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At least 73 records · Page 4

A Fission-like Neutron Spectrum Shaping Assembly based on D-T Generator

For nearly five decades, 252 Cf sources have been used for testing and calibration over a wide range of neutron detection devices used for nuclear safety and radiation protection. However, the vastly increased cost of 252 Cf sources, its short half-life, and concerns about future shortage have prompted nuclear facilities and radiological calibration laboratories that rely on high-intensity neutron sources to seek alternatives. While there appear to be no other radionuclide neutron sources that would match the 252 Cf performance characteristics, all of them, including 252 Cf, present similar concerns in terms of hazards, safety, and security. As a possible solution to this issue, the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) developed a low-risk, cost-efficient alternative to produce fission-like spectra based on commercially available deuterium-tritium (D-T) neutron generators. The alternative of producing a fission-like neutron spectrum without any fissionable materials or beryllium would enable the nuclear facilities across the entire complex to eliminate their reliance on high intensity 252 Cf sources for nuclear safety and radiation protection applications, substantially reducing risks and associated costs. This report describes efforts of designing the spectrum shaping assembly, its construction and characterization of the neutron field produced. Performance of this newly developed D-T generator based neutron field is demonstrated via calibration of a criticality detector, neutron survey instruments, and personal dosimeters verified against current standardized fields produced by 252 Cf spontaneous fission sources.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Sensitivity Calculations for Systems with Polyethylene Reflector Materials Using CLUTCH

The SCALE 6.2.4 code package contains four sequences for calculating $k_{eff}$ sensitivity coefficients. Two of these sequences use deterministic transport solvers: a one-dimensional (1D) capability based on XSDRN, and a two-dimensional (2D) capability based on NEWT. These sequences are restricted to the multigroup (MG) treatment of neutron energy. The three-dimensional (3D) sequences use the KENO V.a or KENO-VI Monte Carlo transport codes and can be used to calculate sensitivity coefficients with either MG or continuous-energy (CE) transport. The 3D sensitivities are ultimately reported in an MG structure, regardless of the method used in the transport calculations. If desired, the sensitivity coefficients can be reported with very fine energy resolution from a CE calculation, but they are calculated only in the MG library structure in the MG mode. CE TSUNAMI methods are available in SCALE starting in SCALE version 6.2. Sensitivity coefficients were generated using the 3D sequences as part of the generation of the SCALE 6.2.2 Validation Report; difficulties encountered when using the CLUTCH method for thick, fissionable-material reflectors were discussed and investigated as documented in a previous paper. This paper discusses the difficulties encountered in generating accurate sensitivity coefficients using the CLUTCH technique for polyethylene reflectors for two fast spectrum benchmarks. Direct perturbation (DP) calculations were performed to confirm the accuracy of the total sensitivity coefficient for important isotopes with large sensitivities in the system. Discrepancies were detected for CLUTCH-calculated sensitivity coefficients in the reflector of a critical experiment with a radial polyethylene reflector. A simple polyethylene-reflected plutonium sphere was then used to further investigate the discrepancy. Calculations performed using the iterated fission probability (IFP) method generated accurate sensitivity coefficients in both cases. The results of this study emphasize the need to confirm CLUTCH sensitivity results with DP calculations. IFP calculations are generally less efficient but more reliable than CLUTCH calculations. Improvements to the CLUTCH methodology that retain the greater efficiency but address identified difficulties are therefore potentially useful to analysts.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Nondestructive Assay Technical Infrastructure Program Mission and Vision

The Nondestructive Assay Program (NDAP) mission and vision is achieved by identifying and accomplishing a set of programmatic goals that correspond with eight broad technical program elements. The NDAP was created as a result of Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board Recommendation 2007-1, entitled “Safety-Related In Situ Nondestructive Assay of Radioactive Materials,” which emphasized the need to improve in situ measurements of radioactive material at US Department of Energy (DOE) defense nuclear facilities. An NDAP five-year plan will define tasks to accomplish specific goals identified in the NDAP mission and vision. This mission and vision is applicable for eight technical program elements: Hardware/Software Development, Algorithm Development and Nuclear Data, Uncertainty Quantification, Nuclear Materials, Staffing, Personnel, And Training, Data Management, Requirement and Standards, and Information Preservation and Dissemination. An additional program element is technical support, which provides daily execution management support for the NDAP, site scope, and deliverable tracking via site task managers, along with technical advisement and support from the technical support group. The NDAP mission and vision provides attributes with specific goals for each program element, and some goals benefit multiple program elements. The goals and attributes defined herein are implemented via an NDAP five-year execution plan that defines site work scope, budget, and deliverables, all of which are updated annually. The NDAP is designed to benefit nondestructive assay (NDA) needs to support DOE nuclear criticality safety programs, ensuring that NDA technology is sufficiently capable of guaranteeing the safety of those who handle, store, process, or transport fissionable materials in the complex. Especially important for the NDAP is to maximize capabilities to identify, characterize, and manage in situ fissile material deposits in process equipment to ensure nuclear criticality safety at processing facilities.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Performance of U 3 Si 2 in an LWR following a cladding breach during normal operation

High-density fuels have been proposed as a possible replacement for uranium-dioxide as a fuel for light water reactors (LWRs) due to their increased loading of fissionable material. The objectives of this proposal are (1) to increase reactor cycle length and reactor power, and (2) to offset any neutronic penalty associated with advanced cladding systems. Of the high-density fuels under consideration, there is particular interest in triuranium disilicide (U 3 Si 2 ) due to its increased metal density and favorable thermal properties as compared to UO 2 . However, there are concerns regarding the chemical compatibility of U 3 Si 2 with water and steam as used for LWR coolant.This paper summarizes research on fuel-coolant chemical compatibility for UO 2 LWR fuel during a cladding breach and highlights that generally, because of its chemical inertness, UO 2 -coolant reactions are of little consequence to reactor operation. However, the volumetric expansion associated with the reaction of UO 2 and oxygen is a concern for possible conditions encountered during air ingress of dry storage. These same concerns arise for U 3 Si 2 , which exhibits greater volumetric expansion than UO 2 when exposed to water or steam. These reactions ultimately result in increased fuel volume that the cladding must accommodate, as well as additional heat generated as the fuel reacts.The BISON fuel performance code was used to perform a comparative analysis on the behavior of UO 2 and U 3 Si 2 under normal operation. Silicide fuel simulations were then extended to demonstrate how varying thermodynamic and chemical kinetics influence fuel expansion and subsequent cladding performance during a cladding breach. These simulations were further extended to a 3D subsection of a fuel rod to demonstrate the characteristics of the resulting cladding crack.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Comparative Analysis of Standard and Advanced USL Methodologies for Nuclear Criticality Safety

The American National Standards Institute/American Nuclear Society national standards 8.1 and 8.24 provide guidance on the requirements and recommendations for establishing confidence in the results of the computerized models used to support operation with fissionable materials. By design, the guidance is not prescriptive, leaving freedom to the analysts to determine how the various sources of uncertainties are to be statistically aggregated. Due to the involved use of statistics entangled with heuristic recipes, the resulting safety margins are often difficult to interpret. Also, these technical margins are augmented by additional administrative margins, which are required to ensure compliance with safety standards or regulations, eliminating the incentive to understand their differences. With the new resurgent wave of advanced nuclear systems, e.g., advanced reactors, fuel cycles, and fuel concepts, focused on economizing operation, there is a strong need to develop a clear understanding of the uncertainties and their consolidation methods to reduce them in manners that can be scientifically defended. In response, the current studies compare the analyses behind four notable methodologies for upper subcriticality limit estimation that have been documented in the nuclear criticality safety literature: the parametric, nonparametric, Whisper, and TSURFER methodologies. Specifically, the work offers a deep dive into the various assumptions of the noted methodologies, their adequacies, and their limitations to provide guidance on developing confidence for the emergent nuclear systems that are expected to be challenged by the scarcity of experimental data. Here, to limit the scope, the current work focuses on the application of these methodologies to criticality safety experiments, where the goal is to calculate a bias, a bias uncertainty, and a tolerance limit for k eff in support of determining an upper subcriticality limit for nuclear criticality safety.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Development of MOSCATO: A CFD-Level Electrochemistry and Corrosion Simulator for Molten Salt Systems

For both coolant and fueled variants of molten salt reactors (MSRs), the corrosion of structural materials is a significant challenge. The corrosion stems from chemical and electrochemical reactions initiated by fissile material, fission products, and impurities in the salt. Lower-fidelity models rely on empirical correlations for mass transfer, simplified lumped temperature profiles, and similar assumptions. They do not capture detailed spatial variations in complex geometries, creating the need for high-fidelity modeling to bridge this gap.As we approach the demonstration and possible deployment of MSRs in this decade, the development of a high-fidelity, high-performance simulator becomes imperative. To simulate the complex electrochemical environment and corrosion within molten salt systems, we have developed the Molten Salt Chemistry And TranspOrt (MOSCATO) code. This endeavor is comprised of three essential components. First, mass transfer equations are coupled with the Navier-Stokes equations in order to account for the transport of species in the salt. Second, the diffusion of alloy constituents, such as Cr, Fe, Ni, etc. is simulated within the structural metals. Third, the alloy and salt domains are coupled to account for the heterogeneous chemical and electrochemical reactions that occur at the salt-alloy interface.MOSCATO manages all three components within the framework of the highly scalable, open-source spectral element method computational fluid dynamics code Nek5000/NekRS. This integration enables MOSCATO to harness the immense computational power of modern high-performance computing resources, ensuring both high fidelity and computational speed.In addition to code development, we have initiated a comprehensive verification and validation campaign, utilizing data from diverse sources. First, MOSCATO's electrochemical solver was verified with reference numerical data. Then validation occurred against experiments: one of a thermal galvanic cell and the other for corrosion in flowing molten salt of FLiNaK (LiF-NaF-KF). This campaign verified and validated MOSCATO as a reliable tool for simulating electrochemical environments and corrosion in molten salt systems.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Nuclear Criticality Safety Training: Needs and Efforts

Nuclear criticality safety (NCS) training is essential and required for NCS professionals to ensure that fissionable materials outside of nuclear reactors are safely processed, handled, stored, and transported. Furthermore, the requirement of training in NCS is mandated in several international and domestic documents. In this regard, management has an obligation to establish an NCS training program that provides confidence in the continuing proficiency of personnel, and supervisors must ensure that their staff is suitably trained. Training of all personnel in nuclear facilities is required to support the robust performance of operations. There is a continuing need to maintain, enhance, and develop new training courses to support the NCS community. This paper provides an outline of some of the ongoing and future training courses in the United States to support the field of NCS.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Conduct of Operations and Nuclear Criticality Safety Standards

Since the beginning of the nuclear age in 1943, there have been 22 criticality accidents in process facilities worldwide in which fissionable materials were processed by hand for various purposes. Of these 22 process criticality accidents, 16 involved faulty or flawed conduct of operations. Most of these process accidents (17 of 22) occurred before 1970, mostly due to the implementation of formal conduct of operations—such as the use of operating procedures and training—and the use of consensus standards for nuclear criticality safety (NCS). Obviously, the nuclear facilities applied lessons learned from their accident history, and the rate of criticality accidents was significantly reduced as a result. Over the years, it has been emphasized in NCS training courses and other venues in the United States that the consensus standards, such as ASA N6.1-1964, were the key contributors to this reduction in accidents. The formality of operations required to implement and apply the standards at a facility is also a crucial prerequisite that must be sufficiently robust to ensure NCS. This prerequisite is crucial to success fully implement the NCS consensus and other safety standards at a site.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Nuclear Criticality Safety in Practice [Slides]

The agenda for the presentation includes the following topics: Requirements; How is criticality safety practiced; criticality safety evaluations; fissionable material operation review; and, procedures.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

NCERC Capabilities [Slides]

NCERC is our nation’s only generalpurpose critical experiments facility and is one of only a few that remain operational throughout the world. The mission of the National Criticality Experiments Research Center (NCERC) is to conduct experiments and training with critical assemblies and fissionable material at or near criticality in order to explore reactivity phenomena, and to operate the assemblies in the regions from subcritical through delayed critical. One critical assembly, Godiva-IV, is designed to operate above prompt critical.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

DOE Microreactor Program: Summary of Experimental Capabilities Development and Activities

This document provides a summary of the experimental capabilities and activities developed and currently performed under the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) Microreactor Program. These capabilities, along with other laboratory capabilities, are available to support developer and other stakeholder needs. Specific experimental capabilities described in this document include the single primary heat extraction and removal emulator (SPHERE), the microreactor agile non-nuclear experimental test bed (MAGNET), microreactor applications research validation and evaluation (MARVEL), yttrium hydride fabrication, the Hypatia critical experiment series, and a brief overview of the National Criticality Experiments Research Center (NCERC), which provides the platform to conduct experiments and training with critical assemblies and fissionable material.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Modeling 233 Pa Generation in Thorium-fueled Reactors for Safeguards

Thorium has been considered as a possible alternative to uranium for nuclear fuel for many decades. It is three to four times more abundant in the earth than uranium and produces significantly less long-lived transuranic nuclear waste. Some claim thorium poses fewer proliferation concerns than other fuel types largely due to 232 U buildup (and associated high energy gamma-emitting decay products) in the irradiated thorium fuel. However, to fully explore potential proliferation concerns, generation and subsequent decay of 233 Pa produced in the reactor core still must be studied. With its half-life of 27 days, 233 Pa decays to 233 U, which is an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) defined special fissionable material that can be used for nuclear weapons production. With more research being dedicated to thorium-fueled reactors, and several of these reactor designs possessing online fuel processing (allowing for on-site protactinium separation), it is important to understand this potential proliferation pathway. In particular, it is theoretically possible to extract protactinium from the irradiated fuel salt before it decays into 233 U. This hypothetical potential diversion can become an even greater proliferation concern if the extracted protactinium is purified through a second separation of protactinium approximately ten days later to remove the short half-life decay products of 232 Pa and 234 Pa, thus resulting in a higher concentration of the 233 Pa isotope, which decays into weapons usable 233 U with hardly any 232 U or 234 U in it. To estimate the concern of this potential proliferation challenge of thorium, different nuclear material accountancy techniques were reviewed for their viability to quantify 233 Pa if extracted from used thorium fuel. Characteristics of interest included technology maturity, cost, precision, and time taken to acquire results. Some technologies, like hybrid K-edge densitometry and passive gamma spectroscopy, appear to be viable techniques based on current literature. Due to the limited scope of this project, only passive gamma spectroscopy was further investigated. Three different reactor types (PWR, CANDU, MSR) were modeled with mixed thorium-uranium oxide fuels that were burned until the fuel was spent. The protactinium in the used fuel was extracted at the time of shutdown and the change in isotopic content of the protactinium quantified. Gamma spectroscopy simulations were performed for the protactinium isotopes and their decay products at various decay times. Given the simplicity of the models and large assumptions made (e.g. no background, no shielding, no self-attenuation), the initial results indicate that though 233 Pa is detectible for all the reactor types modeled at all decay times (0 to 300 days), more work should be done with higher fidelity models.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Brief Overview of the NCSP [Slides]

The mission of the NCSP is to provide sustainable expert leadership, direction, and the technical infrastructure necessary to develop, maintain, and disseminate the essential technical tools, training, and data required to support safe, efficient fissionable material operations within the Department of Energy. The vision of the NCSP is a continually improving, adaptable, and transparent program that communicates and collaborates globally to incorporate technology, practices, and programs to be responsive to the essential technical needs of those responsible for developing, implementing, and maintaining nuclear criticality safety.

2021 NCSP TPR Best Paper Award↗

SCALE 6.2.4 Validation: Reactor Physics

This report is the third volume in a report series documenting the validation of SCALE 6.2.4, which is used herein with ENDF/B-VII.1 libraries, for nuclear criticality safety, reactor physics, and radiation shielding applications. This report focuses on validating SCALE capabilities that affect reactor physics applications. The experimental data used as basis for validation consists of measurement data for nuclide inventory, decay heat, and full-core experiments and include the following: 1. radiochemical assay measurements of 40 nuclides of importance to burnup credit, decay heat, and radiation shielding in 169 light-water reactor (LWR) spent nuclear fuel samples that cover burnups up to 70 GWd/MTU and initial enrichments up to 4.9% 235 U; 2. full-assembly decay heat measurements for 236 LWR assemblies with: a. initial fuel enrichments up to 4% 235 U, b. assembly burnups of 5–51 GWd/MTU, and c. cooling times after discharge in the 2- to 27-year range (of importance to spent nuclear fuel storage, transportation, and disposal); and 3. pulse fission irradiations for fissionable materials at cooling times of interest to severe accident analyses (<10 5 s). Validation examples for full-core analysis are based on startup experiments for the Watts Bar Nuclear Unit 1 (WBN1) pressurized water reactor (PWR) and two high-temperature gas-cooled reactor (HTGR) benchmarks for the HTR-10 pebble bed and the prismatic HTTR reactor.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Brief Overview of the NCSP [Slides]

The mission of the NCSP is to provide sustainable expert leadership, direction, and the technical infrastructure necessary to develop, maintain, and disseminate the essential technical tools, training, and data required to support safe, efficient fissionable material operations within the Department of Energy. The vision of the NCSP is a continually improving, adaptable, and transparent program that communicates and collaborates globally to incorporate technology, practices, and programs to be responsive to the essential technical needs of those responsible for developing, implementing, and maintaining nuclear criticality safety.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Overview of the NCSP Nuclear Data Program [Slides]

The mission of the NCSP is to provide sustainable expert leadership, direction and the technical infrastructure necessary to develop, maintain and disseminate the essential technical tools, training and data required to support safe, efficient fissionable material operations within the Department of Energy. The vision of the NCSP is to create a continually improving, adaptable and transparent program that communicates and collaborates globally to incorporate technology, practices and programs to be responsive to the essential technical needs of those responsible for developing, implementing and maintaining nuclear criticality safety.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Brief Overview of the DOE/NNSA Nuclear Criticality Safety Program [Slides]

The mission of the DOE/NNSA Nuclear Criticality Safety Program is to provide sustainable expert leadership, direction and the technical infrastructure necessary to develop, maintain, and disseminate the essential technical tools, training, and data required to support safe, efficient fissionable material operations within DOE. The vision of the program is to create a continually improving, adaptable, and transparent program that communicates and collaborates globally to incorporate technology, practices, and programs to be responsive to the essential technical needs of those responsible for developing, implementing, and maintaining nuclear criticality safety.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗