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Update of the Fundamental Physics Program. JEM/EF Slip. 2 years delay. Reduced budget. Community support and advocacy led by Professor Nick Bigelow. Reprogramming led by Fred O Callaghan/JPL team. LTMPF M1 mission (DYNAMX and SUMO). PARCS. Carrier re baselined on JEM/EF.
Specific to the application of any technology to a vehicle, such as circulation control, it is important to understand the process that NASA is using to set its direction in research and development. To see how circulation control fits into any given NASA program requires the reader to understand NASA's Vehicle Systems (VS) Program. The VS Program recently celebrated its first year of existence with an annual review - an opportunity to look back on accomplishments, solicit feedback, expand national advocacy and support for the program, and recognize key contributions. Since its formation last year, Vehicle Systems has coordinated seven existing entities in a streamlined aeronautics research effort. It invests in vehicle technologies to protect the environment, make air travel more accessible and affordable for Americans, enable exploration through new aerospace missions, and augment national security. This past year has seen a series of valuable partnerships with industry, academia, and government agencies to make crucial aeronautics advances and assure America s future in flight.
An examination of the interactions between proposed "solar sail" propulsion systems with photovoltaic energy generation capabilities and the space plasma environments. Major areas of interactions ere: Acting from high voltage arrays, ram and wake effects, V and B current loops and EMI. Preliminary analysis indicates that arcing will be a major risk factor for voltages greater than 300V. Electron temperature enhancement in the wake will be produce noise that can be transmitted via the wake echo process. In addition, V and B induced potential will generate sheath voltages with potential tether like breakage effects in the thin film sails. Advocacy of further attention to these processes is emphasized so that plasma environmental mitigation will be instituted in photovoltaic sail design.
After years of patient advocacy and paper studies by a diverse corps of enthusiasts, spaceborne GPS has at last become a presence in the world of flight projects. Owing to rapidly declining hardware costs, and the high value of autonomous onboard positioning, timing, and attitude determination, basic navigation receivers are coming to be seen as almost indispensable to future low earth orbiters.
Space advocates need to engage Generation Y (born 1977-1999).This outreach is necessary to recruit the next generation of scientists and engineers to explore Mars. Space advocates in the non-profit, private, and government sectors need to use a combination of technical communication, marketing, and politics, to develop messages that resonate with Gen Y. Until now, space messages have been generated by and for college-educated white males; Gen Y is much more diverse, including as much as one third minorities. Young women, too, need to be reached. My research has shown that messages emphasizing technology, fun, humor, and opportunity are the best means of reaching the Gen Y audience of 60 million (US population is 300 million). The important things space advocates must avoid are talking down to this generation, making false promises, or expecting them to "wait their turn" before they can participate. This is the MTV generation! We need to find ways of engaging Gen Y now to build a future where human beings can live and work on the planet Mars. In addition to the messages themselves, advocates need to keep up with Gen Y' s social networking and use of iPods, cell phones, and the Internet. NASA and space advocacy groups can use these tools for "viral marketing," where young people share targeted space-related information via cell phones or the Internet because they like it. Overall, Gen Y is a socially dynamic and media-savvy group; advocates' space messages need to be sincere, creative, and placed in locations where Gen Y lives. Mars messages must be memorable!
This document reports the findings of the Mars Science and Telecommunications Orbiter (MSTO) Science Advocacy Group (SAG), which was convened by the Mars Exploration Program Analysis Group (MEPAG) and the Mars Exploration Office at JPL to identify and prioritize areas of Mars atmospheric and surface science objectives for Mars that can be accomplished from orbit on a MSTO like mission.
This viewgraph presentation reviews uplink coding. The purpose and goals of the briefing are (1) Show a plan for using uplink coding and describe benefits (2) Define possible solutions and their applicability to different types of uplink, including emergency uplink (3) Concur with our conclusions so we can embark on a plan to use proposed uplink system (4) Identify the need for the development of appropriate technology and infusion in the DSN (5) Gain advocacy to implement uplink coding in flight projects Action Item EMB04-1-14 -- Show a plan for using uplink coding, including showing where it is useful or not (include discussion of emergency uplink coding).
For near-Earth application, solar electric propulsion advocates have focused on Low Earth Orbit (LEO) to Geosynchronous (GEO) low-thrust transfers because of the significant improvement in capability over chemical alternatives. While the performance gain attained from starting with a lower orbit is large, there are also increased transfer times and radiation exposure risk that has hindered the commercial advocacy for electric propulsion stages. An incremental step towards electric propulsion stages is the use of integrated solar electric propulsion systems (SEPS) for GTO to GEO transfer. Thorough analyses of electric propulsion systems options and performance are presented. Results are based on existing or near-term capabilities of Arcjets, Hall thrusters, and Gridded Ion engines. Parametric analyses based on "rubber" thruster and launch site metrics are also provided.
Boeing was selected in 2007 to manufacture Ares I Upper Stage and Instrument Unit according to NASA's design which would require the use of the latest manufacturing and integration processes to meet NASA budget and schedule targets. Past production experience has established that the majority of the life cycle cost is established during the initial design process. Concept of Operations (CONOPs) visualizations/simulations help to reduce life cycle cost during the early design stage. Production and operation visualizations can reduce tooling, factory capacity, safety, and build process risks while spreading program support across government, academic, media and public constituencies. The NASA/Boeing production visualization (DELMIA; Digital Enterprise Lean Manufacturing Interactive Application) promotes timely, concurrent and collaborative producibility analysis (Boeing)while supporting Upper Stage Design Cycles (NASA). The DELMIA CONOPs visualization reduced overall Upper Stage production flow time at the manufacturing facility by over 100 man-days to 312.5 man-days and helped to identify technical access issues. The NASA/Boeing Interactive Concept of Operations (ICON) provides interactive access to Ares using real mission parameters, allows users to configure the mission which encourages ownership and identifies areas for improvement, allows mission operations or spacecraft detail to be added as needed, and provides an effective, low coast advocacy, outreach and education tool.
In 2005, two physicians, former NASA astronauts, created LifeWings Partners LLC in Memphis, Tennessee and began using Crew Resource Management (CRM) techniques developed at Ames Research Center in the 1970s to help improve safety and efficiency at hospitals. According to the company, when hospitals follow LifeWings? training, they can see major improvements in a number of areas, including efficiency, employee satisfaction, operating room turnaround, patient advocacy, and overall patient outcomes. LifeWings has brought its CRM training to over 90 health care organizations and annual sales have remained close to $3 million since 2007.
This slide presentation reviews the development of space flight sealing and the work required for the further development of a dynamic interface seal for the use on space mating systems to support a fully androgynous mating interface. This effort has resulted in the advocacy of developing a standard multipurpose interface for use with all modern modular space architecture. This fully androgynous design means a seal-on-seal (SOS) system.
This paper gives an overview of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) led multi-center Habitat Demonstration Unit (HDU) project leadership and management strategies. The HDU project team constructed and tested an analog prototype lunar surface habitat/laboratory called the Pressurized Excursion Module (PEM) during 2010. The prototype unit subsystems were integrated in a short amount of time, utilizing a tiger team approach that brought together over 20 habitation-related technologies and innovations from a variety of NASA centers. This paper describes the leadership and management strategies as well as lessons learned pertaining to leading and managing a multi-center diverse team in a rapid prototype environment. The PEM configuration went from a paper design to an operational surface habitat demonstration unit in less than 12 months. The HDU project is part of the strategic plan from the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate (ESMD) Directorate Integration Office (DIO) and the Exploration Mission Systems Office (EMSO) to test destination elements in analog environments. The 2011 HDU-Deep Space Habitat (DSH) configuration will build upon the PEM work, and emphasize validity of crew operations (remote working and living), EVA operations, mission operations, logistics operations, and science operations that might be required in a deep space context for Near Earth Object (NEO) exploration mission architectures. The 2011 HDU-DSH will be field-tested during the 2011 Desert Research and Technologies Studies (DRaTS) field tests. The HDU project is a "technology-pull" project that integrates technologies and innovations from multiple NASA centers. This project will repurpose the HDU 2010 demo unit that was field tested in the 2010 DRaTS, adding habitation functionality to the prototype unit. This paper will describe the strategy of establishing a multi-center project management team that put in place the key multi-center leadership skills and disciplines to enable a successful tiger team approach. Advocacy was established with key stakeholders and NASA Headquarters (HQ) by defining a strategic vision, mission, goals and objectives for the project and team. As a technology-pull testbed capability the HDU project was able to collaborate and leverage the Exploration Technology Development Program (ETDP) and individual NASA center investments which capitalized on their respective center core competencies and skills. This approach enable the leveraging of over $7.5m of value to create an operational habitat demonstration unit 2010 PEM configuration.
This paper gives an overview of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) led multi-center Habitat Demonstration Unit (HDU) project leadership and management strategies being used by the NASA HDU team for a rapid prototyping project. The HDU project team constructed and tested an analog prototype lunar surface habitat/laboratory called the Pressurized Excursion Module (PEM) during 2010. The prototype unit subsystems were integrated in a short amount of time, utilizing a tiger team rapid prototyping approach that brought together over 20 habitation-related technologies and innovations from a variety of NASA centers. This paper describes the leadership and management strategies as well as lessons learned pertaining to leading and managing a multi-center diverse team in a rapid prototype environment. The PEM configuration went from a paper design to an operational surface habitat demonstration unit in less than 12 months. The HDU project is part of the strategic plan from the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate (ESMD) Directorate Integration Office (DIO) and the Exploration Mission Systems Office (EMSO) to test destination elements in analog environments. The 2011 HDU-Deep Space Habitat (DSH) configuration will build upon the PEM work, and emphasize validity of crew operations (remote working and living), EVA operations, mission operations, logistics operations, and science operations that might be required in a deep space context for Near Earth Object (NEO) exploration mission architectures. The 2011 HDU-DSH will be field-tested during the 2011 Desert Research and Technologies Studies (DRaTS) field tests. The HDU project is a "technology-pull" project that integrates technologies and innovations from multiple NASA centers. This project will repurpose the HDU 2010 demo unit that was field tested in the 2010 DRaTS, adding habitation functionality to the prototype unit. This paper will describe the strategy of establishing a multi-center project management team that put in place the key multi-center leadership skills and disciplines to enable a successful tiger team approach. Advocacy was established with key stakeholders and NASA Headquarters (HQ) by defining a strategic vision, mission, goals and objectives for the project and team. As a technology-pull testbed capability the HDU project was able to collaborate and leverage the Exploration Technology Development Program (ETDP) and individual NASA center investments which capitalized on their respective center core competencies and skills. This approach enable the leveraging of over $7.5m of value to create an operational habitat demonstration unit 2010 PEM configuration.
This document (Volume I) provides an executive summary of the lessons learned from the Constellation Program. A companion Volume II provides more detailed analyses for those seeking further insight and information. In this volume, Section 1.0 introduces the approach in preparing and organizing the content to enable rapid assimilation of the lessons. Section 2.0 describes the contextual framework in which the Constellation Program was formulated and functioned that is necessary to understand most of the lessons. Context of a former program may seem irrelevant in the heady days of new program formulation. However, readers should take some time to understand the context. Many of the lessons would be different in a different context, so the reader should reflect on the similarities and differences in his or her current circumstances. Section 3.0 summarizes key findings developed from the significant lessons learned at the program level that appear in Section 4.0. Readers can use the key findings in Section 3.0 to peruse for particular topics, and will find more supporting detail and analyses in Section 4.0 in a topical format. Appendix A contains a white paper describing the Constellation Program formulation that may be of use to readers wanting more context or background information. The reader will no doubt recognize some very similar themes from previous lessons learned, blue-ribbon committee reviews, National Academy reviews, and advisory panel reviews for this and other large-scale human spaceflight programs; including Apollo, Space Shuttle, Shuttle/Mir, and the ISS. This could represent an inability to learn lessons from previous generations; however, it is more likely that similar challenges persist in the Agency structure and approach to program formulation, budget advocacy, and management. Perhaps the greatest value of these Constellation lessons learned can be found in viewing them in context with these previous efforts to guide and advise the Agency and its stakeholders.
System safety assessment is defined in NPR 8715.3C, NASA General Safety Program Requirements as a disciplined, systematic approach to the analysis of risks resulting from hazards that can affect humans, the environment, and mission assets. Achievement of the highest practicable degree of system safety is one of NASA's highest priorities. Traditionally, system safety assessment at NASA and elsewhere has focused on the application of a set of safety analysis tools to identify safety risks and formulate effective controls.1 Familiar tools used for this purpose include various forms of hazard analyses, failure modes and effects analyses, and probabilistic safety assessment (commonly also referred to as probabilistic risk assessment (PRA)). In the past, it has been assumed that to show that a system is safe, it is sufficient to provide assurance that the process for identifying the hazards has been as comprehensive as possible and that each identified hazard has one or more associated controls. The NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) has made several statements in its annual reports supporting a more holistic approach. In 2006, it recommended that "... a comprehensive risk assessment, communication and acceptance process be implemented to ensure that overall launch risk is considered in an integrated and consistent manner." In 2009, it advocated for "... a process for using a risk-informed design approach to produce a design that is optimally and sufficiently safe." As a rationale for the latter advocacy, it stated that "... the ASAP applauds switching to a performance-based approach because it emphasizes early risk identification to guide designs, thus enabling creative design approaches that might be more efficient, safer, or both." For purposes of this preface, it is worth mentioning three areas where the handbook emphasizes a more holistic type of thinking. First, the handbook takes the position that it is important to not just focus on risk on an individual basis but to consider measures of aggregate safety risk and to ensure wherever possible that there be quantitative measures for evaluating how effective the controls are in reducing these aggregate risks. The term aggregate risk, when used in this handbook, refers to the accumulation of risks from individual scenarios that lead to a shortfall in safety performance at a high level: e.g., an excessively high probability of loss of crew, loss of mission, planetary contamination, etc. Without aggregated quantitative measures such as these, it is not reasonable to expect that safety has been optimized with respect to other technical and programmatic objectives. At the same time, it is fully recognized that not all sources of risk are amenable to precise quantitative analysis and that the use of qualitative approaches and bounding estimates may be appropriate for those risk sources. Second, the handbook stresses the necessity of developing confidence that the controls derived for the purpose of achieving system safety not only handle risks that have been identified and properly characterized but also provide a general, more holistic means for protecting against unidentified or uncharacterized risks. For example, while it is not possible to be assured that all credible causes of risk have been identified, there are defenses that can provide protection against broad categories of risks and thereby increase the chances that individual causes are contained. Third, the handbook strives at all times to treat uncertainties as an integral aspect of risk and as a part of making decisions. The term "uncertainty" here does not refer to an actuarial type of data analysis, but rather to a characterization of our state of knowledge regarding results from logical and physical models that approximate reality. Uncertainty analysis finds how the output parameters of the models are related to plausible variations in the input parameters and in the modeling assumptions. The evaluation of unrtainties represents a method of probabilistic thinking wherein the analyst and decision makers recognize possible outcomes other than the outcome perceived to be "most likely." Without this type of analysis, it is not possible to determine the worth of an analysis product as a basis for making decisions related to safety and mission success. In line with these considerations the handbook does not take a hazard-analysis-centric approach to system safety. Hazard analysis remains a useful tool to facilitate brainstorming but does not substitute for a more holistic approach geared to a comprehensive identification and understanding of individual risk issues and their contributions to aggregate safety risks. The handbook strives to emphasize the importance of identifying the most critical scenarios that contribute to the risk of not meeting the agreed-upon safety objectives and requirements using all appropriate tools (including but not limited to hazard analysis). Thereafter, emphasis shifts to identifying the risk drivers that cause these scenarios to be critical and ensuring that there are controls directed toward preventing or mitigating the risk drivers. To address these and other areas, the handbook advocates a proactive, analytic-deliberative, risk-informed approach to system safety, enabling the integration of system safety activities with systems engineering and risk management processes. It emphasizes how one can systematically provide the necessary evidence to substantiate the claim that a system is safe to within an acceptable risk tolerance, and that safety has been achieved in a cost-effective manner. The methodology discussed in this handbook is part of a systems engineering process and is intended to be integral to the system safety practices being conducted by the NASA safety and mission assurance and systems engineering organizations. The handbook posits that to conclude that a system is adequately safe, it is necessary to consider a set of safety claims that derive from the safety objectives of the organization. The safety claims are developed from a hierarchy of safety objectives and are therefore hierarchical themselves. Assurance that all the claims are true within acceptable risk tolerance limits implies that all of the safety objectives have been satisfied, and therefore that the system is safe. The acceptable risk tolerance limits are provided by the authority who must make the decision whether or not to proceed to the next step in the life cycle. These tolerances are therefore referred to as the decision maker's risk tolerances. In general, the safety claims address two fundamental facets of safety: 1) whether required safety thresholds or goals have been achieved, and 2) whether the safety risk is as low as possible within reasonable impacts on cost, schedule, and performance. The latter facet includes consideration of controls that are collective in nature (i.e., apply generically to broad categories of risks) and thereby provide protection against unidentified or uncharacterized risks.
Explore Mars may not be the highest and best use of government-? funded human space flight. However, Explore Mars is pervasively accepted as the ultimate goal for human space flight. This meme has become refractory within the human space flight community despite dramatic contextual changes since Apollo: human space flight is no longer central to commonly-?held national priorities, NASA's fraction of the federal budget has diminished 8 fold, over 60 enabling technology challenges have been identified, and the stunning achievements of robotic Mars exploration have accelerated. The Explore Mars vision has not kept pace with these changes.An unprecedented budgetary commitment would have to be sustained for an unprecedented number of decades to achieve the Explore Mars goal. Further, the goal's justification as uniquely able to definitively determine Mars habitability is brittle, and not driving current planning in any case; yet NASA owns the choice of this goal and has authority to change it. Three alternative goals for government investment in human space flight meet NASA's own expressed rationale at least as well as Explore Mars, some with far greater capacity to regain the cultural centrality of human space flight and to grow by attracting private capital. At a minimum the human space flight advocacy community should address the pragmatics of choosing such a vulnerable goal.
A 2015 NASA Aeronautics Mission "Seedling" Proposal is described for a Severe-Environment UAV (SE-UAV) that can perform in-situ measurements in hazardous atmospheric conditions like lightning, volcanic ash and radiation. Specifically, this paper describes the design of a proof-of-concept vehicle and measurement system that can survive lightning attachment during flight operations into thunderstorms. Elements from three NASA centers draw together for the SE-UAV concept. 1) The NASA KSC Genesis UAV was developed in collaboration with the DARPA Nimbus program to measure electric field and X-rays present within thunderstorms. 2) A novel NASA LaRC fiber-optic sensor uses Faraday-effect polarization rotation to measure total lightning electric current on an air vehicle fuselage. 3) NASA AFRC's state-of-the-art Fiber Optics and Systems Integration Laboratory is envisioned to transition the Faraday system to a compact, light-weight, all-fiber design. The SE-UAV will provide in-flight lightning electric-current return stroke and recoil leader data, and serve as a platform for development of emerging sensors and new missions into hazardous environments. NASA's Aeronautics and Science Missions are interested in a capability to perform in-situ volcanic plume measurements and long-endurance UAV operations in various weather conditions. (Figure 1 shows an artist concept of a SE-UAV flying near a volcano.) This paper concludes with an overview of the NASA Aeronautics Strategic Vision, Programs, and how a SE-UAV is envisioned to impact them. The SE-UAV concept leverages high-value legacy research products into a new capability for NASA to fly a pathfinder UAV into hazardous conditions, and is presented in the SPIE DSS venue to explore teaming, collaboration and advocacy opportunities outside NASA.
The Resource Prospector (RP) is an In-Situ Resource Utilization (ISRU) technology demonstration mission under study by the NASA Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate's (HEOMD) Advanced Exploration Systems (AES) Division. The mission, currently planned to launch in 2020, will demonstrate extraction of oxygen from lunar regolith to validate ISRU capability. The mission will address key Strategic Knowledge Gaps (SKGs) for robotic and human exploration to the Moon, Near Earth Asteroids (NEAs), and ultimately Mars, as well as meet the strategic goals of the Global Exploration Roadmap (GER), offered by the International Space Exploration Coordination Group (ISECG). In this roadmap, the use of local resources is specifically addressed relating to human exploration. RP will provide knowledge to inform the selection of future mission destinations, support the development of exploration systems, and reduce the risk associated with human exploration. Expanding human presence beyond low-Earth orbit to asteroids and Mars will require the maximum possible use of local materials, so-called in-situ resources. The moon presents a unique destination to conduct robotic investigations that advance ISRU capabilities, as well as providing significant exploration and science value. Lunar regolith contains useful resources such as oxygen, water, silicon, and light metals, like aluminum and titanium. Oxygen can be separated from the regolith for life support (breathable air), or used to create rocket propellant (oxidizer). Regolith can be used to protect against radiation exposure, be processed into solar cells, or used to manufacture construction materials such as bricks and glass. RP will characterize the constituents and distribution of water and other volatiles at the poles of the Moon, enabling innovative uses of local resources, in addition to validating ISRU capabilities. This capability, as well as a deeper understanding of regolith, will be valuable in the exploration of near-Earth asteroids (NEAs) and Mars. In order to reduce risk and explore system designs, the RP project is attempting two-fold approaches to development as it looks towards flight. We continue to explore flight planning, requirements, and interfaces definition by using Engineering Test Units (ETUs), looking towards lunar deployment, while also using fiscal year 2015 to develop, build and test an earth-terrestrial prototype rover and payload system. This terrestrial prototype, called "RP15", is built to both inform the system design, and to be a partnership advocacy tool for this unique mission. RP15 must be affordable within the resource and time constraints of fiscal year 2015, while working to the following Needs, Goals, and Objectives provided by HEOMD/AES: 1. Demonstrate rover mobility in a 1g environment 2. The Surface Segment (prototype rover + payload system) shall represent the flight system concept with as much fidelity as affordable (limited by cost and schedule) - Surface Segment shall be the approximate size/dimension/footprint -Surface Segment shall package all the expected devices (instruments, systems, etc.), even if some facets are mocked-up due to time/cost constraints -Overall Surface Segment fidelity negotiable to make achievable 3. Priority should be given to illustrating mission functionality over support functionality, which exists solely to support mission functionality This paper will provide an overview of RP project developments, including the design and build, capturing the development and initial integrated testing of RP15 in relevant environments.