Demonstrating compliance with moderator content limits in uranium dioxide powder upon leaving a furnace environment
A challenge was posed to the criticality safety consultant to consider whether instrumentation identified by Plant Management in an existing facility could be claimed as appropriate safety measures to ensure compliance with moderator content limits in uranium dioxide (UO{sub 2}) powder. During processing of low enriched UO{sub 2}, trays of powder are heated in a steam and hydrogen environment in order to reduce fluoride levels. Whilst in the furnace environment criticality safety is ensured by the geometry of the furnace trays used to convey the powder; however, upon leaving the furnace the UO{sub 2} is bulked to a 210 litre drum subject to limited moderation control. Under fault conditions there is a potential that the powder may become wetted due to an imbalance in furnace gas flows resulting in steam condensing in the cooling section of the furnace. Therefore, the safety case methodology followed suggests that two independent and diverse safety measures are provided to terminate the progression of the fault(s) to criticality. The existing criticality safety case credits an infra-red moisture meter as one of two safety measures; however, the calibration procedure required to ensure this device remains suitable is a considerable challenge from a plant operability perspective. As an initial review failed to identify any suitable like-for-like replacement, the National Nuclear Laboratory (NNL) Nuclear Safety Section were requested by the customer to consider the existing criticality safety case and investigate whether any existing instrumentation could be used as an alternative method of detecting conditions in which excess moisture could be present within the furnace trays. A number of solutions were proposed and the benefits and challenges around each are discussed in this paper, concluding with the approach adopted by the project. (authors)