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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2024

Fault Diagnosis of Power Components with Reliability Assessment in Extraterrestrial Microgrids

This research investigates the possible failures caused by aging and other environmental and external factors that could significantly impact the performance of extraterrestrial power systems. Additionally, it presents a reliability assessment model for the space microgrid based on fault tree analysis (FTA). The reliability assessment model developed in this paper represents a tool that can be used by engineers to harden the system design for operational and economic benefits. To improve the reliability of the system, this work provides a broad review of the different fault detection and diagnosis (FDD) algorithms used for power microgrids and space applications. Using data sets from the Habitat Simulator developed through the NASA-funded Resilient Extraterrestrial Habitat Institute, this paper compares the applicability and accuracy of the different FDD methods. The primary FDD approach proposed and assessed in this work is based on the Markov reliability model. It predicts and detects future faults in the space microgrids by using past data samples and categorizing them into different classes. Data-driven-based models such as artificial neural networks are also investigated, tested, and evaluated using simulation data sets. According to the simulation results and the broad FDD algorithm comparison, this study provides the crew or maintenance engineers with a clear methodology to detect and localize power system failures.

Leila Chebbo↗
NASA NTRS1992

Fault detection and fault tolerance in robotics

Robots are used in inaccessible or hazardous environments in order to alleviate some of the time, cost and risk involved in preparing men to endure these conditions. In order to perform their expected tasks, the robots are often quite complex, thus increasing their potential for failures. If men must be sent into these environments to repair each component failure in the robot, the advantages of using the robot are quickly lost. Fault tolerant robots are needed which can effectively cope with failures and continue their tasks until repairs can be realistically scheduled. Before fault tolerant capabilities can be created, methods of detecting and pinpointing failures must be perfected. This paper develops a basic fault tree analysis of a robot in order to obtain a better understanding of where failures can occur and how they contribute to other failures in the robot. The resulting failure flow chart can also be used to analyze the resiliency of the robot in the presence of specific faults. By simulating robot failures and fault detection schemes, the problems involved in detecting failures for robots are explored in more depth.

Visinsky, Monica↗
DOE OSTI2023

Plant-specific Model and Data Analysis using Dynamic Security Modeling and Simulation

The requirements for U.S. nuclear power plants to maintain a large on-site physical security force contribute to their high operational costs. The cost of maintaining the current physical security posture is approximately 10% of the overall operation and maintenance budget for commercial nuclear power plants. The goal of the Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) program’s physical security pathway is to develop tools, methods, and technologies and provide the technical basis for an optimized physical security posture. The conservatisms built into current security postures may be analyzed and minimized in order to reduce security costs while still ensuring adequate security and operational safety. The research performed at Idaho National Laboratory within LWRS program’s physical security pathway has successfully developed a dynamic force-on-force modeling framework using various computer simulation tools and integrating them with the dynamic assessment Event Modeling Risk Assessment using Linked Diagrams (EMRALD) tool. This document provides an update on the progress in applying a dynamic computational framework that links results from a commercially available force-on-force simulation tool, a commercially available thermal-hydraulic tool, and EMRALD to an operating commercial nuclear power plant. This report is only a summary of the progress and does not contain specific modeling results as those contain sensitive security information. This process of including plant procedures and multiple analysis results is being called Modeling and Analysis for Safety Security using Dynamic EMRALD Framework or MASS-DEF. Previous reports described how a user could integrate their plant-specific force-on-force models with the dynamic simulation tool EMRALD, model operator actions, integrate with probabilistic risk assessment tools, such as CAFTA (Computer Aided Fault Tree Analysis System) or SAPHIRE (Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluations), and with thermal-hydraulic tools, such as RELAP-5. Previous reports applied various combinations of available simulations codes with EMRALD using generic plant models to demonstrate how to perform the analysis. This report documents the results of applying the dynamic computational framework to an actual nuclear facility using their security scenarios and timelines. This report does not contain any plant's sensitive information and/or Safeguards Information. The purpose of this study was to verify that results achieved using generic models are similar to actual plant results and to refine our guidance on the use of the framework. This assessment enables further analysis, such as what-if scenarios and staff-reduction evaluation, thereby optimizing physical security at plants.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2024

An Evaluation of The Dynamic Physical Security Risk Assessment Methodology for Fleet-Wide Applications

The requirements for U.S. nuclear power plants to maintain a large onsite physical security force contribute to their high operational costs. The cost of maintaining the current physical security posture is approximately 10% of the overall operation and maintenance budget for commercial nuclear power plants. The goal of the Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) program’s physical security pathway is to develop tools, methods, and technologies and provide the technical basis for an optimized physical security posture. The conservatisms built into current security postures may be analyzed and minimized to reduce security costs while still ensuring adequate security and operational safety. The research performed at Idaho National Laboratory within LWRS program’s physical security pathway has successfully developed a dynamic force-on-force modeling framework using various computer simulation tools and integrating them with the dynamic assessment Event Modeling Risk Assessment using Linked Diagrams (EMRALD) tool. This integrated process for physical security analysis is named Modeling and Analysis for Safety Security using Dynamic EMRALD Framework (MASS-DEF). This document provides an update on the progress in applying the MASS-DEF process to an operating commercial nuclear power plant as well as additional industry feedback regarding use of the tool for other physical security risk-informed topics. This report is only a summary of the progress and does not contain specific modeling results as those contain sensitive security information. Previous reports described how a user could integrate their plant-specific force-on-force models with the dynamic simulation tool EMRALD, model operator actions, and integrate with probabilistic risk assessment tools, such as CAFTA (Computer Aided Fault Tree Analysis System) or SAPHIRE (Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluations), and with thermal-hydraulic tools, such as RELAP-5 or MAAP. Previous reports applied various combinations of available simulations codes with EMRALD using generic plant models to demonstrate how to perform the analysis. This report is an update the progress of applying the dynamic computational framework to an actual nuclear facility using their security scenarios and timelines. This report also provides an update to the procedural guidance for the MASS-DEF process and an overview of the generic models available for use by utilities. This report does not contain any plant’s sensitive information and/or safeguards information. This study’s purpose was to verify that the results achieved using generic models are similar to actual plant results and refine our guidance on the use of the framework. This assessment enables further analysis, such as what-if scenarios and staff-reduction evaluation, thereby optimizing physical security at plants.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
NASA NTRS2005

Failure Assessment

Three questions to which software developers want accurate, precise answers are "How can the software system fail?", "mat bad things will happen if the software fails?t', and "How many failures will the software experience?". Numerous techniques have been devised to answer these questions; three of the best known are: 1) Software Fault Tree Analysis (SFTA) 2) Software Failure Modes, Effects, and Criticality Analysis (SFMECA 3) Software Fault/Failure Modeling. SFTA and SFMECA have been successfully used to analyze the flight software for a number of robotic planetary exploration missions, including Galileo, Cassini, and Deep Space 1. Given the increasing interest in reusing software components from mission to mission, one of us has developed techniques for reusing the corresponding portions of the SFTA and SFMECA, reducing the effort required to conduct these analyses. SFTA has also been shown to be effective in analyzing the security aspects of software systems; intrusion mechanisms and effects can easily be modeled using these techniques. The Bi- Directional Safety Analysis (BDSA) method combines a forward search (similar to SFMECA) from potential failure modes to their effects, with a backward search (similar to SFTA) from feasible hazards to the contributing causes of each hazard. BDSA offers an efficient way to identify latent failures. Recent work has extended BDSA to product-line applications such as flight-instrumentation displays and developed tool support for the reuse of the failure-analysis artifacts within a product line. BDSA has also been streamlined to support those projects having tight cost and/or schedule constraints for their failure analysis efforts. We discuss lessons learned from practice, describe available tools, and identi@ some future directions for the topic. A substantial amount of research has been devoted to estimating the number of failures that a software system will experience during test and operations, as well as the number of faults that have been inserted into that system during its development. One of us has found that the amount of structural change to a system during its development is strongly related to the number of faults inserted into it. Using techniques requiring no additional effort on the part of the development organization, the required measurements of structural evolution can be easily obtained from a development effort's configuration management system and readily transformed into an estimate of fault content. So far, structure-fault relationships have been identified for source code; current work seeks to examine artifacts available earlier in the lifecycle to determine if similar relationships between structure and fault content can be found. In particular, relationships between requirements change requests and the number of faults inserted into the implemented system would provide a significant improvement in our ability to control software quality during the early development phases.

fault tree↗
NASA NTRS2011

Probabilistic Risk Assessment Procedures Guide for NASA Managers and Practitioners (Second Edition)

Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) is a comprehensive, structured, and logical analysis method aimed at identifying and assessing risks in complex technological systems for the purpose of cost-effectively improving their safety and performance. NASA's objective is to better understand and effectively manage risk, and thus more effectively ensure mission and programmatic success, and to achieve and maintain high safety standards at NASA. NASA intends to use risk assessment in its programs and projects to support optimal management decision making for the improvement of safety and program performance. In addition to using quantitative/probabilistic risk assessment to improve safety and enhance the safety decision process, NASA has incorporated quantitative risk assessment into its system safety assessment process, which until now has relied primarily on a qualitative representation of risk. Also, NASA has recently adopted the Risk-Informed Decision Making (RIDM) process [1-1] as a valuable addition to supplement existing deterministic and experience-based engineering methods and tools. Over the years, NASA has been a leader in most of the technologies it has employed in its programs. One would think that PRA should be no exception. In fact, it would be natural for NASA to be a leader in PRA because, as a technology pioneer, NASA uses risk assessment and management implicitly or explicitly on a daily basis. NASA has probabilistic safety requirements (thresholds and goals) for crew transportation system missions to the International Space Station (ISS) [1-2]. NASA intends to have probabilistic requirements for any new human spaceflight transportation system acquisition. Methods to perform risk and reliability assessment in the early 1960s originated in U.S. aerospace and missile programs. Fault tree analysis (FTA) is an example. It would have been a reasonable extrapolation to expect that NASA would also become the world leader in the application of PRA. That was, however, not to happen. Early in the Apollo program, estimates of the probability for a successful roundtrip human mission to the moon yielded disappointingly low (and suspect) values and NASA became discouraged from further performing quantitative risk analyses until some two decades later when the methods were more refined, rigorous, and repeatable. Instead, NASA decided to rely primarily on the Hazard Analysis (HA) and Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) methods for system safety assessment.

Stamatelatos,Michael↗
NASA NTRS1989

Flammability and sensitivity of materials in oxygen-enriched atmospheres; Proceedings of the Fourth International Symposium, Las Cruces, NM, Apr. 11-13, 1989. Volume 4

The present volume discusses the ignition of nonmetallic materials by the impact of high-pressure oxygen, the promoted combustion of nine structural metals in high-pressure gaseous oxygen, the oxygen sensitivity/compatibility ranking of several materials by different test methods, the ignition behavior of silicon greases in oxygen atmospheres, fire spread rates along cylindrical metal rods in high-pressure oxygen, and the design of an ignition-resistant, high pressure/temperature oxygen valve. Also discussed are the promoted ignition of oxygen regulators, the ignition of PTFE-lined flexible hoses by rapid pressurization with oxygen, evolving nonswelling elastomers for high-pressure oxygen environments, the evaluation of systems for oxygen service through the use of the quantitative fault-tree analysis, and oxygen-enriched fires during surgery of the head and neck.

Stoltzfus, Joel M.↗
NASA NTRS1990

Hubble Space Telescope: SRM/QA observations and lessons learned

The Hubble Space Telescope (HST) Optical Systems Board of Investigation was established on July 2, 1990 to review, analyze, and evaluate the facts and circumstances regarding the manufacture, development, and testing of the HST Optical Telescope Assembly (OTA). Specifically, the board was tasked to ascertain what caused the spherical aberration and how it escaped notice until on-orbit operation. The error that caused the on-orbit spherical aberration in the primary mirror was traced to the assembly process of the Reflective Null Corrector, one of the three Null Correctors developed as special test equipment (STE) to measure and test the primary mirror. Therefore, the safety, reliability, maintainability, and quality assurance (SRM&QA) investigation covers the events and the overall product assurance environment during the manufacturing phase of the primary mirror and Null Correctors (from 1978 through 1981). The SRM&QA issues that were identified during the HST investigation are summarized. The crucial product assurance requirements (including nonconformance processing) for the HST are examined. The history of Quality Assurance (QA) practices at Perkin-Elmer (P-E) for the period under investigation are reviewed. The importance of the information management function is discussed relative to data retention/control issues. Metrology and other critical technical issues also are discussed. The SRM&QA lessons learned from the investigation are presented along with specific recommendations. Appendix A provides the MSFC SRM&QA report. Appendix B provides supplemental reference materials. Appendix C presents the findings of the independent optical consultants, Optical Research Associates (ORA). Appendix D provides further details of the fault-tree analysis portion of the investigation process.

Rodney, George A.↗
NASA NTRS1992

Tethered Satellite System Contingency Investigation Board

The Tethered Satellite System (TSS-1) was launched aboard the Space Shuttle Atlantis (STS-46) on July 31, 1992. During the attempted on-orbit operations, the Tethered Satellite System failed to deploy successfully beyond 256 meters. The satellite was retrieved successfully and was returned on August 6, 1992. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Associate Administrator for Space Flight formed the Tethered Satellite System (TSS-1) Contingency Investigation Board on August 12, 1992. The TSS-1 Contingency Investigation Board was asked to review the anomalies which occurred, to determine the probable cause, and to recommend corrective measures to prevent recurrence. The board was supported by the TSS Systems Working group as identified in MSFC-TSS-11-90, 'Tethered Satellite System (TSS) Contingency Plan'. The board identified five anomalies for investigation: initial failure to retract the U2 umbilical; initial failure to flyaway; unplanned tether deployment stop at 179 meters; unplanned tether deployment stop at 256 meters; and failure to move tether in either direction at 224 meters. Initial observations of the returned flight hardware revealed evidence of mechanical interference by a bolt with the level wind mechanism travel as well as a helical shaped wrap of tether which indicated that the tether had been unwound from the reel beyond the travel by the level wind mechanism. Examination of the detailed mission events from flight data and mission logs related to the initial failure to flyaway and the failure to move in either direction at 224 meters, together with known preflight concerns regarding slack tether, focused the assessment of these anomalies on the upper tether control mechanism. After the second meeting, the board requested the working group to complete and validate a detailed integrated mission sequence to focus the fault tree analysis on a stuck U2 umbilical, level wind mechanical interference, and slack tether in upper tether control mechanism and to prepare a detailed plan for hardware inspection, test, and analysis including any appropriate hardware disassembly.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS1996

Development of a Software Safety Process and a Case Study of Its Use

Research in the year covered by this reporting period has been primarily directed toward: continued development of mock-ups of computer screens for operator of a digital reactor control system; development of a reactor simulation to permit testing of various elements of the control system; formal specification of user interfaces; fault-tree analysis including software; evaluation of formal verification techniques; and continued development of a software documentation system. Technical results relating to this grant and the remainder of the principal investigator's research program are contained in various reports and papers.

Knight, J. C.↗
NASA NTRS1997

Development of a Software Safety Process and a Case Study of Its Use

Research in the year covered by this reporting period has been primarily directed toward the following areas: (1) Formal specification of user interfaces; (2) Fault-tree analysis including software; (3) Evaluation of formal specification notations; (4) Evaluation of formal verification techniques; (5) Expanded analysis of the shell architecture concept; (6) Development of techniques to address the problem of information survivability; and (7) Development of a sophisticated tool for the manipulation of formal specifications written in Z. This report summarizes activities under the grant. The technical results relating to this grant and the remainder of the principal investigator's research program are contained in various reports and papers. The remainder of this report is organized as follows. In the next section, an overview of the project is given. This is followed by a summary of accomplishments during the reporting period and details of students funded. Seminars presented describing work under this grant are listed in the following section, and the final section lists publications resulting from this grant.

Knight, J. C.↗
NASA NTRS2005

Knowledge Representation Standards and Interchange Formats for Causal Graphs

In many domains, automated reasoning tools must represent graphs of causally linked events. These include fault-tree analysis, probabilistic risk assessment (PRA), planning, procedures, medical reasoning about disease progression, and functional architectures. Each of these fields has its own requirements for the representation of causation, events, actors and conditions. The representations include ontologies of function and cause, data dictionaries for causal dependency, failure and hazard, and interchange formats between some existing tools. In none of the domains has a generally accepted interchange format emerged. The paper makes progress towards interoperability across the wide range of causal analysis methodologies. We survey existing practice and emerging interchange formats in each of these fields. Setting forth a set of terms and concepts that are broadly shared across the domains, we examine the several ways in which current practice represents them. Some phenomena are difficult to represent or to analyze in several domains. These include mode transitions, reachability analysis, positive and negative feedback loops, conditions correlated but not causally linked and bimodal probability distributions. We work through examples and contrast the differing methods for addressing them. We detail recent work in knowledge interchange formats for causal trees in aerospace analysis applications in early design, safety and reliability. Several examples are discussed, with a particular focus on reachability analysis and mode transitions. We generalize the aerospace analysis work across the several other domains. We also recommend features and capabilities for the next generation of causal knowledge representation standards.

Throop, David R.↗
NASA NTRS2006

Another Approach to Enhance Airline Safety: Using Management Safety Tools

The ultimate goal of conducting an accident investigation is to prevent similar accidents from happening again and to make operations safer system-wide. Based on the findings extracted from the investigation, the "lesson learned" becomes a genuine part of the safety database making risk management available to safety analysts. The airline industry is no exception. In the US, the FAA has advocated the usage of the System Safety concept in enhancing safety since 2000. Yet, in today s usage of System Safety, the airline industry mainly focuses on risk management, which is a reactive process of the System Safety discipline. In order to extend the merit of System Safety and to prevent accidents beforehand, a specific System Safety tool needs to be applied; so a model of hazard prediction can be formed. To do so, the authors initiated this study by reviewing 189 final accident reports from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) covering FAR Part 121 scheduled operations. The discovered accident causes (direct hazards) were categorized into 10 groups Flight Operations, Ground Crew, Turbulence, Maintenance, Foreign Object Damage (FOD), Flight Attendant, Air Traffic Control, Manufacturer, Passenger, and Federal Aviation Administration. These direct hazards were associated with 36 root factors prepared for an error-elimination model using Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), a leading tool for System Safety experts. An FTA block-diagram model was created, followed by a probability simulation of accidents. Five case studies and reports were provided in order to fully demonstrate the usefulness of System Safety tools in promoting airline safety.

Lu, Chien-tsug↗
NASA NTRS2007

Journal of Air Transportation, Volume 12, No. 2 (ATRS Special Edition)

Topics covered include: Competition and Change in the Long-Haul Markets from Europe; Insights into the Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul Configurations of European Airlines; Validation of Fault Tree Analysis in Aviation Safety Management; An Investigation into Airline Service Quality Performance between U.S. Legacy Carriers and Their EU Competitors and Partners; and Climate Impact of Aircraft Technology and Design Changes.

Bowen, Brent D.↗
NASA NTRS2012

Reusable Solid Rocket Motor - V(RSRMV)Nozzle Forward Nose Ring Thermo-Structural Modeling

During the developmental static fire program for NASAs Reusable Solid Rocket Motor-V (RSRMV), an anomalous erosion condition appeared on the nozzle Carbon Cloth Phenolic nose ring that had not been observed in the space shuttle RSRM program. There were regions of augmented erosion located on the bottom of the forward nose ring (FNR) that measured nine tenths of an inch deeper than the surrounding material. Estimates of heating conditions for the RSRMV nozzle based on limited char and erosion data indicate that the total heat loading into the FNR, for the new five segment motor, is about 40-50% higher than the baseline shuttle RSRM nozzle FNR. Fault tree analysis of the augmented erosion condition has lead to a focus on a thermomechanical response of the material that is outside the existing experience base of shuttle CCP materials for this application. This paper provides a sensitivity study of the CCP material thermo-structural response subject to the design constraints and heating conditions unique to the RSRMV Forward Nose Ring application. Modeling techniques are based on 1-D thermal and porous media calculations where in-depth interlaminar loading conditions are calculated and compared to known capabilities at elevated temperatures. Parameters such as heat rate, in-depth pressures and temperature, degree of char, associated with initiation of the mechanical removal process are quantified and compared to a baseline thermo-chemical material removal mode. Conclusions regarding postulated material loss mechanisms are offered.

Clayton, J. Louie↗
NASA NTRS2009

The Application of a Residual Risk Evaluation Technique Used for Expendable Launch Vehicles

This presentation provides a Residual Risk Evaluation Technique (RRET) developed by Kennedy Space Center (KSC) Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) Launch Services Division. This technique is one of many procedures used by S&MA at KSC to evaluate residual risks for each Expendable Launch Vehicle (ELV) mission. RRET is a straight forward technique that incorporates the proven methodology of risk management, fault tree analysis, and reliability prediction. RRET derives a system reliability impact indicator from the system baseline reliability and the system residual risk reliability values. The system reliability impact indicator provides a quantitative measure of the reduction in the system baseline reliability due to the identified residual risks associated with the designated ELV mission. An example is discussed to provide insight into the application of RRET.

Latimer, John A.↗
NASA NTRS2018

NC Space Grant Report

During the summer of 2018 I supported the Safety & Mission Assurance Directorate (SMA) and Operations Support Division (QA-20) at Stennis Space Center. The mission of the SMA team is to prove safety, risk, reliability, independent assessments, configuration management and quality assurance guidance, and services for all NASA Stennis Space Center (SSC) programs, facilities, and supporting infrastructure. The office actively participates and contributes to the Agency-level Safety & Mission Assurance (S&MA) effort. Over the course of the Summer I participated in three projects. Two of them were focused around Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and the third focused on relief valves for their E-1 engine test stand.

Torres, David↗
NASA NTRS2021

Architectural Modeling and Analysis for Safety Engineering

Model-based development tools are increasingly being used for system-level development of safety-critical systems. Architectural and behavioral models provide important information that can be leveraged to improve the system safety analysis process. Model-based design artifacts produced in early stage development activities can be used to perform system safety analysis, reducing costs and providing accurate results throughout the system life-cycle. In this report we describe an extension to the Architecture Analysis and Design Language (AADL) that supports modeling of system behavior under failure conditions. This Safety Annex enables the independent modeling of component failures and allows safety engineers to weave various types of fault behavior into the nominal system model. The accompanying tool support uses model checking to propagate errors from their source to their effect on safety properties without the need to add separate propagation specifications. The tool also captures all minimal set of fault combinations that can cause violation of the safety properties, that can be compared to qualitative and quantitative objectives as part of the safety assessment process. We describe the Safety Annex, illustrate its use with a representative example, and discuss and demonstrate the tool support enabling an analyst to investigate the system behavior under failure conditions.

FTA↗