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At least 703 records · Page 39
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NASA NTRS2006

Satellite Breakup Risk Mitigation

Many satellite breakups occur as a result of an explosion of stored energy on-board spacecraft or rocket-bodies. These breakups generate a cloud of tens or possibly hundreds of thousands of debris fragments which may pose a transient elevated threat to spaceflight crews and vehicles. Satellite breakups pose a unique threat because the majority of the debris fragments are too small to be tracked from the ground. The United States Human Spaceflight Program is currently implementing a risk mitigation strategy that includes modeling breakup events, establishing action thresholds, and prescribing corresponding mitigation actions in response to satellite breakups.

Leleux, Darrin P.↗
NASA NTRS2007

Anvil Tool in the Advanced Weather Interactive Processing System

Meteorologists from the 45th Weather Squadron (45 WS) and Spaceflight Meteorology Group (SMG) have identified anvil forecasting as one of their most challenging tasks when predicting the probability of violations of the lightning Launch Commit Criteria and Space Shuttle Flight Rules. As a result, the Applied Meteorology Unit (AMU) created a graphical overlay tool for the Meteorological Interactive Data Display Systems (MIDDS) to indicate the threat of thunderstorm anvil clouds, using either observed or model forecast winds as input. In order for the Anvil Tool to remain available to the meteorologists, the AMU was tasked to transition the tool to the Advanced Weather interactive Processing System (AWIPS). This report describes the work done by the AMU to develop the Anvil Tool for AWIPS to create a graphical overlay depicting the threat from thunderstorm anvil clouds. The AWIPS Anvil Tool is based on the previously deployed AMU MIDDS Anvil Tool. SMG and 45 WS forecasters have used the MIDDS Anvil Tool during launch and landing operations. SMG's primary weather analysis and display system is now AWIPS and the 45 WS has plans to replace MIDDS with AWIPS. The Anvil Tool creates a graphic that users can overlay on satellite or radar imagery to depict the potential location of thunderstorm anvils one, two, and three hours into the future. The locations are based on an average of the upper-level observed or forecasted winds. The graphic includes 10 and 20 nm standoff circles centered at the location of interest, in addition to one-, two-, and three-hour arcs in the upwind direction. The arcs extend outward across a 30 degree sector width based on a previous AMU study which determined thunderstorm anvils move in a direction plus or minus 15 degrees of the upper-level (300- to 150-mb) wind direction. This report briefly describes the history of the MIDDS Anvil Tool and then explains how the initial development of the AWIPS Anvil Tool was carried out. After testing was performed by SMG, 45 WS, and AMU, a number of needed improvements were identified. A bug report document was created that showed the status of each bug and desired improvement. This report lists the improvements that were made to increase the accuracy and user-friendliness of the tool. Final testing was carried out and documented and then the final version of the software and Users Guide was provided to SMG and the 45 WS. Several possible future improvements to the tool are identified that would increase the flexibility of the tool. This report contains a brief history of the development of the Anvil Tool in MIDDS, and then describes the transition and development of software to AWIPS.

Barrett, Joe, III↗
NASA NTRS2008

Review of End-of-Life Thermal Control Coating Performance

White thermal control coatings capable of long term performance are needed for Fission Surface Power (FSP) where heat from a nuclear reactor placed on the surface of the Moon must be rejected to the environment. The threats to thermal control coating durability on the lunar surface are electrons, protons, and ultraviolet radiation. The anticipated damage to the coating is a gradual darkening over time. The increase in solar absorptance would, in essence, add a cyclic heat load to the radiator. The greater the darkening, the greater the added heat load. The cyclic heat load could ultimately impart a cyclic influence on FSP system performance. No significant change in emittance is anticipated. Optical properties degradation data were found in the open literature for the Z-93 series of thermal control paints. Additional optical properties degradation data were found from the Lunar Orbiter V mission, the Optical Properties Monitor, and the Materials International Space Station Experiment. Anticipated end-of-life thermal control coating performance for a FSP installation is postulated. With the FSP installation located away from landing and launching areas, and out of line-of-sight, lunar dust from human activity may not be a threat. The benefits of investing in next generation thermal control paint chemistry are explored.

Jaworske, Donald A.↗
NASA NTRS2009

A History of Space Toxicology Mishaps: Lessons Learned and Risk Management

After several decades of human spaceflight, the community of space-faring nations has accumulated a diverse and sometimes harrowing history of toxicological events that have plagued human space endeavors almost from the very beginning. Lessons have been learned in ground-based test beds and others were discovered the hard way - when human lives were at stake in space. From such lessons one can build a risk-management framework for toxicological events to minimize the probability of a harmful exposure, while recognizing that we cannot foresee all events. Space toxicologists have learned that relatively harmless compounds can be converted by air revitalization systems into compounds that cause serious harm to the crew. Our toxic risk management strategy now includes an assessment of the fate of any compound that might be released into the atmosphere. Propellants are highly toxic compounds, yet we have not always been able to thoroughly isolate the crew from exposure to these toxicants. Leakage of fluids from systems has resulted in hazardous conditions at times, and the behavior of such compounds inside a spacecraft has taught us how to manage potentially harmful escapes should they occur. Potential combustion events are an ever-present threat to the wellbeing of the crew. Such events have been sufficiently common that we have learned that one cannot judge the health threat of a given fire by the magnitude of the event. Management of such risks demands monitoring of combustion products. In the category of unpredictable toxic events, if one assumes that fires are predictable, we can place experience with toxic microbial metabolites, upsets during repair operations, and discharges from filters that have accumulated a substantial load of pollutants in their absorption beds. Management of such events requires a broad-spectrum, real-time analytical capability to discern the identity and concentrations of pollutants if they enter the atmosphere. Adverse events are an integral part of any human activity, and the spacefaring community must learn as much as possible from mistakes and near misses.

James, John T.↗
NASA NTRS2008

Simulating Operation of a Complex Sensor Network

Simulation Tool for ASCTA Microsensor Network Architecture (STAMiNA) ["ASCTA" denotes the Advanced Sensors Collaborative Technology Alliance.] is a computer program for evaluating conceptual sensor networks deployed over terrain to provide military situational awareness. This or a similar program is needed because of the complexity of interactions among such diverse phenomena as sensing and communication portions of a network, deployment of sensor nodes, effects of terrain, data-fusion algorithms, and threat characteristics. STAMiNA is built upon a commercial network-simulator engine, with extensions to include both sensing and communication models in a discrete-event simulation environment. Users can define (1) a mission environment, including terrain features; (2) objects to be sensed; (3) placements and modalities of sensors, abilities of sensors to sense objects of various types, and sensor false alarm rates; (4) trajectories of threatening objects; (5) means of dissemination and fusion of data; and (6) various network configurations. By use of STAMiNA, one can simulate detection of targets through sensing, dissemination of information by various wireless communication subsystems under various scenarios, and fusion of information, incorporating such metrics as target-detection probabilities, false-alarm rates, and communication loads, and capturing effects of terrain and threat.

Jennings, Esther↗
NASA NTRS2009

Towards Designing an Integrated Architecture for NEO Characterization, Mitigation, Scientific Evaluation, and Resource Utilization

This poster reviews the planning and design for an integrated architecture for characterization, mitigation, scientific evaluation and resource utilization of near earth objects. This includes tracks to observe and characterize the nature of the threat posed by a NEO, and deflect if a significant threat is posed. The observation stack can also be used for a more complete scientific analysis of the NEO.

Adams, Robert B.↗
NASA NTRS2009

Declining Global Per Capita Agricultural Production and Warming Oceans Threaten Food Security

Despite accelerating globalization, most people still eat food that was grown locally. Developing countries with weak purchasing power tend to import as little food as possible from global markets, suffering consumption deficits during times of high prices or production declines. Local agricultural production, therefore, is critical to both food security and economic development among the rural poor. The level of local agricultural production, in turn, will be controlled by the amount and quality of arable land, the amount and quality of agricultural inputs (fertilizer, seeds, pesticides, etc.), as well as farm-related technology, practices, and policies. In this paper we discuss several emerging threats to global and regional food security, including declining yield gains that are failing to keep up with population increases, and warming in the tropical Indian Ocean and its impact on rainfall. If yields continue to grow more slowly than per capita harvested area, parts of Africa, Asia, and Central and Southern America will experience substantial declines in per capita cereal production. Global per capita cereal production will potentially decline by 14 percent between 2008 and 2030. Climate change is likely to further affect food production, particularly in regions that have very low yields due to lack of technology. Drought, caused by anthropogenic warming in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, may also reduce 21 st century food availability by disrupting Indian Ocean moisture transports and tilting the 21 st century climate toward a more El Nino-like state. The impacts of these circulation changes over Asia remain uncertain. For Africa, however, Indian Ocean warming appears to have already reduced main growing season rainfall along the eastern edge of tropical Africa, from southern Somalia to northern parts of the Republic of South Africa. Through a combination of quantitative modeling of food balances and an examination of climate change, we present an analysis of emerging threats to global food security.

Funk, Chris C.↗
NASA NTRS2007

Large Solar-Rejection Filter

NASA utilized Image Intensified Video Cameras for ATV data acquisition from a jet flying at 12.8 km. Afterwards the video was digitized and then analyzed with a modified commercial software package, Image Systems Trackeye. Astrometric results were limited by saturation, plate scale, and imposed linear plate solution based on field reference stars. Time-dependent fragment angular trajectories, velocities, accelerations, and luminosities were derived in each video segment. It was evident that individual fragments behave differently. Photometric accuracy was insufficient to confidently assess correlations between luminosity and fragment spatial behavior (velocity, deceleration). Use of high resolution digital video cameras in future should remedy this shortcoming. A scenically accurate description of matter interpreted as a substance made up of corpuscular constituents was established during the course of the 19th century. In this description, atoms--the building blocks of the matter--form molecules. The properties of the molecules were described by chemistry or thermodynamics depending on what characteristics of the matter were investigated. In both theories, the molecules can dissociate to atoms when the kinetic energies of the atoms exceed the strength of the chemical bonds. The number of atoms is always preserved in a closed system. This is not true, however, when the matter takes up much higher energies at relativistic scales. New particles can be produced at the expense of the kinetic energy. The number of particles is no longer preserved. There are other conserved quantities, however, these quantities, the charge, baryon number, lepton number, are associated with particles that are considered elementary today. The properties and behavior of these elementary particles is the subject of Particle Physics or High Energy Physics. Practice Page: A crewmember touching a positively charged surface was thought to be galvanically isolated from the vehicle ground analogous to a bird on a high voltage power wire. Recent analysis confirms that positive floating potentials, ionospheric currents to the EVA suit, can be hazardous. The analysis is wrong in that the ionospheric plasma itself can close the circuit. Parametric analysis of very low voltage exposures (2 to 15 volts) could cause pain and/or involuntary muscle tetani or spinal cord shock. NASA worked with the Naval Health Research Center Detachment Directed Energy Bioeffects Laboratory to examine the affects electrical hazards could have on extravehicular activity using two models. The results of the two computational models were combined to predict areas of the body in which neurons of different diameters would be excited. They predicted that physiologically active current could be conducted across the crew member causing catastrophic hazards. Future work to analyze additional current paths was proposed. The FUSE spectrum of BB Dor, observed in a high state, is modeled with an accretion disk with a very low inclination (possibly lower than 10 degrees). Assuming an average WD mass of 0.8 solar mass leads to a distance of the order of approximately 650pc, consistent with the extremely low galactic reddening in its direction, and a mass accretion rate of 10 (exp -9) solar mass a year. The spectrum presents some broad and deep silicon and sulfur absorption lines, indicating that these elements are over-abundant: silicon is 3 times solar, and sulfur is 20 times solar. The FUSE spectrum of BB Dor, observed in a high state, is modeled with an accretion disk with a very low inclination (possibly lower than 10 degrees). Assuming an average WD mass of 0.8 solar mass leads to a distance of the order of approximately 650pc, consistent with the extremely low galactic reddening in its direction, and a mass accretion rate of 10 (exp -9) solar mass a year. The spectrum presents some broad and deep silicon and sulfur absorption lines, indicating that these elements are over-abundant: silicon is times solar, and sulfur is 20 times solar. From its previously observed optical emission lines, P831-57 (WD 0334 6400 or Ret 1 in A Catalog and Atlas of Cataclysmic Variables: Living Edition) has been suspected to contain an accretion disk associated with a companion star in orbit around a subdwarf star with a temperature T is greater than 21,000K. P831-57 has therefore been classified as a nova-like. However, our present observations show it to be a DA + dMe binary. The analysis of its Far Ultraviolet Spectroscopic Explorer (FUSE) spectrum (continuum and lines) reveal an average mass white dwarf (Log(g) approximately equals 7.8 plus or minus 0.1)with a temperature T approximately equals 37,000 plus or minus 500K, an extremely low projected rotational velocity, and a distance of about 115 plus or minus 5pc. The photosphere contains C, N, Si, and S (at about 1% of solar abundances). The dMe star is seen as a flux excess in near-infrared photometry and appears to show occasional flaring of about one magnitude as seen in the Harvard plates. There is no evidence of periodic variability in the spectroscopic or photometric data. We find no evidence of a an accretion disk, instead we find evidence of wind accretion as the stellar carbon abundance (N(C)/N(H) = 2.5 x 10 (exp -6) is about ten times larger than predicted by radiative levitation for such a gravity and temperature. The power needs and solutions for the space exploration and lunar mobility program are discussed. Long term missions in space and on the lunar surface require high energy batteries. Rechargeable batteries for mobility systems and portable utility pallet are needed for successful exploration missions. Nanomaterial usage increases the energy density of the cells apart from increasing the power density. The symptoms and threats from acute mountain sickness (AMS) are discussed. The underlying assumptions concerning spacecraft atmosphere mean there is a potential risk to astronauts. The baseline worst case scenario is about 25% based on direct ascent to 8.0 psia with 32% O2. The practical mitigation approach is a staged depressurization scheme. Due to the uncertainty about potential AMS risk the flight surgeon should prepare, focused research should proceed, and current analytical efforts should continue. This slide presentation reviews the threat astronauts face from acute mountain sickness (AMS). The incidence of AMS is highly variable and the risk to astronauts is unclear. However, the potential risk is higher than current EAAs suggest and precautions should be implemented. Due to the uncertain nature of the risk flight surgeons should prepare, and focused research should proceed. Quasiparticle tunneling can be understood at low temperatures using a non-equilibrium kinetic theory. Low-temperature tunneling can be suppressed using existing techniques: island-lead gap engineering, lead cooling with SIN junctions, and quasiparticle traps. The slide presentation reviews the science goals and mission planning for the proposed Jupiter System Observer (JSO). The spacecraft would accommodate 9 instruments making the instrument payload more capable than any previously flown to Jupiter. The would-be mission includes study programs for Jupiter's satellites, interior, magnetosphere and atmosphere. The power needs and solutions for the space exploration and lunar mobility program are discussed. Long term missions in space and on the lunar surface require high energy batteries. Rechargeable batteries for mobility systems and portable utility pallet are needed for successful exploration missions. Nanomaterial usage increases the energy density of the cells apart from increasing the power density. This slide presentation reviews the power requirements for the space exploration and the lunar surface mobility programs. It includes information about the specifications for high energy batteries and the power requirements for lunar rovers,

Roberts, William↗
NASA NTRS2010

Operating and Managing a Backup Control Center

Due to the criticality of continuous mission operations, some control centers must plan for alternate locations in the event an emergency shuts down the primary control center. Johnson Space Center (JSC) in Houston, Texas is the Mission Control Center (MCC) for the International Space Station (ISS). Due to Houston s proximity to the Gulf of Mexico, JSC is prone to threats from hurricanes which could cause flooding, wind damage, and electrical outages to the buildings supporting the MCC. Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) has the capability to be the Backup Control Center for the ISS if the situation is needed. While the MSFC Huntsville Operations Support Center (HOSC) does house the BCC, the prime customer and operator of the ISS is still the JSC flight operations team. To satisfy the customer and maintain continuous mission operations, the BCC has critical infrastructure that hosts ISS ground systems and flight operations equipment that mirrors the prime mission control facility. However, a complete duplicate of Mission Control Center in another remote location is very expensive to recreate. The HOSC has infrastructure and services that MCC utilized for its backup control center to reduce the costs of a somewhat redundant service. While labor talents are equivalent, experiences are not. Certain operations are maintained in a redundant mode, while others are simply maintained as single string with adequate sparing levels of equipment. Personnel at the BCC facility must be trained and certified to an adequate level on primary MCC systems. Negotiations with the customer were done to match requirements with existing capabilities, and to prioritize resources for appropriate level of service. Because some of these systems are shared, an activation of the backup control center will cause a suspension of scheduled HOSC activities that may share resources needed by the BCC. For example, the MCC is monitoring a hurricane in the Gulf of Mexico. As the threat to MCC increases, HOSC must begin a phased activation of the BCC, while working resource conflicts with normal HOSC activities. In a long duration outage to the MCC, this could cause serious impacts to the BCC host facility s primary mission support activities. This management of a BCC is worked based on customer expectations and negotiations done before emergencies occur. I.

Marsh, Angela L.↗
NASA NTRS2000

International Space Station: Meteoroid/Orbital Debris Survivability and Vulnerability

This slide presentation reviews the surviability and vulnerability of the International Space Station (ISS) from the threat posed by meteoroid and orbital debris. The topics include: (1) Space station natural and induced environments (2) Meteoroid and orbital debris threat definition (3) Requirement definition (4) Assessment methods (5) Shield development and (6) Component vulnerability

Graves, Russell↗
NASA NTRS2011

L-Band Digital Aeronautical Communications System Engineering - Initial Safety and Security Risk Assessment and Mitigation

This document is being provided as part of ITT's NASA Glenn Research Center Aerospace Communication Systems Technical Support (ACSTS) contract NNC05CA85C, Task 7: "New ATM Requirements--Future Communications, C-Band and L-Band Communications Standard Development." ITT has completed a safety hazard analysis providing a preliminary safety assessment for the proposed L-band (960 to 1164 MHz) terrestrial en route communications system. The assessment was performed following the guidelines outlined in the Federal Aviation Administration Safety Risk Management Guidance for System Acquisitions document. The safety analysis did not identify any hazards with an unacceptable risk, though a number of hazards with a medium risk were documented. This effort represents a preliminary safety hazard analysis and notes the triggers for risk reassessment. A detailed safety hazards analysis is recommended as a follow-on activity to assess particular components of the L-band communication system after the technology is chosen and system rollout timing is determined. The security risk analysis resulted in identifying main security threats to the proposed system as well as noting additional threats recommended for a future security analysis conducted at a later stage in the system development process. The document discusses various security controls, including those suggested in the COCR Version 2.0.

Zelkin, Natalie↗
NASA NTRS2010

Filovirus Research: The Need for an Integrated Approach in Time and Space

The episodic appearance of Ebola virus (EBOV) and Marburg virus (MARV) across central Africa over the last 15 years not only underscores the importance of filoviruses as uniquely virulent agents to both human and wildlife communities but also implies a very complex transmission scenario that must be understood if we are to prevent or mitigate filovirus outbreaks in the future. Efforts of a global network of scientists and healthcare workers have expanded our knowledge of filoviruses to meet the growing threat of Ebola and Marburg hemorrhagic fevers in Africa. In recent decades, several newly emerging diseases have resulted in major threats to both affected communities and global public health. Viruses from wildlife hosts in particular, have exhibited a capability for cross-species transmission (CST), and have caused high-impact diseases in humans Such as Ebola and Marburg hemorrhagic fevers, Nipah and severe acute respiratory syndrome (SAILS). It has been estimated that about 60.3% (Jones et al. 2008) of human infectious diseases are of animal origin (zoonoses) and even some important viral diseases that are traditionally considered of human origin, for example measles and smallpox, may very well have their prehistoric origins in wildlife (Wolfe et al 2007). It maybe logical and prudent therefore, to anticipate that there are other, new filoviruses out there that will cross into humans at some point in time. If we anticipate that these will happen and wish to be prepared for and mitigate this potential, then an understanding of filoviruses as a biologic system in the environment will be essential to that process. We will need to know how the ecological dynamic of CST interacts with a 'new' viruse's evolutionary factors to overcome environmental, demographic and host-specific barriers to transmission and infectivity to humans.

Pinzon, Jorge E.↗
NASA NTRS2011

C-Band Airport Surface Communications System Engineering-Initial High-Level Safety Risk Assessment and Mitigation

This document is being provided as part of ITT's NASA Glenn Research Center Aerospace Communication Systems Technical Support (ACSTS) contract: "New ATM Requirements--Future Communications, C-Band and L-Band Communications Standard Development." ITT has completed a safety hazard analysis providing a preliminary safety assessment for the proposed C-band (5091- to 5150-MHz) airport surface communication system. The assessment was performed following the guidelines outlined in the Federal Aviation Administration Safety Risk Management Guidance for System Acquisitions document. The safety analysis did not identify any hazards with an unacceptable risk, though a number of hazards with a medium risk were documented. This effort represents an initial high-level safety hazard analysis and notes the triggers for risk reassessment. A detailed safety hazards analysis is recommended as a follow-on activity to assess particular components of the C-band communication system after the profile is finalized and system rollout timing is determined. A security risk assessment has been performed by NASA as a parallel activity. While safety analysis is concerned with a prevention of accidental errors and failures, the security threat analysis focuses on deliberate attacks. Both processes identify the events that affect operation of the system; and from a safety perspective the security threats may present safety risks.

Zelkin, Natalie↗
NASA NTRS2010

Anatomy of a Security Operations Center

Many agencies and corporations are either contemplating or in the process of building a cyber Security Operations Center (SOC). Those Agencies that have established SOCs are most likely working on major revisions or enhancements to existing capabilities. As principle developers of the NASA SOC; this Presenters' goals are to provide the GFIRST community with examples of some of the key building blocks of an Agency scale cyber Security Operations Center. This presentation viII include the inputs and outputs, the facilities or shell, as well as the internal components and the processes necessary to maintain the SOC's subsistence - in other words, the anatomy of a SOC. Details to be presented include the SOC architecture and its key components: Tier 1 Call Center, data entry, and incident triage; Tier 2 monitoring, incident handling and tracking; Tier 3 computer forensics, malware analysis, and reverse engineering; Incident Management System; Threat Management System; SOC Portal; Log Aggregation and Security Incident Management (SIM) systems; flow monitoring; IDS; etc. Specific processes and methodologies discussed include Incident States and associated Work Elements; the Incident Management Workflow Process; Cyber Threat Risk Assessment methodology; and Incident Taxonomy. The Evolution of the Cyber Security Operations Center viII be discussed; starting from reactive, to proactive, and finally to proactive. Finally, the resources necessary to establish an Agency scale SOC as well as the lessons learned in the process of standing up a SOC viII be presented.

Wang, John↗
NASA NTRS2011

Risk Management of Jettisoned Objects in LEO

The construction and maintenance of the International Space Station (ISS) has led to the release of many objects into its orbital plane, usually during the course of an extra-vehicular activity (EVA). Such releases are often unintentional, but in a growing number of cases, the jettison has been intentional, conducted after a careful assessment of the net risk to the partnership and to other objects in space. Since its launch in 1998 the ISS has contributed on average at least one additional debris object that is simultaneously in orbit with the station, although the number varies widely from zero to eight at any one moment. All of these objects present potential risks to other objects in orbit. Whether it comes from known and tracked orbiting objects or from unknown or untrackable objects, collision with orbital debris can have disastrous consequences. Objects greater than 10cm are generally well documented and tracked, allowing orbiting spacecraft or satellites opportunities to perform evasive maneuvers (commonly known as Debris Avoidance Maneuvers, or DAMs) in the event that imminent collision is predicted. The issue with smaller debris; however, is that it is too numerous to be tracked effectively and yet still poses disastrous consequences if it intercepts a larger object. Due to the immense kinetic energy of any item in orbit, collision with debris as small as 1cm can have catastrophic consequences for many orbiting satellites or spacecraft. Faced with the growing orbital debris threat and the potentially catastrophic consequences of a collision-generated debris shower originating in an orbit crossing the ISS altitude band, in 2007 the ISS program manger asked program specialists to coordinate a multilateral jettison policy amongst the ISS partners. This policy would define the acceptable risk trade rationale for intentional release of a debris object, and other mandatory constraints on such jettisons to minimize the residual risks whenever a jettison was accepted. Although ISS-related debris often presents untenable risks to the EVA crew, IVA crew, or to a departing cargo vehicle for a controlled disposal, such released objects also present a ballistic nuisance to the visiting vehicle traffic, and a potential fragmentation threat to the hundreds of other functional and debris objects whose perigees lie below the ISS orbital altitude. Thus, every such jettison decision is a conscious risk trade.

Bacon, John B.↗
NASA NTRS2011

Shuttle Communications and Tracking, Avionics, and Electromagnetic Compatibility

By definition, electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) is the capability of components, sub-systems, and systems, to operate in their intended electromagnetic environment, within an established margin of safety, and at design levels of performance. Practice of the discipline itself incorporates knowledge of various aspects of applied physics, materials science, and engineering across the board, and includes control and mitigation of undesirable electromagnetic interaction between intentional and unintentional emitters and receivers of radio frequency energy, both within and external to the vehicle; identification and control of the hazards of non-ionizing electromagnetic radiation to personnel, ordnance, and fuels and propellants; and vehicle and system protection from the direct and indirect effects of lightning and various other forms of electrostatic discharge (ESD) threats, such as triboelectrification and plasma charging. EMC is extremely complex and far-reaching, affecting in some degree every aspect of the vehicle s design and operation. The most successful efforts incorporate EMC design features and techniques throughout design and fabrication of the vehicle s structure and components, as well as appropriate operational considerations with regard to electromagnetic threats in the operational environment, from the beginning of the design effort to the end of the life cycle of the manufactured product. This approach yields the highest design performance with the lowest cost and schedule impact.

deSilva, K.↗
NASA NTRS2003

Software To Secure Distributed Propulsion Simulations

Distributed-object computing systems are presented with many security threats, including network eavesdropping, message tampering, and communications middleware masquerading. NASA Glenn Research Center, and its industry partners, has taken an active role in mitigating the security threats associated with developing and operating their proprietary aerospace propulsion simulations. In particular, they are developing a collaborative Common Object Request Broker Architecture (CORBA) Security (CORBASec) test bed to secure their distributed aerospace propulsion simulations. Glenn has been working with its aerospace propulsion industry partners to deploy the Numerical Propulsion System Simulation (NPSS) object-based technology. NPSS is a program focused on reducing the cost and time in developing aerospace propulsion engines

Blaser, Tammy M.↗
NASA NTRS2005

Hurricane Recovery Report 2004

During August and September 2004, four hurricanes tested the mettle of Space Coast residents and the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) leadership and workforce. These threats underscored two important points: the very real vulnerability of KSC and its valuable space program assets to the devastating power of a hurricane, and the planning required to effectively deal with such threats. The damage was significant even though KSC did not experience sustained hurricane-force winds. To better understand and appreciate these points, this report provides an overview of the meteorological history of the Space Coast and what is involved in the planning, preparation, and recovery activities, as well as addressing the impacts of the 2004 hurricane season.

Gordon, Joseph P.↗