Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “NASA Process Requirements”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 73 records · Page 4

Multi-Center Implementation of NPR 7123.1A: A Collaborative Effort

Collaboration efforts between MSFC and GRC Engineering Directorates to implement the NASA Systems Engineering (SE) Engine have expanded over the past year to include other NASA Centers. Sharing information on designing, developing, and deploying SE processes has sparked further interest based on the realization that there is relative consistency in implementing SE processes at the institutional level. This presentation will provide a status on the ongoing multi-center collaboration and provide insight into how these NPR 7123.1A SE-aligned directives are being implemented and managed to better support the needs of NASA programs and projects. NPR 7123.1A, NASA Systems Engineering Processes and Requirements, was released on March 26, 2007 to clearly articulate and establish the requirements on the implementing organization for performing, supporting, and evaluating SE activities. In early 2009, MSFC and GRC Engineering Directorates undertook a collaborative opportunity to share their research and work associated with developing, updating and revising their SE process policy to comply and align with NPR 7123.1A. The goal is to develop instructions, checklists, templates, and procedures for each of the 17 SE process requirements so that systems engineers will be a position to define work that is process-driven. Greater efficiency and more effective technical management will be achieved due to consistency and repeatability of SE process implementation across and throughout each of the NASA centers. An added benefit will be to encourage NASA centers to pursue and collaborate on joint projects as a result of using common or similar processes, methods, tools, and techniques.

Hall, Phillip B.↗

History of NASA's Determination of Offgassed Products (Test 7)

NASA's Determination of Offgassed Products (Test 7) from materials and assembled articles for spaceflight has evolved since the Apollo program for over 50 years to meet various habitable spacecraft nonmetallic programmatic requirements. Now mandated by NASA STD-6016A, Standard Materials and Processes Requirements for Spacecraft, all nonmetallic materials used in habitable flight compartments, with the exception of ceramics, metal oxides, inorganic glasses, and materials used in sealed containers, must meet the offgassing requirements in NASA-STD-6001B Test 7. This manuscript presents the history of Test 7, beginning with the Apollo spacecraft nonmetallic materials selection guidelines and test requirements in 1967, in which tests were performed in mostly oxygen atmospheres. It progresses through Skylab, Space Shuttle, International Space Station nonmetals testing, and acceptance requirements with milder test environments. This review of the history of Test 7 presents the reader with a perspective on the development and changes undergone since inception to the present. Related NASA standard tests (some now former, discontinued, combined, or supplemental) including Test 6, Odor Assessment, Test 16, Determination of Offgassed Products from Assembled Articles, and Test 12, Total Spacecraft Cabin Offgassing, are discussed in context

Greene, Benjamin↗

Johnson Space Center Health and Medical Technical Authority

1.HMTA responsibilities: a) Assure program/project compliance with Agency health and medical requirements at identified key decision points. b) Certify that programs/projects comply with Agency health and medical requirements prior to spaceflight missions. c) Assure technical excellence. 2. Designation of applicable NASA Centers for HMTA implementation and Chief Medical Officer (CMO) appointment. 3. Center CMO responsible for HMTA implementation for programs and projects at the center. JSC HMTA captured in "JSC HMTA Implementation Plan". 4. Establishes specifics of dissenting opinion process consistent with NASA procedural requirements.

Fogarty, Jennifer A.↗

Requirements Development for the NASA Advanced Engineering Environment (AEE)

The requirements development process for the Advanced Engineering Environment (AEE) is presented. This environment has been developed to allow NASA to perform independent analysis and design of space transportation architectures and technologies. Given the highly collaborative and distributed nature of AEE, a variety of organizations are involved in the development, operations and management of the system. Furthermore, there are additional organizations involved representing external customers and stakeholders. Thorough coordination and effective communication is essential to translate desired expectations of the system into requirements. Functional, verifiable requirements for this (and indeed any) system are necessary to fulfill several roles. Requirements serve as a contractual tool, configuration management tool, and as an engineering tool, sometimes simultaneously. The role of requirements as an engineering tool is particularly important because a stable set of requirements for a system provides a common framework of system scope and characterization among team members. Furthermore, the requirements provide the basis for checking completion of system elements and form the basis for system verification. Requirements are at the core of systems engineering. The AEE Project has undertaken a thorough process to translate the desires and expectations of external customers and stakeholders into functional system-level requirements that are captured with sufficient rigor to allow development planning, resource allocation and system-level design, development, implementation and verification. These requirements are maintained in an integrated, relational database that provides traceability to governing Program requirements and also to verification methods and subsystem-level requirements.

Rogers, Eric↗

The Cognition and Fine Motor Skills Test Batteries: Normative Data and Interdependencies

Space mission success and safety relies upon astronaut functional state. Since spaceflight stressors affect cognitive processing and fine motor skills, NASA requires that measures of performance of these things remain within clinically accepted values (NASA STD 3001). NASA is in the process of developing two test batteries for the assessment of crew cognitive and fine motor skills before, during and after spaceflight. Toward that goal, the current project collected normative scores in 91 “astronaut-like” military and civilian pilots. The Cognition Test Battery (CTB) contains ten sub-tests that measure a range of cognitive abilities. For five of the ten CTB sub-tests, we propose scores to improve the battery’s sensitivity. Among the ten sub-tests, response times were more highly correlated than accuracy scores. Principle component analysis of the correlations revealed that the first response time factor could explain over 40% of the total variance and appeared to represent the tendency of observers to try to respond more quickly. The first accuracy factor (explaining only 20%) gave a high weight to the higher level cognitive sub-tests and a negative weight to tasks associated with motor and lower level cognitive processing. The Fine Motor Skills (FMS) test battery contains four sub-tests (Tracking, Pointing, Tracing, Rotating) performed on an Apple iPad tablet computer. Principle component analysis on the sub-test response time correlations revealed that the first two factors accounted for ~80% of the variance in performance. The first component captured overall speed on all four of the sub-tests. The second factor separated the sub-tasks into two groups (Drag-Point vs Trace-Rotate). Previous work found the first group response times correlated with that of a standard peg board task, while those of the other group did not. Correlations were computed between the first FMS factor and the response time and accuracy scores from each CTB sub-task. Performing fine motor behaviors rapidly was significantly correlated with the ability to perform many of the CTB sub-tests rapidly. This ability cannot be simple motor speed since scores on the Psychomotor Vigilance Test (PVT) subtask did not correlate with the ability to perform the other tasks rapidly. Speed on fine motor skills correlated significantly with accuracy on the short-term-memory sub-test. We hypothesize that eye movements, which can be regarded as a fine motor skill, may explain this relationship.

cognition↗

Systems Engineering and Management Applications of ISO 9001:2015 for Government

The manufacturing segment of the business world is busy assessing the impact of ISO 9001:2015, and updating their management systems to meet the required compliance date. What does the new revision mean for government agencies that deliver large engineering projects rather than mass production? In fact, the standard, especially the new revision, can be used quite readily for government agencies, or applied to specific projects, once it is understood in terms of the similarities with systems engineering and project management. From there it can be extrapolated to "mission realization" systems, and a Quality Management System (QMS) is a logical result that can bring order to processes and systems that likely already exist in some fashion. ISO 9001:2015 is less product-oriented than previous versions. It can be more broadly applied to public organizations as well as private; and to services (missions) as well as products. The emphasis on risk management in the revised standard provides the needed balance for weighing decisions with respect to cost, schedule, technical, safety, and regulatory compliance; so if this is not part of agency governance already, this is a good place to start, especially for large engineering projects. The Systems Engineering standard used for this analysis is from NASA's NPR 7123.1 NASA Systems Engineering Processes and Requirements; however, those who are more familiar with ISO/IEC 26702 Systems Engineering-application and management of the systems engineering process, or SAE/EIA 632 Processes for Engineering a System will also recognize the similarities. In reality, the QMS outlined by ISO 9001 reinforces the systems engineering processes, and serves to ensure that they are adequately implemented, although most of the ISO 9001 literature emphasizes the production and process aspects of the standard. Rather than beginning with ISO 9001and getting lost in the vocabulary, it is useful to begin with the systems engineering lifecycle. Identification of stakeholder expectations, identifying solutions, creating specific product or service designs, production of the product or service, delivery to the public, and the associated management, planning, and control processes, are a familiar place to begin thinking of the overall system of identifying, designing, and competing a project or mission. Lining up this lifecycle with the ISO requirements (see Figure 1) illustrates how a quality management system is concerned with the same processes, and provides a governance and assurance function. If implemented properly, there are cost savings resulting from less rework, repair, reprocessing, failures, misplaced documents, and similar types of deficiencies1. Starting with an organization's systems engineering processes allows the organization to use their own terminology for a QMS plan, and tailor the plan to their own project or organization, so that it is more easily developed, understood, and implemented.

Shepherd, Christena C.↗

Fracture Control for Additive Manufactured Spacecraft Structures

Final Paper is attached. This paper discusses how the intent of current NASA fracture control requirements may be applied to "fracture critical" additive manufactured spacecraft hardware. Fracture control is a multi-discipline design and certification methodology that is applied in order to mitigate catastrophic failure of structures resulting from growth of an undetected crack-like defect. The methodology is defined in existing spacecraft standards and is required by NASA on all human-rated space structures. Recently, standards have been published by NASA to define materials and processes requirements for certain metallic additive manufactured hardware, but procedures for fracture control implementation on additive manufactured parts are not yet addressed in detail in any standard or guidance document.The discussion contained herein is necessary at this time as new guidance in this area should be founded collaboratively by the technical community at large including industry, academia, and government. Three Fracture Control Certification Methods are proposed for discussion. Additionally, a concept for "Design for AM fracture control" is introduced. The goals of this paper are to further expose the need for maturing additive manufacturing fracture control guidance in the spacecraft industry and to generate discussion on what this guidance should consist of.

McElroy, Mark↗

The Saturn management concept

Management of the Saturn launch vehicles was an evolutionary process, requiring constant interaction between NASA Headquarters, the Marshall Space Flight Center (particularly the Saturn 5 Program Office), and the various prime contractors. Successful Saturn management was a blend of the decades of experience of the von Braun team, management concepts from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Government, and private industry. The Saturn 5 Program Office shared a unique relationship with the Apollo Program Office at NASA Headquarters. Much of the success of the Saturn 5 Program Office was based on its painstaking attention to detail, emphasis on individual responsibilities (backed up by comprehensive program element plans and management matrices), and a high degree of visibility as embodied in the Program Control Center.

Bilstein, R. E.↗

Mission Radiation Environment Modeling and Analysis: Avionics Trade Study for GCD Rad-Neuro Project

The two main objectives of this trade study are characterizing the mission radiation environment for multiple Design Reference Missions (DRM) and analysis of radiation effects on avionics with the goal of producing radiation tolerant Neuromorphic Computing processor chips with innovative radiation-induced fault mitigation. The NASA process for defining radiation requirements for flight avionics is applied to this domain. The effects of trapped protons and electrons in the Van Allen radiation belts predominates in Low-Earth-Orbit (LEO) and the solar wind, solar flares and Galactic Cosmic Rays (GCRs) are the dominant radiation challenge in the open space between the planets of our solar system. The nature and energy of the particles that cause circuit upset and failure is very different in the two regimes. Two results are produced from the radiation models: determining the Total Integrated Dose (TID) experienced by avionics for a given DRM and predicting the Single Event Effects (SEE) rates for avionics during high rate exposure. These tools are applied to existing semiconductors and can be used for predicting the radiation performance of future semiconductors based on early radiation testing of new devices.

Space Radiation↗

State-of-the-Art: Small Spacecraft Technology

When the first edition of NASA’s Small Spacecraft Technology State-of-the-art report was published in 2013, 247 CubeSats and 105 other non-CubeSat small spacecraft under 50 kilograms (kg) had been launched worldwide, representing less than 2% of launched mass into orbit over multiple years. In 2013 alone, around 60% of the total spacecraft launched had a mass under 600 kg, and of those under 600 kg, 83% were under 200 kg and 37% were nanosatellites (1). Of the total 1,849 spacecraft launched in 2021, 94% were small spacecraft with an overall mass under 600 kg, and of those under 600 kg, 40% were under 200 kg, and 11% were nanosatellites (1). Since 2013, the fight heritage for small spacecraft has increased by over 30% and has become the primary source to space access for commercial, government, private, and academic institutions. The total number of spacecraft launched in the past 10 years is 5,681 and 45% of those had a mass. As with all previous editions of this report, the 2022 edition captures and distills a wealth of new information available on small spacecraft systems from NASA and other publicly available sources. This report is limited to publicly available information and cannot reflect major advances in development that are not publicly disclosed. We encourage any opportunity to publish mission outcomes and technology development milestones (e.g., via conference papers, press releases, company website) so they can be reflected in this report. Overall, this report is a survey of small spacecraft technologies sourced from open literature; it does not endeavor to be an original source, and only considers literature in the public domain to identify and classify devices. Commonly used sources for data include manufacturer datasheets, press releases, conference papers, journal papers, public filings with government agencies, news articles, presentations, the compendium of databases accessed via NASA’s Small Spacecraft Systems Virtual Institute (S3VI) Information Search, and engagement with companies. Data not appropriate for public dissemination, such as proprietary, export controlled, or otherwise restricted data, are not considered. As a result, this report includes many dedicated hours of desk research performed by subject matter experts reviewing resources noted above. Content in this 2022 edition is based on data available by October 2022. This report should not be considered as a comprehensive overview of all the technologies but a great reference for the current state-of-the-art SmallSat technologies. The organizational approach for each chapter is relatively consistent with previous editions and includes an introduction of the technology, current development status of the technology’s procurable systems, and summary tables of technologies surveyed. The content in each chapter is uniquely organized to present a mini-stand-alone report on spacecraft subsystems. As in previous years, chapters include information from previous editions but are updated with new and maturating technologies and reference missions. Tables in each section provide a convenient summary of the technologies discussed, with explanations and references in the body text. The authors have attempted to isolate trends in the small spacecraft industry to point out which technologies have been adopted after successful demonstration missions. Lastly, the authors tried to use the terms “SmallSat,” “microsatellite,” “nanosatellite,” and “CubeSat” in a consistent manner, even as these terms are often used interchangeably in the space industry. Every subsystem chapter contains updated information to reflect the growth in the small spacecraft market. Significant changes are included in several chapters. The “Complete Spacecraft Platforms” chapter now includes information on the two main market options, hosted payload services and dedicated buses. The “Power” chapter provides information on the development of solid-state batteries with significantly higher energy than the current state-of-theart lithium-ion batteries. A large effort was made to update the “Communications” chapter to appropriately capture the recent technology maturation of optical communications for SmallSats. The “Ground Data Systems and Mission Operations” chapter was updated to reflect the recent establishment of the Near Space Network and influx of SmallSat Optical Ground Stations. The “Guidance, Navigation and Control” chapter was updated to include Lidar sensor technology. The “Deorbit Systems” chapter includes a discussion of recently proposed changes by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to limit a spacecraft’s lifetime to no longer than 5 years after end-of-mission. The “Identification and Tracking” Chapter includes updated information on the progress of SmallSat tracking. Finally, this report now encompasses technology funded by NASA’s Small Spacecraft Technology (SST) program’s SmallSat Technology Partnerships (STP) initiative which is described further in this Introduction. The reader can find the included SST technology in the “On the Horizon” section of the “Thermal Systems”, “Communications”, and “Guidance, Navigation, and Control” chapters. A central element of this report is to list state-of-the-art technologies by NASA standard Technology Readiness Level (TRL) as defined by the 2020 NASA Engineering Handbook, found in NASA NPR 7123.1C NASA Systems Engineering Processes and Requirements. The authors have endeavored to independently verify the TRL value of each technology by reviewing and citing published test results or publicly available data to the best of their ability. Where test results and data disagree with vendors’ own advertised TRL, the authors have attempted to engage the vendors to discuss the discrepancy. Readers are strongly encouraged to follow the references cited in the literature describing the full performance range and capabilities of each technology. Readers of this report should reach out to individual companies to further clarify information. It is important to note that this report takes a broad system-level view. To attain a high TRL, the subsystem must be in a flight-ready configuration with all supporting infrastructure—such as mounting points, power conversion, and control algorithms—in an integrated unit. An accurate TRL assessment requires a high degree of technical knowledge on a subject device, and an in-depth understanding of the mission (including interfaces and environment) on which the device was flown. There is variability in TRL values depending on design factors for a specific technology. For example, differences in TRL assessment based on the operating environment may result from the thermal environment, mechanical loads, mission duration, or radiation exposure. If a technology has flown on a mission without success, or without providing valid confirmation to the operator, such claimed “flight heritage” was discounted. The authors believe TRLs are most accurately determined when assessed within the context of a program’s unique requirements. While the overall capability of small spacecraft has matured since the 2021 edition of this report, technologies are still being developed to make deep space SmallSat missions more routine and more cost effective. Future editions of this report may include content dedicated to the rapidly growing fields of assembly, integration, and testing services, and mission modeling and simulation–all of which are now extensively represented at small spacecraft conferences. Many of these subsystems and services are still in their infancy, but as they evolve and reliable conventions and standards emerge, the next iteration of this report may also evolve to include additional chapters.

Bruce Yost↗

Applying Generative-AI to NASA Documentation and Processes

This research and development project leverages generative-AI to assist in the generation of software process documentation based on NASA standards. By utilizing fine-tuned AI models, the proposed system will analyze NASA's software guidelines, helping to translate them into well-structured, compliant process documents. This assistance can reduce the manual effort required to produce such documentation, enhance consistency, and assure alignment with NASA's stringent software development and operational requirements. In addition to assisting in the generation of software process documentation, the project explores how generative-AI can help create audit checklists as well as assess the compliance of NASA provider documentation against applicable NASA standards. This approach would support the compliance auditing process, providing real-time insights and assessments. The intended result will be a streamlined process, potentially including a Python-based tool and database, that improves audit efficiency, reduces human error, lowers manpower costs and required manhours, and assures continuous compliance with NASA and industry evolving standards for safety-critical software development. Future task might be to investigate the software industry approach and standards for potential collaboration.

NASA Standards↗

A Matrix Approach to Software Process Definition

The Software Engineering Laboratory (SEL) is currently engaged in a Methodology and Metrics program for the Information Systems Center (ISC) at Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC). This paper addresses the Methodology portion of the program. The purpose of the Methodology effort is to assist a software team lead in selecting and tailoring a software development or maintenance process for a specific GSFC project. It is intended that this process will also be compliant with both ISO 9001 and the Software Engineering Institute's Capability Maturity Model (CMM). Under the Methodology program, we have defined four standard ISO-compliant software processes for the ISC, and three tailoring criteria that team leads can use to categorize their projects. The team lead would select a process and appropriate tailoring factors, from which a software process tailored to the specific project could be generated. Our objective in the Methodology program is to present software process information in a structured fashion, to make it easy for a team lead to characterize the type of software engineering to be performed, and to apply tailoring parameters to search for an appropriate software process description. This will enable the team lead to follow a proven, effective software process and also satisfy NASA's requirement for compliance with ISO 9001 and the anticipated requirement for CMM assessment. This work is also intended to support the deployment of sound software processes across the ISC.

Schultz, David↗

Current Challenges for HTCMC Aero-Propulsion Components

In comparison to the best metallic materials, HTCMC aero-propulsion engine components offer the opportunity of reduced weight and higher temperature operation, with corresponding improvements in engine cooling requirements, emissions, thrust, and specific fuel consumption. Although much progress has been made in the development of advanced HTCMC constituent materials and processes, major challenges still remain for their implementation into these components. The objectives of this presentation are to briefly review (1) potential HTCMC aero-propulsion components and their generic material performance requirements, (2) recent progress at NASA and elsewhere concerning advanced constituents and processes for meeting these requirements, (3) key HTCMC component implementation challenges that are currently being encountered, and (4) on-going activities within the new NASA Fundamental Aeronautics Program that are addressing these challenges.

DiCarlo, James A.↗

Fracture Control for Additively Manufactured Spacecraft Structures

This paper describes how the intent of current NASA fracture control requirements may be applied to “fracture critical” additively manufactured spacecraft hardware. Fracture control is a multi-discipline design and certification methodology that is applied in order to mitigate catastrophic failure of structures resulting from growth of an undetected crack-like defect. The methodology is defined in existing NASA standards and is required on all human-rated space structures. As legacy spacecraft structures have been built using primarily metallic and composite materials manufactured using well established methods, guidance for application of fracture control to parts composed of these material types has been established and is documented in several NASA requirements. Additive manufactured structures offer advantages in design flexibility and manufacturing efficiency and as a result are expected to continue to be used more and more in the future. Recently, relevant guidance has been published by NASA to define materials and processes requirements for certain additive manufactured hardware, but procedures for fracture control are not addressed yet in any requirements or guidance document. While use of additive manufactured parts in non-critical scenarios may be of relatively low concern in current structural certification processes, there is a need for new fracture control guidance in order to use and certify additively manufacture hardware that is “fracture critical” where failure of the part may result in loss of life or loss of vehicle. Assurance of damage tolerance, i.e., that as-built flaws in a given part either do not exist or will not grow to become catastrophic, is of particular interest to the fracture control community. This poses a challenge due to the fact that damage tolerance behavior is not well understood in additive manufactured parts compared to legacy material types and manufacturing techniques. The discussion contained herein is necessary at this time as new guidance in this area should be founded collaboratively by the technical community at large. Different hardware types (e.g., pressure vessel, structural member) are described to highlight specific challenges and solutions for each. The discussion concludes with considering specific disciplines within fracture control (non-destructive evaluation, materials & processes, fracture mechanics, and structural certification) in a proposed extension of existing fracture control requirements to additive manufactured parts.

McElroy, Mark↗

Fracture Control for Additive Manufactured Spacecraft Structures

This paper describes how the intent of current NASA fracture control requirements may be applied to “fracture critical” additively manufactured spacecraft hardware. Fracture control is a multi-discipline design and certification methodology that is applied in order to mitigate catastrophic failure of structures resulting from growth of an undetected crack-like defect. The methodology is defined in existing NASA standards and is required on all human-rated space structures. As legacy spacecraft structures have been built using primarily metallic and composite materials manufactured using well established methods, guidance for application of fracture control to parts composed of these material types has been established and is documented in several NASA requirements. Additive manufactured structures offer advantages in design flexibility and manufacturing efficiency and as a result are expected to continue to be used more and more in the future. Recently, relevant guidance has been published by NASA to define materials and processes requirements for certain additive manufactured hardware, but procedures for fracture control are not addressed yet in any requirements or guidance document. While use of additive manufactured parts in non-critical scenarios may be of relatively low concern in current structural certification processes, there is a need for new fracture control guidance in order to use and certify additively manufacture hardware that is “fracture critical” where failure of the part may result in loss of life or loss of vehicle. Assurance of damage tolerance, i.e., that as-built flaws in a given part either do not exist or will not grow to become catastrophic, is of particular interest to the fracture control community. This poses a challenge due to the fact that damage tolerance behavior is not well understood in additive manufactured parts compared to legacy material types and manufacturing techniques. The discussion contained herein is necessary at this time as new guidance in this area should be founded collaboratively by the technical community at large. Different hardware types (e.g., pressure vessel, structural member) are described to highlight specific challenges and solutions for each. The discussion concludes with considering specific disciplines within fracture control (non-destructive evaluation, materials & processes, fracture mechanics, and structural certification) in a proposed extension of existing fracture control requirements to additive manufactured parts.

McElroy, Mark↗

Continuous Risk Management at NASA

NPG 7120.5A, "NASA Program and Project Management Processes and Requirements" enacted in April, 1998, requires that "The program or project manager shall apply risk management principles..." The Software Assurance Technology Center (SATC) at NASA GSFC has been tasked with the responsibility for developing and teaching a systems level course for risk management that provides information on how to comply with this edict. The course was developed in conjunction with the Software Engineering Institute at Carnegie Mellon University, then tailored to the NASA systems community. This presentation will briefly discuss the six functions for risk management: (1) Identify the risks in a specific format; (2) Analyze the risk probability, impact/severity, and timeframe; (3) Plan the approach; (4) Track the risk through data compilation and analysis; (5) Control and monitor the risk; (6) Communicate and document the process and decisions. This risk management structure of functions has been taught to projects at all NASA Centers and is being successfully implemented on many projects. This presentation will give project managers the information they need to understand if risk management is to be effectively implemented on their projects at a cost they can afford.

Hammer, Theodore F.↗

Continuous Risk Management: A NASA Program Initiative

NPG 7120.5A, "NASA Program and Project Management Processes and Requirements" enacted in April, 1998, requires that "The program or project manager shall apply risk management principles..." The Software Assurance Technology Center (SATC) at NASA GSFC has been tasked with the responsibility for developing and teaching a systems level course for risk management that provides information on how to comply with this edict. The course was developed in conjunction with the Software Engineering Institute at Carnegie Mellon University, then tailored to the NASA systems community. This presentation will briefly discuss the six functions for risk management: (1) Identify the risks in a specific format; (2) Analyze the risk probability, impact/severity, and timeframe; (3) Plan the approach; (4) Track the risk through data compilation and analysis; (5) Control and monitor the risk; (6) Communicate and document the process and decisions.

Hammer, Theodore F.↗

Human Rating Requirements for NASA's Constellation Program

This slide presentation reviews the human system integration (HSI) process in achieving human ratings for NASA Constellation Program (CxP). The NASA Procedural Requirements (NPR) document that defines the Human Ratings Requirements is NPR 8705.2B. An example of the human rating requirements flow down is given in the handling qualities for space craft control.

Berdich, Debbie↗