Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “International IAEA”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 73 records · Page 4

Assessing high fidelity multi-component models to facilitate safeguards at Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants

We report that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors routinely carry out environmental sampling (ES) as a verification method. Collection of environmental swipe samples at various locations in Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Facilities (GCEPs) is an important process in detecting misuse of a declared facility and possibly the existence of undeclared nuclear material. These samples are measured for isotopic composition in uranium containing particles by Thermal Ionization Mass Spectrometry (TIMS) or Inductively Coupled Plasma Mass Spectrometry (ICP-MS). Even though ES is highly effective in detecting the absolute value of enrichments and their deviations from the declared values, it cannot explain the cause of those changes. Several potential explanations can serve as possibilities for particles detected above or other than the declared enrichment. These include normal and non-malicious events such as the design of the enrichment cascades, unintentional failures of the machines, or overshoot during startup of a cascade. It can also be the result of deliberate misuse by the facility operators. The primary objective of this work is to understand how these factors affect the enrichments produced by a cascade and quantify anticipated multi-isotopic concentrations for each case. The following methodology is employed to determine signatures at a particular facility. 1) Utilize a new two-dimensional multi-component diffusion code to obtain centrifuge performance data and use that information to design and perform cascade analysis. Compare and contrast the results with previous 1-D radially averaged solutions from the Pancake code. 2) Design a GCEP cascade with the production goal of 19.75% 235 U for each set of machine data above. Investigate two cascade scenarios that include enrichment of natural uranium (NU) feed to 19.75% 235U in a single cascade compared to a two-step process of NU to 5% and then 5% to 19.75%. 3) Simulate the intentional vs. unintentional off-normal scenarios in the cascades to assess the differences in isotopic concentrations. A non-ideal squared-off cascade model developed at the University of Virginia is used to calculate flow rates and isotopic concentrations of the process gas. The analysis is performed using the Rome machine model operated at 600 m/s rotor speed. The upper and lower bounds of normal and abnormal enrichments in a typical facility are used in conjunction with ES results to understand the root causes of such observations.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Enhancement of risk informed validation framework for external hazard scenario

In recent years, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have developed methodologies to assess the vulnerabilities of nuclear plants against site specific extreme hazards. In many cases, advanced simulation tools are being considered to simulate multi-physics, multi-scale phenomena and to evaluate vulnerability of nuclear facilities. The credibility of advanced simulation tools is assessed based on a formal verification, validation, and uncertainty quantification procedure. One of the key limitations in validation is the lack of relevant experimental data at system-level. This limitation leads to a decrease in the confidence of system-level risk predictions. Therefore, a robust validation framework is needed to formalize the confidence in predictive capability of advanced simulation results. Additionally, this study enhances the existing risk informed validation methodology, originally proposed by Kwag et al. [1] and Bodda et al. [2], by developing additional attributes and a new set of validation indicies for a complete and wider applicability of the framework. In this manuscript, the methodology to identify the critical path that leads to the system-level failure is illustrated. The overall validation is checked for completeness and consistency by comparing the critical path for both the system-level simulation and experimental models. The applicability of the code for an intended application is represented in terms of various maturity levels and helps in the process of decision making.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Quantitative imaging and automated fuel pin identification for passive gamma emission tomography

Compliance of member States to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is monitored through nuclear safeguards. The Passive Gamma Emission Tomography (PGET) system is a novel instrument developed within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) project JNT 1510, which included the European Commission, Finland, Hungary and Sweden. The PGET is used for the verification of spent nuclear fuel stored in water pools. Advanced image reconstruction techniques are crucial for obtaining high-quality cross-sectional images of the spent-fuel bundle to allow inspectors of the IAEA to monitor nuclear material and promptly identify its diversion. In this work, we have developed a software suite to accurately reconstruct the spent-fuel cross sectional image, automatically identify present fuel rods, and estimate their activity. Unique image reconstruction challenges are posed by the measurement of spent fuel, due to its high activity and the self-attenuation. While the former is mitigated by detector physical collimation, we implemented a linear forward model to model the detector responses to the fuel rods inside the PGET, to account for the latter. The image reconstruction is performed by solving a regularized linear inverse problem using the fast-iterative shrinkage-thresholding algorithm. We have also implemented the traditional filtered back projection (FBP) method based on the inverse Radon transform for comparison and applied both methods to reconstruct images of simulated mockup fuel assemblies. Higher image resolution and fewer reconstruction artifacts were obtained with the inverse-problem approach, with the mean-square-error reduced by 50%, and the structural-similarity improved by 200%. We then used a convolutional neural network (CNN) to automatically identify the bundle type and extract the pin locations from the images; the estimated activity levels finally being compared with the ground truth. The proposed computational methods accurately estimated the activity levels of the present pins, with an associated uncertainty of approximately 5%.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Infrared spectroscopic method for uranium isotopic analysis

A high performance infrared (HPIR) system was developed and demonstrated for the infrared absorption analysis of {sup 235}U and {sup 238}U isotopes in uranium hexafluoride gas samples. Sweeping the quantum cascade laser light source over the spectral range and sampling via a high-rate analog-to-digital converter provided 0.0005 cm-1 spectral resolution, which allowed for high-precision measurements of the isotopic peak shift. A data analysis method was developed using principal component analysis to predict the isotope weight % content of {sup 235}U. The HPIR precision, accuracy, and error were evaluated for a wide range of isotopic ratio samples (0.287 – 93.7 weight % {sup 235}U), and the results were compared to the International Target Values (ITVS) set forth by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for non-destructive and destructive analytical techniques. The method meets or surpasses the IAEA ITVs for non-destructive analysis of samples with isotopic content of depleted to highly enriched. The results also demonstrated the capability of the HPIR system to correctly predict the {sup 235}U weight % content of a mislabeled sample whose isotopic distribution was validated by mass spectroscopic measurements. The HPIR measurement is nondestructive and, thus, allows for confirmatory analyses of the exact sample at a designated IAEA lab if higher-resolution or a certified analysis is needed. (author)

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Spectral Peak Enhancement by Combining Trusted Response Elements via Machine Learning (SPECTRE-ML) v0.8.0

SPECTRE-ML (Spectral Peak Enhancement by Combining Trusted Response Elements via Machine Learning) is a machine learning based program for finding optimal clusters of radiation detector segments (i.e., pixels or voxels) in order to improve spectral performance. It provides facilities for pre-processing and analyzing training datasets, running ML algorithms, and evaluating and visualizing outputs. SPECTRE-ML outperforms simpler ad-hoc segmentation methods such as uniform depth clusters, learning detector performance trends such as dead layers, edge effects, and gain shifts. Although extensible to arbitrary highly-segmented spectroscopic radiation detectors, SPECTRE-ML currently focuses on improving spectral performance in highly-segmented CdZnTe (CZT) detectors for International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) non-destructive assay (NDA) safeguards tasks.

Vavrek, Jayson↗

Comprehensive compilations of computation results and validations for neutronics start-up tests at China Experimental Fast Reactor

This paper compiles and analyzes refined results of the coordinated research project (CRP) on Neutronics Benchmark of China Experimental Fast Reactor (CEFR) Start-Up Tests conducted by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) since 2018. Twenty-eight research organizations participated with various code systems. The China Institute of Atomic Energy (CIAE) provided the benchmark specifications and participants conducted the benchmark through blind and refined phases. This paper presents the benchmark results on six experimental measurements, criticality, control rod worth, temperature reactivity coefficients, sodium void worth, assembly swap reactivities, and foil activations. Except for a few outlier results, the simulation results show good agreement with the measured data within 1-σ experiment uncertainties. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Safety Functions and Features, Events and Processes for the E-Area Performance Assessment

The DOE Technical Standard, “Disposal Authorization Statement and Tank Closure Documentation,” (DOE 2017) recommends the use of safety functions and features, events and processes (FEPs) to support development of conceptual models and identification of scenarios to be considered in a performance assessment (PA). The FEP process provides a means to describe how a PA considers and addresses the factors that could influence the performance of key barriers. Understanding the roles of barriers in terms of limiting migration helps to focus on how changes in the system could lead to a situation where those roles cannot be fulfilled and there is the potential for compromised performance. The FEPs screening and review process was used to identify FEPs that are relevant for the EArea Low-Level Waste Facility (LLWF) and specifically those FEPs that could have a detrimental impact on the effectiveness of a given safety function. For this PA, a default list of FEPs developed at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA 2004) and an approach implemented for PAs at the Hanford and Idaho sites (Mehta et al. 2016, DOE-ID 2019) are used to identify processes and events that could influence the effectiveness of a given safety function for the E-Area LLWF (e.g., subsidence can impact the safety function of the cover system and lead to increased infiltration). The Hanford and Idaho PAs represent two of the most recent applications of this approach. The PA evaluates the potential impacts of changes in performance of different features of the system and demonstrates that the safety functions represent multiple and redundant barriers. Barrier analyses, assuming a safety function is not present, also test the robustness of the system in the event of the loss of one or more safety functions. Such evaluations also support a qualitative illustration of the concept of defense in depth. The safety concept for closure of the E-Area LLWF (generically referred to as “E-Area”) encompasses a variety of different features (i.e., administrative controls, natural site features, and engineered barriers) that reduce the potential impacts on human health and the environment from the residual waste that will remain after closure. These features can be represented as a collection of safety functions acting independently and as a system to provide for overall safety. In some applications, there have been attempts to assign numerical expectations to specific safety functions, but that is not the intent in this case. The concept of safety functions is used more qualitatively in two ways for this PA: 1. To illustrate the robustness of the E-Area design, operational practices and closure approach by documenting features that are and are not credited in different modeling cases. 2. To identify the roles of the different features and potential processes and events that could compromise the performance of safety features and need to be considered when developing the modeling approach. This report addresses both safety functions and FEPs for the E-Area PA.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

MSTAR2019 Code Description and User's Manual

This report describes an ideal cascade model of uranium enrichment that includes side feed and side product streams and flexible input options. It is based on the original MSTAR model developed by Ed Von Halle and implemented in a Visual Basic code. The current version allows the user to specify integer numbers of stages or the stage numbers of external flows instead of assays in those flows. The computational engine is written in FORTRAN-90 and is invoked by a user-friendly GUI written in C++. This version of MSTAR has been demonstrated to operate on Linux, Mac, and Windows platforms, and has undergone significant testing and quality analysis. A number of examples are presented to illustrate the operation of the code and guide the user. The code is extremely fast, and results are returned immediately. The input and output have been specially configured for analysis by the environmental sampling team of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). A number of additional output features are included to assist the user in visualizing computational results and downloading data to files for use in other analysis software.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

A Conceptual Design for a Mobile Application to Support Infield Inventory Activities

This paper introduces an inventory assistant being developed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) that we believe will empower users to perform inventory activities at nuclear facilities more accurately, reliably, and quickly. Inventory activities at nuclear facilities are often conducted using pen and paper, which can be time-consuming, tedious, and susceptible to reading or transcription errors. The proposed inventory assistant would replace the paper-based process used by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors, nuclear facility operators, or verification monitors to complete an inventory of nuclear and non-nuclear items. In general, the inventory assistant would ingest an inventory list, distribute assigned items from the inventory list to one or more mobile devices, enable inventory teams to record their observations in the field, and then enable an inventory lead to integrate and reconcile the observations to produce a final report. The assistant consists of two software components—one for the inventory teams to record observations in the field (In-Field Observations App [IFOA]) and one for the inventory lead to reconcile the inventory list with observations (Distribution, Integration, and Reconciliation Application [DIRA]). This paper introduces the overall workflow of the inventory assistant and describes the IFOA user experience in more detail. To demonstrate the concept, the authors present a use case of IAEA inspectors conducting item counting and tag checking activities of UF6 cylinders at a gas centrifuge enrichment plant with a large number of UF6 cylinders (e.g., thousands). These activities can currently require 30–40 person-days of inspection to complete. Based on experiences during an exercised performed at the IAEA by the ORNL team in 2016, we believe an inventory assistant could allow the IAEA to complete item counting and tag checking using the global identifier or the operator’s barcode in 8–10 person-days of inspection. We would expect other users (e.g., facility operators or verification monitors) to also benefit from significant time savings.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Considerations for using Privacy Preserving Machine Learning Techniques for Safeguards

In international nuclear safeguards, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is tasked with inspecting and verifying nuclear facilities and their activities. Data analytics and machine learning to support inspections require large amounts of data that nuclear facility operators may consider proprietary or sensitive, so the IAEA may not have full access. Allowing computation over private data without compromising its security therefore has value for safeguards inspections and analysis. Privacy-preserving machine learning (PPML) consists of security-focused techniques that allow data analytics and machine learning algorithms to run on sensitive data without revealing it. This includes ideas like homomorphic encryption (HE), secure multiparty computation (SMPC), and secure enclaves. HE allows algorithms and mathematical operations to be conducted directly on the encrypted data instead of first decrypting it. With SMPC, multiple entities collaboratively compute over distributed data such that no party is able to directly view any others’ original data. Secure enclaves allow computation to take place in a separate and heavily blocked-off section of a CPU. Techniques like these allow for several potential use cases in which the security of data is essential. With SMPC, machine learning models can be trained over the input data from multiple entities, resulting in a model that all users can benefit from without leaking the input data from any particular entity. With SMPC or a zero-knowledge proof (ZKP), an algorithm returning some single answer or truth value can be run on someone else’s data without ever needing to see that data, potentially allowing for verification or proof of some underlying question. HE can allow for outsourcing computation on data to a hostile or untrusted environment. Although most of the research in this field resides within the health and financial domains, tools from PPML may have similar applications in nuclear safeguards. Allowing the IAEA to compute over proprietary information, such as process models and raw sensor data using PPML techniques, provides the baseline for running complex analytics without needing direct unencrypted access to the underlying data, maintaining its privacy. Important limitations to consider for these techniques include the efficiency and level of security required. The security of HE and SMPC come at the cost of speed—the significant amount of overhead means that algorithms implemented in these protocols and encryption schemes are slower than when run on plaintext. Additionally, several important parameters determine what techniques or protocols are used based on the security requirements. SMPC protocols may need to be selected for resistance against a party that attempts to deviate from the protocol to distort the result or gain access to additional information, and a protocol secure against these attacks may further increase the overhead of the algorithm.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

24.1.3.1.1 - Frisch Grid CZT Spectrometer

Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) worked with FLIR System Inc., the manufacturer of the nanoRAIDER, to develop a handheld field deployable detector based on the novel position-sensitive virtual Frisch-grid (VFG) Cadmium-Zinc-Telluride (CdZnTe or CZT) detectors (with 1% FWHM at 662 keV or better energy resolution). The detector called nanoRAIDER-VFG would be an improvement to the current nanoRAIDER, which is a compact gamma-ray detection instrument manufactured by FLIR Systems Inc. that employs relatively lower-performing CZT hemispheric detectors (i.e., 3%-FWHM CZT detectors). The nanoRAIDER-VFG would have significantly improved accuracy of measurements while maintaining similar efficiency, as compared to the nanoRAIDER, for in-field analysis of nuclear materials and detection of undeclared activities during inspections conducted by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Since the nanoRAIDER is currently used by the IAEA as part of its Complementary Access toolkit, a relatively quick acceptance of the nanoRAIDER-VFG for safeguards was anticipated. The nanoRAIDER-VFG project was undertaken to address the following items in the IAEA's Long-Term R&D Plan, 2012-2023: 2.2 (elemental and isotopic signatures of fuel cycle processes); 2.3 (detect signatures of undeclared activity and improve analysis); and 2.6 (detect process emanations). The high energy-resolution of the nanoRAIDER-VFG would also have had applicability to 3.2 (fissile content of metal mixtures containing actinides Np, Am, etc.). The project was not completed due to a change in priorities within FLIR.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

A Conceptual Design for a Desktop Application to Support Inventory Reconciliation Activities

This paper describes desktop software being developed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) to empower users to reconcile observations about items at nuclear facilities more accurately, reliably, and quickly. Inventory activities at nuclear facilities are often conducted using pen and paper, which can be time-consuming, tedious, and susceptible to reading or transcription errors. The proposed inventory assistant would be a replacement for the paper-based process that could be used by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors, nuclear facility operators, or treaty verification monitors to conduct an inventory of nuclear and non-nuclear items in a more timely and accurate manner. Garner, McGirl, and Whitaker previously reported their work about a conceptual design for a mobile app to assist users in the field. In general, the inventory assistant would ingest an inventory list, distribute assigned items from the inventory list to one or more mobile devices, enable inventory teams to record their observations in the field, and then enable an inventory lead to integrate and reconcile the observations to produce a final report. The assistant consists of two software components - one for the inventory teams to record observations in the field (In-Field Observations App [IFOA]) and one for the inventory lead to (1) distribute the inventory list to each team, (2) integrate the observations from each team, and (3) reconcile the inventory list with observations (Distribution, Integration, and Reconciliation Application [DIRA]). This paper reviews the inventory assistant workflow and describes the DIRA user experience in more detail. As an example, the authors have chosen to follow the use case of IAEA inspectors conducting item counting and tag checking activities of UF 6 cylinders at a gas centrifuge enrichment plant with a large number of UF 6 cylinders (e.g., thousands). These activities can currently require 30 - 40 person-days of inspection to complete. The authors believe an inventory assistant could allow the IAEA to complete item counting and tag checking using the global identifier or the operator’s barcode in 8 - 10 person-days of inspection. We would expect other users (e.g., facility operators or treaty verification monitors) to also benefit from significant time savings.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Misuse Detection for a Generalized SFR Test Reactor

Sodium-cooled Fast Reactors (SFRs) present unique challenges for international safeguards. SFRs possess neutron physics characteristics that if configured appropriately could produce more fissile material than consumed. An adversary state may choose to build an SFR, justified by a lack of domestic natural uranium and limited access or interest to procuring uranium from international markets. Once constructed, the state may choose to misuse the SFR for the purpose of diverting fissile plutonium from declared operation. This work shows that a demonstration SFR does not need to be configured as a plutonium breeder to create one Significant Quantity (SQ) of plutonium in a short amount of time (e.g., one to few years). However, such an extreme case of misuse would change the core reactivity in such a way as to be easily indicated by deviations of control rod position compared to declared operation. In this work a contrived SFR demonstration reactor was modeled for the purpose of exploring proliferation scenarios and how such misuse could be detected using the SFR's Reactor Data Acquisition System (RDAS). Typically, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) does not have access to the control rod position, power, thermal, pressure sensing and indicating systems of nuclear power plants. However, this work shows that such data streams can be compared against a parallel detailed simulation model (a Digital Twin) to detect possible misuse.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

The Global Nonproliferation Regime: The NPT and Beyond

In the aftermath of WWII, the fear of nuclear war prompted the international community to confront the issue of nuclear proliferation. The global nonproliferation regime that exists today is comprised of a matrix of multilateral treaties, political commitments, and unilateral measures designed to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. It has evolved considerably since the dawn of the nuclear age. This presentation covers the origins of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), an introduction to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, a discussion of contemporary challenges and opportunities in the field, and an overview of the broader nonproliferation regime beyond the NPT.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Stochastic Approaches for Calculating and Aggregating Detection Probabilities for Nuclear Material Diversion

The authors built and tested a stochastic simulation to estimate achieved detection probabilities (DPs) on a stratum basis, over a tailorable range of diverted amounts from 0 to 2 significant quantities (SQ), using typical International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection data: i.e., SQ in stratum, number of items, number of gross/partial/bias defect measurements conducted, and realistic relative standard deviation (RSD) values for typical IAEA verification measurements. For bulk strata, the model calculates achieved DP at 0.01 SQ diversion increments; for item strata, the model calculates DP using the smallest realistic diversion increment (e.g., a plate, pin, or coupon). After successfully benchmarking against IAEA deterministic models, the simulation was used to test the sensitivity of DP to certain standard assumptions and selected input parameters. First, the equal defect assumption was tested; the results suggest significant complexity in the effectiveness of partial defect measurements. Next, the authors explored the sensitivity of DP to the assumed RSD of attribute tests. Then, the authors compared non-normal models for instrument performance (e.g., logistic, step, or arbitrary functions) to the typical results from a normal distribution (characterized by RSD). This last comparison was supplemented with experimentally derived performance data for an HM-5 gamma spectrometer. The HM-5 was used to make enrichment measurements on both LEU and HEU MTR fuel elements as plates were removed, and the results fit with logistic and step curves and applied in the simulation. These stochastic DP results were compared to DP estimates from a deterministic model assuming a normal curve and typical RSD, yielding insights that could improve effectiveness in the field. These early results illustrate the potential of stochastic models to better understand achieved DP and to improve safeguards effectiveness.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Autonomous Inspection of Geologic Repositories: Current State of the Art and Future Directions

Geological repositories for nuclear waste, including spent nuclear fuel, present a significant challenge for traditional International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards tools due to their inaccessibility and demanding operational conditions. The IAEA has been working closely with Member State organizations currently involved in repository construction and planning, including Euratom, the Finnish and Swedish regulatory authorities, and relevant facility operators. However, the verification challenge remains unsolved, and there persists an out- standing need for tools and approaches that will help the IAEA verify that no nuclear material is diverted from a repository environment. The challenge is also not static. Activities must encompass verification of the design, prior to and during the construction/operation phase, and post backfill. Throughout these various phases, it is imperative that the IAEA maintains a continuity of knowledge (CoK) of all material including information on material inventory and flow. This paper highlights these challenges and outlines how they might be addressed by using remote or autonomous vehicles. Specifically, we discuss the current state of the art in robotic autonomy for known or partially known environment mapping and patrolling, as well as shared autonomy, where humans collaborate with closed loop autonomation to complete tasks. We explore the feasibility of using rovers for these verification tasks, along with the challenges associated with system implementation. Hardware and software suggestions are provided based on the adoption of similar technologies in other comparable areas and ability to close technical gaps. Lastly, human-robotic interactions are considered based on the challenges of the environment of the repository and effective deployment and continued operation of the robot system.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Additively Manufactured Tamper Evident Container (TEC)

The protection of sensitive data, proprietary information, and physical assets from adversarial disclosure is a high priority in today’s environment of government and industrial espionage. Furthermore, knowledge of the security history and monitoring for potential acquisition or disclosure of the protected assets from oppositional sources is equally important. In 2016, as part of an LANL Institute for Materials Science (IMS) rapid response research initiative, the investigators of this technology demonstration project developed the concept of an additively manufactured tamper resistant container that possessed tamper evident features. Tamper evident seals and detection technologies have a long history in protecting consumers from product tampering, recording the installation and activation of mechanical safety panels and fasteners on dangerous electro-mechanical systems, and serving as a warranty void indicator on expensive electronic equipment. Examples of such tamper evident seals range from “no-tech” versions, e.g., the paper seals under medicine caps, to “high-tech” seals that are radio frequency-active and include encryption capabilities used by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to monitor stored nuclear materials in support of safeguards missions. The tamper evident container (TEC) technology would have many uses.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Modeling 233 Pa Generation in Thorium-fueled Reactors for Safeguards

Thorium has been considered as a possible alternative to uranium for nuclear fuel for many decades. It is three to four times more abundant in the earth than uranium and produces significantly less long-lived transuranic nuclear waste. Some claim thorium poses fewer proliferation concerns than other fuel types largely due to 232 U buildup (and associated high energy gamma-emitting decay products) in the irradiated thorium fuel. However, to fully explore potential proliferation concerns, generation and subsequent decay of 233 Pa produced in the reactor core still must be studied. With its half-life of 27 days, 233 Pa decays to 233 U, which is an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) defined special fissionable material that can be used for nuclear weapons production. With more research being dedicated to thorium-fueled reactors, and several of these reactor designs possessing online fuel processing (allowing for on-site protactinium separation), it is important to understand this potential proliferation pathway. In particular, it is theoretically possible to extract protactinium from the irradiated fuel salt before it decays into 233 U. This hypothetical potential diversion can become an even greater proliferation concern if the extracted protactinium is purified through a second separation of protactinium approximately ten days later to remove the short half-life decay products of 232 Pa and 234 Pa, thus resulting in a higher concentration of the 233 Pa isotope, which decays into weapons usable 233 U with hardly any 232 U or 234 U in it. To estimate the concern of this potential proliferation challenge of thorium, different nuclear material accountancy techniques were reviewed for their viability to quantify 233 Pa if extracted from used thorium fuel. Characteristics of interest included technology maturity, cost, precision, and time taken to acquire results. Some technologies, like hybrid K-edge densitometry and passive gamma spectroscopy, appear to be viable techniques based on current literature. Due to the limited scope of this project, only passive gamma spectroscopy was further investigated. Three different reactor types (PWR, CANDU, MSR) were modeled with mixed thorium-uranium oxide fuels that were burned until the fuel was spent. The protactinium in the used fuel was extracted at the time of shutdown and the change in isotopic content of the protactinium quantified. Gamma spectroscopy simulations were performed for the protactinium isotopes and their decay products at various decay times. Given the simplicity of the models and large assumptions made (e.g. no background, no shielding, no self-attenuation), the initial results indicate that though 233 Pa is detectible for all the reactor types modeled at all decay times (0 to 300 days), more work should be done with higher fidelity models.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗