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Evolution of Hardware and Philosophy of Emergency Response Actions on the International Space Station and Future Spacecrafts

Human spaceflight is dangerous for numerous reasons. This ranges from the dynamic environment of launching on a rocket, flying in space among the thousands and thousands pieces of space debris, to the hazards of re-entry & landing, as well as being surrounded by vehicle systems containing hazardous materials or gasses. In-flight emergencies fall into four categories: Rapid Depressurization, Fire, Toxic Spill, and Medical emergency. This paper will address the first three, which fall under the responsibility of the Environmental Control and Life Support (ECLS) Systems flight control and engineering teams. It will review the evolution of the International Space Station’s emergency response philosophy, procedures, training, and equipment changes over the years. The International Space Station (ISS) emergency equipment has evolved over the last two decades of operations in many ways, but in some it has remained the same. The core actions the flight crew takes to ensure team safety, personal safety, vehicle safety, and equipment safety has not changed. However, the equipment and capabilities provided to them have. From early days of minimal capability when the ISS consisted of a few modules, to today’s 30,000 ft^3 vehicle with over a dozen isolatable segments. From use of positive pressure O2 masks, to the development of respirators. From a lack of procedures for a deadly ammonia leak scenario to a memorized response utilizing numerous atmosphere measurement systems. This paper will review all these various areas that fall under the umbrella of “on-board emergencies”. In addition, the comparison to the planned emergency operations on the Orion vehicle will be reviewed. The Orion vehicle differs from the ISS in that it has no isolatable volume, being approximately 2% the size of ISS, as well as not having a quick return to earth capability.

Barry Tobias↗

Evolution of Hardware and Philosophy of Emergency Response Actions on the International Space Station and Future Spacecrafts

Human spaceflight is dangerous for numerous reasons. This ranges from the dynamic environment of launching on a rocket, flying in space among the thousands and thousands pieces of space debris, to the hazards of re-entry & landing, as well as being surrounded by vehicle systems containing hazardous materials or gasses. In-flight emergencies fall into four categories: Rapid Depressurization, Fire, Toxic Spill, and Medical emergency. This paper will address the first three, which fall under the responsibility of the Environmental Control and Life Support (ECLS) Systems flight control and engineering teams. It will review the evolution of the International Space Station’s emergency response philosophy, procedures, training, and equipment changes over the years. The ISS emergency equipment has evolved over the last two decades of operations in many ways, but in some it has remained the same. The core actions the flight crew takes to ensure team safety, personal safety, vehicle safety, and equipment safety has not changed. However, the equipment and capabilities provided to them have. From early days of minimal capability when the ISS consisted of a few modules, to today’s 30,000 ft^3 vehicle with over a dozen isolatable segments. From use of Russian gas masks to positive pressure O2 masks, to the development of respirators. From a lack of procedures for a deadly ammonia leak scenario to a memorized response utilizing numerous atmosphere measurement systems. This paper will review all these various areas that fall under the umbrella of “on-board emergencies”. In addition, the comparison to the planned emergency operations on the Orion vehicle will be reviewed. The Orion vehicle differs from the ISS in that it has no isolatable volume, being approximately 2% the size of ISS, as well as not having a quick return to earth capability.

Emergency↗

Preventing Absenteeism and Promoting Resilience Among Health Care Workers In Biological Emergencies

The ability to ensure adequate numbers of medical staff represents a crucial part of the medical response to any disaster. However, healthcare worker absenteeism during disasters, especially in the event of an attack of biological terrorism or an epidemic such as pandemic influenza, is a serious concern. Though a significant rate of absenteeism is often included as a baseline assumption in emergency planning, published reports on strategies to minimize absenteeism are comparatively few. This report documents interviews with managers and emergency response planners at hospitals and public health agencies and reviews existing survey data on healthcare worker absenteeism and studies of disasters to glean lessons about the needs of healthcare workers during those disasters. Based on this research, expected rates of absenteeism and individual determinants of absenteeism are presented along with recommendations of steps that hospitals, emergency medical services departments, public health organizations, and government agencies can take to meet the needs of healthcare workers and minimize absenteeism during a biological event.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Idaho National Laboratory Emergency Readiness Assurance Plan — Fiscal Year 2017

Battelle Energy Alliance, LLC, the prime contractor for Idaho National Laboratory (INL), provides this Emergency Readiness Assurance Plan (ERAP) for Fiscal Year 2017 in accordance with DOE O 151.1C, “Comprehensive Emergency Management System.” The ERAP documents the readiness of the INL Emergency Management Program using emergency response planning and preparedness activities as the basis. It describes emergency response planning and preparedness activities, and where applicable, summarizes and/or provides supporting information in tabular form for easy access to data. The ERAP also provides budget, personnel, and planning forecasts for Fiscal Year 2018. Specifically, the ERAP assures the Department of Energy Idaho Operations Office that stated emergency capabilities at INL are sufficient to implement PLN 114, “INL Emergency Plan/RCRA Contingency Plan.”

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Optimization approaches to decision making on long-term cleanup and site restoration following a nuclear or radiological terrosim incident.

Emergency planning activities have historically focused on the early phase of an event, especially issues associated with triaging in the initial response such as rescuing survivors. The most difficult task following an event may be the eventual recovery of society's most affected areas; the government must spend a large amount of money and effort to cope with the long-term site cleanup and restoration issues. In particular, the underlying principles and implementation guidelines for conducting the recovery effort have not been well developed. Following publication of the National Response Framework by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, some major responsibilities have been identified and defined. For example, DHS recently published Protective Action Guides as planning guidance for health protection and recovery following incidents involving Radiological Dispersal Devices or Improvised Nuclear Devices. For the first time, the guidance addresses long-term recovery issues associated with radiological events, for which an 'optimization' process is prescribed to address the multifaceted, long-term recovery effort. This article analyzes this particular subject more deeply and evaluates the critical need for further development.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Idaho National Laboratory Emergency Readiness Assurance Plan — Fiscal Year 2014

Battelle Energy Alliance, LLC, the prime contractor for Idaho National Laboratory (INL), provides this Emergency Readiness Assurance Plan (ERAP) for Fiscal Year 2014 in accordance with DOE O 151.1C, “Comprehensive Emergency Management System.” The ERAP documents the readiness of the INL Emergency Management Program using emergency response planning and preparedness activities as the basis. It describes emergency response planning and preparedness activities, and where applicable, summarizes and/or provides supporting information in tabular form for easy access to data. The ERAP also provides budget, personnel, and planning forecasts for Fiscal Year 2015. Specifically, the ERAP assures the Department of Energy Idaho Operations Office that stated emergency capabilities at INL are sufficient to implement PLN-114, “INL Emergency Plan/RCRA Contingency Plan.”

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Summary of Building Protection Factor Studies for External Exposure to Ionizing Radiation

Radiation dose assessments are used to help inform decisions to minimize health risks in the event of an atmospheric release of radioactivity including, for example, from a Radiological Dispersal Device, an Improvised Nuclear Device detonation, or a Nuclear Power Plant accident. During these incidents, radiation dose assessments for both indoor and outdoor populations are needed to make informed decisions. These dose assessments inform emergency plans and decisions including, for example, identifying areas in which people should be sheltered and determining when controlled population evacuations should be made. US dose assessment methodologies allow consideration of the protection, and therefore dose reduction, that buildings provide their occupants. However, these methodologies require an understanding of the protection provided by various building types that is currently lacking. To help address this need, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, in cooperation with Sandia National Laboratories and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, was tasked with (a) identifying prior building protection studies, (b) extracting results relevant to US building construction, and (c) summarizing building protection by building type. This report focuses primarily on the protection against radiation from outdoor fallout particles (external gamma radiation).

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Remediation Guidance for Major Airports after a Bioterrorist Attack

This document provides general guidelines for airport managers, local officials, and other stakeholders for developing a response and recovery plan for a major airport following the release of a biological warfare agent, with specific guidance for remediation. San Francisco International Airport was selected as the example airport during development of the guidance to illustrate specific details. The spore-forming bacterium Bacillus anthracis was selected as the biological agent of primary concern because it is the most difficult of known bioterrorism agents to inactivate and is considered to be one of the agents most likely to be used as a biological weapon. The focus of the guidance is on cleanup and disposal activities associated with the Characterization, Decontamination, and Clearance Phases that are defined herein. Activities associated with the Notification and First-Response Phases are brieÀy discussed in Appendixes A and B, respectively. In addition to the main text of this Remediation Guidance document and associated appendixes, a data supplement was developed specifically for San Francisco International Airport. Requests for the data supplement must be made directly to the Emergency Planning Operations Division of San Francisco International Airport. This document does not describe public health responses to release of a biological warfare agent. If laboratory analytical results confirm the presence of a biological agent, the responsible public health agency involved in the response will commence appropriate public health actions, such as treatment (CDC 2004) and decontamination of potentially contaminated individuals, distribution of prophylaxis, and medical examinations. See the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention web site for more information on emergency public health responses (http://www.bt.cdc.gov/). Effective communication with the media and the public is an essential component of airport remediation and recovery. Whereas such communication is beyond the scope of this document, many helpful resources are available. (See Section 1.1 for more information.) The concept of operations described in this document for cleanup of a Bacillus anthracis release at a major airport conforms to the National Response Framework (NRF) (DHS 2008) and implementation of the National Incident Management System (NIMS 2004). In most cases, a Unified Command would be formed to direct the cleanup process jointly and to take ultimate responsibility for all cleanup decisions. The Unified Command would likely include the Airport Manager or Airport Emergency Operations Manager, representatives from state and local public health and emergency management agencies, and Federal agencies, such as the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. The Unified Command and Incident Command Staff would ideally be co-located in an Incident Command Post in an uncontaminated area of the airport. If a release is large or complex, co-location of all key players may not be possible. If a major incident is declared, a Principal Federal Official may be appointed by the Department of Homeland Security to facilitate Federal support to the Unified Command. In some facilities and jurisdictions, additional response plans or procedures (such as BioWatch or other emergency response plans, procedures, or protocols) may govern notification and first response. Facility personnel, responders, and emergency management coordinators should be aware of all applicable plans and procedures and how to implement them. Cleanups following the anthrax attacks of 2001 in the U.S. pre-dated the NRF and NIMS and did not make use of a NIMS Incident Command System as we know it today. Most Incident Commanders for the larger of those cleanups chose to convene a Technical Working Group (TWG) of multi-agency, multi-disciplinary, outside experts to advise in developing sampling and decontamination plans. Most of the Incident Commanders also convened a separate Environmental Clearance Committee (ECC) to independently review pre- and post decontamination sampling data as well as data on decontamination parameters, to evaluate whether the decontamination was effective, and to add credibility regarding a decision that decontaminated areas may be reoccupied. Use of such specialized technical expertise is strongly recommended, although it would now operate within the construct of the NIMS Incident Command System. The TWG, if convened, would act in an advisory capacity to the Environmental Unit within the Planning Section. Likewise, the ECC, if convened, would provide independent peer review of products and recommendations by the Environmental Unit. For maximum impartiality, the ECC could also provide recommendations directly to the Unified Command. Cleanup activities commence with site characterization. The principal goal of characterization is to define the extent of contamination and to gather information needed to design the decontamination approach. Initial sampling data collected by first responders are assessed to approximate the location(s) of contamination. Confirmation of the agent type and viability is obtained from a Laboratory Response Network laboratory. Additional characterization data are collected to determine the extent of contamination and where decontamination actions are needed. Areas suspected of being contaminated are contained and isolated to the degree possible to prevent further movement of an agent to uncontaminated areas or the environment, and to reduce the potential for future exposure from the agent or fumigant, if fumigation is needed. Agent air monitoring in areas adjacent to the contained contamination zones is done to ensure the protection of remediation personnel and to monitor any release from the contained zones. Various sampling approaches are considered. For example, wipe samples can be used to sample hard, nonporous surfaces. Swab samples can be used to sample nooks, crannies, joints, and seams. Appendix I is a template for preparing an incident-specific, operational characterization plan. Upon completion of the characterization plan, an internal review is initiated. Upon approval of the plan by the Unified Command, characterization commences. The Site Safety Officer develops a Health and Safety Plan to ensure that coordinated health and safety measures are in place for all responding personnel. This plan describes physical, chemical, and biological hazards at the site, personal protective equipment, personal decontamination procedures, and emergency procedures to be used by sampling and remediation personnel. An incident-specific Remediation Action Plan is developed, which describes the decontamination methods to be used and other details, including waste disposal. Under NIMS, this overall plan, as well as other plans described below, are implemented through a series of standardized, shorter-term Incident Action Plans, which describe specific activities that will take place during a shift or a day. The template in Appendix J is designed to facilitate preparation of the Remediation Action Plan. If fumigation will be done, a Sampling and Analysis Plan will be needed, as well as an Ambient Air Monitoring Plan, which can be a component of the Remediation Action Plan. These three plans are needed to obtain a crisis exemption from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency for authorized use of an unregistered sterilant or pesticide during cleanup. If pesticide products become registered for inactivation of B. anthracis in the future, the three plans will likely be required by the product’s labeling, but the plans would no longer be submitted to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency for approval; rather, the Incident Commander would approve them. If fumigation is used, an Emergency Response Plan is also recommended, although such a plan is not required for a crisis exemption. For some nonpersistent biological warfare agents, natural attenuation may be an adequate decontamination option. In cases where contamination is not extensive or an agent is not persistent, application of surface decontaminants or other methods of medical infection control may be effective. For extensive contamination by persistent agents, such as Bacillus anthracis, fumigation may be necessary. In those cases, the Decontamination Phase commences with source reduction, such as pre-cleaning surfaces to reduce the contaminant load. To expedite cleanup and prevent costs from escalating unnecessarily, a cost–benefit analysis should be incorporated in the decision process related to retention versus disposal of facility items and materials. Certain materials and structural components can be decontaminated for reuse, but it may not be feasible or cost-effective to decontaminate other items. Those items must be pre-treated, packaged (with the package decontaminated externally), and removed for disposal as waste. Site preparation includes sealing openings to prevent leaks and setting up equipment. Decontamination reagents and delivery systems are selected, and pre-testing all systems is done before carrying out chemical treatment(s). The important choice of decontamination technologies depends on characteristics of the agent, the nature and extent of contamination, and other site parameters identified during characterization. Decontamination-related decisions can have a major impact on waste-disposal costs, and it is necessary to develop a disposal plan that identifies a means of disposal, necessary approvals, transportation, and other details. A clearance strategy is developed to ensure that after decontamination, the risk of exposure to residual contamination is negligible. A clearance sampling plan is developed, which sets clearance criteria, specifies how to determine whether the criteria have been met, and describes how and where to collect clearance samples after decontamination. In most cases, clearance sampling includes both surface and aggressive air samples. Appendix K is a clearance plan template that identifies the types of required information. To determine whether the decontaminated area may be reoccupied, the Environmental Unit (and the ECC separately, if one is convened) evaluates the results of clearance samples. For the anthrax incidents to date, and given methods that have been used, cleanup was considered successful only when there was no growth of B. anthracis cultured from any environmental samples taken after decontamination. Other factors that will be considered include the decontamination process parameters (e.g., temperature, relative humidity, decontaminant concentration, and contact time) and the results from post-decontamination culture of biological indicators that may have been used during fumigation or sterilization processes. From such an evaluation the Environmental Unit or ECC, or both, recommend whether the area may be reoccupied, or whether further decontamination is necessary. The UC makes the final decision that a facility is appropriately decontaminated for reoccupancy. The facility owner or responsible public health agency makes the final decision to reopen a decontaminated facility. A theme that is emphasized throughout this document is that many activities can greatly reduce the time required to restore airport operations if those activities are conducted prior to an actual release of biological warfare agent. A summary of specific resources (such as Federal, state, and local agency contacts; contractors; prospective team members; subject-matter experts; laboratory facilities; and other entities) that should be identified in advance by airport officials is provided in each pertinent section of this document, and summary contact lists of such resources are provided in Appendix L. A summary of overall pre-planning actions that should be completed by airport officials is presented at the end of this document.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

Plan evaluation for heat resilience: complementary methods to comprehensively assess heat planning in Tempe and Tucson, Arizona

Abstract Escalating impacts from climate change and urban heat are increasing the urgency for communities to equitably plan for heat resilience. Cities in the desert Southwest are among the hottest and fastest warming in the U.S., placing them on the front lines of heat planning. Urban heat resilience requires an integrated planning approach that coordinates strategies across the network of plans that shape the built environment and risk patterns. To date, few studies have assessed cities’ progress on heat planning. This research is the first to combine two emerging plan evaluation approaches to examine how networks of plans shape urban heat resilience through case studies of Tempe and Tucson, Arizona. The first methodology, Plan Quality Evaluation for Heat Resilience, adapts existing plan quality assessment approaches to heat. We assess whether plans meet 56 criteria across seven principles of high-quality planning and the types of heat strategies included in the plans. The second methodology, the Plan Integration for Resilience Scorecard™ (PIRS™) for Heat, focuses on plan policies that could influence urban heat hazards. We categorize policies by policy tool and heat mitigation strategy and score them based on their heat impact. Scored policies are then mapped to evaluate their spatial distribution and the net effect of the plan network. The resulting PIRS™ for Heat scorecard is compared with heat vulnerability indicators to assess policy alignment with risks. We find that both cities are proactively planning for heat resilience using similar plan and strategy types, however, there are clear and consistent opportunities for improvement. Combining these complementary plan evaluation methods provides a more comprehensive understanding of how plans address heat and a generalizable approach that communities everywhere could use to identify opportunities for improved heat resilience planning.

Environmental Sciences & Ecology↗

Linear Radiation Monitor (LRM)

These PPTs will be handouts for students attending the Nuclear Emergency Management System (NEMS) Workshop. This workshop is training on how to plan emergency response drills/exercises.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

NeutronRAE II Check List

This document will be used as a handout to the students attending the Nuclear Emergency Management System (NEMS) Workshop. The workshop is training on how to plan emergency response drills/exercises.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Assessing Vulnerabilities, Risks, and Consequences of Damage to Critical Infrastructure

Since the publication of 'Critical Foundations: Protecting America's Infrastructure,' there has been a keen understanding of the complexity, interdependencies, and shared responsibility required to protect the nation's most critical assets that are essential to our way of life. The original 5 sectors defined in 1997 have grown to 18 Critical Infrastructures and Key Resources (CIKR), which are discussed in the 2009 National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) and its supporting sector-specific plans. The NIPP provides the structure for a national program dedicated to enhanced protection and resiliency of the nation's infrastructure. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) provides in-depth, multi-disciplinary assessments of threat, vulnerability, and consequence across all 18 sectors at scales ranging from specific facilities to infrastructures spanning multi-state regions, such as the Oil and Natural Gas (ONG) sector. Like many of the CIKR sectors, the ONG sector is comprised of production, processing, distribution, and storage of highly valuable and potentially dangerous commodities. Furthermore, there are significant interdependencies with other sectors, including transportation, communication, finance, and government. Understanding the potentially devastating consequences and collateral damage resulting from a terrorist attack or natural event is an important element of LLNL's infrastructure security programs. Our work began in the energy sector in the late 1990s and quickly expanded other critical infrastructure sectors. We have performed over 600 physical assessments with a particular emphasis on those sectors that utilize, store, or ship potentially hazardous materials and for whom cyber security is important. The success of our approach is based on building awareness of vulnerabilities and risks and working directly with industry partners to collectively advance infrastructure protection. This approach consists of three phases: The Pre-Assessment Phase brings together infrastructure owners and operators to identify critical assets and help the team create a structured information request. During this phase, we gain information about the critical assets from those who are most familiar with operations and interdependencies, making the time we spend on the ground conducting the assessment much more productive and enabling the team to make actionable recommendations. The Assessment Phase analyzes 10 areas: Threat environment, cyber architecture, cyber penetration, physical security, physical penetration, operations security, policies and procedures, interdependencies, consequence analysis, and risk characterization. Each of these individual tasks uses direct and indirect data collection, site inspections, and structured and facilitated workshops to gather data. Because of the importance of understanding the cyber threat, LLNL has built both fixed and mobile cyber penetration, wireless penetration and supporting tools that can be tailored to fit customer needs. The Post-Assessment Phase brings vulnerability and risk assessments to the customer in a format that facilitates implementation of mitigation options. Often the assessment findings and recommendations are briefed and discussed with several levels of management and, if appropriate, across jurisdictional boundaries. The end result is enhanced awareness and informed protective measures. Over the last 15 years, we have continued to refine our methodology and capture lessons learned and best practices. The resulting risk and decision framework thus takes into consideration real-world constraints, including regulatory, operational, and economic realities. In addition to 'on the ground' assessments focused on mitigating vulnerabilities, we have integrated our computational and atmospheric dispersion capability with easy-to-use geo-referenced visualization tools to support emergency planning and response operations. LLNL is home to the National Atmospheric Release Advisory Center (NARAC) and the Interagency Modeling and Atmospheric Assessment Center (IMAAC). NARAC/IMAAC has capabilities to respond to toxic industrial chemical spills, nuclear-power plant accidents, fires, chemical/biological agents, radiological/nuclear devices (RDDs, INDs), and other airborne hazards. Our web-based systems provide hazards assessments of critical infrastructure for defensive planning and can provide infrastructure operators and emergency responders with a baseline for planning and exercises. LLNL's infrastructure security web mapping services facilitate dissemination of technical information for all phases of disaster management. Examples of some of these products are shown in the Figure 1.

03 NATURAL GAS↗

FHT 1377 PackEye

This PPT will be provided as a handout to students attending the Nuclear Emergency Management System (NEMS) Workshop in Oct 2015. This workshop is training on how to plan emergency response drills/exercises.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

The Future of Electricity Resource Planning

Electricity resource planning is the process of identifying longer-term investments to meet electricity reliability requirements and public policy goals at a reasonable cost. Resource planning processes provide a forum for regulators, electric utilities, and electricity industry stakeholders to evaluate the economic, environmental, and social benefits and costs of different investment options. By facilitating a discussion on future goals, challenges and strategies, resource planning processes often play an important role in shaping utility business decisions. Resource planning emerged more than three decades ago in an era of transition, where declining electricity demand and rising costs spurred fundamental changes in electricity industry regulation and structure. Despite significant changes in the industry, resource planning continues to play an important role in supporting investment decision making. Over the next two decades, the electricity industry will again undergo a period of transition, driven by technological change, shifting customer preferences and public policy goals. This transition will bring about a gradual paradigm shift in resource planning, requiring changes in scope, approaches and methods. Even as it changes, resource planning will continue to be a central feature of the electricity industry. Its functions — ensuring the reliability of high voltage (“bulk”) power systems, enabling oversight of regulated utilities and facilitating low-cost compliance with public policy goals — are likely to grow in importance as the electricity industry enters a new period of technological, economic and regulatory change. This report examines the future of electricity resource planning in the context of a changing electricity industry. The report examines emerging issues and evolving practices in five key areas that will shape the future of resource planning: (1) central-scale generation, (2) distributed generation, (3) demand-side resources, (4) transmission and (5) uncertainty and risk management. The analysis draws on a review of recent resource plans for 10 utilities that reflect some of the U.S. electricity industry’s extensive diversity.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Use of Autonomous Vehicles in Emergency Situations - Wildfire Planning and Mitigation

Unmanned vehicles can be useful in emergency situations for many applications such as surveillance, access to harsh environments, and delivery of supplies. However, efforts to use drones in these situations has not been well-coordinated. This project is looking at multiple aspects of the problem with sub-teams addressing: establishing a method and database network to identify and communicate resources for deployment during major incidents and disasters; identifying how drones and other aviation assets can be useful in wildfire-specific emergencies, including mitigation and prevention planning; and considering safety, rules, and behavior of autonomous vehicles.

Autonomous Vehicles↗

Maximizing Operational Efficiencies in Waste Management on the Hanford Plateau Remediation Contract in a Down-turned Market - 13484

Recent changes in DOE priorities and funding have pressed DOE and its contractors to look for innovative methods to sustain critical operations at sites across the Complex. At the Hanford Site, DOE Richland Operations and its prime contractor, CH2M Hill Plateau Remediation Company (CHPRC), have completed in-depth assessments of the Plateau Remediation Contract (PRC) operations that compared available funding to mission and operational objectives in an effort to maintain requisite safety and compliance margins while realizing cost savings that meet funding profiles. These assessments included confirmation of current baseline activities, identification of potential efficiencies, barriers to implementation, and potential increased risks associated with implementation. Six operating PRC waste management facilities were evaluated against three possible end-states: complete facility closure, maintaining base operations, and performing minimum safe surveillance and maintenance activities. The costs to completely close evaluated facilities were determined to be prohibitively high and this end-state was quickly dropped from consideration. A summary of the analysis of remaining options by facility, efficiencies identified, impact to risk profiles, and expected cost savings is provided in Table I. The expected cost savings are a result of: - right-sizing and cross-training work crews to address maintenance activities across facilities; - combining and sequencing 'like-moded' operational processes; - cross-cutting emergency planning and preparedness staffing; - resource redistribution and optimization; - reducing areas requiring routine surveillance and inspection. For the efficiencies identified, there are corresponding increases in risk, including a loss of breadth and depth of available resources; lengthened response time to emergent issues; inability to invest in opportunities for improvement (OFIs); potential single-point failures or non-compliancies due to resource scarcity; limited cross-training capability; and reduced capability to respond to changes in DOE priorities. Finally, there are many challenges to achieving these cost savings. With a workforce nearing retirement effective succession planning becomes critical to success and requires establishing a balance between the cost of hiring and training and cost-saving activities. With six active waste management facilities spread across nearly 15 square miles, scheduling and deploying cross-trained surveillance and maintenance teams is a logistical challenge, particularly as the loss of funding has not diminished emphasis by regulatory agencies placed on the safe and compliant performance of DOE and its contractors. As reflected in Table I, efficiencies are currently being implemented on the Hanford Plateau Remediation Contract (PRC) that deliver cost savings that align with the current site budget while maintaining critical capabilities. It is currently estimated that these efficiencies will result in a cost savings of approximately $9 million for FY13 in base and minimum safe operations on the PRC - a cost reduction of more than 13 percent over FY12 and nearly 30 percent over FY09 levels. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Estimating Power System Interruption Costs: A Guidebook for Electric Utilities

Utilities are constantly making improvements to their infrastructure and operating protocols to maintain or enhance the reliability and resilience of the electric grid. Customer interruption cost (CIC) estimates are useful in assessing and monetizing the economic benefits customers receive from these improvements. This Guidebook for electric utilities explains how to conduct customer interruption cost studies and describes commonly-used, value-based planning methods. The authors intend that this Guidebook will serve as a reference for utility personnel, policymakers and experts in survey design and administration who may be planning to implement CIC studies. It brings the utility industry up-to-date using modern survey technologies, practices, and data analytics to estimate CICs and, ultimately, use the estimates to address both traditional and emerging planning needs.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Human Research Program Human Health Countermeasures Element Cardiovascular Risks Standing Review Panel (SRP)

The Cardiovascular Risk Standing Review Panel (SRP) evaluated several cardiovascular risks associated with space flight along with the ongoing and emerging plans to study these issues and potentially propose and/or develop countermeasures. The areas of focus included: 1) The risk of cardiac rhythm problems during prolonged space flight, and 2) Issues related to the risk of orthostatic intolerance during re-exposure to gravity. An emerging area of concern is radiation associated vascular injury. The risk of cardiac rhythm disturbances has emerged based on case reports only. No systematic study of this risk has been published. However, concerns about this risk are heightened by the age range of astronauts, the structural changes in the heart that occur during space flight, and the potential shifts in fluids and electrolytes. The current plan is to use prolonged Holter monitor EKG records made as part of the "Integrated Cardiovascular SMO" in space to determine more about the frequency and magnitude of this problem and to link this data to complementary data from the nutrition group on electrolytes. The SRP was supportive of this approach. The SRP also felt that any data related to cardiovascular risk in space should be better coordinated with the medical screening data that all astronauts undergo at regular intervals. Additionally, while there are potential privacy issues related to this suggestion, many of the current barriers to better coordination of experimental and clinical data appear to reflect longstanding cultural traditions at NASA that need rethinking. The risk of orthostatic intolerance during re-exposure to gravity was seen by the SRP as an area supported by a wealth of published physiological evidence. The SRP also felt that moving forward with the planned approach to countermeasures was reasonable and that extensive additional hypothesis testing on the physiology of orthostatic intolerance was not needed at this time. There was support for developing ground based models of limited (e.g. 1/6 th) G environments on Earth that generated a number of ideas for consideration by NASA investigators.

Joyner, Michael↗