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At least 73 records · Page 4
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2022

Cross-Layered Distributed Data-Driven Framework for Enhanced Smart Grid Cyber-Physical Security

Smart Grid (SG) research and development has drawn much attention from academia, industry and government due to the great impact it will have on society, economics and the environment. Securing the SG is a considerably significant challenge due the increased dependency on communication networks to assist in physical process control, exposing them to various cyber-threats. In addition to attacks that change measurement values using False Data Injection (FDI) techniques, attacks on the communication network may disrupt the power system's real-time operation by intercepting messages, or by flooding the communication channels with unnecessary data. Addressing these attacks requires a cross-layer approach. In this paper a cross-layered strategy is presented, called Cross-Layer Ensemble CorrDet with Adaptive Statistics(CECD-AS), which integrates the detection of faulty SG measurement data as well as inconsistent network inter-arrival times and transmission delays for more reliable and accurate anomaly detection and attack interpretation. Numerical results show that CECD-AS can detect multiple False Data Injections, Denial of Service (DoS) and Man In The Middle (MITM) attacks with a high F1-score compared to current approaches that only use SG measurement data for detection such as the traditional physics-based State Estimation, Ensemble CorrDet with Adaptive Statistics strategy and other machine learning classification-based detection schemes.

cyber-physical security↗
DOE OSTI2024

SNNPG: Using Spiking Neural Networks to Detect Attacks in the Power Grid

We explore the potential of Spiking Neural Networks (SNN) to enhance the security of power grid operations by detecting False Data Injection (FDI) attacks. These attacks manipulate PMU readings, leading to erroneous control decisions and grid disruptions. We develop a method to convert Phase Measurement Unit (PMU) data into spike trains, capturing both temporal and spatial dimensions. Using an SNN model, we conduct evaluations with simulated power grid data, showcasing accuracy in detecting FDI attacks. SNN models rapidly identify anomalies in real-time PMU data, safeguarding grid operations by alerting operators to irregular readings and preventing incorrect decisions.

artificial intelligence↗
DOE OSTI2024

Autonomous Inverter Controls for Resilient and Secure Grid Operation: Vector Control Design for Grid Forming

The project addresses both fundamental and practical challenges of GFM/GFL inverter control for the power grids with high inverter based resources (IBRs) penetration. A data- driven modeling technique is applied to accurately model dynamics of PWM inverters, including electromagnetic-transient (EMT). Systematic and integrative designs of grid- forming (GFM) and grid-following (GFL) primary controls are developed to guarantee system performance under either normal or abnormal operating conditions without violating constraints. This modeling and control framework provides black-start capability in case of an outage without relying on rotating generators, and its secondary control is also shown to enhance resilience against cyber-physical attacks.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2025

Secure State Estimation with Asynchronous Measurements for Coordinated Cyber Attack Detection in Active Distribution Systems

Coordinated cyber attacks tamper with measurement data to disrupt the situational awareness of active distribution systems. Various sensors report measurements asynchronously at different rates, which introduces challenges during state estimation. In addition, this forces cyber intruders to exert greater effort to compromise multiple communication channels and launch coordinated attacks. Therefore, multi-channel and asynchronous measurements could be harnessed to develop more secure cyber defense strategies. In this paper, a prediction-correction-based multi-rate observer is designed to exploit the value of asynchronous measurements for the detection of coordinated false data injection (FDI) attacks. First, a time-function-dependent prediction-correction strategy is proposed to adjust the sampling interval for each sensor’s measurement. Then, an observer is designed based on the trade-off between estimation error and the optimal period of the most recent sampling instant, with the convergence of estimation error with the maximum permitted sampling interval. Moreover, the conditions for exponential stability are developed using the Lyapunov–Krasovskii functional technique. Next, a coordinated FDI attack detection strategy is developed based on the dual nonlinear minimization problem. The proposed attack detection and secure state estimation strategies are tested on the IEEE 13-node system. Simulation results show that these schemes are effective in enhancing attack detection based on asynchronous measurements or compromised data.

asynchronous measurements↗
DOE OSTI2023

Cyber-Resilient Automatic Generation Control for Systems of AC Microgrids

In this paper we propose a co-design of the secondary frequency regulation in systems of AC microgrids and its cyber security solutions. We term the secondary frequency regulator a Micro-Automatic Generation Control (μ AGC) for highlighting its same functionality as the AGC in bulk power systems. We identify sensory challenges and cyber threats facing the μ AGC. To address the sensory challenges, we introduce a new microgrid model by exploiting the rank-one deficiency property of microgrid dynamics. This model is used to pose an optimal μ AGC control problem that is easily implemented, because it does not require fast frequency measurements. An end-to-end cyber security solution to the False Data Injection (FDI) attack detection and mitigation is developed for the proposed μ AGC. The front-end barrier of applying off-the-shelf algorithms for cyber attack detection is removed by introducing a data-driven modeling approach. Finally, we propose an observer-based corrective control for an islanded microgrid and a collaborative mitigation scheme in systems of AC microgrids. We demonstrate a collaborative role of systems of microgrids during cyber attacks. Furthermore, the performance of the proposed cyber-resilient μ AGC is tested in a system of two networked microgrids.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2023

Robust Distribution State Estimation for Reliable Locational Marginal Pricing under Cyber-Attacks

Here this paper examines the impact of false data injection (FDI) cyber-attacks on distribution system state estimation (DSSE) and the resulting distribution locational marginal price (DLMP) in power markets. Two robust high-breakdown regression estimators, namely S- and MM- estimators, are implemented to provide resistance against FDI attacks targeting measurements and grid topology, creating leverage points. The introduced estimators are compared to the weighted least squares (WLS) with a bad data detection and rejection module (BDD) and the robust Huber M-estimator. The proposed estimators are shown to be effective and compare favorably to both existing Huber M- and the WLS with BDD in the presence of topology FDI attacks. Both the S- and MM-estimators provide good performance in the case of clean and corrupted measurements. Their performance is comparable in this case to the Huber M- and the WLS, followed by a BDD module. The simulation considered a modified distribution IEEE 13 and 34-bus systems where the impact of FDI attack scenarios is shown on the state and the DLMP pricing in the presence of distributed Generation.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2026

CONTROL AND DATA ACQUISITION IN A CYBER-PHYSICAL MIDSTREAM TESTBED

This thesis presents the development of a laboratory-scale cyber–physical midstream pipeline testbed designed to address this gap and support research in industrial control systems security. The platform integrates pumps, valves, sensors, programmable logic controllers (PLCs), and a human–machine interface (HMI) to emulate the monitoring and control architecture of real pipeline operations. The physical process is implemented as a closed-loop liquid circulation system designed to replicate flow behavior characteristic of midstream pipeline infrastructure. The testbed enables real-time data acquisition of key process variables, including flow rate and pressure facilitating the generation of datasets representative of normal pipeline operation. A threat model encompassing common ICS attack vectors was developed, including sensor spoofing, command injection, false data injection, denial-of-service attacks, and relay manipulation. Multiple attack scenarios were implemented and evaluated to demonstrate how cyber intrusions targeting sensors, actuators, networks, and software propagate into measurable physical consequences in pipeline flow and pressure. The developed platform serves as a practical, cost-effective environment for experimentation, education, and future cybersecurity research in midstream pipeline systems.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2022

Cross-Layered Cyber-Physical Power System State Estimation towards a Secure Grid Operation

In the Smart Grid paradigm, this critical infrastructure operation is increasingly exposed to cyber-threats due to the increased dependency on communication networks. An adversary can launch an attack on a power grid operation through False Data Injection into system measurements and/or through attacks on the communication network, such as flooding the communication channels with unnecessary data or intercepting messages. A cross-layered strategy that combines power grid data, communication grid monitoring and Machine Learning based processing is a promising solution for detecting cyberthreats. In this paper, an implementation of an integrated solution of a cross-layer framework is presented. The advantage of such a framework is the augmentation of valuable data that enhances the detection of anomalies in the operation of power grid. IEEE 118-bus system is built in Simulink to provide a power grid testing environment and communication network data is emulated using SimComponents. The performance of the framework is investigated under various FDI and communication attacks.

cyber security, network security, cyber-physical s↗
DOE OSTI2023

The Cost and Benefit of Enhancing Cybersecurity for Hybrid AC/DC Grids

As critical interfaces of AC grids and DC grids inside a hybrid AC/DC grid, the voltage-sourced-converter (VSC) has been demonstrated to be vulnerable to false data injection (FDI) cyber-attacks. As a result, the cyber-attack-induced AC grid frequency deviations and DC grid voltage deviations threaten the secure operation. Here, to enhance cybersecurity in a not only feasible but also cost-effective manner, this paper proposes a cost-benefit-based cyber-defense strategy for a hybrid AC/DC grid. First, this paper establishes a spatial-temporal dual cyber-attack evaluation model, in which the cyber-attack-induced frequency and voltage deviations are modelled in both a spatially and temporally dual manner. Then, the proposed cost-benefit-based cyber-defense strategy is modelled as a VSC commitment problem to achieve the trade-off between maximizing the cyber-defense benefits and minimizing the cyber-defense costs. The VSC commitment problem is then mathematically convexified into a mixed-integer second-order cone programming (MISOCP) problem, which could be efficiently solved in an event-triggered manner against unfolding cyber-attack events. Simulation results on a test hybrid AC/DC grid verified the feasibility and the cost-effectiveness of the proposed cyber-defense strategy.

cost-benefit analysis↗
DOE OSTI2021

Man‐in‐the‐middle attacks and defence in a power system cyber‐physical testbed

Abstract Man‐in‐The‐Middle (MiTM) attacks present numerous threats to a smart grid. In a MiTM attack, an intruder embeds itself within a conversation between two devices to either eavesdrop or impersonate one of the devices, making it appear to be a normal exchange of information. Thus, the intruder can perform false data injection (FDI) and false command injection (FCI) attacks that can compromise power system operations, such as state estimation, economic dispatch, and automatic generation control (AGC). Very few researchers have focused on MiTM methods that are difficult to detect within a smart grid. To address this, we are designing and implementing multi‐stage MiTM intrusions in an emulation‐based cyber‐physical power system testbed against a large‐scale synthetic grid model to demonstrate how such attacks can cause physical contingencies such as misguided operation and false measurements. MiTM intrusions create FCI, FDI, and replay attacks in this synthetic power grid. This work enables stakeholders to defend against these stealthy attacks, and we present detection mechanisms that are developed using multiple alerts from intrusion detection systems and network monitoring tools. Our contribution will enable other smart grid security researchers and industry to develop further detection mechanisms for inconspicuous MiTM attacks.

Wlazlo, Patrick↗
DOE OSTI2023

Secure Data Logging and Processing with Blockchain and Machine Learning (Final Report)

Secure Data Logging and Processing with Blockchain and Machine Learning (ML) research is focused on the development of a platform to securely log and process sensor data in fossil power plants. The platform integrates two emerging technologies, blockchain and ML, and incorporates several innovative mechanisms to ensure the integrity, reliability, and resiliency of power systems. The goal is to protect the power plant from various cyberattacks such as false data injection and denial of service attacks using these technologies. The research goal was enabled by the following Research Project Objectives: 1) Secure authentication and identity verification of sensor nodes, actuators, and other equipment within a network. 2) Development of mechanisms that ensure only data sent by legitimate sensors are accepted and stored in the data repository. 3) Development of data aggregation methodologies using ML / Deep Learning (DL) algorithms to minimize noise / faulty data. 4) Implementation of the blockchain technologies to provide data security using secured IOTA framework & nodes.

20 FOSSIL-FUELED POWER PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Impact of cyber attacks on distributed compressive sensing based state estimation in power distribution grids

Modern power distribution grids suffer from multiple vulnerabilities due to the tight integration between the physical system and the cyber infrastructure. Sophisticated and malicious cyber attacks continue to adversely impact the grid operation leading to performance degradation, service interruption, and grid failure. State estimation plays an essential role in grid monitoring and advancing cyber-attack situational awareness. In this regard, this paper first proposes a distributed compressive sensing (CS) state estimation approach for an unobservable distribution grid. Further, the proposed distributed CS approach divides the distribution grid into sub-areas to perform local state estimation. Then an alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM) based iterative information exchange among neighboring areas is employed to complete the estimation process. In this estimation process, the impact of loss of measurement data, false data injection (FDI), replay, and neighborhood cyber-attacks is analyzed. Extensive simulations are performed on the IEEE 37-bus and IEEE 123-bus standard networks to demonstrate the algorithm’s robustness to the aforementioned cyber-attacks. A quantitative analysis of computational complexity and simulation time of the distributed CS based approach is also presented.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2022

Implementation Aspects of Smart Grids Cyber-Security Cross-Layered Framework for Critical Infrastructure Operation

Communication networks in power systems are a major part of the smart grid paradigm. It enables and facilitates the automation of power grid operation as well as self-healing in contingencies. Such dependencies on communication networks, though, create a roam for cyber-threats. An adversary can launch an attack on the communication network, which in turn reflects on power grid operation. Attacks could be in the form of false data injection into system measurements, flooding the communication channels with unnecessary data, or intercepting messages. Using machine learning-based processing on data gathered from communication networks and the power grid is a promising solution for detecting cyber threats. In this paper, a co-simulation of cyber-security for cross-layer strategy is presented. The advantage of such a framework is the augmentation of valuable data that enhances the detection as well as identification of anomalies in the operation of the power grid. The framework is implemented on the IEEE 118-bus system. The system is constructed in Mininet to simulate a communication network and obtain data for analysis. A distributed three controller software-defined networking (SDN) framework is proposed that utilizes the Open Network Operating System (ONOS) cluster. According to the findings of our suggested architecture, it outperforms a single SDN controller framework by a factor of more than ten times the throughput. This provides for a higher flow of data throughout the network while decreasing congestion caused by a single controller’s processing restrictions. Furthermore, our CECD-AS approach outperforms state-of-the-art physics and machine learning-based techniques in terms of attack classification. The performance of the framework is investigated under various types of communication attacks.

cross-layered↗
DOE OSTI2023

Forced Power Systems Oscillations Due to Cyberattacks: Threats, Detection and Partial Mitigation

Forced oscillations in power systems can be caused by misconfigured controllers at generator stations. They can also be caused by cyberattacks against the exciters or governors. This paper explores the effects of forced oscillations from cyberattacks on generator excitation and governor systems and the effectiveness of a novel control system for a static var compensator in mitigating those oscillations to enhance transmission system resilience. A brief overview of oscillations, especially forced oscillations, within power systems is presented, along with an overview of cyberattacks on power systems. This paper also examines and implements FACTS devices to partially mitigate the forced oscillations created by cyberattacks by reducing the magnitude of the oscillations caused by the attack. The proposed approach is more effective against attacks targeting exciters.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2025

Cybersecurity Challenges in Low-Inertia Power-Electronics-Dominated Grids

Here, the low inertia characteristics of the power electronics dominated grid (PEDG) introduces challenges while restoring voltage and frequency to their nominal values. These stability challenges create new cybersecurity vulnerabilities that are not thoroughly discussed in the literature. Cyber events such as false data injection (FDI), denial of service (DoS), man-in-the-middle attacks, stealthy attacks, and advanced persistent threats target PEDG to disrupt grid stability or gain financial benefits. The low inertia of PEDG (< 2s) compared to traditional grids (~10s) exacerbates these vulnerabilities. In response to stealthy attacks on state variables that supervisory layers cannot detect until significant harm occurs, the low inertia characteristics of PEDG offer substantial stealthy attack surfaces. To counteract such threats, PEDG must be equipped with ultra-fast real-time anomaly detection system and trajectory prediction mechanism to achieve effective cyberattack resiliency.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2021

Design and evaluation of a cyber‐physical testbed for improving attack resilience of power systems

Abstract A power system is a complex cyber‐physical system whose security is critical to its function. A major challenge is to model, analyse and visualise the communication backbone of the power systems concerning cyber threats. To achieve this, the design and evaluation of a cyber‐physical power system (CPPS) testbed called Resilient Energy Systems Lab (RESLab) are presented to capture realistic cyber, physical, and protection system features. RESLab is architected to be a fundamental platform for studying and improving the resilience of complex CPPS to cyber threats. The cyber network is emulated using Common Open Research Emulator (CORE), which acts as a gateway for the physical and protection devices to communicate. The physical grid is simulated in the dynamic time frame using Power World Dynamic Studio (PWDS). The protection components are modelled with both PWDS and physical devices including the SEL Real‐Time Automation Controller (RTAC). Distributed Network Protocol 3 (DNP3) is used to monitor and control the grid. Then, the design is exemplified and the tools are validated. This work presents four case studies on cyberattack and defence using RESLab, where we demonstrate false data and command injection using Man‐in‐the‐Middle and Denial of Service attacks and validate them on a large‐scale synthetic electric grid.

Sahu, Abhijeet↗
DOE OSTI2023

Signal Decomposition for Intrusion Detection in Reliability Assessment in Cyber Resilience (Summary Report)

The complexity of assuring cyber resilience for physical process interactions in connected systems such as energy grids increases dramatically as the coupling between processes becomes more direct and responsive. An example of this growing complexity is provided by Integrated Energy Systems (IES), in which various processes such as nuclear heat generation and commodity production are being directly coupled for increased responsiveness to highly variable signals such as market pricing or electricity demand. As such, the potential attack surface of the coupled processes is larger than the two processes independently. Securing these complex systems requires two-fold monitoring: cybersecure monitoring for potential malicious incursion, and physics monitoring for system tampering. Physics monitoring includes analyzing the behavior of the signals within the system for anomalous behavior. This analysis has been shown to be insufficient if approached by only data-driven machine learning and artificial intelligence (MLAI) techniques or only low-level model comparison. Previous efforts at Purdue University suggested combining high-fidelity models with MLAI algorithms as a basis for a software tool for detecting anomalies in physical processes. This work built on that suggestion, developing an advanced library for signal decomposition and analysis using both MLAI and high-fidelity physics algorithms for greatly improved anomaly detection, especially false data injection. This software can be used as part of a secure imbedded intelligence (SEI) system designed under Consequence-driven Cyber-informed Engineering (CCE) for complex coupled systems. This library established a foundation for online and posteriori analysis of digital signals for the purpose of detecting potential malicious tampering in digital signals representing physical processes. Demonstrations carried out throughout the development highlight the effective use of characterization algorithms to detect signal perturbations, particularly triangle attack-style perturbations, in three wide-ranging applications: seismic monitoring, nuclear thermal hydraulics system simulation, and custom manufacturing.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗