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At least 73 records · Page 4

U.S. Department of Energy Implementation of Chemical Evaluation Requirements for Transuranic Waste Disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

This report summarizes new controls designed to ensure that transuranic waste disposed at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) does not contain incompatible chemicals. These new controls include a Chemical Compatibility Evaluation, an evaluation of oxidizing chemicals, and a waste container assessment to ensure that waste is safe for disposal. These controls are included in the Chapter 18 of the Documented Safety Analysis for WIPP (1).

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Solidified Organics Testing

The Radiochemical Engineering Development Center currently has plutonium-containing liquid organic waste that must be solidified before final disposal as solid debris waste. The documented safety analysis for the Radiochemical Engineering Development Center limits the amount of plutonium that can be released from solid debris waste forms during a fire scenario, which is less than 10 -4 airborne release fraction. Experimental results for plutonium release fractions from burning various materials has been compiled by the Department of Energy [DOE, 1994]. Combustion of organic liquids gave an average airborne release fraction of 6 × 10 -3 and combustion of surface-contaminated solids (paper, plastic, etc.) gave an average airborne release fraction of 5 × 10 -4 . Burning of 30% tri- n -butyl phosphate (TBP) in kerosene gave cerium release fractions of 5.6–7.7 × 10 -3 [Mishima and Schwendiman, 1973]. Earlier testing had evaluated many different grout-based formulations to solidify plutonium-containing organic waste liquids, and the ones used in these tests were shown to produce monolithic, fairly homogeneous solids. Each of the waste forms tested would meet the waste acceptance criteria for disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant as transuranic waste, but there were questions about whether they would meet the plutonium release criteria during a fire. The purpose of the work described here was to quantify the airborne release fraction for cerium, as a surrogate for plutonium, in these proposed waste forms. Cerium is often used as a simulant for plutonium in bench-scale testing, and cerium nitrate hexahydrate [Ce (NO 3 ) 3 ·6H 2 O] was added to the organic solutions that were solidified to prepare the surrogate waste forms for these tests. The waste forms were subjected to the designated fire scenario of 600ºC for 1 hour, and any cerium in the off-gas was trapped using a quartz filter followed by a scrubber containing 0.1 M NaOH, which is the same as used by Mishima and Schwendiman, [1973].

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Water Ingress Testing of Commercially Available Containers for the TA-55 Criticality Safety Program

This memorandum outlines the water ingress test results for several commercially available container types that are advertised as “leak tight” but need to be tested to the water resistant criteria set forth by the TA-55 Criticality Safety Program. The usage of SAVY-4000 containers as water resistant containers inside gloveboxes, although allowed, is expensive, ergonomically challenging, and could be avoided if there is a commercial alternative that meets the water ingress criterion. The contents of this document are strictly for TA55 Criticality Safety Requirements (PA-RD01009), and it is not to be used to assign a damage ratio for the reduction of material at risk or implementation in the documented safety analysis. The NMCC will proceed as identified under PA-DOP-0091, and will be invoked as the review and approval control regarding usage of these containers in the facility.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Solidification of REDC Organics and Airborne Release Fraction Measurements

The Radiochemical Engineering Development Center (REDC) generates various liquid organic wastes from processing irradiated targets to recover heavy elements. In the past, these organics were discharged to the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) liquid low-level waste (LLLW) system, along with the aqueous waste. Because of a reduction in aqueous LLLW from other ORNL generators and an increase in the radionuclide concentration, particularly 238 Pu, in the organic waste stream, the organics can no longer be discharged to the LLLW system. The plan is to solidify the liquid organic waste for disposal as solid debris waste. The documented safety analysis for REDC uses an airborne release fraction of 5 x 10 -4 with a respirable fraction of 0.2 for plutonium and other actinides from packaged solid debris waste during a fire scenario, for an overall airborne release fraction/respirable fraction of 10 -4 . Solidifying the organic liquids, either by using PM-199 Organoclay ® or by grouting, would produce solid waste forms with no free liquid, which should qualify for disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant. The use of Organoclay would be much simpler to implement inside a hot cell. Granular Organoclay can be added to the organic waste solutions until there is a dry layer on top of the liquid and then allowed to cure for a few hours. Grouting the liquids would require using multiple ingredients and mixing steps. Both methods produced waste forms that trapped cerium, as a surrogate for plutonium, inside the waste, with airborne release fractions during fire scenario tests of well below the 10 -4 limit.

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Nimble Feedthrough Qualification - 125% High Explosive Overpressure Test Plan RevA

The primary purpose of this High Explosive (HE) Over-Pressure Test (OPT) is to qualify top cover diagnostic feedthroughs that will be used on LLNL Nimble Subcritical Experiment (SCE) Series designs per experimental design verification requirements specified in ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Case 2564, Impulsively-Loaded Pressure Vessels, Section VIII, Division 3; and to satisfy the over-test requirement of DOE-STD-1212. The diagnostic feedthroughs are part of the Vessel Confinement System (VCS), which is credited as a Safety Significant Design Feature per the U1a Facility Documented Safety Analysis (DSA). The OPT will be conducted at the LANL Area 1, R306 Firing Site (TA-15-R306) in a 3-foot diameter VCS depicted in Figure 1.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Alternative Liquid DSA Containers for Sludge Slurry Storage in the SRNL Shielded Cells

A pending revision of the Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) for the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) defines “DSA containers” for liquid sludge slurries as containers not susceptible to a flashing spray release in a fire and requires that a list of DSA containers be maintained. High Level Waste (HLW) samples are typically received from the Savannah River Site (SRS) tank farm after retrieval from the storage tanks. Glass bottles are preferred for long-term storage of radioactive liquid sludge slurry samples but are not on the DSA container list. An evaluation has been conducted to identify vessel lids for the glass bottles that would vent prior to pressurization and liquid superheating in a fire event. Low melting Field’s Metal eutectic alloy with a melting point of 62 °C has been identified as a preferred material of construction for vessel lids for this application because the material is resistant to puncture and is expected to have good chemical compatibility and radiation stability in the shielded cells environment. A test vessel was designed to evaluate the alloy and confirm that it would melt before the water in the vessel reaches the boiling point. The tests confirmed: 1) that the reported melting point of the alloy was accurate, 2) that a top fashioned from this material will melt creating an open atmosphere in the vessel headspace prior to sample boiling under moderate and fast heating rates, and 3) that nonuniform heating of the bottle from the bottom also results in melting of the alloy prior to boiling. Based on the results, neither an engulfing fire with standing or toppled bottles or a fire producing localized heat at the vessel bottom would result in flashing spray conditions.

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Temperature Effect of Cesium Exchange onto Crystalline Silicotitanate in AP-107 and AP-105 Hanford Tank Wastes and Two Simulants

Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC (WRPS) is charged with the development of the Tank Side Cesium Removal (TSCR) system to process Hanford tank waste supernates in preparation for vitrification. In addition to a filtration step, TSCR will remove cesium (Cs) using ion exchange columns filled with crystalline silicotitanate (CST) ion exchange media. CST is produced by Honeywell UOP, LLC. The documented safety analysis (DSA) developed for the TSCR system limits a single column loading to 141,600 Ci 137 Cs. Given a 137 Cs isotopic mass fraction of 20% and the planned CST bed size of 596 L (157.5 gal) in a TSCR column, this equates to 0.10 mmole Cs per g CST (Cs distribution coefficient, K d , 1400 mL/g). Factors that influence Cs uptake by CST include (but are not limited to) (1) CST production (lot-to-lot variations), (2) contact temperature, (3) contact duration, (4) competitors in the tank waste feed, (5) anionic composition of the tank waste feed, and (6) the 137 Cs isotopic mass fraction (differs slightly among tank wastes and decreases with time).

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3013 Surveillance Program Interim Summary Report (FY16-FY21)

The K-Area Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) requires the facility participate in the SRS Site Surveillance Program as a part of Shipping Package Qualification and Storage Surveillance Program. The Site Surveillance Program outlines activities for field surveillance and laboratory tests that demonstrate the 3013 containers meet the functional performance requirements described in the DSA. The SRS Surveillance Program also supports the complex-wide Integrated Surveillance Program (ISP) for 3013 containers in accordance with DOESTD-3013. The purpose of this report is to provide a summary of the SRS portion of the surveillance program activities from FY16 through FY21 and formally communicate the interpretation of these results by the Surveillance Program Authority (SPA).

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H-Canyon Jumper Gasket Sealing Evaluation

H-Canyon Documented Safety Analysis approved December 2019 credits the leak integrity of HCanyon (HCA) process tanks, piping, and jumpers in preventing the release of radioactive material in a post seismic environment. Demonstration of leak tightness capability for this equipment was achieved through substantial analytical effort. However, one potential weak point that affects leak integrity exists at the gasketed joint between Hanford Connectors (HC) and nozzles. Review of the HCA Crane Log over a three-year period indicates the HCs periodically leak. Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) was requested to perform gasket compression tests that evaluate gasket relaxation characteristics, i.e., creep, and provide improvements to the HC installation process that can reduce or eliminate the frequency of leaks at HCs. A HC torque value of 312 ft-lbf is the target value used because it is the minimum torque value, with 95% confidence, when an unlubricated HC is impacted for standard sealing period of 9 seconds.

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Packaging Capacity Calculation: Pu Oxide Packaging Options with the 2 Quart SAVY Container

This calculation supports programmatic efforts to Dilute and Dispose Pu. Metal is to be oxidized at LANL, then transported to SRS for dilution at SRS. Ultimately, the diluted oxide will be disposed of at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). Currently 3013 containers are used to package the oxide, which are placed in to 9975 Type B shipping containers. The Oxide Packaging Technology Maturation Plan determined that a transition to the used of 2-qt SAVY containers placed in 9977 would increase efficiency in shipping and handling and increase programmatic flexibility. The 2-quart SAVY container meets DOE M 441.1 and TA-55 Documented Safety Analysis requirements for handling and storage of Pu oxide at LANL.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Annual Transuranic Waste Inventory Report – 2015 (Data Cutoff Date 12/31/2014)

The purpose of this Annual Transuranic Waste Inventory Report – 2015 (ATWIR-2015) is to document the updated inventory estimate of transuranic (TRU) waste reported by the TRU waste generator sites as of December 31, 2014. This updated inventory information is provided to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) and is available to the DOE TRU waste complex, Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) stakeholders, and regulators. The TRU waste inventory information is used for strategic planning, supports DOE/CBFO’s input into documents (e.g., WIPP Documented Safety Analysis and National Environmental Policy Act analyses), the development of new containers or shipping packages, planned change requests, and other design changes that may take place in the repository. Furthermore, if requested by DOE/CBFO, this report will provide the basis for the Performance Assessment Inventory Report for performance assessment modeling. This report focuses on the TRU waste stored or projected to be generated (up through calendar year [CY] 2033) at the TRU waste generator sites.

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Annual Transuranic Waste Inventory Report – 2016 (Data Cutoff Date 12/31/2015)

The purpose of this Annual Transuranic Waste Inventory Report – 2016 (ATWIR-2016), using a cutoff date of December 31, 2015, is to document the updated inventory estimate of transuranic (TRU) waste reported by the TRU waste generator sites in the Annual Transuranic Waste Inventory Report – 2015 (ATWIR-2015) (DOE 2015a) that had a cutoff date of December 31, 2014. This updated inventory information is provided to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) and is available to the DOE TRU waste complex, Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) stakeholders, and regulators. The TRU waste inventory information is used for strategic planning, and supports DOE/CBFO’s input into documents (e.g., WIPP Documented Safety Analysis and National Environmental Policy Act analyses), the development of new containers or shipping packages, planned change requests, and other design changes that may take place in the repository. Furthermore, if requested by DOE/CBFO, this report will provide the basis for the Performance Assessment Inventory Report for performance assessment (PA) modeling. This report focuses on the TRU waste stored or projected to be generated (up through calendar year [CY] 2050) at the TRU waste generator sites.

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Annual Transuranic Waste Inventory Report – 2018 (Data Cutoff Date 12/31/2017)

The purpose of this Annual Transuranic Waste Inventory Report – 2018 (ATWIR-2018) is to document the inventory estimate of transuranic (TRU) waste reported by the TRU waste generator sites as of December 31, 2017. This report also notes major changes to the inventory used for the Annual Transuranic Waste Inventory Report – 2017 (ATWIR-2017) (U.S. DOE 2017a) that had a cutoff date of December 31, 2016. This updated inventory information is provided to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) and is available to the DOE TRU waste complex, Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) stakeholders, and regulators. The TRU waste inventory information is used for strategic planning, and supports DOE/CBFO’s input into documents (e.g., WIPP Documented Safety Analysis and National Environmental Policy Act analyses), planned changes, and other design changes that may take place in the repository. The DOE/CBFO has determined this report will provide the basis for the Performance Assessment Inventory Report for development of the 2019 Compliance Recertification Application (CRA) deferred performance assessment (PA) (Shrader 2018).

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Annual Transuranic Waste Inventory Report – 2020 (Data Cutoff Date 12/31/2019)

The purpose of this Annual Transuranic Waste Inventory Report (ATWIR) – 2020 is to document the inventory estimate of transuranic (TRU) waste reported by the TRU waste generator sites as of December 31, 2019. This report also notes major changes to the inventory used for the ATWIR-2019 that had a data cutoff date of December 31, 2018. This updated inventory information is available to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) TRU waste complex, Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) stakeholders, and regulators. The TRU waste inventory information is used for strategic planning, and supports the DOE Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) input into documents (e.g., WIPP Documented Safety Analysis and National Environmental Policy Act analyses), planned changes, and other design changes as needed for the WIPP project.

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Annual Transuranic Waste Inventory Report – 2021 (Data Cutoff Date 12/31/2020)

The purpose of this Annual Transuranic Waste Inventory Report (ATWIR) – 2021 is to document the inventory estimate of transuranic (TRU) waste reported by the TRU waste generator sites as of December 31, 2020. This report also notes major changes to the inventory used for the ATWIR-2020 that had a data cutoff date of December 31, 2019. This updated inventory information is available to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) TRU waste complex, Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) stakeholders, and regulators. The TRU waste inventory information is used for strategic planning, and supports the DOE Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) input into documents (e.g., WIPP Documented Safety Analysis and National Environmental Policy Act analyses), planned changes, and other design changes as needed for the WIPP project.

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Annual Transuranic Waste Inventory Report – 2022 (Data Cutoff Date 12/31/2021)

The purpose of this Annual Transuranic Waste Inventory Report (ATWIR) – 2022 is to document the inventory estimate of transuranic (TRU) waste reported by the TRU waste generator sites as of December 31, 2021. This report also notes major changes to the inventory since the ATWIR-2021, which had a data cutoff date of December 31, 2020. This updated inventory information is available to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) TRU waste complex, Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) stakeholders, and regulators. The TRU waste inventory information is used for strategic planning, and supports the DOE Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) input into documents (e.g., WIPP Documented Safety Analysis and National Environmental Policy Act evaluations), performance assessments, planned changes, and other design changes as needed for the WIPP project.

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HFIR LEU High Density Silicide Dispersion Optimized Design Steady-State Heat Transfer Analyses

Steady-state heat transfer simulations of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) with the low-enriched uranium (LEU) high-density silicide dispersion Optimized fuel design were performed to support comprehensive performance and safety metric studies concerning this design. The LEU Optimized design operates at 95 MW to maintain HFIR’s current highly enriched uranium (HEU) core performance level at 85 MW. Full cycle Mode 1 full flow Case 1 (inlet temperature), Case 2 (flux-to-flow), and Case 3 (inlet pressure) safety limit analyses were performed to assess the margins to critical heat flux. Under the prescribed conditions, this LEU design meets the safety limit and limiting control setting requirements outlined in HFIR’s documented safety analysis; however, the safety margins are less than those for the 85 MW HEU core, and several assumptions were made where fuel fabrication and qualification data are currently lacking for the silicide fuel design. Effects of changes to pertinent fuel fabrication assumptions and uncertainty factors on thermal safety margins were also evaluated, showing that the margins are sensitive to many of these parameters. Power and pressure perturbations were also performed, indicating that significant steady-state thermal margins could be gained by increasing the coolant inlet pressure.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗