttle, an early heavy lift launch vehicle demonstration flight would not only demonstrate capabilities that could be utilized for future space exploration missions, but also serve as a building block for the development of our nation s next heavy lift launch system. An early heavy lift demonstration could be utilized as a test platform, demonstrating capabilities of future space exploration systems such as the Multi Purpose Crew Vehicle. By using existing shuttle assets, including the RS-25D engine inventory, the shuttle equipment manufacturing and tooling base, and the segmented solid rocket booster industry, a demonstrator concept could expedite the design-to-flight schedule while retaining critical human skills and capital. In this study two types of vehicle designs are examined. The first utilizes a high margin/safety factor battleship structural design in order to minimize development time as well as monetary investment. Structural design optimization is performed on the second, as if an operational vehicle. Results indicate low earth orbit payload capability is more than sufficient to support various vehicle and vehicle systems test programs including Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle articles. Furthermore, a shuttle-derived, hydrogen core vehicle configuration offers performance benefits when trading evolutionary paths to maximum capability.

Creech, Dennis M.↗
NASA NTRS2005

Space Resource Utilization and Extending Human Presence Across the Solar System

The Presidents Vision for Exploration is not a single mission, but an open ended journey that seeks to answer "How can we live on other worlds?" Using space resources is the only known approach for affordable, sustained, flexible, and self sufficient, human occupation beyond Earth orbit. Earth is a large planet. A simple analysis using the rocket equation shows that if Earth were a bit larger, chemical propulsion as a mechanism to access space would become impractical. Thus, even with the most efficient chemical rocket launch capability, the cost of lifting massive payloads into space will remain very steep (currently about $l00k/lb to the Moon and greater than $500k/lb to Mars). Space resource utilization should begin with an aggressive broad based demonstration program as afforded by the precursor missions implementation of the President's Vision of Exploration. Ion engine upper stages, for example, were studied for over 30 years, but only implemented in design after the Deep Space 1 in space demonstration. These demonstrations should include: extraction of elements from lunar regolith, and Martian soil and atmosphere, demonstration of power break even and growth from lunar or Mars moons derived photovoltaics, oxygen extraction for life support and propellant, and metals and alloys for in space repair and the production of habits and radiation shielding. Space resource utilization yields operational dividends through the subsequent programs including: propellant from lunar oxygen which could cut transportation costs from Earth in half, mega watts per year of power grown from lunar photovoltaics at decreasing cost per kW, decreased cost for human Mars missions by a factor of 10 by using propellant derived from Mars atmosphere for return, and in space manufacturing and food production with space resources yielding safe sustained and eventually self sufficient human presence in space. After the demonstration and implementation, the space resource utilization investment enables commercial and private viability beyond Earth orbit. For example, analysis has shown the lunar oxygen production for propellant becomes commercially viable after the exploration program completes the R&D, and power from lunar derived photovoltaics could, according to past NASA sponsored studies, pay for themselves while supplying most of Earth's electrical energy after about 17 years. Besides the Moon and Mars the resources of the near Earth asteroids enable the building of large space structures and science payloads. Analysis has shown that one of the thousands of these objects (some as easily accessible in space as the Moon and Mars), 2 km dia, the size of a typical open pit mine, would cost the total global financial product of Earth for 30,000 years if we were to launch it from Earth. Beyond Mars, the belt asteroids have been calculated to contain enough materials for habitat and life to support 10 quadrillion people. Thus, the development and use of space resources enables the extension of human life through the solar system allowing humanity to move from a planetary to a solar system society.

Curreri, Peter A.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Artemis Internal Science Team Update: Deployed Payloads

Artemis will reestablish human presence on the Moon and lead to a new era of scientific discovery and exploration. Led by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the Artemis effort includes a collaboration of space agencies and companies from around the world. In support of Artemis, a cross-disciplinary effort of science, engineering, operations, and human factors personnel is currently developing the best methods, facilities, and field locations to test hardware, train astronauts, and evaluate concepts of operations. This poster, as part of the Artemis Internal Science Team (AIST), provides an update to NASA’s plans for the solicitation, development, and operations of deployed surface payloads. In calendar year 2023, NASA’s Science Mission Directorate will solicit proposals for instruments to be deployed by crew on the surface of the Moon (Fig. 1), beginning with Artemis III. The Artemis III mission will land in the south polar region of the Moon, within 6º of latitude from the south pole, in the vicinity of both persistently illuminated and permanently shadowed areas of the Moon, with potential access to surface-accessible volatile deposits. Several of the proposed landing regions are located among some of the oldest parts of the Moon, and together with the permanently shadowed regions, provide the opportunity to learn about the history of the Moon through previously unexplored lunar regions. Deployed payloads will be a critical part of a notional program that captures the highest-priority science for Artemis III and provides the greatest feed-forward to follow-on missions and the build-up to the Artemis Base Camp.

R. C. Weber↗
NASA NTRS2010

Human Factors, Habitability and Environmental Health and the Human Integration Design Handbook

For decades, Space Life Sciences and NASA as an Agency have considered NASA-STD-3000, Man-Systems Integration Standards, a significant contribution to human spaceflight programs and to human-systems integration in general. The document has been referenced in numerous design standards both within NASA and by organizations throughout the world. With research program and project results being realized, advances in technology and new information in a variety of topic areas now available, the time arrived to update this extensive suite of requirements and design information. During the past several years, a multi-NASA center effort has been underway to write the update to NASA-STD-3000 with standards and design guidance that would be applicable to all future human spaceflight programs. NASA-STD-3001 - Volumes 1 and 2 - and the Human Integration Design Handbook (HIDH) were created. Volume 1, Crew Health, establishes NASA s spaceflight crew health standards for the pre-flight, in-flight, and post-flight phases of human spaceflight. Volume 2, Human Factors, Habitability and Environmental Health, focuses on the requirements of human-system integration and how the human crew interacts with other systems, and how the human and the system function together to accomplish the tasks for mission success. The HIDH is a compendium of human spaceflight history and knowledge, and provides useful background information and research findings. And as the HIDH is a stand-alone companion to the Standards, the maintenance of the document has been streamlined. This unique and flexible approach ensures that the content is current and addresses the fundamental advances of human performance and human capabilities and constraints research. Current work focuses on the development of new sections of Volume 2 and collecting updates to the HIDH. The new sections in development expand the scope of the standard and address mission operations and support operations. This effort is again collaboration with representatives from the Johnson Space Center Missions Operations and Space Life Sciences Directorates and the Engineering Directorate from Kennedy Space Center as well as discipline experts from across the Agency.

Houbec, Keith↗
NASA NTRS2012

Development of Human System Integration at NASA

Human Systems Integration seeks to design systems around the capabilities and limitations of the humans which use and interact with the system, ensuring greater efficiency of use, reduced error rates, and less rework in the design, manufacturing and operational deployment of hardware and software. One of the primary goals of HSI is to get the human factors practitioner involved early in the design process. In doing so, the aim is to reduce future budget costs and resources in redesign and training. By the preliminary design phase of a project nearly 80% of the total cost of the project is locked in. Potential design changes recommended by evaluations past this point will have little effect due to lack of funding or a huge cost in terms of resources to make changes. Three key concepts define an effective HSI program. First, systems are comprised of hardware, software, and the human, all of which operate within an environment. Too often, engineers and developers fail to consider the human capacity or requirements as part of the system. This leads to poor task allocation within the system. To promote ideal task allocation, it is critical that the human element be considered early in system development. Poor design, or designs that do not adequately consider the human component, could negatively affect physical or mental performance, as well as, social behavior. Second, successful HSI depends upon integration and collaboration of all the domains that represent acquisition efforts. Too often, these domains exist as independent disciplines due to the location of expertise within the service structure. Proper implementation of HSI through participation would help to integrate these domains and disciplines to leverage and apply their interdependencies to attain an optimal design. Via this process domain interests can be integrated to perform effective HSI through trade-offs and collaboration. This provides a common basis upon which to make knowledgeable decisions. Finally, HSI must be considered early in the requirements development phase of system design and acquisition. This will provide the best opportunity to maximize return on investment (ROI) and system performance. HSI requirements must be developed in conjunction with capability ]based requirements generation through functional. HSI requirements will drive HSI metrics and embed HSI issues within the system design. After a system is designed, implementation of HSI oversights can be very expensive. An HSI program should be included as an integral part of a total system approach to vehicle and habitat development. This would include, but not limited to, workstation design, D&C development, volumetric analysis, training, operations, and human -robotic interaction. HSI is a necessary process for Human Space Flight programs to meet the Agency Human ]System standards and thus mitigate human risks to acceptable levels. NASA has been involved in HSI planning, procedures development, process, and implementation for many years, and has been building several internal and publicly accessible products to facilitate HSI fs inclusion in the NASA Systems Engineering Lifecycle. Some of these products include: NASA STD 3001 Volumes 1 and 2, Human Integration Design Handbook, NASA HSI Implementation Plan, NASA HSI Implementation Plan Templates, NASA HSI Implementation Handbook, and a 2 ]hour short course on HSI delivered as part of the NASA Space and Life Sciences Directorate Academy. These products have been created leveraging industry best practices and lessons learned from other Federal Government agencies.

Whitmore, Mihriban↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Artemis Internal Science Team Update: Deployed Payloads

Artemis will reestablish human presence on the Moon and lead to a new era of scientific discovery and exploration. Led by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the Artemis effort includes a collaboration of space agencies and companies from around the world [1]. In support of Artemis, a cross-disciplinary effort of science, engineering, operations, and human factors personnel is currently developing the best methods, facilities, and field locations to test hardware, train astronauts, and evaluate concepts of operations. This abstract, as part of the Artemis Internal Science Team (AIST) [2], provides an update to NASA’s plans for the solicitation, development, and operations of deployed surface payloads. In calendar year 2023, NASA’s Science Mission Directorate will solicit proposals for instruments to be deployed by crew on the surface of the Moon (Fig. 1), beginning with Artemis III [3]. The Artemis III mission will land in the south polar region of the Moon, within 6º of latitude from the south pole, in the vicinity of both persistently illuminated and permanently shadowed areas of the Moon, with potential access to surface-accessible volatile deposits [4]. Several of the proposed landing regions are located among some of the oldest parts of the Moon, and together with the permanently shadowed regions, provide the opportunity to learn about the history of the Moon through previously unexplored lunar regions [5]. Deployed payloads will be a critical part of a notional program that captures the highest-priority science for Artemis III and provides the greatest feedforward to follow-on missions and the build-up to the Artemis Base Camp

R. C. Weber↗
NASA NTRS2013

Solar System Escape Architecture for Revolutionary Science

Our most distance spacecraft, Voyager 1 and Voyager 2, recently reached the boundary of the solar system known as the Heliopause. Beyond this boundary lies interstellar space, and, at tremendous distance, the stars. The Voyager spacecraft have shown us that the Heliopause is a dynamic, rapidly changing environment, varying greatly as the fields and effects emanating from the sun are met by a host of forces pushing in from our nearby galactic neighborhood. This is the region we aim to explore. Specifically we aim to develop a mission architecture and spacecraft concept capable of reaching the Heliopause (approximately100 AU (Astronomical Units)) region in multiple directions of interest, with a variety of scientific instrument suites, within a reasonable timeframe (about 15 years.) This report details our Phase 1 work including science goal definition, trajectory planning, technology research, mission planning, instrument selection, spacecraft design, and more. We present an architecture employing a 250-meter by 250-meter solar sail with a 175 kilogram spacecraft. This spacecraft could carry a variety of instrument suites depending on the destination, time, and other factors. The spin-stabilized spacecraft would powered by a small radioisotope power system (about 20 watts), makes use of an optical communication system, and carries 3 extensible booms for instrument accommodation as visible in the sketch and rendering below. We conclude that it would be reasonable to implement the architecture described herein in the 2020-2030 timeframe based on likely near-term technological and material advances. We are confident that cruise times of around 15 years could be achieved to science-rich destinations. This report details the approach we used to come to these conclusions and identifies some of the steps along the way. We utilized a variety of methodologies involving our full capability at JPL (Jet Propulsion Laboratory) - from small point studies to large collaborative engineering processes. This paper also describes potential industry partnerships and costing information, and includes the methods used to account for our project’s significant deviation from any prior mission in the NASA costing tool database. Outreach and public engagement is an important part of NASA activities. We engaged in several different forms of this outreach and describe them in this report. We conclude with some open questions and a summary of activities we hope to engage in with Phase 2 funding. The entire team would like to thank the NIAC (NASA Innovative Advanced Concepts) program for the opportunity to investigate this fascinating and challenging concept. The Voyager program gives us tantalizing clues as to the nature and behavior of the Heliopause – the boundary between the sun’s influence and the interstellar medium. This information comes from forty-year old instruments designed to study the outer planets. A targeted Heliopause investigation would give insight into the formation of the solar system, the role of the sun in the local interstellar neighborhood, and contribute to human exploration planning by helping to predict periods of low galactic cosmic ray (GCR) penetration into the inner solar system.

Spacecraft↗
NASA NTRS2008

Lunar Dust Mitigation Technology Development

NASA s plans for implementing the Vision for Space Exploration include returning to the moon as a stepping stone for further exploration of Mars, and beyond. Dust on the lunar surface has a ubiquitous presence which must be explicitly addressed during upcoming human lunar exploration missions. While the operational challenges attributable to dust during the Apollo missions did not prove critical, the comparatively long duration of impending missions presents a different challenge. Near term plans to revisit the moon places a primary emphasis on characterization and mitigation of lunar dust. Comprised of regolith particles ranging in size from tens of nanometers to microns, lunar dust is a manifestation of the complex interaction of the lunar soil with multiple mechanical, electrical, and gravitational effects. The environmental and anthropogenic factors effecting the perturbation, transport, and deposition of lunar dust must be studied in order to mitigate it s potentially harmful effects on exploration systems. This paper presents the current perspective and implementation of dust knowledge management and integration, and mitigation technology development activities within NASA s Exploration Technology Development Program. This work is presented within the context of the Constellation Program s Integrated Lunar Dust Management Strategy. The Lunar Dust Mitigation Technology Development project has been implemented within the ETDP. Project scope and plans will be presented, along with a a perspective on lessons learned from Apollo and forensics engineering studies of Apollo hardware. This paper further outlines the scientific basis for lunar dust behavior, it s characteristics and potential effects, and surveys several potential strategies for its control and mitigation both for lunar surface operations and within the working volumes of a lunar outpost.

Hyatt, Mark J.↗
NASA NTRS2006

A Case for Developing a Ground Based Replication of the Earth, Moon and Mars Spaceflight Infrastructure

When the systems are developed and in place to provide the services needed to operate en route and on the Lunar and Martian surfaces, an Earth based replication will need to be in place for the safety and protection of mission success. The replication will entail all aspects of the flight configuration end to end but will not include any closed loop systems. This would replicate the infrastructure from Lunar and Martian robots, manned surface excursions, through man and unmanned terrestrial bases, through the various types of communication systems and technologies, manned and un-manned space vehicles (large and small), to Earth based systems and control centers. An Earth based replicated infrastructure will enable checkout and test of new technologies, hardware, software updates and upgrades and procedures without putting humans and missions at risk. Analysis of events, what ifs and trouble resolution could be played out on the ground to remove as much risk as possible from any type of proposed change to flight operational systems. With adequate detail, it is possible that failures could be predicted with a high probability and action taken to eliminate failures. A major factor in any mission to the Moon and to Mars is the complexity of systems, interfaces, processes, their limitations, associated risks and the factor of the unknown including the development by many contractors and NASA centers. The need to be able to introduce new technologies over the life of the program requires an end to end test bed to analyze and evaluate these technologies and what will happen when they are introduced into the flight system. The ability to analyze system behaviors end to end under varying conditions would enhance safety e.g. fault tolerances. This analysis along with the ability to mine data from the development environment (e.g. test data), flight ops and modeling/simulations data would provide a level of information not currently available to operations and astronauts. In this paper we will analyze the beginnings of such a replication and what it could do in terms of reducing risk in the near term for development. We will analyze the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) test lab which has to a large extent accomplished this replication for the SSME and has been highly successful in analyzing hardware and software problems and changes. The cost of replicating the flight system as proposed here could be very high if attempted as an afterthought. We will describe the initial steps for the development of a replication of this infrastructure starting with the communication infrastructure. The Constellation of Labs (CofL) under the Command, Control, Communication and Information (C3I) project for the NASA Exploration Initiative will provide the initial foundation upon which to base this replication. Simply put, there is very little margin for error in high latency situations e.g. en-route to/from Mars or in an autonomous process on the Lunar far side. Any thought out approach to reduce risk and increase safety needs to be accomplished end to end with the actual systems configuration.

Bradford, Robert N.↗