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DOE OSTI2020

Methodology for inferring reactor core power distribution from an optical fiber based gamma thermometer array

Here, a 4-step data analytic methodology has been devised for the purpose of inferring the distribution of power in a reactor core, based on the response of an array of optical fiber based gamma thermometers (OFBGTs). This data analytic methodology is crucial for the development of a system of OFBGTs for the purpose of calibrating local power range monitors in boiling water reactors. Such a system would be an improvement to the present calibration system in boiling water reactors, in terms of safety, efficiency, and permanence. The first step of this methodology is to establish an energy balance method. In this method, one uses MCNP to determine response functions, which allow one to convert from gamma thermometer response to power. The gamma thermometers and the reactor core are segmented, such that each gamma thermometer segment provides an estimate of power for each reactor core segment. The estimates of power for the reactor core segments (hereafter referred to as fuel assembly segments) are calculated based on the measured response of the gamma thermometers. The second step of the methodology is to employ a weighting scheme to combine the estimates of the power of the various fuel assembly segments, based on the response of the various OFGBT segments and the incremental dose rates of the various fuel assembly segments to the OFBGT segments. The third step is to iteratively calculate the estimates of the power of the fuel assembly segments, until a convergence criterion is met, which indicates that the calculation has converged. The fourth and final step of the methodology is to estimate the uncertainty of the power for each fuel assembly segment. The mathematical basis for this step is not the focus of this paper. We have used a 3-D homogeneous reactor model to demonstrate the data analytic methodology; and have found that the data analytic methodology operates as intended.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

DOE OSTI2024

FY2024 Mid-Year Report: Verification of Spent Fuel Inside Dry Storage Casks by Cask Top Fast Neutron Mapping

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2023

Towards Realistic and High Fidelity Models for Nuclear Reactor Power Synthesis Simulation with Self-Powered Neutron Detectors

As presented in this report, a weighting function–based inferencing method is being applied to synthesize the power distribution in next-generation and university research reactors based on simulated self power neutron detector (SPND) responses. The overall goal is to assess the impacts of sensor uncertainty and true power distribution perturbations on the error in the synthesized power distribution. Regarding sensor uncertainty, the NuScale Small Modular Reactor (SMR) and the Westinghouse AP1000 serve as testbeds for analyzing the impact of varying the sensor uncertainty, as well as varying the number of sensors per sensor string in the reactor core. The reactor models are informed by Monte Carlo N-Particle (MCNP) neutron flux tallies. For the NuScale SMR and Westinghouse AP1000, the SPND response functions (i.e., the response of the SPNDs to individual segments of fuel) were determined homogeneously. Regarding an analysis of power distribution perturbation detection, the Texas A&M Testing, Research, Isotopes, General Atomics Reactor (TAMU TRIGA) reactor was used as a demonstration case with one particular arrangement of SPNDs; the response functions for this reactor model were determined heterogeneously, making this a uniquely high-fidelity demonstration of perturbation detection. Finally, SPND models generated in the Geometry and Tracking 4 (Geant4) code have been generated and tested for comparison with traditionally implemented analytical SPND models, with the intent for Geant4 integration with the full methodological framework. SPND current outputs as a function of distance from some fuel assembly segment in the NuScale SMR are compared with the analytically determined currents. Results from the sensor uncertainty simulations for the NuScale SMR and AP1000 indicate that the average error in the inferred power distribution on the fuel assembly segment level is reasonably low, being slightly less than the random uncertainty applied to all respective SPNDs in both cores. For example, if all SPNDs in the core have a random uncertainty of 5%, then the corresponding fuel assembly segment level error (i.e. difference between the true and inferred local power) is ~2–3%. However, the maximum error in the inferred power distribution on the fuel assembly segment level can be considerably high (>15%) when SPND random uncertainties start to exceed ~3%. In general, the average and maximum errors in the inferred power distribution were slightly higher in the AP1000 as opposed to the NuScale SMR for the sensor string configurations considered herein. Another result determined from analysis of the sensor uncertainty simulations was that increasing the number of SPNDs per string does not clearly reduce inferred power distribution error and can in fact make the error large in some cases; however, this assessment may skewed due to imposed iteration limits. Results from the perturbation detection demonstration using the high-fidelity TAMU TRIGA model indicate that, given the arrangement of 17 SPND strings and 4 SPNDs per string considered herein, there is a clear, provable ability to infer a localized Gaussian-type peak perturbation in the 3D power distribution. Such a perturbation was detected with an average fuel assembly segment level error of 0.19%, and the general visualization of the detected perturbation clearly indicates that the magnitude and shape were appropriately resolved. Finally, the electrical current output generated by the Geant4 modeled SPND indicates significant magnitude differences than the analytically modeled SPND, demonstrating the need for accurate SPND models which account for finite sensor geometry effects to inform the power synthesis work described herein.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2020

Blind Modeling Validation Exercises Using the Horizontal Dry Cask Simulator

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) established a need to understand the thermal-hydraulic properties of dry storage systems for commercial spent nuclear fuel (SNF) in response to a shift towards the storage of high-burnup (HBU) fuel (> 45 gigawatt days per metric ton of uranium, or GWd/MTU). This shift raises concerns regarding cladding integrity, which faces increased risk at the higher temperatures within spent fuel assemblies present within HBU fuel compared to low-burnup fuel (≤ 45 GWd/MTU). A dry cask simulator (DCS) was built at Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) in Albuquerque, New Mexico to produce validation-quality data that can be used to test the accuracy of the modeling used to predict cladding temperatures. These temperatures are critical to evaluating cladding integrity throughout the storage cycle of commercial spent nuclear fuel. A model validation exercise was previously carried out for the DCS in a vertical configuration. Lessons learned during the previous validation exercise have been applied to a new, blind study using a horizontal dry cask simulator (HDCS). Three modeling institutions – the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), and Empresa Nacional del Uranio, S.A., S.M.E. (ENUSA) – were granted access to the input parameters from the DCS Handbook, SAND2017-13058R, and results from a limited data set from the horizontal BWR dry cask simulator tests reported in the HDCS update report, SAND2019-11688R. With this information, each institution was tasked to calculate peak cladding temperatures and air mass flow rates for ten HDCS test cases. Axial as well as vertical and horizontal transverse temperature profiles were also calculated. These calculations were done using modeling codes (ANSYS/Fluent, STAR-CCM+, or COBRA-SFS), each with their own unique combination of modeling assumptions and boundary conditions. For this validation study, the ten test cases of the horizontal dry cask simulator were defined by three independent variables – fuel assembly decay heat (0.5 kW, 1 kW, 2.5 W, and 5 kW), internal backfill pressure (100 kPa and 800 kPa), and backfill gas (helium and air). The plots provided in Chapter 3 of this report show the axial, vertical, and horizontal temperature profiles obtained from the dry cask simulator experiments in the horizontal configuration and the corresponding models used to describe the thermal-hydraulic behavior of this system. The tables provided in Chapter 3 illustrate the closeness of fit of the model data to the experiment data through root mean square (RMS) calculations of the error in peak cladding temperatures (PCTs), PCT axial locations, axial temperature profiles, vertical and horizontal temperature profiles at two different axial locations, and air mass flow rates for the ten test cases, normalized by the experimental results. The model results are assigned arbitrary model numbers to retain anonymity. Due to the relatively flat axial temperature profiles, small temperature gradients resulted in large deviations of all models’ PCT axial location from the experimental PCT axial location. When the PCT axial location error is excluded in the calculation of the combined RMS of the normalized errors that considers PCT, the temperature profiles, and the air mass flow rates, the model data fits the experimental data to within 5%. When the vault information is excluded, the model data fits the experimental data to within 2.5%. An error analysis was developed further for one model, using the model and experimental uncertainties in each validation parameter to calculate validation uncertainties. The uncertainties for each parameter were used to define quantifiable validation criteria. For this analysis, the model was considered validated for a given comparison metric if the normalized error in that metric divided by the validation uncertainty was less than or equal to 1. When considering the combined RMS of the normalized errors of all metrics divided by their validation uncertainties, the model was found to have satisfied the criterion for model validation.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2023

Verification of Spent Fuel Inside Dry Storage Casks by Cask Top Fast Neutron Mapping (FY2023 Mid-Year Report)

This project is developing a prototype scanner array verification system for detection of missing fuel assemblies in spent-fuel storage casks. The prototype consists of six fast-neutron scintillator detectors mounted to a linear actuator frame that is placed on the top of a spent fuel cask to scan across all fuel assembly positions. The scanner array was assembled and tested at LLNL in FY2022. A field test schedule has been requested at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Cask Farm site for FY2023. Note that the Cask Farm contractor determines this scheduling and not INL directly. Further system automation will be designed and implemented with the goal of obtaining a level of system operation that meets IAEA needs. This includes integration of the scanner array and data-acquisition control software into a single interface for operator use. In addition, commercial operators and the IAEA may have special requirements for portability, shipping, lifting, and installation. Prior to the Field Test at INL, the system will be operated at LLNL to exercise lifting procedure and linear actuators, monitor stability of detector energy and pulse-shape discrimination calibration, and test system software integration efforts. Following the Field Test, we will present results and discuss the technology with the IAEA. We will incorporate additional improvements to the system based on lessons learned from the field test and feedback from the IAEA. If successful, the technology can be transferred to the IAEA or other stakeholders for assessment.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

DOE OSTI2024

Criticality Analysis of FSV Spent Nuclear Fuel in the DOE Standard Canister

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible for managing over 300 types of spent nuclear fuel (SNF). To manage this large variety of fuel types, DOE plans to employ standardized canisters for the transportation, long-term storage, and eventual disposal of SNF. Idaho National Laboratory is currently supporting DOE’s SNF Packaging Demonstration Project, in which Fort Saint Vrain (FSV) fuel assemblies will be loaded into a DOE Standard Canister. This paper presents criticality calculations demonstrating that all four or five FSV fuel assemblies loaded into the DOE Standard Canister will remain subcritical in any expected normal or credible abnormal conditions. Previous criticality analyses were performed for one FSV fuel assembly and 12 Peach Bottom Core 2 fuel elements loaded into a DOE Standard Canister. This paper covers the criticality analysis performed for loading both four and five FSV fuel assemblies into a DOE Standard Canister. Various intact and degraded mode configurations were modeled in conducting the criticality calculations. This analysis encompassed three different configurations: (1) a single DOE Standard Canister loaded into a concrete storage overpack, (2) seven DOE Standard Canisters loaded into a concrete storage overpack, and (3) nine DOE Standard Canisters loaded into a concrete storage overpack. The overpack dimensions were varied for each of the three configurations, and transport, storage, and disposal scenarios were analyzed for each configuration. For transport scenarios, a pair of degradation cases was analyzed. In the first case, the fuel compacts became degraded and were removed from the fuel block, then deposited at the bottom of a horizontally placed canister, thereby simulating a drop event. The canister was considered to remain intact. In the second case, the spacing between horizontally placed canisters in a nine-canister overpack was reduced such that the canisters were piled on top of each other, simulating a drop event. For this case, no degradation of the canister internals or fuel was considered. For storage scenarios, the water moderator location in the system was varied to enable identification of the most reactive configurations. Dry and wet conditions were analyzed for the fuel materials, canister, and overpack. For disposal scenarios, two degradation cases were analyzed. In the first, the stainless-steel internals of the canister degraded to either hematite or goethite under both dry and wet conditions. In the second case, degraded FSV fuel formed a uranium-water slurry that filled the coolant/void holes. None of the cases presented exceeded the application specific upper subcritical limit.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2022

Finite Element Modeling of Spent Nuclear Fuel in Dry Storage under Seismic Excitation

Spent nuclear fuel (SNF) is currently stored at independent spent fuel storage installations (ISFSIs) at nuclear power plant sites across the US. The US Department of Energy (DOE) Spent Fuel and Waste Science and Technology (SFWST) program is currently working to understand the response of SNF during a seismic event. This investigation is part of a long-term effort by DOE to quantify the external mechanical loads on SNF. The SFWST program has recently completed campaigns evaluating SNF behavior during normal conditions of transport and in 30 cm package drop scenarios; both campaigns included a combination of testing and modeling. Likewise, the investigation into seismic response of SNF will include full-size shake table tests of a vertical storage overpack containing instrumented surrogate fuel assemblies, as well as pre- and post-test finite element modeling. This work focuses on the development of finite element models simulating the planned test configuration. The seismic response is calculated at two scales: at the package level, and at the fuel level. The package level model evaluates the behavior of the storage overpack and its contents in response to the ground motions of a representative earthquake. The motion of the package is input to the fuel level model, which consists of a detailed finite element model of a 17x17 or 16x16 pressurized water reactor (PWR) fuel assembly or of a 10x10 boiling water reactor (BWR) fuel assembly. The stress and strain on individual components such as fuel rods and guide tubes are extracted from this model. This work details the SNF response to various input ground motions, considering representative earthquakes in the Central and Eastern US under various site conditions. Also discussed is the development of a “reduced scope” finite element model of the SNF, which consists of a single fuel rod while retaining the dynamic response of the entire fuel assembly. This reduced scope model addresses the significant computational expense of modeling the SNF under long-duration input ground motions and facilitates simulating additional parameter variations of the model beyond the as-tested configuration. The modeling results provide important insight that will help to inform future testing and modeling efforts by the SFWST program to close the knowledge gap related to external loads on SNF.

Kadooka, Kevin↗

DOE OSTI2024

SCALE 6.3.1 Radiation Source Terms and Shielding Analysis for a Postulated Sodium-Cooled Fast Reactor Accident Scenario

In support of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission non–light-water reactor fuel cycle demonstration project, SCALE 6.3.1 capabilities for radiation source term and shielding calculations are demonstrated for scenarios in the sodium-cooled fast reactor (SFR) fuel cycle. A postulated accident scenario, which consists of a seismic event causing the refueling machine to fall and release a spent fuel assembly inside the containment building (CB), is analyzed in this paper. Radiation source terms were generated for a U/TRU-10Zr metal fuel assembly with a 16.5% initial transuranic waste content and a discharge burnup of approximately 95 GWd/tHM; source terms were also generated for a high-assay low-enriched uranium metal fuel assembly (U-10Zr) with a 16.5% initial enrichment and a discharge burnup of 149.74 GWd/tHM. These radiation source terms were then used to determine the dose rate inside the CB and near the outer surface of the CB for a range of spent fuel assembly cooling times. The dose rate produced by the analyzed SFR assemblies is similar to that produced by a typical pressurized water reactor assembly with a discharge burnup of 50 GWd/MTU. Ultimately, the validation of the source terms predicted for SFRs with SCALE will need to be demonstrated via the use of assay measurements.

Radulescu, Georgeta↗

DOE OSTI2020

Validation of ORIGEN for VVER-440 Spent Fuel with Application to Fork Detector Safeguards Measurements

The US Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) are collaborating with the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority in Finland to assess spent fuel verification methods for potential application to measurements at the planned spent fuel encapsulation plant and geological repository prior to final disposal in Finland. The fork detector (FDET) used to measure the neutron and gamma radiation from a given spent fuel assembly is an existing technology widely used by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Euratom for the safeguards verification of spent fuel operator declaration. Recently, an FDET data analysis software, referred to as the ORIGEN module, was developed and incorporated into the IAEA/Euratom Integrated Review and Analysis Program. This module uses the ORIGEN burnup code to calculate the nuclide concentrations and the neutron and gamma source terms in the spent fuel based on operator declarations. Then, to predict the expected FDET signals for a given fuel assembly, the module combines the source terms calculated by ORIGEN with FDET response functions that were pre-generated using MCNP models. The inspector can compare the calculated signals to the measured values in real time to identify possible anomalies in fuel assembly’s operator declaration, integrity, or measurement. In this work, the capability of the ORIGEN module was extended from application to typical light water reactor fuels to use for VVER-440 assembly types. The accuracy of ORIGEN for this type of fuel assembly calculations was assessed by comparing calculated nuclide concentrations against destructive assay measurements for VVER-440 spent fuel. The performance of the ORIGEN module for FDET safeguards verification in routine inspections was assessed using FDET measurement data for 13 spent VVER-440 assemblies that were measured at the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant in Finland, by comparing the calculated signals to the measured quantities. The results show that the calculated FDET neutron and gamma detector signals are generally within 12% of the measurements except for one assembly. Thus, these results are applicable to future safeguards verification in the planned Finland encapsulation plant, such as for passive neutron albedo reactivity safeguards measurements.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

DOE OSTI2020

Assessment of the Griffin Reactor Multiphysics Application Using the Empire Micro Reactor Design Concept

In late 2019, INL and ANL agreed to jointly develop the reactor physics code named Griffin based on the integration of the two code suites, MAMMOTH/Rattlesnake (INL) and MC2 - 3/PROTEUS (ANL). Griffin is being developed based on the MOOSE framework and MOOSE quality assurance procedures. This decision was made to be able to allow DOE-NE to efficiently invest funding to this area and to provide effective and timely support for existing and potential users; the latter includes industry and government organizations who are developing various types of advanced reactors in the near and long term. Since MAMMOTH/Rattlesnake has been developed based on the MOOSE framework, the INL/ANL Griffin development team agreed to build Griffin beginning with a merger of MAMMOTH and Rattlesnake into a single code and moving forward by implementing capabilities from the PROTEUS suite into Griffin. Moving forward, both ANL and INL efforts are equally invested in the Griffin project, with management support, to provide an advanced reactor multiphysics tool to assist in reactor design, optimization, and safety analysis. Much work remains in moving Griffin forward to migrate PROTEUS capabilities and to optimize performance to meet user needs. The main objective of this work is to assess the current status of Griffin capabilities in terms of performance and accuracy, to determine priorities for PROTEUS migration, and to identify capabilities and features to improve for supporting the code integration effort. For this assessment, the Empire micro reactor problem that was developed in the ARPA-E MEITNER program was selected as an advance reactor concept of interest to the technical community. The Empire reactor problem was expanded from its original incomplete specification to be a small heat-pipe-cooled micro reactor core with ~113 cm radius and 70 cm in height, composed of 18 fuel assemblies, 12 control drums, and beryllium radial and axial reflectors. In the current model, using 5 cm axial reflectors specified in the original Empire assembly model, more than 10% of neutrons leak axially and through the empty center safety hole, as well as through heat pipe channels in fuel assembly elements that extend through the top reflector region. Several calculation models of the core were defined for systematic assessment, including 2-D and 3-D fuel assemblies and whole cores with cylindrical boundaries. Cross sections were generated using Serpent 2, and meshes were produced using the Argonne mesh tool or the INL neutronics meshing tools combined with CUBIT. Cross sections and meshes were converted to the ISOXML and Exodus formats, respectively, so that Griffin and PROTEUS could use consistent data for solving the reactor problems. With the prepared cross sections and meshes, PROTEUS was run first to ensure that all input data were correctly generated and input options in terms of angle, mesh, and energy group were accurately determined. Comparisons against Serpent 2 solutions were made in terms of eigenvalue and pin power. The same calculations and comparisons were then conducted using Griffin. For the fuel assembly and whole core problems, the PROTEUS eigenvalues agreed well with reference Serpent 2 solutions within 100 and 30 pcm, respectively, and pin power differences relative to Serpent 2 were overall less than 2.2% and RMS 0.8% for the whole core models. This indicated that all input data were properly prepared. Using the same data, Griffin was run selecting the SAAF-CFEM SN solver with Legendre-Gaussian quadrature and NDA and DSA for acceleration. It was found that the SAAF-CFEM solver of Griffin required finer meshes to achieve eigenvalue and pin power solutions in good agreement with Serpent 2, consequently requiring more memory requirement and longer computation time. On the other hand, the SPH-Diffusion 2-D core calculations performed using Griffin were able to recover the exact eigenvalue from the reference Serpent 2 solutions, resulting in a pin-power distribution with an RMS of 0.6% and maximum absolute difference of less than 1.4%. The runtimes for SPH-Diffusion for the 2-D core were less than 3 minutes on 40 cores. During this evolution of this evaluation, many updates were made in Griffin by the Griffin development team of INL (focusing on software updates) and ANL (reviewing and supporting software updates) to complete this assessment. Observations from the code assessment are presented in the conclusion section of this report, followed by a discussion of recommendations for future work.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

DOE OSTI2020

Analysis with the ORIGEN Module of PNAR Spent Fuel Measurements for Nuclear Safeguards Applications

This report documents the analysis of the Passive Neutron Albedo Reactivity (PNAR) measurements for 23 boiling water reactor spent fuel assemblies that were performed in Finland under Action Sheet 65, which is an international collaboration on spent fuel safeguards verification methods in the context of the Finnish spent fuel encapsulation/repository system. PNAR measures the passive neutron and gamma emission rates from each of the spent fuel assemblies like a Fork detector, and it also measures the PNAR ratio, which is expected to correlate with the net neutron multiplication of the measured fuel assembly. The analysis was performed with the Oak Ridge Isotope Generation and Depletion (ORIGEN) Data Analysis Module, which was originally developed for predicting Fork detector spent fuel measurement signals in real time and has been integrated into the Integrated Review and Analysis Package developed by Euratom and the International Atomic Energy Agency. The module includes the ORIGEN burnup analysis code and integrates detector response functions pregenerated using the MCNP Monte Carlo transport code to predict the detector signals in several seconds per assembly. In this study, new response functions specific to the analyzed PNAR measurements were generated for the ORIGEN Module. The study also analyzes the impact of using detailed fuel design and operation information vs. standard safeguards information on the results calculated with the ORIGEN Module. Using detailed information reduced the standard deviation of the relative differences between calculated and measured neutron count rates among the 23 assemblies from ~10% to ~4%. The results obtained using standard safeguards information for these PNAR measurements were similar to those obtained for the Fork detector. A clear trend was found between the calculated net neutron multiplications and the measured PNAR ratios of the 23 assemblies. An uncertainty assessment of the calculations was also performed to estimate the potential impact of the accuracy and the completeness of declaration information on the calculated results for the count rates and net neutron multiplications. The ORIGEN Module predictions for PNAR signals and net neutron multiplication are expected to directly support the safeguards inspectors’ efforts to verify operator declarations of a spent fuel assembly in real time in safeguards practices.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2023

Preliminary Neutronics Design and Analysis of the Fast Modular Reactor

General Atomics is developing a new 100-MW(thermal) fast modular reactor (FMR) that provides safe, carbon-free electricity and is capable of incremental capacity additions. The modular design allows it to be factory built and assembled onsite to keep the capital cost low, while the use of dry cooling facilitates siting to complement renewables in nearly any location. The FMR uses high-assay low-enriched uranium-dioxide fuel encapsulated by recognized irradiationresistant silicon carbide composite (SiGA®) cladding that is derisked in the current accident-tolerant fuel program. The FMR fuel assembly is a hexagonal fuel bundle of 120 fuel rods. The total length of the fuel assembly is less than 4 m, with an active fuel length of 1.8 m. The fuel assemblies are configured in an annular core that is located and supported by the reactor internals. The coolant material is helium at a normal operating pressure of 7 MPa. The core is surrounded by zirconium silicide (Zr 3 Si 2 ) and graphite reflector blocks. The fuel, coolant, internals, and reflectors are contained within a reactor pressure vessel. Here, the preliminary nuclear design and analysis established the arrangement of the active core and reflector blocks. The nuclear design analyses of the FMR defined the design parameters, such as fuel enrichments, excess reactivity, fueling scheme, fuel cycle, power distribution, and control rod worth. The preliminary conceptual design determined the three-batch fueling scheme with the allowable total power peaking factor of 1.5. The average discharge burnup is 100 GW days per ton of uranium.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2024

H-Canyon Flowsheet for the Neutralization of Dissolved Fast Critical Assembly (FCA) Fuel

The H-Canyon facility will be dissolving unirradiated stainless-steel clad Fast Critical Assembly (FCA) fuel in HNO3 and neutralizing the resulting solution with 50 wt% NaOH with no recovery operations prior to transfer to the Concentration, Storage, and Transfer Facility (CSTF). There are two types of FCA fuel, including a Pu-Al metal alloy and a mixed U and Pu oxide. H-Canyon anticipates dissolving 16 batches of the metal fuel and two batches of the oxide fuel. Potassium fluoride will be added to the dissolver solution at 0.05 M to promote dissolution. Gadolinium will be added after the dissolution as a thermal neutron poison for criticality control. H-Canyon requested that SRNL evaluate Gd:239Pu equivalent (239PuEq) ratios of 1:1 and 10:1. The neutralization process precipitates metals including actinides, Gd, and cladding components resulting in a slurry. Caustic neutralization is a routine H-Canyon operation, but the FCA dissolver solution will be unique relative to solutions that are typically processed due to the stainless-steel components, high HNO3 concentration of ~8.5 M, and an initial Pu concentration of up to 4 g/L. Previous neutralization studies have been performed for Pu containing solutions but at less than half the initial Pu concentration and much lower initial HNO3 concentrations. Experimental neutralizations targeted a final free hydroxide (OH-) concentration of 0.6 M as this was anticipated to be the final endpoint, but H-Canyon now expects the endpoint to be 1.2 M OH-. The purpose of this study was to characterize the distribution of the actinide, Gd, and cladding components between the precipitate and supernate, determine if the slurry will back up in the header during the transfer to the CSTF, and determine if solids will settle in the pipeline during the transfer.

Mills, Matthew S.↗

DOE OSTI2023

Sensor Development for Liquid Water Detection in Dry Storage Casks: FY 2023 Status

Modeling efforts were undertaken in fiscal year (FY) 2023 to evaluate the feasibility and capability for sensing of liquid water inside canister-based dry cask storage systems (DCSSs). The focus was on the development of full-scale finite element models (FEMs) of ultrasound propagation through DCSS canister components. For these initial investigations, simulation of the baseplate component was targeted, envisioning water collection at the bottom of a vertically oriented canister. The effects of internal canister components (i.e., fuel basket, fuel assemblies) on ultrasound propagation in the baseplate component were evaluated in these efforts. The environment inside a DCSS confinement is intended to be inert and free of water to prevent potential corrosion of used fuel cladding or other internal hardware. Spent fuel assemblies are dried, after storage in water pools, to make sure water has been removed from assembly cavities. However, there is some uncertainty about the amount of residual water potentially left behind in a DCSS after drying processes, because water can become trapped in cavities or other small crevices in the surfaces formed by the fuel cladding, fuel assemblies, and other internal hardware components. Considering the complex space- and time-dependent temperature profiles in DCSSs, water may be in a liquid or gas phase depending on its location in the cask and how long the cask has been in storage. Evacuating most water and oxidizing agents contained within a canister is recommended by NUREG-1536 (NRC 2010), which covers DCSSs. As summarized by Salazar et al. (2020), existing guidance typically relies on achievable vacuum pumping pressures sustained over a hold period as a signal of dryness and water removal. However, time series data about water removal from full-scale commercial drying procedures are lacking (Hanson and Alsaed 2019). A review of drying specifications from several vendors led to the conclusion that if the specifications are followed correctly, the residual moisture in DCSSs should present an insignificant risk of cladding degradation (Knoll and Gilbert 1987). A more recent analysis concluded that much larger quantities of residual water could remain in DCSSs, but the amount would still not be expected to lead to significant corrosion of fuel cladding or other internal components (Jung et al. 2013). Industry drying procedures are mostly prescriptive in nature, and operational issues arising during the process could result in incomplete drying. A summary of operational issues and potential negative effects of residual water is provided by Salazar et al. (2019). Experimental efforts are ongoing to validate the extent of water removal in a DCSS based on drying procedures used at nuclear power plants through well-designed investigations of drying process efficacy and water retention (Durbin et al. 2021; Pulido et al. 2022a, Pulido et al. 2022b). This has been approached by simulating limited portions of a DCSS internal volume and fuel assemblies. So far, these efforts have focused on the effects of potential water trapping in the dashpot region of control rod guide tubes but are expected to be expanded to include the effects of other internal hardware features and failed fuel rod cladding. A method for detection and measurement of liquid water (Meyer et al. 2022; Meyer et al. 2021), in tandem with the drying information gained through experimental investigations, provides comprehensive bases for understanding the internal conditions of DCSSs and provides technical information to support licensing decisions.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2020

Augmented Monitoring and Condition Assessment Program for SNF Wet Storage Life Extension - 20489

Approximately 27 MTHM of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) owned and managed by the U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Environmental Management is stored in the L Basin at the Savannah River Site (SRS). This 'DOE SNF' is comprised of approximately 12,000 aluminum-clad, aluminum-based fuel assemblies (∼7 MTHM), and approximately 2000 non-aluminum fuel assemblies (∼20 MTHM). A program is in progress to perform Non-Destructive Examination (NDE) of the fuel and their storage containers to characterize the materials' condition, and to evaluate the effects of service to enable continued safe wet storage of the SNF. The Augmented Monitoring and Condition Assessment Program (AMCAP), a two-part program to develop and implement remote underwater Non-Destructive Examination of the aluminum SNF, and of the containers of the non-aluminum SNF, respectively, is aimed at the characterization and evaluation of corrosion degradation of aluminum fuel and container materials. The predominant design of the aluminum SNF (ASNF) stored in L Basin is the Materials Test Reactor (MTR) equivalent design, a plate fuel design. These SNF are stored in 5'' diameter tubes or 5'' x 5'' squares (called bundles) that are nominally 12' or up to 14' long. The SNF is de-bundled and inspected using a custom-designed MTR Fuel Inspection Table. The inspection table provides for indexed fuel positioning for a video camera examination with controlled lighting. A total of 10 of the SNF originating from foreign research and test reactors were selected for examination based on burnup, enrichment, and prior damage caused by service/storage history. A special inspection campaign of these 10 assemblies is in progress. The observed corrosion damage included minor to moderate attack from general corrosion, pitting, crevice, end grain and galvanic corrosion. Example results from the completed inspections are shown and discussed. The focus is a comparison of the as-received condition versus the as-found current storage condition that will serve to validate Water Chemistry and Corrosion Monitoring Programs. The non-aluminum SNF (NASNF) stored in L Basin are of diverse design that includes various geometries with claddings of stainless steel, Zircaloy, and Hastelloy. The fuel core materials include uranium alloys, oxides/mixed oxides, and carbides. These SNF materials, originating from early experimental and test reactors, are in various physical forms including single fuel elements and cut pieces. The fuel is stored in L Basin in various configurations including in direct bundled storage in aluminum tubes and in isolation cans that are in the bundles or in a larger over-size storage container (OSC). Concern with inside-out corrosion and the potential loss of configuration control and ability to handle the storage containers prompted the development of remote NDE methods that include visual and UT technologies to assess the condition of the containers. Candidate stored materials were selected for a special inspection campaign; the development of the NDE methods for the inspection for galvanic, crevice and sediment-induced corrosion (inside-out) are discussed. A summary of the SNF storage in L Basin at the SRS, and an overview of the AMCAP to enable continued safe storage of DOE SNF are described. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2020

Vibrational metrics for the evaluation of internal conditions in a scaled nuclear dry storage cask

In many countries, permanent repositories for high burnup spent nuclear fuel assemblies have yet to be established. As a result, much of the spent fuel from nuclear reactors is contained within dry storage casks, with many being beyond their designed service life. The assessment of the internal structural integrity of these casks and the fuel assemblies contained therein is of critical importance for both extended storage and transport to permanent repositories. The large size, structural complexity, and inaccessibility of the interior of the casks make this task challenging. To address these difficulties, a 1:6 scaled model based closely on the design of a Transnuclear (TN-32) dry storage cask was fabricated to facilitate controlled studies of these structures in the laboratory. Vibrational spectroscopy was used to evaluate the state of the cargo and internal structures within the cask utilizing only measurements on the outer surface. Using modes identified through Finite Element modeling corresponding to those previously measured on a full-scale TN-32 cask, we report on the development of amplitude- and phase-based metrics that are sensitive to internal conditions in the lab cask. Steel rod bundles and steel shot were used as surrogates for intact and damaged fuel assemblies, and various internal configurations of these materials were investigated. Finally, the metrics were based on acquired spectra involving the (1, 2) global bending mode and the (2, 1) radial-with-shearing mode. The results show that the metrics are sensitive to the condition of a single assembly and have some ability to determine the locations of damaged and empty slots.

71 CLASSICAL AND QUANTUM MECHANICS, GENERAL PHYSIC↗

DOE OSTI2020

Updates to Relevance Vector Machine: Multiclass Classification, Variable Selection, and Proof-of-Concept Application to Safeguards Fresh Fuel Verification using List-Mode Neutron Collar Data

To expand the capabilities of safeguards authorities to verify the integrity of fresh fuel assemblies, Oak Ridge National Laboratory has retrofit the existing electronics of the JCC-71 uranium neutron coincidence collar, which contains 18 3 He neutron detectors and an external 241 AmLi(α, n) neutron interrogation source arranged to surround a fresh nuclear fuel assembly. The new electronics system allows analysts to record list-mode neutron multiplicity data in addition to the singles and doubles rates that are currently measured. Based on previous proof-of-concept research, analysis of these new data will identify off-normal fuel configurations in an assembly and characterize or localize the specific partial fuel defects. The purpose of this report it to document the analysis algorithm development and then to demonstrate its capability for the safeguards verification of fresh fuel assemblies using list mode neutron collar data. To analyze the complex list-mode data collected with the upgraded uranium neutron collar, multivariate classification algorithms are being developed using a novel classification method, the relevance vector machine. This approach may be applied to multiclass problems to estimate the probability that test data belongs to one of many possible classes of data. In addition, our method identifies the most useful variables/channels for making predictions, which illuminates the basis for the model’s predictions, and this interpretability is largely unique among data analytics methods. Variable selection occurs during model training and parameter tuning and does not need any external hyperparameter tuning routines. Finally, we apply the modified relevance vector machine to a simulated dataset of list-mode neutron collar data generated with the radiation transport code MCNP. The method can correctly identify off-normal fuel configurations, categorize the data according to four fuel defect scenarios, and rank the channels in the data according to prediction utility. For nuclear safeguards applications, it is concluded that this method has the potential to increase the sensitivity and reliability to detect missing fuel rods from a standard 17 x 17 Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) fresh fuel assembly. Within this analysis, “off-normal” (i.e., missing fuel rods) were correctly classified in 17 simulated test scenarios with one quarter (25%) of the fresh fuel rods missing using a training data set of 58 simulated measurements.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2023

Nuclear fuel rods and heat pipes in a graphite moderator matrix for a micro-reactor, with the fuel rods having fuel pellets in a BeO sleeve

A reactor unit cell is disclosed including a graphite moderator structure, a heat pipe positioned in the graphite moderator structure, and a fuel assembly positioned in the graphite moderator structure. The fuel assembly comprises at least one fuel rod. Each fuel rod comprises a beryllium-oxide sleeve and nuclear fuel positioned in the beryllium-oxide sleeve.

Levinsky, Alex↗