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At least 73 records · Page 4
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2019

Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence (FY 2018 Data Analysis Annual Report)

The National Nuclear Security Administration’s Office of Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence (NSDD) has facilitated the installation of more than 3,728 radiation portal monitors (RPMs) at 660 sites in 63 countries. This collection of RPMs represents the world’s largest network of radiation detectors and provides one element of the defense-in-depth approach that supports the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture. These systems support NSDD’s mission to build partner country capability to deter, detect, and interdict the illicit transport of radiological and fissile material through strategic points of entry and exit at seaports, airports, and border crossings.NSDD works collaboratively with partner countries and international organizations to optimize the operation of these RPMs. The large amount of data provided by NSDD partner countries (summarized in the banner to the right) highlights the close cooperation and partnerships NSDD has built with 63 countries around the world. Thirty-two of these countries shared at least some RPM-related data with NSDD in fiscal year (FY) 2018. This significant level of data sharing is a key element that distinguishes the NSDD office as unique among nuclear nonproliferation programs and initiatives: NSDD can provide specific, objective, data-driven decisions and support for sustaining the radiation detection systems it helped deploy. This data analysis report summarizes and aggregates the RPM data provided to the NSDD office for analysis and review in FY 2018.The data can be used to describe RPM performance and characterize the wide diversity of NSDD deployment sites. For example, NSDD deploys detector systems across sites with natural background radiation levels that can vary by a factor of up to nine from site to site. Some RPM lanes have few occupancies, whereas others have up to approximately 8,000 occupancies per day, and the different types of cargo traveling through a site can result in site-wide alarm rates that range from near 0% at some sites to above 3% at others. Based on the data received, the global average uptime for NSDD RPMs was 97% for FY 2018. NSDD takes all these factors into account in making recommendations to partner countries on how to most effectively manage and maintain site operations. NSDD utilizes reports and other information products created by ORNL Radiation Inspection Systems Team (RIST) data analysts to efficiently allocate the resources needed to detect and ultimately interdict illicit nuclear and radiological material.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2019

On the Legality of Nuclear Deterrence

Since the birth of nuclear weapons in 1945, the morality of nuclear weapons has been debated vigorously and often heatedly. This debate will continue as long as civilian populations are potentially subject to the immediate and long-term horrors of nuclear blast and radioactive fallout; the use of nuclear weapons in the world today would almost certainly constitute a profound moral failure. While fully acknowledging the importance of debating the morality of nuclear weapons, this paper focuses on the legality of nuclear weapons, in particular the legality of nuclear deterrence.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2020

LANSCE 21st Century Deterrence

The LANSCE accelerator is an important tool in the assessment and certification of the nation’s nuclear stockpile. LANSCE provides critical materials and nuclear data needed to develop a predictive capability for the performance of nuclear weapons. As the stockpile ages, materials are replaced, and manufacturing processes change, it is critical that we understand how these changes impact device performance. Dynamic proton radiography and neutron diffraction are ideally suited to contribute to this need. These capabilities are essential to enabling the NNSA labs to become more responsive and agile in advancing the deterrent of the future.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Nuclear Weapons Deterrence Concepts

Deterrence is the action of discouraging an action or event through instilling doubt or fear of the consequences. Our security hedge in an uncertain world discourages our adversaries & reassures our allies.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2019

5th Annual LLNL Deterrence Workshop -- Multi-Domain Strategic Competition: Rewards and Risks

A fundamental uncertainty in the U.S. approach to strategic competition is about the long-term goals. It remains unclear to what end the U.S. is competing. One answer is that the U.S. aims to preserve and expand its influence to secure economic and political interests while safeguarding a global order that serves these interests. The competition, thus, is about using political, economic, and military instruments to achieve limited national aims by changing Russia’s and China’s behavior. Yet, if this is the U.S. goal, it has not been clearly articulated. The NSS and the NDS provide over a dozen different answers about the goals of strategic competition. In addition, senior administration officials have set out their own ideas of what the goals of the competition should be. The question of long-term goals is especially sharp at the strategic level of war. It is unclear whether the United States seeks “over-matching” capabilities for “strategic dominance” in cyber space, outer space, missile defense, conventional strike, and nuclear deterrence, or if the U.S. goals are more limited.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2019

The Need for Nuclear Deterrent Fundamentals Training

NNSA policy requires that personnel working in the Nuclear Security Enterprise (NSE) receive comprehensive training to be fully capable before they begin their work and that personnel receive ongoing training to maintain their capability and competence. However, the loss of experienced NSE staff through retirements and the influx of personnel who are inexperienced and untrained in nuclear weapons technology make these training requirements difficult to achieve. This paper presents an approach for developing and delivering a nuclear deterrent (ND) fundamentals curriculum to respond to these challenges. The training approach leverages existing material already used by Sandia National Laboratories in the ND training arena and proposes to deliver the material in an e-learning format as much as possible. The approach also seeks to maximize the amount of material to be delivered in an unclassified setting.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗
DOE OSTI2022

You Can't Spell Integrated Deterrence Without 'E'

Instruments of national power include DIME (Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic). In light of the 2022 National Defense Strategy, when considering a fully integrated deterrence model, the US must leverage each and every one of these instruments; and in the case of China, especially the economic ‘E’. This paper highlights the current problems with the Sino-American economic relationship and proposes a solution that will enhance the competitive position and national power of the US.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Pits 101: The true meaning of deterrence

Mark Davis (ALDWP-COO) is the Chief Operation Officer for the Associate Laboratory Directorate of Weapons Production, where he focuses on ramping up operations in the Plutonium Facility in support of the directorate's programs, including the plutonium pit mission. Davis has had an accomplished career in the U.S. Navy that has compelled him to inspire those who support our nation's national security through sharing stories of our nation's history and the individuals who have been world-changers. He is passionate not only about our national security mission here at the Lab, but also about ensuring every employee understands that they play a key role in the mission, no matter their day job. In this special edition of the Pits 101 series, Public Affairs sat down with Davis to get his perspective on the meaning of credible and sustainable strategic deterrence, and why it matters today.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2014

Deterrence of device counterfeiting, cloning, and subversion by substitution using hardware fingerprinting

Deterrence of device subversion by substitution may be achieved by including a cryptographic fingerprint unit within a computing device for authenticating a hardware platform of the computing device. The cryptographic fingerprint unit includes a physically unclonable function ("PUF") circuit disposed in or on the hardware platform. The PUF circuit is used to generate a PUF value. A key generator is coupled to generate a private key and a public key based on the PUF value while a decryptor is coupled to receive an authentication challenge posed to the computing device and encrypted with the public key and coupled to output a response to the authentication challenge decrypted with the private key.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2014

Stockpile Stewardship: How We Ensure the Nuclear Deterrent Without Testing

In the 1990s, the U.S. nuclear weapons program shifted emphasis from developing new designs to dismantling thousands of existing weapons and maintaining a much smaller enduring stockpile. The United States ceased underground nuclear testing, and the Department of Energy created the Stockpile Stewardship Program to maintain the safety, security, and reliability of the U.S. nuclear deterrent without full-scale testing. This video gives a behind the scenes look at a set of unique capabilities at Lawrence Livermore that are indispensable to the Stockpile Stewardship Program: high performance computing, the Superblock category II nuclear facility, the JASPER a two stage gas gun, the High Explosive Applications Facility (HEAF), the National Ignition Facility (NIF), and the Site 300 contained firing facility.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2016

Cross Domain Deterrence: Livermore Technical Report, 2014-2016

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) is an original collaborator on the project titled “Deterring Complex Threats: The Effects of Asymmetry, Interdependence, and Multi-polarity on International Strategy,” (CDD Project) led by the UC Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation at UCSD under PIs Jon Lindsay and Erik Gartzke , and funded through the DoD Minerva Research Initiative. In addition to participating in workshops and facilitating interaction among UC social scientists, LLNL is leading the computational modeling effort and assisting with empirical case studies to probe the viability of analytic, modeling and data analysis concepts. This report summarizes LLNL work on the CDD Project to date, primarily in Project Years 1-2, corresponding to Federal fiscal year 2015. LLNL brings two unique domains of expertise to bear on this Project: (1) access to scientific expertise on the technical dimensions of emerging threat technology, and (2) high performance computing (HPC) expertise, required for analyzing the complexity of bargaining interactions in the envisioned threat models. In addition, we have a small group of researchers trained as social scientists who are intimately familiar with the International Relations research. We find that pairing simulation scientists, who are typically trained in computer science, with domain experts, social scientists in this case, is the most effective route to developing powerful new simulation tools capable of representing domain concepts accurately and answering challenging questions in the field.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗