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At least 73 records · Page 4
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2022

A Demonstration of Intelligent Container Surveillance Using Stationary and Mobile Camera Platforms

Surveillance of nuclear material storage containers is required to ensure that the container safety boundary is maintained during the service life of the container. As many of these container types are the first and only containment barrier to release protecting the worker, public, and environment, it is imperative to develop robust surveillance tools to characterize container degradation. Machine learning (ML) techniques have matured quickly in the past decade and are slowly becoming a routine application in data analysis. While more popular architectures have been developed with different applications in mind, these can be easily translated to container surveillance requirements. In this study, we developed a ML model based on the Detectron2 framework to identify slip lid containers and common exterior container defects, primarily dents. Commercial-off-the-shelf cameras are combined into a stationary camera array or are mounted to a robotic arm to provide more mobility for positioning needs. Results from the model evaluations on the images indicate that the stationary camera arrays outperform the accuracy of the mobile camera systems for both individual camera and composite image detections. Overall, however, the detection accuracies of the systems fell short of 50% and were less than satisfactory. Future efforts to improve the system involve focusing on a single camera deployable solution that combines a controllable light source that eliminates one of the biggest environmental factors that influence ML model detection performance. Additional training set collection is planned to build a more robust model that enables accurate detection from a wider range of imaging conditions.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2024

Lifetime extension drop-test of real-world corroded 5 Quart Hagan nuclear material storage container

A 5Qt Hagan container with a 20-year history of nuclear material storage was challenged with three successive drop tests at a height of 3.7 meters. The total mass of the test package was 12.1 kg. The 1st and 2nd drop tests (center of gravity over the container bottom corner but 180 degrees apart on the container bottom face) passed the pre- and post- impact helium leak criterion at less than 1.00E-6 atm-cc/sec (ambient cubic centimeters per second). The 3rd and final test (center of gravity over top corner) failed with a post-impact gross leak of 1.1E-1 atmcc/sec. The RRFMC (Respirable Release Fraction Measurement Chamber) is a drop tower test system that is critical for the sustainability of the SAVY-4000™ series and Hagan-type (NFT Inc. Golden CO) nuclear material storage containers. These are the primary in-use nuclear material storage container types at the Los Alamos National Laboratory TA-55 facility. Results are presented to expand the technical knowledge basis for container lifetime, regarding actual exposure to corrosive gas species on the container inner surfaces. The primary source of general corrosion throughout the container is gaseous hydrogen chloride (HCl). This gas is generated by the degradation of the polyvinylchloride (PVC) bag-out bag. Additionally, in most cases, the nuclear material itself also releases HCl gas (due to residual chemical components associated with the material formation). The RRFMC drop tower gives the end-user the ability record and analyze high-speed video and photography and if needed aerosol mass release measurements. In this report the principal issue is the physical deformation of the 5Qt Hagan container. There were no mass release experiments of test aerosol mass in the present study.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2025

Examination of 3013 Containers Baseline Surface Features

The Surveillance and Monitoring Program at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) was tasked with evaluating the baseline features of 3013 containers. This baseline is to be used as a basis for comparison for 3013 containers that had been packaged with corrosive plutonium materials. The LANL team evaluated an unwelded container, an unused welded container, and a welded container that had held plutonium metal without any corrosive impurities. These three containers had features with depths no larger than 6 µm and had similar depth distributions. The features observed in the baseline containers were all shallower than those seen in containers packaged with corrosive plutonium materials. This work establishes workflows for feature identification and measurement, as well as establishment of baseline data for future comparison with corroded containers.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2020

A Vertex-Aligned Model for Packing 4-Hexagonal Clusters in a Regular Hexagonal Container

This paper deals with a problem the packing polyhex clusters in a regular hexagonal container. It is a common problem in many applications with various cluster shapes used, but symmetric polyhex is the most useful in engineering due to its geometrical properties. Hence, we concentrate on mathematical modeling in such an application, where using the “bee” tetrahex is chosen for the new Compact Muon Solenoid (CMS) design upgrade, which is one of four detectors used in Large Hadron Collider (LHC) experiment at European Laboratory for Particle Physics (CERN). We start from the existing hexagonal containers with hexagonal cells packed inside, and uniform clustering applied. We compare the center-aligned (CA) and vertex-aligned (VA) models, analyzing cluster rotations providing the increased packing efficiency. We formally describe the geometrical properties of clustering approaches and show that cluster sharing is inevitable at the container border with uniform clustering. In addition, we propose a new vertex-aligned model decreasing the number of shared clusters in the uniform scenario, but with a smaller number of clusters contained inside the container. Also, we describe a non-uniform tetrahex cluster packing scheme in the proposed container model. With the proposed cluster packing solution, it is accomplished that all clusters are contained inside the container region. Since cluster-sharing is completely avoided at the container border, the maximal packing efficiency is obtained compared to the existing models.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2023

Aluminum-fiber composites containing intermetallic phase at the matrix-fiber interface

A solid aluminum-fiber composite comprising: (i) an aluminum-containing matrix comprising elemental aluminum; (ii) coated or uncoated fibers embedded within said aluminum-containing matrix, wherein said fibers have a different composition than said aluminum-containing matrix and impart additional strength to said aluminum-containing matrix as compared to said aluminum-containing matrix in the absence of said fibers embedded therein; and (iii) an intermetallic layer present as an interface between each of said fibers and the aluminum-containing matrix, wherein said intermetallic layer has a composition different from said aluminum-containing matrix and said fibers, and said intermetallic layer contains at least one element that is also present in the aluminum-containing matrix and at least one element present in the fibers, whether from the coated or interior portion of the fibers. Methods of producing the above-described composite are also described.

Rios, Orlando↗
DOE OSTI2024

He Leak Testing of 3013 Inner Container Lids

The 3013-container package is used for the long-term storage of plutonium bearing materials at Department of Energy (DOE) sites. The package consists of three nested stainless-steel containers: outer, inner and convenience, which are made of stainless steel. The requirements of the DOE 3013 Standarda, also entail the development of a surveillance program, tasked to ensure structural integrity of the outer container for at least 50 years. The Materials Identification and Surveillance Working Group (MIS-WG) is specified to be responsible for selecting the containers for the surveillance as well as analyzing results. The MIS-WG determined that corrosion is a potential mechanism for container degradation with the most credible type of failure to be stress corrosion cracking (SCC) through wall breach of the inner container closure weld region (ICCWR). A breach of the inner container has the potential of allowing corrosive gases to be released into the safety class outer container.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2025

COMPUTATION FLUID DYNAMICS ANALYSIS FOR GENERIC SMALL MODULAR REACTOR CONTAINMENT SEPARATE EFFECTS TEST

It is desirable for fourth-generation Small Modular Reactors to be passively cooled in standard and accident operations. Passive Containment Cooling Systems can reject heat from the containment structure, without using pumps or blowers. The targeted design containment structure is a large, domed, stainless steel, cylindrical vessel. In a postulated Design Basis Accident, steam will flash inside containment. Steam condensation occurs on the inner containment wall and transfers heat through the steel containment into a large body of water known as the annular reservoir (AR) surrounding the vessel serving as the ultimate heat sink. Natural circulation drives the flow in the AR and heat will be released to the environment by evaporation of water. Unique containment geometry requires a separate effects test (SET) facility for the verification and validation of the computer code and evaluation model development and assessment for reactor licensing efforts. In this study, STAR-CCM+, a computational fluid dynamics (CFD) code was used to inform the decision-making process on the design of the SET. The CFD simulation modeled, a two-phase turbulent flow with fluid film development and heat transfer for different containment geometries. The Reactor Excursion and Leak Analysis Program will also be used in a code-to-code verification against the CFD results.

21 - SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLAN↗
DOE OSTI2025

SMR Containment Cable and Electrical Penetration Assembly System

GAIN Project CRADA Number NFE-21-08839, entitled “SMR Containment Cable and EPA System” was initiated by the partnership of Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) and Engineered Solutions Group (ESG) to test an ESG-designed Electrical Penetration Assembly and Containment Cabling System Qualified for not only SMR technologies, but also Advanced Reactors design. An Electrical Penetration Assembly (EPA) is a component used to allow electrical power and signal conductors as well as optical fiber through the nuclear reactor’s containment structure while maintaining a pressure barrier. The EPA ensures the containment's integrity both during the normal operation and also accident conditions by providing a sealed passage for power and signals. This project was undertaken to fill the equipment gap of EPA and Cabling Systems that require much more severe environmental requirements than legacy plant applications present due to their smaller containment volumes that result in high energy densities compared to legacy designs. This high energy density results in severe accident environments and also more severe normal operating conditions.This document describes cost effective approaches to qualify a unique EPA for Small Modular Reactor (SMR) technologies as legacy LWR EPA technologies will likely have inherent material performance insufficiencies. The DBA profiles for SMRs (and some Advanced Reactor Technologies) are more severe than the legacy qualification requirements making the design of the qualification testing system challenging as the temperatures and pressures can approach the limits permitted by ASME Pressure Vessel Code, as well as accident temperatures exceeding the capability of polymeric gaskets and dielectrics. Small Modular Reactors are designed to have, as the name suggests, modularity which implies sized for factory fabrication and subsequent assembly at the power plant site. SMR containment is much smaller than a legacy Light Water Reactor containment. The containment walls are likely to be comprised of stainless steel. Qualifying Electrical Penetration Assemblies (EPAs) through these steel vessels are of interest in this work. Methods are presented here that discuss critical safety and cost effectiveness for these SMR EPA’s test systems.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2021

A study on computational fluid dynamics modeling of a refrigerated container for COVID-19 vaccine distribution with experimental validation

A key issue with the distribution of vaccines to prevent COVID-19 is the temperature level required during transport, storage, and distribution. Typical refrigerated transport containers can provide a temperature-controlled environment down to -30 °C. However, the Pfizer vaccine must be carefully transported and stored under a lower temperature between -80 °C and -60 °C. One way to provide the required temperature is to pack the vaccine vials into small packages containing dry ice. Dry ice sublimates from a solid to a gas, which limits the allowable transport duration. This can be mitigated by transporting in a -30 °C refrigerated container. Moreover, because the dry ice will sublimate and thereby release CO 2 gas into the transport container, monitoring the CO 2 concentration within the refrigerated container is also essential. In the present work, a 3D computational fluid dynamics model was developed based on a commercially available refrigerated container and validated with experimental data. The airflow, temperature distribution, and CO 2 concentration within the container were obtained from the simulations. The modeling results can provide guidance on preparing experimental setups, thus saving time and lowering cost, and also provide insight into safety precautions needed to avoid hazardous conditions associated with the release of CO 2 during vaccine distribution.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2020

Pressurizing Hagan and SAVY containers to 30-psig (air) to measure the release of analytical cerium oxide test powder

In response to an ESS surrounding the storage of sealed sources at TA-55, personnel from RP-SVS (Radiation Protection Services) and ORI-2 (Operational Readiness & Execution) were approached by ES-55 (Facility System Engineering) to provide technical testing of known nuclear material storage containers. Testing criteria were determined by SB-PF (Safety Basis for Plutonium Facilities). Tests were conducted in conjunction with multiple related projects at the Aerosol Sciences Laboratory (TA-03-0130-0103). An experimental system was quickly developed to deliver a pressure pulse (30-psig) that mimics a sealed source burst scenario. A series of twelve tests was conducted. Six tests were done with two different 5QT SAVY-4000 containers, where each SAVY filter-lid combination was subjected to three successive test insults. Three tests were done with a (0.375" diameter filter) 8Q.T Hagan container, and three tests with a (0.625" diameter filter) 8QT Hagan container. An unused, fresh container filter was used for each tested Hagan container, each receiving only one test insult per filter. Cerium oxide (CeO 2 ) powder was loaded (100 grams per test) into a nozzle in the tested Hagan and SAVY containers, and the nozzle was hard-plumbed to a ball valve and a pressure source. This system was installed into the Los Alamos RRFMC (Respirable Release Measurement Chamber), which is an integrated multipurpose aerosol wind tunnel that satisfies NQA-1 subpart 2.4 for R&D work. The ball valve was fitted with a mechanical linkage for operation from outside the wind tunnel. An aerodynamic particle sizer counted the particle concentrations and size distributions of released aerosol. Respirable aerosol released during the tests was measured and a correction factor for wind tunnel flowrate and internal duct deposition was applied.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2021

Evaluation of Safety Standards for Fuel System and Fuel Container Integrity of Alternative Fuel Vehicles

There are two Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS) in place that specify requirements for integrity of the fuel system and fuel container on compressed natural gas (CNG) fuel vehicles. These are FMVSS Nos. 303, “Fuel system integrity of compressed natural gas vehicles,” and FMVSS No. 304, “CNG fuel container integrity.” At this time, no FMVSS are defined for the fuel system and fuel container integrity of propane and liquefied natural gas (LNG) vehicles or fuel system integrity requirements for heavy-duty CNG vehicles on the road. However, there are voluntary industry design standards and best practices, as well as regulations defined in other countries. FMVSS No. 303 specifies requirements for the integrity of the CNG fuel system of light-duty vehicles and school buses, and FMVSS No. 304 specifies requirements for fuel container integrity on all CNG vehicles. FMVSS No. 304 applies to containers used for vehicle propulsion, whereas containers used to transport CNG and transportation of CNG containers are regulated by the DOT Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration. FMVSS Nos. 303 and 304 are performance-based standards to consistently test and validate equipment and are not design restrictive. Despite the increasing number of natural gas and propane medium- and heavy-duty vehicles on the road, there are no FMVSS fuel system integrity requirements beyond light-duty and school buses for CNG vehicles and no FMVSS fuel system integrity requirements for propane vehicles. NHTSA is researching fuel system safety for medium- and heavy-duty natural gas and propane vehicles to update FMVSS Nos. 303 and 304. NHTSA is also researching current best practices and standards for high pressure fuel tanks in motor vehicles as they may apply to FMVSS No. 304.

30 DIRECT ENERGY CONVERSION↗
DOE OSTI2023

On the Durability of Tin‐Containing Perovskite Solar Cells

Abstract Tin (Sn)‐containing perovskite solar cells (PSCs) have gained significant attention in the field of perovskite optoelectronics due to lower toxicity than their lead‐based counterparts and their potential for tandem applications. However, the lack of stability is a major concern that hampers their development. To achieve the long‐term stability of Sn‐containing PSCs, it is crucial to have a clear and comprehensive understanding of the degradation mechanisms of Sn‐containing perovskites and develop mitigation strategies. This review provides a compendious overview of degradation pathways observed in Sn‐containing perovskites, attributing to intrinsic factors related to the materials themselves and environmental factors such as light, heat, moisture, oxygen, and their combined effects. The impact of interface and electrode materials on the stability of Sn‐containing PSCs is also discussed. Additionally, various strategies to mitigate the instability issue of Sn‐containing PSCs are summarized. Lastly, the challenges and prospects for achieving durable Sn‐containing PSCs are presented.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2025

An approach for spent nuclear fuel containment integrity verification using gas tagging

Verification of containment integrity is required for spent nuclear fuel (SNF) managed by the commercial nuclear industry and U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), especially after extended storage. Certain SNF storage systems, such as the DOE road-ready dry storage system, hold several packaged containments within a welded over-canister. These packaged containments are called Department of Energy Standard Canisters (DOESCs). DOESC leakage identification is challenging because their containment boundary cannot be accessed for testing and their contents (i.e., SNF and fill gas) are often similar. There are concerns that this could result in costly characterization and repackaging operations of DOE road-ready dry storage systems if compromised DOESCs are suspected. Here, to address these concerns, this paper presents an approach for applying a gas tagging process using xenon to uniquely identify compromised inaccessible containments following extended storage. The containments considered for this application are seven DOESCs, each packaged within a single over-canister. Two different SNF loading configurations from the Advanced Test Reactor and Fort Saint Vrain nuclear power plant are considered. These configurations are used to represent research reactor aluminum-clad spent nuclear fuel (ASNF) and TRi-structural ISOtropic (TRISO) SNF types. Results for this application show that for ASNF and TRISO type fuels for which the selected fuels are representative, the volume of taggant required at loading is determined primarily by the lower detection limit and leak rate of taggant from a compromised DOESC, rather than the amount of fission-generated xenon in the loaded fuel. While the application presented is suited for larger leaks, smaller leaks could be detected by modifying certain design parameters. This gas tagging approach can also be applied to other DOE containments and advanced reactor SNF storage systems.

07 - ISOTOPES AND RADIATION SOURCES↗
DOE OSTI2021

Alternative Liquid DSA Containers for Sludge Slurry Storage in the SRNL Shielded Cells

A pending revision of the Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) for the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) defines “DSA containers'’ for liquid sludge slurries as containers not susceptible to a flashing spray release in a fire and requires that a list of DSA containers be maintained. High Level Waste (HLW) samples are typically received from the Savannah River Site (SRS) tank farm after retrieval from the storage tanks. Glass bottles are preferred for long-term storage of radioactive liquid sludge slurry samples but are not on the DSA container list. An evaluation has been conducted to identify vessel lids for the glass bottles that would vent prior to pressurization and liquid superheating in a fire event. Low melting Field's Metal eutectic alloy with a melting point of 62°C has been identified as a preferred material of construction for vessel lids for this application because the material is resistant to puncture and is expected to have good chemical compatibility and radiation stability in the shielded cells environment. A test vessel was designed to evaluate the alloy and confirm that it would melt before the water in the vessel reaches the boiling point. The tests confirmed: 1) that the reported melting point of the alloy was accurate, 2) that a top fashioned from this material will melt creating an open atmosphere in the vessel headspace prior to sample boiling under moderate and fast heating rates, and 3) that nonuniform heating of the bottle from the bottom also results in melting of the alloy prior to boiling. Based on the results, neither an engulfing fire with standing or toppled bottles or a fire producing localized heat at the vessel bottom would result in flashing spray conditions. It is recommended that glass vessels of various volumes ranging from 125 mL to 1 gallon with modified tops containing the specified Field's Metal eutectic alloy which are appropriately designed to avoid flashing spray material releases be added to the DSA container list. These vessels will be utilized in the Shielded Cells for the storage of radioactive liquid samples of sludge slurries. Use of these vessels will also be advantageous for other liquid samples containing accountable amounts of nuclear material throughout other SRNL laboratories. Similarly constructed paraffin vessel lids could also potentially be added to the approved list, though additional testing would be required.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2023

Simulations of Criticality Control Overpack Container Compaction at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

Criticality Control Overpack (CCO) containers are being considered for the disposal of defense-related nuclear waste at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). At WIPP, these containers would be placed in underground disposal rooms, which will naturally close and compact the containers closer to one another over several centuries. This report details simulations to predict the final container configuration as an input to nuclear criticality assessments. Each container was discretely modeled, including the plywood and stainless steel pipe inside the 55-gallon drum, in order to capture its complex mechanical behavior. Although these high-fidelity simulations were computationally intensive, several different material models were considered in an attempt to reasonably bound the horizontal and vertical compaction percentages. When exceptionally strong materials were used for the containers, the horizontal and vertical closure respectively stabilized at 43:9 % and 93:7 %. At the other extreme, when the containers completely degraded and the clay seams between the salt layers were glued, the horizontal and vertical closure reached respective final values of 48:6 % and 100 %.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2023

Addendum 2 to the Closure Report for CAU 577 Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells, NNSS, Nevada

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 577, “Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells,” includes five low-level waste cells at the Nevada National Security Site Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site where buried waste received from Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc., was subsequently determined to contain chromium that exceeded the toxicity characteristic leaching procedure regulatory limit, which would require the waste to carry hazardous waste code D007. CAU 577 was created to satisfy the requirements of the Settlement Agreement (SA) executed between the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) and the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) on April 25, 2019 (NDEP 2019). The SA required that the chromium-containing waste received from NFS would be addressed following the closure process laid out in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO). The FFACO process ensures proper closure of the chromium-containing waste and documentation of that closure through FFACO-type documents. The following three Corrective Action Sites (CASs) were closed, and their closure was documented in the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 577: Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, DOE/EMNV--0030, dated September 2021 (U.S. Department of Energy [DOE] Environmental Management [EM] Nevada Program 2021a): • CAS 05-21-02, Waste Disposal Cell 12 • CAS 05-21-03, Waste Disposal Cell 15 • CAS 05-21-04, Waste Disposal Cell 17 Closure of the following CAS was previously documented in the Addendum to the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 577: Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, DOE/EMNV--0030-ADD, dated September 2022 (DOE EM Nevada Program 2022): • CAS 05-21-05, Waste Disposal Cell 20 This second addendum to the Closure Report documents the closure activities that have occurred for CAS 05-21-06, Waste Disposal Cell 21. This is the last CAS in CAU 577. The final waste shipment was placed in the waste disposal cell on November 21, 2022. Following this, closure activities began on November 28, 2022, and were conducted according to the Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan (CADD/CAP) for CAU 577 (DOE EM Nevada Program 2021b). The following closure activities were performed: • Constructing an engineered evapotranspiration cover • Installing two subsidence monuments and vadose zone monitoring equipment • Seeding the cover with a mixture of native plant species • Installing four concrete monuments on the corners of the cover and placing two use restriction (UR) warning signs on each monument These activities fulfill applicable federal and state regulations for closure of CAS 05-21-06 and minimize potential future exposure pathways to buried waste. Completed closure activities are also consistent with closure of the nine historical Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) units included in Section 10.2.2 of the RCRA Permit that governs hazardous waste management activities at the Nevada National Security Site (Permit NEV HW0101) (NDEP 2023). UR documentation for this CAS is included in Appendix B of this report. The post-closure plan is presented in detail in the CADD/CAP for CAU 577 (DOE EM Nevada Program 2021b), and the requirements are summarized in Section 5.2 of this document. In accordance with paragraph 5D of the SA, a request to incorporate the requirements for post-closure monitoring of CAU 577 was included with the permit application for RCRA Permit NEV HW0101 that was submitted in January 2022 (NNSA/NFO 2022). The request included the post-closure requirements for the three CASs that had been closed at the time of submittal of the application as well as requirements that would be implemented upon future approval of closure of the remaining two CASs. All CAU 577 post-closure monitoring requirements have been captured in the April 4, 2023, Revision 7 of the RCRA Permit (NDEP 2023). As the RCRA Permit NEV HW0101 has been revised since the submittal of the original CAU 577 Closure Report (DOE EM Nevada Program 2021a) and Addendum 1 (DOE EM Nevada Program 2022), the post-closure requirements in this Addendum 2 report do not align with the previous documents. Specific changes resulting from the issuance of Revision 7 of the RCRA Permit are discussed in Section 5.2 of this report. The requirements in this report are consistent with the current permit (NDEP 2023) and supersede all requirements listed in the CAU 577 Closure Report and Addendum 1. All CAU 577 post-closure requirements should be conducted in accordance with the version of the RCRA Permit that is current at the time of the activities being performed. The DOE EM Nevada Program is requesting a Notice of Completion from NDEP for closure of CAU 577. Although CAU 577 is not a legacy site, the FFACO process is being followed to ensure proper closure of the chromium-containing waste. Therefore, transfer of CAU 577 from Appendix III of the FFACO to Appendix IV, Closed Corrective Action Units, is requested, as all closure activities have been completed.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Model for Collaboration among Carriers to Reduce Empty Container Truck Trips

In recent years, intermodal transport has become an increasingly attractive alternative to freight shippers. However, the current intermodal freight transport is not as efficient as it could be. Oftentimes an empty container needs to be transported from the empty container depot to the shipper, and conversely, an empty container needs to be transported from the receiver to the empty container depot. These empty container movements decrease the freight carrier’s profit, as well as increase traffic congestion, decrease roadway safety, and add unnecessary emissions to the environment. To this end, our study evaluates a potential collaboration strategy to be used by carriers for domestic intermodal freight transport based on an optimization approach to reduce the number of empty container trips. A binary integer-linear programming model is developed to determine each freight carrier’s optimal schedule while minimizing its operating cost. The model ensures that the cost for each carrier with collaboration is less than or equal to its cost without collaboration. It also ensures that average savings from the collaboration are shared equally among all participating carriers. Additionally, two stochastic models are provided to account for uncertainty in truck travel times. The proposed collaboration strategy is tested using empirical data and is demonstrated to be effective in meeting all of the shipment constraints.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2023

The HPC Container Experience on the Summit Supercomputer

Containers are seeing widespread use in the world of High Performance Computing, with many HPC Centers either providing their own containerization solution or adopting existing ones like Singularity and Apptainer. The demand for containerization options come from users who want to take advantage of the portability and reproducibility containers can provide, as well as being able to build and use applications that are only distributed in container form or are otherwise unsuited to natively run in an HPC environment. The users served by the Oak Ridge Leadership Computing Facility are no exception. We go over the past and current containerization offerings at the Oak Ridge Leadership Computing Facility, mainly focusing on the Summit supercomputer. We arrive at using a combination of Podman and Singularity to allow users to build and run containers directly on Summit, without requiring external resources or hardware for any step of the process. We look at a couple of projects running on Summit that greatly benefited from being able to use containers on Summit. And we compare benchmarks running natively and in containers on Summit at different scales, observing minimal performance difference and consistent behavior across all tests.

Abraham, Subil↗