Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “HAZARDOUS”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 73 records · Page 4

Landslide hazard mapping with selected dominant factors: A study case of Penang Island, Malaysia

Landslide is one of the destructive natural geohazards in Malaysia. In addition to rainfall as triggering factos for landslide in Malaysia, topographical and geological factors play important role in the landslide susceptibility analysis. Conventional topographic factors such as elevation, slope angle, slope aspect, plan curvature and profile curvature have been considered as landslide causative factors in many research works. However, other topographic factors such as diagonal length, surface area, surface roughness and rugosity have not been considered, especially for the research work in landslide hazard analysis in Malaysia. This paper presents landslide hazard mapping using Frequency Ratio (FR) and the study area is Penang Island of Malaysia. Frequency ratio approach is a variant of probabilistic method that is based on the observed relationships between the distribution of landslides and each landslide-causative factor. Landslide hazard map of Penang Island is produced by considering twenty-two (22) landslide causative factors. Among these twenty-two (22) factors, fourteen (14) factors are topographic factors. They are elevation, slope gradient, slope aspect, plan curvature, profile curvature, general curvature, tangential curvature, longitudinal curvature, cross section curvature, total curvature, diagonal length, surface area, surface roughness and rugosity. These topographic factors are extracted from the digital elevation model of Penang Island. The other eight (8) non-topographic factors considered are land cover, vegetation cover, distance from road, distance from stream, distance from fault line, geology, soil texture and rainfall precipitation. After considering all twenty-two factors for landslide hazard mapping, the analysis is repeated with fourteen dominant factors which are selected from the twenty-two factors. Landslide hazard map was segregated into four categories of risks, i.e. Highly hazardous area, Hazardous area, Moderately hazardous area and Not hazardous area. The maps was assessed using ROC (Rate of Curve) based on the area under the curve method (AUC). The result indicates an increase of accuracy from 77.76% (with all 22 factors) to 79.00% (with 14 dominant factors) in the prediction of landslide occurrence.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

Preliminary Approach to Assess the Seismic Hazard on a Lunar Site

The passive seismic network deployed on the Moon during the Apollo missions operated for eight years and allowed the observation of seismic activity. More than 12500 seismic events were registered, where 28 were classified as shallow moonquakes with moment magnitudes up to 4.1. Seismic events of this nature pose a significant risk to future long-term lunar habitats; thus, these events must be carefully studied and considered in the seismic design of these structures. This paper proposes a preliminary seismic hazard assessment imposed by shallow moonquakes. The hazard assessment is performed using the Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis (PSHA) methodology, considering previous studies and theories regarding the seismic environment of the Moon. The study zone covers ~860 km2 of the Taurus-Littrow Valley, containing the Apollo 17 landing site and the Lee-Lincoln lobate scarp as the considered seismic source. The seismic hazard is quantified in terms of peak ground acceleration (PGA) and spectral acceleration (5% damped pseudo-acceleration, PSA). Seismic hazard deaggregation scenarios, Uniform Hazard Spectra (UHS) for different hazard levels, and a Conditional Mean Spectrum (CMS) for a target period of 0.2 s are obtained to quantify the seismic hazard on a specific site on the Moon. The developed seismic hazard assessment provides a preliminary approach for realistic scenarios to conduct structural designs that ensure the seismic performance of fully operational long-term lunar structures.

Moonquake↗

INL Reactor Technology Complex Out-of-Service Buried Piping Hazards

Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Reactor Technology Complex (RTC) buried piping and components are being characterized to determine if they should be managed as hazardous waste and subject to the Hazardous Waste Management Act /Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). RTC buried piping and components involve both active piping and components from currently operating nuclear facilities, such as the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR), and inactive lines from facilities undergoing D&D activities. The issue exists as to the proper methods to analyze and control hazards associated with D&D activities on facilities collocated with existing operating nuclear facilities, or future collocated facilities being considered with the resurgent nuclear industry. During initial characterization activities, it was determined that residual radioactive material in several inactive RTC lines and components could potentially exceed hazard category (HC) 3 thresholds. In addition, concerns were raised as to how to properly isolate active nuclear facility piping and components from those inactive lines undergoing RCRA actions, and whether the operating facility safety basis could be impacted. Work was stopped, and a potential inadequacy in the safety analysis (PISA) was declared, even though no clear safety basis existed for the inactive, abandoned lines and equipment. An unreviewed safety question (USQ) and an occurrence report resulted. A HC 3 or greater Nuclear Facility/Activity for the buried piping and components was also declared in the occurrence report. A qualitative hazard assessment was developed to evaluate the potential hazards associated with characterization activities, and any potential effects on the safety basis of the collocated RTC operating nuclear facilities. The hazard assessment clearly demonstrated the low hazards associated with the activities based on form and dispersiblity of the radioactive material in the piping and components. The hazard assessment developed unique controls to isolate active RTC piping and components from inactive components, and demonstrated that existing safety management programs were adequate for protection of the worker.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Hydrothermal Liquefaction Treatment Hazard Analysis Report

Hazard analyses were performed to evaluate the modular hydrothermal liquefaction treatment system. The hazard assessment process was performed in 2 stages. An initial assessment utilizing Hazard Identification and Preliminary Hazards Analysis (PHA) techniques identified areas with significant or unique hazards (process safety-related hazards) that fall outside of the normal operating envelope of PNNL and warranted additional analysis. The subsequent assessment was based on a qualitative What-If analysis. The analysis was augmented, as necessary, by additional quantitative analysis for scenarios involving a release of hazardous material or energy with the potential for affecting the public. The following selected hazardous scenarios received increased attention: •Scenarios involving a release of hazardous material or energy, controls were identified in the What-If analysis table that prevent the occurrence or mitigate the effects of the release. •Scenarios with significant consequences that could impact personnel outside the immediate operations area, quantitative analyses were performed to determine the potential magnitude of the scenario. The set of “critical controls” were identified for these scenarios (see Section 4) which prevent the occurrence or mitigate the effects of the release of events with significant consequences.

09 BIOMASS FUELS↗

Multi-Mechanism Flood Hazard Assessment: Critical Review of Current Practice and Approaches

This report documents the initial findings from the Nuclear Regulatory commission (NRC)-sponsored research project Methods for Estimating Joint Probabilities of Coincident and Correlated Flooding Mechanisms for Nuclear Power Plant Flood Hazard Assessments.1 This research project is a part of NRC’s Probabilistic Flood Hazard Assessment (PFHA) Research Program and will aid the development of guidance on the use of PFHA methods to evaluate infrastructure safety for existing and proposed US nuclear power plants (NPPs). More specifically, this project intends to provide technical background for the development of flood hazard curves for multi-mechanism floods (MMFs). MMFs are flood events caused by more than one flooding mechanism (e.g., flood events due to the simultaneous occurrence of precipitation-induced river flooding and storm surge). Project activities include three main tasks: Task 1—Survey of current concepts and methods in assessing MMF hazards; Task 2—Critical assessment of selected methods and approaches for quantifying probabilistic MMF hazard risk; Task 3—Development of example case studies to illustrate best practices for quantifying probabilistic MMF hazard risk The initial findings from Tasks 1 and 2 are documented in this report. Task 1 comprised a survey of approaches and methods that have been applied to understand and assess flood hazards due to MMFs. Task 2 involved a critical review of the selected approaches and methods. To that end, the scope of this report includes documentation of (1) a reconnaissance-level survey of the current state of concepts and practice for MMF hazard assessment; (2) a generalized MMF assessment framework to address the distinctions among various types of flood-forcing phenomena, flood mechanisms (grouped into three mechanism types), and flood severity metrics; (3) a wide-ranging survey of approaches and methods that have been applied to various flooding phenomena and settings; and (4) a critical assessment of MMF hazard assessment methods. Studies were identified involving MMFs related to coastal flooding mechanisms, fluvial (rivers/streams) flooding mechanisms, and associated combinations of coastal and fluvial flooding mechanisms. Studies were also identified that address MMFs involving coastal and fluvial flooding mechanisms as well as coastal flooding mechanisms along with extreme precipitation (without specific attribution to fluvial or pluvial mechanisms). The studies identified for review in this report included assessments at varying spatial scales (from local to global) with differing geographic regions of focus using both observed and synthetic data. The majority of studies identified and reviewed were site-specific assessments focusing on relatively short return periods. Studies considered a range of flood severity metrics, made differing assumptions regarding the occurrence of extrema, and used multiple statistical techniques; the use of copulas for the development of joint distributions was a particularly popular analysis technique. The literature review highlighted the differences among existing studies relative to terminology used, means of presenting results, framework and techniques employed, and level of sophistication regarding the number and types of variables considered. Despite the significant diversity in existing studies, the review identified several promising techniques that will be considered in future work under this project, including the development of joint distributions for MMFs using copula and Bayesian-motivated approaches.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Lunar mission safety and rescue: Hazards analysis and safety requirements

The results are presented of the hazards analysis which was concerned only with hazards to personnel and not with loss of equipment or property. Hazards characterization includes the definition of a hazard, the hazard levels, and the hazard groups. The analysis methodology is described in detail. The methodology was used to prepare the top level functional flow diagrams, to perform the first level hazards assessment, and to develop a list of conditions and situations requiring individual hazard studies. The 39 individual hazard study results are presented in total.

Source record↗

GO/NO-GO - When is medical hazard mitigation acceptable for launch?

Medical support of spaceflight missions is composed of complex tasks and decisions that dedicated to maintaining the health and performance of the crew and the completion of mission objectives. Spacecraft represent one of the most complex vehicles built by humans, and are built to very rigorous design specifications. In the course of a Flight Readiness Review (FRR) or a mission itself, the flight surgeon must be able to understand the impact of hazards and risks that may not be completely mitigated by design alone. Some hazards are not mitigated because they are never actually identified. When a hazard is identified, it must be reduced or waivered. Hazards that cannot be designed out of the vehicle or mission, are usually mitigated through other means to bring the residual risk to an acceptable level. This is possible in most engineered systems because failure modes are usually predictable and analysis can include taking these systems to failure. Medical support of space missions is complicated by the inability of flight surgeons to provide "exact" hazard and risk numbers to the NASA engineering community. Taking humans to failure is not an option. Furthermore, medical dogma is mostly comprised of "medical prevention" strategies that mitigate risk by examining the behaviour of a cohort of humans similar to astronauts. Unfortunately, this approach does not lend itself well for predicting the effect of a hazard in the unique environment of space. This presentation will discuss how Medical Operations uses an evidence-based approach to decide if hazard mitigation strategies are adequate to reduce mission risk to acceptable levels. Case studies to be discussed will include: 1. Risk of electrocution risk during EVA 2. Risk of cardiac event risk during long and short duration missions 3. Degraded cabin environmental monitoring on the ISS. Learning Objectives 1.) The audience will understand the challenges of mitigating medical risk caused by nominal and off-nominal mission events. 2.) The audience will understand the process by which medical hazards are identified and mitigated before launch. 3.) The audience will understand the roles and responsibilities of all the other flight control positions in participating in the process of reducing hazards and reducing medical risk to an acceptable level.

Hamilton, Douglas R.↗

Hazard Analysis for the Mark III Space Suit Assembly (SSA) Used in One-g Operations

This Hazard Analysis document encompasses the Mark III Space Suit Assembly (SSA) and associated ancillary equipment. It has been prepared using JSC17773, "Preparing Hazard Analyses for JSC Ground Operation", as a guide. The purpose of this document is to present the potential hazards involved in ground (23 % maximum O2, One-g) operations of the Mark III and associated ancillary support equipment system. The hazards listed in this document are specific to suit operations only; each supporting facility (Bldg. 9, etc.) is responsible for test specific Hazard Analyses. A "hazard" is defined as any condition that has the potential for harming personnel or equipment. This analysis was performed to document the safety aspects associated with manned use of the Mark III for pressurized and unpressurized ambient, ground-based, One-g human testing. The hazards identified herein represent generic hazards inherent to all standard JSC test venues for nominal ground test configurations. Non-standard test venues or test specific configurations may warrant consideration of additional hazards analysis prior to test. The cognizant suit engineer is responsible for the safety of the astronaut/test subject, space suit, and suit support personnel. The test requester, for the test supported by the suit test engineer and suited subject, is responsible for overall safety and any necessary Test Readiness Reviews (TRR).

Mitchell, Kate↗

Robots, systems, and methods for hazard evaluation and visualization

A robot includes a hazard sensor, a locomotor, and a system controller. The robot senses a hazard intensity at a location of the robot, moves to a new location in response to the hazard intensity, and autonomously repeats the sensing and moving to determine multiple hazard levels at multiple locations. The robot may also include a communicator to communicate the multiple hazard levels to a remote controller. The remote controller includes a communicator for sending user commands to the robot and receiving the hazard levels from the robot. A graphical user interface displays an environment map of the environment proximate the robot and a scale for indicating a hazard intensity. A hazard indicator corresponds to a robot position in the environment map and graphically indicates the hazard intensity at the robot position relative to the scale.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

An examination of interventions to reduce respiratory health and injury hazards in homes of low-income families

We evaluated whether combining asthma trigger reduction with housing structural repairs, device disbursement and education in low-income households with children would improve self-reported respiratory health and reduce housing-related respiratory health and injury hazards (convenience sample of n=67 homes with 63 asthmatic and 121 non-asthmatic children). At baseline, a visual assessment of the home environment and a structured occupant interview were used to examine 29 potential injury hazards and 7 potential respiratory health hazards. A home-specific intervention was designed to provide the children's parents or caretakers with the knowledge, skills, motivation, supplies, equipment, and minimum housing conditions necessary for a healthy and safe home. The enrolled households were primarily Hispanic and owned their homes. On average, 8 injury hazards were observed in the homes at baseline. Four months following intervention, the average declined to 2.2 hazards per home (p<0.001), with 97% of the parents reporting that their homes were safer following the interventions. An average of 3.3 respiratory health hazards were observed in the homes at baseline. Four months following intervention, the average declined to 0.9 hazards per home (p<0.001), with 96% of parents reporting that the respiratory health of their asthmatic children improved. A tailored healthy homes improvement package significantly improves self-reported respiratory health and safety, reduces respiratory health and injury hazards, and can be implemented in concert with a mobile clinical setting.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

Hazardous waste status of discarded electronic cigarettes

Highlights: • Electronic cigarettes were tested using TCLP and WET. • Several electronic cigarette products leached lead at hazardous waste levels. • Lead was the only element that exceeded hazardous waste concentration thresholds. • Nicotine solution may cause hazardous waste classification when discarded unused. - Abstract: The potential for disposable electronic cigarettes (e-cigarettes) to be classified as hazardous waste was investigated. The Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedure (TCLP) was performed on 23 disposable e-cigarettes in a preliminary survey of metal leaching. Based on these results, four e-cigarette products were selected for replicate analysis by TCLP and the California Waste Extraction Test (WET). Lead was measured in leachate as high as 50 mg/L by WET and 40 mg/L by TCLP. Regulatory thresholds were exceeded by two of 15 products tested in total. Therefore, some e-cigarettes would be toxicity characteristic (TC) hazardous waste but a majority would not. When disposed in the unused form, e-cigarettes containing nicotine juice would be commercial chemical products (CCP) and would, in the United States (US), be considered a listed hazardous waste (P075). While household waste is exempt from hazardous waste regulation, there are many instances in which such waste would be subject to regulation. Manufactures and retailers with unused or expired e-cigarettes or nicotine juice solution would be required to manage these as hazardous waste upon disposal. Current regulations and policies regarding the availability of nicotine-containing e-cigarettes worldwide were reviewed. Despite their small size, disposable e-cigarettes are consumed and discarded much more quickly than typical electronics, which may become a growing concern for waste managers.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Proposed Risk-Informed Seismic Hazard Periodic Reevaluation Methodology for Complying with DOE Order 420.1C

Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear facilities must comply with DOE Order 420.1C Facility Safety, which requires that all such facilities review their natural phenomena hazards (NPH) assessments no less frequently than every ten years. The Order points the reader to Standard DOE-STD-1020-2012. In addition to providing a discussion of the applicable evaluation criteria, the Standard references other documents, including ANSI/ANS-2.29-2008 and NUREG-2117. These documents provide supporting criteria and approaches for evaluating the need to update an existing probabilistic seismic hazard analysis (PSHA). All of the documents are consistent at a high level regarding the general conceptual criteria that should be considered. However, none of the documents provides step-by-step detailed guidance on the required or recommended approach for evaluating the significance of new information and determining whether or not an existing PSHA should be updated. Further, all of the conceptual approaches and criteria given in these documents deal with changes that may have occurred in the knowledge base that might impact the inputs to the PSHA, the calculated hazard itself, or the technical basis for the hazard inputs. Given that the DOE Order is aimed at achieving and assuring the safety of nuclear facilities—which is a function not only of the level of the seismic hazard but also the capacity of the facility to withstand vibratory ground motions—the inclusion of risk information in the evaluation process would appear to be both prudent and in line with the objectives of the Order. The purpose of this white paper is to describe a risk-informed methodology for evaluating the need for an update of an existing PSHA consistent with the DOE Order. While the development of the proposed methodology was undertaken as a result of assessments for specific SDC-3 facilities at Idaho National Laboratory (INL), and it is expected that the application at INL will provide a demonstration of the methodology, there is potential for general applicability to other facilities across the DOE complex. As such, both a general methodology and a specific approach intended for INL are described in this document. The general methodology proposed in this white paper is referred to as the “seismic hazard periodic review methodology,” or SHPRM. It presents a graded approach for SDC-3, SDC-4 and SDC-5 facilities that can be applied in any risk-informed regulatory environment by once risk-objectives appropriate for the framework are developed. While the methodology was developed for seismic hazard considerations, it can also be directly applied to other types of natural hazards.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

Proposed Risk-Informed Seismic Hazard Periodic Reevaluation Methodology for Complying with DOE Order 420.1C

Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear facilities must comply with DOE Order 420.1C Facility Safety, which requires that all such facilities review their natural phenomena hazards (NPH) assessments no less frequently than every ten years. The Order points the reader to Standard DOE-STD-1020-2012. In addition to providing a discussion of the applicable evaluation criteria, the Standard references other documents, including ANSI/ANS-2.29-2008 and NUREG-2117. These documents provide supporting criteria and approaches for evaluating the need to update an existing probabilistic seismic hazard analysis (PSHA). All of the documents are consistent at a high level regarding the general conceptual criteria that should be considered. However, none of the documents provides step-by-step detailed guidance on the required or recommended approach for evaluating the significance of new information and determining whether or not an existing PSHA should be updated. Further, all of the conceptual approaches and criteria given in these documents deal with changes that may have occurred in the knowledge base that might impact the inputs to the PSHA, the calculated hazard itself, or the technical basis for the hazard inputs. Given that the DOE Order is aimed at achieving and assuring the safety of nuclear facilities—which is a function not only of the level of the seismic hazard but also the capacity of the facility to withstand vibratory ground motions—the inclusion of risk information in the evaluation process would appear to be both prudent and in line with the objectives of the Order. The purpose of this white paper is to describe a risk-informed methodology for evaluating the need for an update of an existing PSHA consistent with the DOE Order. While the development of the proposed methodology was undertaken as a result of assessments for specific SDC-3 facilities at Idaho National Laboratory (INL), and it is expected that the application at INL will provide a demonstration of the methodology, there is potential for general applicability to other facilities across the DOE complex. As such, both a general methodology and a specific approach intended for INL are described in this document. The general methodology proposed in this white paper is referred to as the “seismic hazard periodic review methodology,” or SHPRM. It presents a graded approach for SDC-3, SDC-4 and SDC-5 facilities that can be applied in any risk-informed regulatory environment once risk-objectives appropriate for the framework are developed. While the methodology was developed for seismic hazard considerations, it can also be directly applied to other types of natural hazards.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Idaho Wildfires II: Assessing the Relationship Between Drought Indicators and Wildfire Risk to Enhance Hazard Modeling and Inform Mitigation Planning

The western United States has experienced twenty years of increased and prolonged drought which have exacerbated wildfire hazards. These jeopardize population centers through increased risks to ecosystem services, local economies, and livelihoods. The Idaho Office of Emergency Management, Water Resources, and Department of Lands are seeking methods to dynamically monitor these conditions and update models that inform hazard mitigation planning and resource allocation. Towards this, these agencies partnered with NASA DEVELOP to produce drought-enhanced wildfire hazard models. Part of a two-term project, the two teams revised the state’s static wildfire hazard model with refined data layers and remotely-sensed data to reflect dynamic ecosystem responses to drought conditions and wildfire potential. Our team distinguished between rangeland and forestland ecosystems, and investigated relationships between drought metrics and vegetation condition using TerrSet Earth Trends Modeler. This analysis determined that total precipitation at a 5-month lag interval (r 2 = 0.72) along with the Evaporative Stress Index (r 2 = 0.69); and precipitation at a 5-month interval (r 2 = 0.42) were important drivers in rangeland and forestland, respectively. These driver variables were incorporated into a temporally dynamic wildfire hazard map. Our team used linear regression to correlate hazard ratings with wildfire frequency. For the year 2020, neither the enhanced hazard model (p < 0.10, r 2 = 0.01) nor the state’s static model (p < 0.05, r 2 = 0.03) were strongly correlated with actual wildfire frequency as they expressed an inverse relationship between wildfire hazard and frequency. This suggests wildfire occurrence is complex and not necessarily driven by the variables used.

Wildfire↗

Potential Benefits in Remapping the Special Flood Hazard Area: Evidence from the U.S. Housing Market

A typical U.S. homebuyer's understanding of whether a property faces flood risk is based on whether the property is located inside the National Flood Insurance Program's (NFIP) Special Flood Hazard Area (SFHA). The SFHA boundary, however, may bias homebuyers’ perceptions of flood risk relative to unobserved true risk because the SFHA is an incomplete, and sometimes inaccurate, representation of flood hazards. Using a national dataset of property transactions, flood hazard data from the First Street Foundation, state-level measures of flood disclosure laws, and a spatially restricted triple-difference design, we distinguish capitalization effects of policy-driven (SFHA) versus quasi-objective (First Street) indicators of flood hazard. We identify these effects by assessing thousands of local spatial interactions between property SFHA designations, measures of quasi-objective flood hazard, and being in a state that mandates flood history disclosures. Being inside the SFHA generates a risk discount, but the signal is muted relative to underlying hazard exposure. Further, the SFHA signal can result in inefficient discounts for properties erroneously mapped in the SFHA. Disclosure requirements about flood history accentuate price effects for hazardous properties and result in more adequate risk internalization. In the absence of disclosures, however, we find either no or a weak risk signal for houses outside the SFHA that face flood hazard. Our results highlight potential benefits of updating SFHA boundaries to include all houses that may experience flooding, and argue in favor of requiring flood-related disclosures from sellers to improve the market's ability to internalize flood risk.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Hydrotreater/Distillation Column Hazard Analysis Report Rev. 2

This project Hazard and Risk Analysis Report contains the results of several hazard analyses and risk assessments. An initial assessment was conducted in 2012, which included a multi-step approach ranging from design reviews to a formal What-If hazard analysis. A second What-If hazard analysis was completed during February 2013 to evaluate the operation of the hydrotreater/distillation column processes to be installed in a process enclosure within the Process Development Laboratory West (PDL-West) facility located on the PNNL campus. The qualitative analysis included participation of project and operations personnel and applicable subject matter experts. The analysis identified potential hazardous scenarios, each based on an initiating event coupled with a postulated upset condition. The unmitigated consequences of each hazardous scenario were generally characterized as a process upset; the exposure of personnel to steam, vapors or hazardous material; a spray or spill of hazardous material; the creation of a flammable atmosphere; or an energetic release from a pressure boundary.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Wake-Vortex Hazards During Cruise

Even though the hazard posed by lift-generated wakes of subsonic transport aircraft has been studied extensively for approach and departure at airports, only a small amount of effort has gone into the potential hazard at cruise altitude. This paper reports on a studio of the wake-vortex hazard during cruise because encounters may become more prevalent when free-flight becomes available and each aircraft, is free to choose its own route between destinations. In order to address the problem, the various fluid-dynamic stages that vortex wakes usually go through as they age will be described along with estimates of the potential hazard that each stage poses. It appears that a rolling-moment hazard can be just as severe at cruise as for approach at airports, but it only persists for several minutes. However, the hazard posed by the downwash in the wake due to the lift on the generator aircraft persists for tens of minutes in a long narrow region behind the generating aircraft. The hazard consists of severe vertical loads when an encountering aircraft crosses the wake. A technique for avoiding vortex wakes at cruise altitude will be described. To date the hazard posed by lift-generated vortex wakes and their persistence at cruise altitudes has been identified and subdivided into several tasks. Analyses of the loads to be encounter and are underway and should be completed shortly. A review of published literature on the subject has been nearly completed (see text) and photographs of vortex wakes at cruise altitudes have been taken and the various stages of decay have been identified. It remains to study and sort the photographs for those that best illustrate the various stages of decay after they are shed by subsonic transport aircraft at cruise altitudes. The present status of the analysis and the paper are described.

Rossow, Vernon J.↗

Applications of a Forward-Looking Interferometer for the On-board Detection of Aviation Weather Hazards

The Forward-Looking Interferometer (FLI) is a new instrument concept for obtaining measurements of potential weather hazards to alert flight crews. The FLI concept is based on high-resolution Infrared (IR) Fourier Transform Spectrometry (FTS) technologies that have been developed for satellite remote sensing, and which have also been applied to the detection of aerosols and gases for other purposes. It is being evaluated for multiple hazards including clear air turbulence (CAT), volcanic ash, wake vortices, low slant range visibility, dry wind shear, and icing, during all phases of flight. Previous sensitivity and characterization studies addressed the phenomenology that supports detection and mitigation by the FLI. Techniques for determining the range, and hence warning time, were demonstrated for several of the hazards, and a table of research instrument parameters was developed for investigating all of the hazards discussed above. This work supports the feasibility of detecting multiple hazards with an FLI multi-hazard airborne sensor, and for producing enhanced IR images in reduced visibility conditions; however, further research must be performed to develop a means to estimate the intensities of the hazards posed to an aircraft and to develop robust algorithms to relate sensor measurables to hazard levels. In addition, validation tests need to be performed with a prototype system.

West, Leanne↗