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At least 73 records · Page 4

Estimation of Ground-Level Radioisotope Distributions for Underground Nuclear Test Leakage

On-site inspections (OSI) will be an important process to deter and help verify compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). An important tool in narrowing the possible locations to collect evidence of a nuclear test during an on-site inspection may be over-flights of the general area using aerial gamma spectroscopy which can measure the energy and intensity of gamma radiation and help identify areas that may warrant further investigation of areas of high concentrations of radioactivity. This paper will investigate the capabilities of gamma ray detectors that are typically used in aerial searches. Modeling and simulation results of the detector response for radionuclide species for an OSI will be presented for a variety of assumed releases, depositions on the ground, and times after a suspected Treaty violation for typical over flight heights and speeds. This data will provide information on the possible applicability for airborne spectroscopy and the challenges and limitations of this tool for OSI. Of particular interest will be analysis of the data for gross count, regions of interest, and isotope identification types of algorithms and the characteristics of each.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Underground Gas Sampling for {sup 37}Ar in Hard Limestone

On-Site Inspection (OSI) is a part of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Each State Party has the right to request an OSI to clarify if a nuclear weapon test or other nuclear explosion has been carried out in violation of the Treaty. In order to conduct an OSI, States Parties must have a solid understanding of the source term, environmental transport, and radionuclide background. This work focuses on the development of sampling technologies to measure {sup 37}Ar and other underground forensic radiotracer noble gasses. The inert properties of these noble gasses makes them vital for the detection of underground nuclear tests. (authors)

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Applied antineutrino physics workshop.

This workshop is the fourth one of a series that includes the Neutrino Geophysics Conference at Honolulu, Hawaii, which I attended in 2005. This workshop was organized by the Astro-Particle and Cosmology laboratory in the recently opened Condoret building of the University of Paris. More information, including copies of the presentations, on the workshop is available on the website: www.apc.univ-paris7.fr/AAP2007/. The workshop aims at opening neutrino physics to various fields such that it can be applied in geosciences, nuclear industry (reactor and spent fuel monitoring) and non-proliferation. The workshop was attended by over 60 people from Europe, USA, Asia and Brazil. The meeting was also attended by representatives of the Comprehensive nuclear-Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The workshop also included a workshop dinner on board of a river boat sailing the Seine river.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Radioxenon Detection for Monitoring Subsurface Nuclear Explosion

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) bans the testing of nuclear weapons anywhere on the earth (atmospheric, surface, underwater and subsurface). Identification of nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, surface, and underwater is relatively straightforward considering a wide range of signatures resulting from such an event. However, for a subsurface explosion, most of the signatures traditionally associated with a nuclear explosion are not readily available. Therefore, the international community has increasingly relied on the atmospheric measurement of noble gases to identify subsurface nuclear weapon explosions. This chapter initially covers the basic principles of subsurface nuclear explosion identification and the importance of detecting radioxenon. This is followed by reviewing some of the early radioxenon detection systems that were developed by research groups around the world in the late 1990s and early 2000s. The detection media employed, results from laboratory and field testing, and some challenges/drawbacks for these systems are detailed. The next section of the chapter is dedicated to innovative detector concepts that have emerged in the past ten to fifteen years using novel detection material, algorithms, and signal readout techniques. The advances achieved in terms of energy resolution, coincidence detection efficiencies, system performance, and the minimum detectable concentration are covered. The final section goes over some of the potential improvements that can be incorporated in the design to enhance detector sensitivity and new detection material that can be explored in the field of radioxenon detection.

Gadey, Harish Reddy↗

Impact of environmental backgrounds on atmospheric monitoring of nuclear explosions

Radionuclide monitoring for nuclear explosions includes measuring radioactive aerosol and noble gas concentrations in the atmosphere. The International Monitoring System (IMS) of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) has made such measurements for decades, revealing much about how atmospheric radioactivity impacts the sensitivity of the network. For example, civilian emissions of radioiodine make a substantial regional impact, but a minor global impact, while civilian radioxenon emissions create major regional and complex global impacts. This example statement is strongly influenced by the minimum signal level anticipated to be interesting. The original design of the IMS anticipated relatively large signal levels, and the accomplished IMS network substantially meets or exceeds the sensitivity needed to detect those signal levels. Much lower signal levels can be motivated, which could require reconsideration of station sensitivity. Using measured and simulated background concentrations, various possible desired signal levels, and an innovative anomaly threshold, maps of sensitivity and a station ranking are developed for current and future stations. These provide a strong motivation for additional experimentation to learn about sources and the potential plusses of new technology.

Eslinger, Paul W.↗

SDAT implementation for the analysis of radioxenon β–γ coincidence spectra

The Standard Deconvolution Analysis Tool (SDAT) was developed for analysis of radioxenon β-γ coincidence spectra measured as part of the International Monitoring System (IMS) as defined in the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). The SDAT software analyzes each β-γ coincidence spectrum by fitting library vectors of each radionuclide of interest: 131mXe, 133mXe, 133Xe, and 135Xe. Detector background and radon are incorporated as optional components of the sample solution. Results are reported in mBq m-3. A new graphical user interface has been developed to facilitate ease of use and improve the data visualization. Automated energy vs. channel calibration algorithms were developed and implemented based on 137Cs β-γ coincidence spectra. Details on the user tool and testing are included.

Biegalski, S.↗

Multi-Detection Events, Probability Density Functions, and Reduced Location Area

Abstract Several efforts have been made in the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) community to assess the benefits of combining detections of radionuclides to improve the location estimates available from atmospheric transport modeling (ATM) backtrack calculations. We present a Bayesian estimation approach rather than a simple dilution field of regard approach to allow xenon detections and non-detections to be combined mathematically. This system represents one possible probabilistic approach to radionuclide event formation. Application of this method to a recent interesting radionuclide event shows a substantial reduction in the location uncertainty of that event.

atmospheric modeling↗

Coincidence measurements of radioxenon using passive implemented planar silicon (PIPS) detector

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) bans nuclear weapons testing and establishes the International Monitoring System (IMS) for the purpose of treaty verification. IMS is a detector network that confirms that global nuclear activity is peaceful in nature. These detector systems use β-γcoincidence measurements to characterize atmospheric samples containing radioxenon isotopes. The goal of this work is to use the system consisting of two sodium iodide detectors and two PIPSbox detectors to characterize isotopically pure samples of 131m Xe, 133m Xe, 133 Xe, and 135 Xe via β, γ, and β-γ coincidence measurements.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗

An Experimental Method to Measure Gaseous Diffusivity in Tight and Partially Saturated Porous Media via Continuously Monitored Mass Spectrometry

Detection of radioxenon and radioargon produced by underground nuclear explosions is one of the primary methods by which the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test–Ban Treaty (CTBT) monitors for nuclear activities. However, transport of these noble gases to the surface via barometric pumping is a complex process relying on advective and diffusive processes in a fractured porous medium to bring detectable levels to the surface. To better understand this process, experimental measurements of noble gas and chemical surrogate diffusivity in relevant lithologies are necessary. However, measurement of noble gas diffusivity in tight or partially saturated porous media is challenging due to the transparent nature of noble gases, the lengthy diffusion times, and difficulty maintaining consistent water saturation. Here, the quasi-steady-state Ney–Armistead method is modified to accommodate continuous gas sampling via effusive flow to a mass spectrometer. An analytical solution accounting for the cumulative sampling losses and induced advective flow is then derived. Experimental results appear in good agreement with the proposed theory, suggesting the presence of retained groundwater reduces the effective diffusivity of the gas tracers by 10–1000 times. Finally, by using a mass spectrometer, the method described herein is applicable to a broad range of gas species and porous media.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

127 Xe quantification method development and intercomparison exercise

Monitoring of the atmosphere for fission products ( 131m Xe, 133m Xe, 133 Xe, and 135 Xe) is performed by various laboratories to detect nuclear explosions. Quantification of 127 Xe is not routinely performed by laboratories measuring atmospheric radioxenon because it is not a fission product. 127 Xe was recently detected by a ground-based beta-gamma air monitoring system. When measured using beta-gamma coincidence detector systems, such as those in use on the International Monitoring System (IMS) of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), 127 Xe can interfere with the quantification of fission product radioxenon due to overlap of the 127 Xe beta-gamma coincidence signatures with those of fission product radioxenon. Here, this work demonstrates quantification of 127 Xe at different laboratories with different measurement techniques. Production and purification of 127 Xe was performed by neutron activation of enriched 126 Xe. The purified 127 Xe was then split between laboratories, and detection and quantification methods were developed. At Idaho National Laboratory, a quantification method involving high purity germanium detectors was devised that included self-attenuation correction. At AWE, a beta-gamma coincidence counting method, as used in support of the IMS, was modified to enable the measurement and analysis of the 127 Xe samples. Corrections were made for self-attenuation, which showed a strong xenon volume dependency, for some coincidence signatures. The gas sample activity concentration was used as the comparison metric and it showed excellent agreement between the methods.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Detection of nuclear testing from surface concentration measurements: Analysis of radioxenon from the February 2013 underground test in North Korea

A method is outlined and tested to detect low level nuclear or chemical sources from time series of concentration measurements. The method uses a mesoscale atmospheric model to simulate the concentration signature from a known or suspected source at a receptor which is then regressed successively against segments of the measurement series to create time series of metrics that measure the goodness of fit between the signatures and the measurement segments. The method was applied to radioxenon data from the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) collection site in Ussuriysk, Russia (RN58) after the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) underground nuclear test on February 12, 2013 near Punggye. The metrics were found to be a good screening tool to locate data segments with a strong likelihood of origin from Punggye, especially when multiplied together to a determine the joint probability. Metrics from RN58 were also used to find the probability that activity measured in February and April of 2013 originated from the Feb 12 test. A detailed analysis of an RN58 data segment from April 3/4, 2013 was also carried out for a grid of source locations around Punggye and identified Punggye as the most likely point of origin. Thus, the results support the strong possibility that radioxenon was emitted from the test site at various times in April and was detected intermittently at RN58, depending on the wind direction. The method does not locate unsuspected sources, but instead, evaluates the probability of a source at a specified location. However, it can be extended to include a set of suspected sources. Extension of the method to higher resolution data sets, arbitrary sampling, and time-varying sources is discussed along with a path to evaluate uncertainty in the calculated probabilities.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Modeling of fission and activation products in molten salt reactors and their potential impact on the radionuclide monitoring stations of the International Monitoring System

Molten Salt Reactors (MSRs) are one of six Generation IV reactor designs currently under development around the world. Because of the unique operating conditions of MSRs, which include molten fuel and the continuous removal of gaseous fission products during operation, work was performed to analyze the potential impact of emissions on the International Monitoring System (IMS) of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Simulations were performed to predict the production of IMS-relevant radionuclides in four MSR designs operating under two scenarios: (1) a sealed reactor with releases only during operational shutdown, and (2) continuous reprocessing or sparging of the fuel salt. From these production estimates the radioxenon and radioiodine signatures were extracted and compared to three current reactor designs (Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR), BWR, RBMK). In cases where continuous reprocessing of the fuel salt occurred, both the radioxenon and radioiodine signatures were nearly indistinguishable from a nuclear explosion. Estimates were also made of the potential emission rate of radioxenon for three reactor designs and it was found that MSRs have the potential to emit radioxenon isotopes at a rate of 10^15-8×10^16 Bq/d for 133Xe if no abatement is used. An assessment was made of activation products using a candidate fuel salt (FLiBe) mixed with corrosion products for the Thorium Molten Salt Reactor (TMSR-LF1).

Johnson, Christine M.↗

Third international challenge to model the medium- to long-range transport of radioxenon to four Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty monitoring stations

In 2015 and 2016, atmospheric transport modeling challenges were conducted in the context of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) verification, however, with a more limited scope with respect to emission inventories, simulation period and number of relevant samples (i.e., those above the Minimum Detectable Concentration (MDC)) involved. Therefore, a more comprehensive atmospheric transport modeling challenge was organized in 2019. Stack release data of Xe-133 were provided by the Institut National des Radioéléments/IRE (Belgium) and the Canadian Nuclear Laboratories/CNL (Canada) and accounted for in the simulations over a three (mandatory) or six (optional) months period. Best estimate emissions of additional facilities (radiopharmaceutical production and nuclear research facilities, commercial reactors or relevant research reactors) of the Northern Hemisphere were included as well. Model results were compared with observed atmospheric activity concentrations at four International Monitoring System (IMS) stations located in Europe and North America with overall considerable influence of IRE and/or CNL emissions for evaluation of the participants’ runs. Participants were prompted to work with controlled and harmonized model set-ups to make runs more comparable, but also to increase diversity. It was found that using the stack emissions of IRE and CNL with daily resolution does not lead to better results than disaggregating annual emissions of these two facilities taken from the literature if an overall score for all stations covering all valid observed samples is considered. A moderate benefit of roughly 10% is visible in statistical scores for samples influenced by IRE and/or CNL to at least 50% and there can be considerable benefit for individual samples. Effects of transport errors, not properly characterized remaining emitters and long IMS sampling times (12–24 h) undoubtedly are in contrast to and reduce the benefit of high-quality IRE and CNL stack data. Complementary best estimates for remaining emitters push the scores up by 18% compared to just considering IRE and CNL emissions alone. Despite the efforts undertaken the full multi-model ensemble built is highly redundant. An ensemble based on a few arbitrary runs is sufficient to model the Xe-133 background at the stations investigated. The effective ensemble size is below five. An optimized ensemble at each station has on average slightly higher skill compared to the full ensemble. However, the improvement (maximum of 20% and minimum of 3% in RMSE) in skill is likely being too small for being exploited for an independent period.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Projected network performance for next generation aerosol monitoring systems

Aerosol monitoring for radioactivity is a mature and proven technology. However, by improving key specifications of aerosol monitoring equipment, more samples per day can be collected and analyzed with the same minimum detectable concentrations as current systems. This work models hypothetical releases of 140 Ba and 131 I over a range of magnitudes corresponding to the inventory produced from the fission of about 100 g to 1 kiloton TNT-equivalent of 235 U. The releases occur over an entire year to incorporate the natural variability in atmospheric transport. Sampling equipment located at the 79 locations for radionuclide stations identified in the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) for the International Monitoring System are used to determine the detections of the individual releases. Alternative collection schemes in next generation equipment that collect 2, 3, or 4 samples per day, rather than the current 1 sample per day, would result in detections in many more samples at more stations with detections for a given release level. The authors posit that next generation equipment will result in increased network resilience to outages and improved source-location capability for lower yield source releases. The application of dual-detector and coincidence measurements to these systems would significantly boost sensitivity for some isotopes and would further enhance the monitoring capability.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Radionuclide measurements of the international monitoring system

The International Monitoring System (IMS) is a unique global network of sensors, tuned to measure various phenomenology, with the common goal of detecting a nuclear explosion anywhere in the world. One component of this network collects measurements of radioactive particulates and gases (collectively known as radionuclides) present in the atmosphere; through this, compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) can be verified. The radionuclide sub-network consists of 120 sensors across 80 locations, supported by 16 measurement laboratories. All radionuclide stations make use of a form of γ-ray spectroscopy to measure radionuclides from samples; this remains largely unchanged since the network was first established 25 years ago. Advances in sampling and spectroscopy systems can yield improvements to the sensitivity of the network to detect a nuclear explosion. This paper summarises the status of the IMS radionuclide network, the current suite of technology used and reviews new technology that could enhance future iterations, potentially improving the verification power of the IMS.

Goodwin, Matthew A.↗

Performance characterization of the Radionuclide Aerosol Sampler/Analyzer air sampler during a high-activity release event

The performance of the Radionuclide Aerosol Sampler/Analyzer (RASA) under high-activity conditions has been evaluated to maintain and protect the operations of International Monitoring System (IMS) radionuclide stations. Station measurements following the Fukushima Daichi accident of 11 March 2011 have been combined with laboratory measurements to understand how the quality of the measurements made using the RASA High-Purity Germanium (HPGe) gamma-spectrometer are impacted by increased sample activity and detector dead-time. Detector saturation has been identified to occur at a count rate of 175,000 counts s-1, at which level there are significant impacts to the sample live-time and detector resolution in addition to a system contamination risk. To safeguard against these effects, a dead-time limit of 16.6% is proposed that could be maintained by monitoring the activity collecting on the filter using a Cadmium Zinc Telluride (CZT) detector installed into the particulate collection area of the RASA. This limit would ensure that the IMS technical specifications for measurement time (> 20 h) and detector resolution (2.5 keV at 1332 keV) are met. The CZT would dynamically control the RASA air flow to limit the collection of particulate activity beneath the HPGe dead-time threshold and would also provide measurements useful for CTBT verification purposes and dose assessments.

Burnett, Jonathan L.↗

The history and outlook for seismic monitoring of nuclear explosions in the context of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

Modern methods of nuclear-explosion monitoring are vastly more capable than they were when underground nuclear testing began in the late 1950s, in part because a cycle of improvements in explosion monitoring in the 1960–80 period led to improvements in monitoring for earthquakes and other phenomena, which then led to a general growth in monitoring assets that in turn has been applied back to explosion monitoring. Practical experiences in nuclear-explosion monitoring, acquired during the era of active testing prior to finalization of the CTBT text in 1996, laid the basis for monitoring in support of this arms-control initiative. This article elaborates on the future of nuclear-test-monitoring technology, which can build upon an additional and remarkable growth of general monitoring assets that began in the 1990s, largely unrelated to the specifics of nuclear-test monitoring. A new cycle of improvements in earthquake monitoring is likely to improve monitoring for explosions. While it is not easy to quantify the degree of monitoring improvement afforded by such new assets, an example from North Korea indicates the improvement can be substantial.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Measurements of radioxenon activities during periods of gaseous release from an advanced gas-cooled reactor

Activities of radioxenon isotopes are reported from an Advanced Gas-cooled Reactor (AGR) during periods of gaseous release. Xenon isotopes are relevant to the monitoring regime of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). These releases may affect detections from the International Monitoring System (IMS) by influencing the radioxenon background. Time series activity plots have been produced from both in-core monitoring and direct measurement at the point of release using a stack monitor system. Ratio plots using both data sets have been produced with results compared with a commonly chosen nuclear explosion “discrimination line.” The reported results improve the understanding of radionuclide emissions from civil nuclear power plants. This work is being performed as part of the Xenon Environmental Nuclide Analysis at Hartlepool (XENAH) collaboration between the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE, UK), EDF Energy (UK), Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL, USA), and the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI).

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗