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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2020

Degradation and Failure Phenomena of Accident Tolerant Fuel Concepts: FeCrAl Alloy Cladding

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is anticipating licensing applications and commercial use of accident tolerant fuel (ATF) in United States commercial nuclear power reactors. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory is providing technical assistance to the NRC related to the newly proposed nuclear fuel and cladding designs. This report focuses specifically on the iron-chromium-aluminum (FeCrAl) alloys being investigated to replace zirconium-based alloys for fuel cladding and provides current state-of-the-industry information on material properties and fuel performance considerations under reactor operating conditions and design basis accident conditions. Currently, Global Nuclear Fuels (GNF) is the only U.S.-based fuel vendor considering FeCrAl cladding as a near-term ATF design. GNF has tested several different FeCrAl alloys including Kanthal APMT, C26M, and MA956; fueled C26M rods and unfueled Kanthal APMT, C26M, and MA956 rods have been inserted in lead test assemblies at Plants Hatch and Clinton. This report will focus on those three alloys specifically, with broader information given regarding in-reactor and ex-reactor testing of FeCrAl alloys. To support the NRC’s readiness efforts, this report will identify and discuss degradation and failure modes of FeCrAl cladding concepts, including fuel performance characteristics that may not be addressed within existing regulatory documents.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Safety Analysis Report for Packagings – Model 9979 Type AF Shipping Package

This Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP) documents the performance of the Department of Energy (DOE) Model USA/9979/AF-96 shipping package and compliance with the regulatory safety requirements of Title 10 and Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations. The SARP is prepared in accordance with U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Order 460.1D. The Model 9979 Type A Fissile shipping package replaces the Department of Transportation (DOT) UN1A2 Specification Packaging. Formerly, the UN1A2 was authorized under Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Section 173.417 (2004) for transport of Type A quantities of fissile material over public highways. In accordance with the Federal Register, final rule making issued on January 26, 2004, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, in a joint effort with the Department of Transportation, initiated a planned phase out of multiple Specification Packagings from 49 CFR 173, the UN1A2 being one. The rulemaking mandated, by law, removal of these specification packagings from service no later than September 30, 2008. The 9979 is a Performance Packaging and replaces the UN1A2 Specification Packaging. The Packaging Technology and Transportation Engineering (PT&TE) organization of the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) is the Design Authority and Design Agency for the 9979.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2022

Designing Hydropower Flows to Balance Energy and Environmental Needs (HydroWIRES Topic A Final Project Report)

Hydropower is expected to play a new role in the US electricity grid as more variable renewable energy sources like wind and solar come online. Wind and solar generation increase fluctuations in electrical supply increasing the value of flexible generation sources that can quickly ramp generation up and down. The flexible generation hydropower can provide as well as the ancillary services (e.g., frequency and voltage regulation and reserves, black start capability) it provides for balancing and stabilizing the power grid are predicted to be of increased value in these future grid scenarios. Yet, the flexibility of hydropower may come with environmental costs due to up- and down-ramping of hydropower plants (i.e., quickly increasing or decreasing generation flows, respectively) which may strand fish, dewater or scour fish nests, alter habitat, or create unsafe recreational conditions that may be unacceptable to participants in the hydropower regulatory process. These types of environmental impacts are often mitigated through environmental flow requirements that specify minimum or maximum flow releases, or ramp-rates changes allowed at a hydropower facility. While it is not currently known to what degree electrical grid reliability could be affected by environmental flow requirements, gaining a better understanding of these interactions before the grid becomes more deeply decarbonized can help define what policy, regulation, or infrastructure may be needed to support the clean energy transition. As the future grid will rely on hydropower to provide both flexibility and robust environmental protections, the analyses and tools described in this report are centered on making mechanistic linkages between energy and the environment in hydropower systems. This understanding of energy-environment linkages can provide the foundational understanding needed to quantitatively assess the trade-offs between the increased generation flexibility that hydropower will be expected to provide and the environmental impacts of this flexibility. This report seeks to provide an objective foundation for building future science and tools that can be used by a broad spectrum of the hydropower community that is involved in licensing or environmental regulatory proceedings tasked with balancing energy and environmental objectives through flow management.

13 HYDRO ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2023

Assessment of Potential Dose and Environmental Impacts from Proposed Testing at the INL Radiological Response Training Range

This assessment uses screening-level models to calculate potential environmental impacts from proposed tests at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Radiological Response Training Range (RRTR) site. Proposed tests could be conducted using 11 different radioactive material types that include K2O, LaBr3, KBr, Cu, Zr, F, Ga, Ga2O3, NaNO2, Ga-68, and Tc-99m. The tests could potentially release radioactive material to the atmosphere and radionuclides and other contaminants to the soil, which could leach into the unsaturated zone and migrate to the aquifer. Atmospheric transport of radionuclides to potential human receptors and time-integrated air concentrations were calculated with a Gaussian plume model and three years of hourly meteorological data. Potential surface-soil impacts were calculated with the computer program mixing-cell model (MCM). Groundwater impacts were calculated with the computer programs MCM and GWSCREEN. Radiological doses from potential atmospheric releases were calculated for public receptors off the INL Site and for workers at nearby INL facilities. Results were compared to regulatory dose limits. Maximum potential groundwater concentrations were estimated in the aquifer below the NSTR site and compared to drinking water standards or risk-based screening levels for resident tap water. Soil concentrations were calculated and compared to risk-based screening levels for workers and potential future residents. All impacts were estimated assuming 12 tests are conducted annually using all 11 material types for a period of 15 years. This document provides the resources to enable a subject matter expert in the field of environmental assessments to replicate the modeling and calculations. The methodology and parameters are presented in the text. All electronic files, including computer-code input, output, executable files, batch files, scripts, and spreadsheet files are contained in a zip file that can be accessed by selecting “Additional Information” (select Native File) in the INL Electronic Document Management System (EDMS). It is highly unlikely the test scenarios evaluated in this ECAR will adversely impact human health based on comparisons of calculated dose and concentration against regulatory standards and risk-based screening levels. Conservative estimates of dose to workers and the public from atmospheric transport of possible radionuclide releases are far below federal radiation protection standards. Conservative estimates of potential contaminant concentrations in groundwater are less than federal drinking water standards or screening levels. Predicted radionuclide concentrations in surface soils are below risk-based screening levels, except for Ge-68 (material Ga-68) for the worker. The Ge-68 soil concentration can be made less than the worker PRG, if the number of annual tests using Ga-68 is reduced from 12 to 6. However, the sum of ratios still exceeds one because of the high K-40 ratio. If the EF of the worker (number of days the worker is in the contaminated testing area) is reduced from 225 days/yr (default value for full time worker) to 112 days/yr, the Ge-68 ratio is less than one and the sum of ratios is less than one. Actual radiation doses and groundwater and surface-soil concentrations are likely to be much less than those calculated because of the conservative assumptions and parameters employed in the modeling. For example, atmospheric-transport calculations assume the entire inventory of each material type is readily released to the atmosphere and no plume deposition, depletion, or radioactive decay occurs during transport. The calculations also assume the same meteorological conditions (e.g., wind velocity, wind direction, stability class) that produce the maximum 95th percentile concentration (i.e., concentration representing the 95th percentile of a distribution of concentrations derived from 3 years of hourly meteorological data) at each receptor location are the same for all 12 tests during the year, and each receptor is assumed to be present during all 12 tests. The surface-soil assessment assumes the entire inventory of each test is deposited in the top 5 cm of soil. No atmospheric dispersal is assumed, and the radionuclides are subject only to leaching and radioactive decay. The groundwater-pathway modeling is conservative in that it is one-dimensional in the unsaturated zone (no lateral spreading/dilution) and assumes the entire inventory of contaminants infiltrates into the ground at the same location for every test. This is especially conservative for particulate radionuclides because they would have to dissolve or corrode first and some would be dispersed into the atmosphere. The groundwater receptor is also assumed to consume water directly from a hypothetical well positioned in the location of maximum concentration. In addition, conservative degradation rates were used, and volatilization was not considered for the nonradioactive chemical

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2023

Assessment of Potential Dose and Environmental Impacts from Proposed Testing at the INL National Security Test Range

This assessment uses screening-level models to calculate potential environmental impacts from proposed tests at two locations at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) National Security Test Range (NSTR) site. Proposed tests could be conducted using 11 different radioactive material types that include K 2 O, LaBr 3 , KBr, Cu, Zr, F, Ga, Ga 2 O 3 , NaNO 2 , Ga-68, and Tc-99m. The tests could potentially release radioactive material to the atmosphere and radionuclides and other contaminants to the soil, which could leach into the unsaturated zone and migrate to the aquifer. Atmospheric transport of radionuclides to potential human receptors and time-integrated air concentrations were calculated with a Gaussian plume model and three years of hourly meteorological data. Potential surface-soil impacts were calculated with the computer program mixing-cell model (MCM). Groundwater impacts were calculated with the computer programs MCM and GWSCREEN. Radiological doses from potential atmospheric releases were calculated for public receptors off the INL Site and for workers at nearby INL facilities. Results were compared to regulatory dose limits. Maximum potential groundwater concentrations were estimated in the aquifer below the NSTR site and compared to drinking water standards or risk-based screening levels for resident tap water. Soil concentrations were calculated and compared to risk-based screening levels for workers and potential future residents. All impacts were estimated based on the assumption that 12 tests are conducted annually using all 11 material types for 15 years. This document provides the resources to enable a subject matter expert in the field of environmental assessments to replicate the modeling and calculations. The methodology and parameters are presented in the text. All electronic files, including computer-code input, output, executable files, batch files, scripts, and spreadsheet files, are contained in a zip file that can be accessed by selecting “Additional Information” (select Native File) in the INL Electronic Document Management System (EDMS). It is highly unlikely the test scenarios evaluated in this ECAR will adversely impact human health based on comparisons of calculated dose and concentration against regulatory standards and risk-based screening levels. Conservative estimates of dose to workers and the public from atmospheric transport of possible radionuclide releases are far below federal radiation protection standards. Conservative estimates of potential contaminant concentrations in groundwater are less than federal drinking water standards or screening levels. Predicted radionuclide concentrations in surface soils are below risk-based screening levels, except for Ge-68 (material Ga-68) for the worker. The Ge-68 soil concentration can be made less than the worker PRG, if the number of annual tests using Ga-68 is reduced from 12 to 6. However, the sum of ratios still exceeds one because of the high K-40 ratio. If the EF of the worker (number of days the worker is in the contaminated testing area) is reduced from 225 days/yr (default value for full time worker) to 112 days/yr, the Ge-68 ratio is less than one and the sum of ratios is less than one. Actual radiation doses and groundwater and surface-soil concentrations are likely to be much less than those calculated because of the conservative assumptions and parameters employed in the modeling. For example, atmospheric-transport calculations assume the entire inventory of each material type is readily released to the atmosphere and no plume deposition, depletion, or radioactive decay occurs during transport. The calculations also assume the same meteorological conditions (e.g., wind velocity, wind direction, stability class) that produce the maximum 95th percentile concentration (i.e., concentration representing the 95th percentile of a distribution of concentrations derived from 3 years of hourly meteorological data) at each receptor location are the same for all 12 tests during the year, and each receptor is assumed to be present during all 12 tests. The surface-soil assessment assumes the entire inventory of each test is deposited in the top 5 cm of soil. No atmospheric dispersal is assumed, and the radionuclides are subject only to leaching and radioactive decay. The groundwater-pathway modeling is conservative in that it is one-dimensional in the unsaturated zone (no lateral spreading/dilution) and assumes the entire inventory of contaminants infiltrates into the ground at the same location for every test. This is especially conservative for particulate radionuclides because they would have to dissolve or corrode first and some would be dispersed into the atmosphere. The groundwater receptor is also assumed to consume water directly from a hypothetical well positioned in the location of maximum concentration. In addition, conservative degradation rates were used, and volatilization was not considered for the nonradradioactive chemicals modeled. And finally, the calculations assume all 12 tests will be performed at the same place at both locations, and all 11 radioactive material types will be used for each test. This is conservative because it is anticipated that no more than two material types will be used per test.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Clean Energy Microgrids: Considerations for State Energy Offices and Public Utility Commissions to Increase Resilience, Reduce Emissions, and Improve Affordability

In fall 2019, the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC) and the National Association of State Energy Officials (NASEO) initiated a joint Microgrids State Working Group (MSWG), funded by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Electricity (OE). The MSWG aims to bring together NARUC and NASEO members to explore the capabilities, costs, and benefits of microgrids; discuss barriers to microgrid development; and develop strategies to plan, finance, and deploy microgrids to improve resilience. This report, Clean Energy Microgrids: Considerations for State Energy Offices and Public Utility Commissions to Increase Resilience, Reduce Emissions, and Improve Affordability, focuses specifically on how clean energy microgrids can achieve both resilience and clean energy benefits. The paper provides an overview of the challenges faced by clean energy microgrids, outlines benefits that clean energy microgrids can provide, and details economic and cost considerations for the development of clean energy microgrid projects. Outlined in the paper are the necessary technological components of a clean energy microgrid, including generation, storage, energy efficiency measures, and smart controls. Current technologies are highlighted, along with potential configurations of clean technologies that are approaching cost competitiveness with commercially available options. The paper concludes with both policy and regulatory considerations for State Energy Offices and Public Utility Commissions to enhance the development and deployment of clean energy microgrids. Although it touches on the clean energy microgrids’ role in integrating distributed energy resources (DERs) into the larger grid, this is not the focus of this paper.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2023

Assessment of Modeling and Simulation Technical Gaps in Safety Analysis of High Burnup Accident-Tolerant Fuels

The United States nuclear industry is facing a strong challenge to maintain regulatory-required levels of safety while ensuring economic competitiveness to stay in business. Safety remains a key parameter for all aspects related to the operation of light water reactor (LWR) nuclear power plants (NPPs), and it can be achieved more economically by using a risk-informed ecosystem, such as that being developed by the Risk-Informed Systems Analysis (RISA) Pathway under the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program. The LWRS Program is promoting a wide range of research and development activities to maximize both the safety and economically efficient performance of NPPs through improved scientific understanding, especially given that many plants are considering second license renewal. The RISA Pathway has two main goals: The deployment of methodologies and technologies that enable better representation of safety margins and the factors that contribute to cost and safety, and; The development of advanced applications that enable cost-effective plant operation. As part of the RISA Pathway, the Enhanced Resilient Plant (ERP) project refers to an NPP where safety is improved by implementing various measures, such as accident-tolerant fuels (ATF), diverse and flexible coping strategy (FLEX), enhancements to plant components and systems, incorporation of augmented or new passive cooling systems, and utilization of advanced battery technologies. The objective of the ERP research is to use novel methods and computational tools to enhance existing reactors’ safety while reducing operational costs. Many U.S. utilities are targeting implementation of ATFs instead of traditional fuel in the near future since ATFs offer benefits in terms of improved performance and cost savings. The robust properties of ATF make it possible to extend the refueling cycle from 18 to 24 months in addition to the opportunity to use less of fuel. Extensive safety assessments are required to support regulatory requirements and obtain the approvals to use ATFs and the ERP project support the industry by developing novel effective methodologies for safety evaluations. In this project, the technical gaps in the modeling and simulation of the high burnup (HBU) ATF were assessed in terms of the fuel cladding behavior during the postulated accident events. The issues were identified in modeling the cladding deformation, the hydrodynamic change due to cladding deformation and the critical heat flux (CHF). The RELAP5-3D cladding deformation model was assessed by multiple verification tests and validation with the instrumented fuel assembly (IFA) experiment.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2023

RCT Module 2.12: Shipment and Receipt of Radioactive Material [Slides]

The basis of regulations governing the packaging and shipping of radioactive material is to keep radioactive material from affecting the environment during transportation and to keep the environment from affecting the integrity of the radioactive material. The package itself is to be designed and constructed to be the effective barrier between the environment and the radioactive material; thus, most of the regulatory restrictions apply to the package and the method of shipment used to transport the package. To reduce any potential hazard, the regulatory requirements become more restrictive as the quantity, concentration, and potential hazard of the radioactive material increase.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
DOE OSTI2023

A Systems Approach to Increasing Carbon Flux to Seed Oil for Biofuels and Bioproducts Production in Camelina sativa (Final Report)

To combat climate change and alleviate the dependency of the United States on fossil fuels, the transition to biofuel crops has long been proposed as a crucial part of the long-term solution. Camelina sativa has emerged as one of the leading commercially viable options for biofuel and bioproduct production for the U.S. Camelina has the advantages of low agronomic inputs and natural resistance to diverse biotic and abiotic stresses relative to other oilseed crops, and Camelina oil-based blends have been tested and approved as liquid transportation fuels. A major limitation in the widespread adoption of Camelina as a viable industrial oilseed crop is its modest oil yields. This project directly investigated possible paths towards increasing oil, by employing tissue-specific and whole plant systems approaches to identify major regulatory bottlenecks. We developed a new high-throughput method for the identification of multi-gene transformants in polyploid species like Camelina sativa and used this to determine that, contrary to what mathematical models suggested, introduction of the microbial Entner-Doudoroff (ED) pathway into Camelina sativa did not result in significant seed oil increases. We developed flux maps providing accurate and statistically robust models of central carbon metabolism in Camelina, including of cultured Camelina embryos. This knowledge was used in the capacitation of a number of junior researchers in gaining knowledge on approaches used for quantitative flux map analyses. We identified several novel Camelina transcription factor genes regulating fatty acid biosynthesis that showed variable effects on seed oil accumulation in transgenic plants. Among a number of community resources, we also developed a knowledge base web resource (CamRegBase) to integrate Camelina gene regulatory information. Together, research outcomes from this project have contributed to a much better understanding of the regulation and bottlenecks to engineer seed oil production in Camelina.

09 BIOMASS FUELS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Third-Party Aggregation Rulemaking in MISO and SPP Footprints

The report highlights key considerations for retail regulators in the footprints of the Southwest Power Pool (SPP) or Midcontinent Independent System Operator (MISO) in states that previously opted out of allowing third-party aggregation participation under FERC Order 719 and that may want to explore reversing the decision due to a changing policy environment under new FERC orders (i.e., 2222) and/or tightening resource adequacy constraints. Through a document review and a series of 27 interviews with regulators, aggregators, and other industry professionals, this document provides a high-level policy overview of the retail regulator’s role in a selection of processes, rules, and regulations to better understand how states have treated and/or integrated aggregators into wholesale markets. The report summarizes findings in two sections: General Findings and Specific Policy Findings. The General Findings offer high level takeaways such as the fact that 17 of the 20 states in MISO and SPP footprints opted out of third party aggregations following Order 719. Additionally, there is only one state that is fully restructured in the MISO and SPP footprints whereas the rest are vertically integrated, and the majority of third-party aggregations in the U.S. take place in restructured states outside of these footprints. Even so, third-party aggregations do take place in MISO and SPP albeit in small numbers and in an ad hoc regulatory environment. The specific policy findings delve deeper into specific examples of state actions on the topics of jurisdiction, registration and licensing, data governance, dual participation, and dispute resolution. Tables in each category organize state actions into Tiers I-III, which roughly correspond to the possible level of involvement or possible change necessary by state regulators and/or legislators to implement these actions. The tier level does not indicate any value judgement, as each state has respective regulatory limitations and each decision comes with various tradeoffs. One main tradeoff is between simplicity and quick implementation versus comprehensive and prolonged implementation. In many cases, actions in Tier I could be implemented without significant changes by relying on the use of existing processes for an aggregator context. On the other hand, many actions in Tier III are more narrowly designed to address aggregators specifically, but often require more significant changes including the involvement of additional parties through stakeholder engagement or legislative action. In some cases, these tiers are discrete. However, state regulators may also choose to progress through these various tiers sequentially as they phase in aggregators while learning from their experience. With the ability to stack bulk system level services, distributed energy resource aggregations in MISO and SPP could provide various private benefits (e.g., increased value streams to the owner) as well as societally beneficial grid services (e.g., peaking capacity, ancillary services, and other services that increase the grid’s overall operational efficiency). In deciding how to best to enable these benefits, states and retail regulators must weigh various tradeoffs if considering reversing a previous opt out.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2022

Integrated Issues and Risk Management: A Theoretical Framework Overview

The contractor requirements document for DOE O 226.1B, Implementation of Department of Energy Oversight Policy, requires DOE/NNSA contractors to establish an assurance system that includes, among other things, “Rigorous, risk-informed, and credible self-assessment and feedback and improvement activities. Assessment programs must be risk-informed, formally described and documented, and appropriately cover potentially high consequence activities” and “Contains an issues management process that is capable of categorizing the significance of findings based on risk and priority and other appropriate factors….” However, the term “risk-informed” is not defined in this or any other DOE order, and no formal guidance on how to integrate the two concepts currently exists. The Risk Management Guide for Defense Programs released by NA-18, Office of Systems Engineering and Integration (SE&I), states it is “a framework and general guidance to program office personnel on the effective management of program risks and issues”, however it then defines issues as “events with 100% likelihood of affecting program objectives” and states “unless specified otherwise, the term “risk” will also serve to represent issues for the remainder of this plan,” severally limiting its ability to provide adequate guidance on this topic. Outside of DOE scope, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (U.S. NRC) imposes similar requirements. ASME NQA-1-2015 Requirement 16 states “Conditions adverse to quality shall be identified promptly and corrected as soon as practicable. In the case of a significant condition adverse to quality, the cause of the condition shall be determined, and corrective action taken to preclude recurrence. The identification, cause, and corrective action for significant conditions adverse to quality shall be documented and reported to appropriate levels of management. Completion of corrective actions shall be verified”. The purpose of this document is to provide a best-in-class framework for an integrated risk and issues management process. This process would provide a robust feedback loop between risk management and issues management to: Enhance risk identification and characterization, use risk handling principles to improve corrective action planning, and ensure regulatory compliance.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗
DOE OSTI2024

Development and Optimization of a Multi-Functional SCR-DPF Aftertreatment System for Heavy-Duty NOX and Soot Emission Reduction

The objective of this project is to develop a strategy for the integration of catalytic NOX emission control and particulate matter emission control into a single device for the successful application to heavy-duty on-road diesel engine exhaust aftertreatment. The critical attributes of such a device, for successful application to PACCAR fleet, are as follows: 1. Must have sufficient filtration efficiency and successfully demonstrate soot management strategies (i.e., oxidation) to be economically attractive and regulatory compliant for particulate matter abatement. 2. In particular, the integrated device must retain sufficiently high soot oxidation capacity with NO2 (i.e., passive soot oxidation) across an applicable engine test cycle to be economically attractive. 3. Must exhibit sufficient catalytic NOX reduction activity in an economically-attractive fashion that is regulatory compliant.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2023

Coronado Generating Station Repowering Evaluation - Siting Evaluation

The purpose of this initial siting evaluation is to consider the suitability of the Salt River Project (SRP) owned land at/near Coronado Generating Station (CGS) for a nuclear generating station (including advanced light water reactors, light water small modular reactors, and non-light-water designs1) and to assess if there are any exclusionary or avoidance factors associated with coal to nuclear repowering at CGS. This initial siting evaluation considers several characteristics (e.g., environmental conditions, seismic concerns, site footprint, water use, etc.) and highlights favorable/preferred characteristics as well as potential risks to feasibility. The results are intended to inform SRP on the strengths and weaknesses associated with the CGS site and inform the selection of candidate nuclear technologies for the CGS site that align with SRP’s mission and business objectives. This report relies on industry-recognized siting guidance, including Electric Power Research Institute’s (EPRI’s) Siting Guide (Reference 1) 2 and Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC’s) Regulatory Guide (RG) 4.7 (Reference 3), as well as nuclear domain expertise within the Gateway for Accelerated Innovation in Nuclear (GAIN), MPR Associates, Inc. (MPR), and the Idaho National Laboratory (INL).

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Task 12 PV Sustainability - Status of PV Module Recycling in Selected IEA PVPS Task 12 Countries

Photovoltaic (PV) deployment has accelerated in recent years compared to projections in the early 2010s. This means that PV end of life (EOL) waste streams will also increase at a higher pace than anticipated. To meet and optimise PV EOL management, appropriate regulatory and technological approaches must be implemented in the near term, ensuring that available options are adapted to the conditions of each country or region. This report aims to review the current regulatory and industrial landscape for selected countries belonging to the International Energy Agency's PV Power Systems technology collaboration programme, to assess status of PV EOL management, allow for comparison and cross-fertilization, and establish a foundation for future tracking of progress. Although volumes of EOL PV modules are still small, EOL PV is treated and recycled in a proper manner in the countries and regions that have EOL regulations in place. However, the current low volumes, limited available recycling technologies, logistics challenges, and undeveloped markets for recovered materials result in a high-cost, low-revenue scenario for PV module recycling globally. Nevertheless, the implementation of PV EOL regulations in more countries and R&D investment in PV recycling is expected to accelerate further improvements to meet future demand and to achieve high-value, low-cost recycling. We hope this report contributes to understanding the global status of PV recycling and to accelerating its development as a promising option for the proper EOL management of PV modules in the coming decades.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2020

Task 12 PV Sustainability - Human Health Risk Assessment Methods for PV, Part 3: Module Disposal Risks

End-of-life management is important for addressing large future photovoltaic (PV) waste volumes and conserving raw materials for use in new PV modules. In regions without regulatory mandates for PV recycling, end-of-life PV modules can be disposed in accordance with general waste laws. Given the use of various metals as raw materials in semiconductor compounds and electrical contacts in commercial PV modules, some stakeholders have raised concerns regarding potential environmental impacts if PV modules are subject to improper disposal instead of being recycled or disposed in sanitary landfills, as is required in most world regions. To evaluate these concerns, screening-level risk assessment methods are developed herein that evaluate potential human health risks from groundwater and surface (air, soil, surface water) exposure pathways. The methods estimate potential impacts from disposal of end-of-life (EOL) PV modules in non-sanitary landfills under the following worst-case conditions: no leachate collection or groundwater monitoring, no liner for preventing leachate migration, uncovered waste, and lack of stormwater management. Examining worst-case conditions allows the exploration of maximum potential risk to attempt to ensure disposal does not increase health risk above regulatory thresholds. Specifically, this report presents an analysis of potential human health risks associated with non-sanitary landfill disposal for three PV technologies, focusing on release of the highest-prioritized chemical element for each: lead (Pb) in crystalline-silicon (c-Si) PV modules, cadmium (Cd) in thin film cadmium telluride (CdTe) PV modules, and selenium (Se) in thin film copper indium selenide (CIS) PV modules. The prioritization of these chemical elements for analysis is based on stakeholder interest. Because the methodology is chemical-specific, the risk assessment results for these chemicals cannot be directly generalized to other chemicals, although the risk assessment methodology can be applied to other chemicals. If the chemicals chosen are indeed the ones presenting greatest risk, then the results herein should represent the upper bound of health risk from exposure to a single constituent.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2022

Tank Waste LDR Organics Data Summary for Sample-and-Send (Rev.1A)

The presence of organic chemicals regulated under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Land Disposal Restrictions (LDR) adds complexity to treating and disposing of the low activity fraction of Hanford tank waste if a low temperature treatment method such as grouting is used (SRNL-STI-2020-00228). The complexity arises from the fact that the baseline vitrification method is considered by the Washington State Department of Ecology (Ecology) as providing adequate thermal treatment for organics; a status not automatically extended to a lowtemperature process, such as solidifying the waste in a cementitious waste form. In addition, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) LDR program is intended to ensure that wastes are properly treated prior to disposal. Proper treatment makes hazardous waste less harmful to groundwater by reducing the mobility and/or toxicity of the hazardous constituents in the waste. EPA guidance indicates that stabilization/solidification of waste for organics could be considered impermissible dilution under the LDR dilution prohibition. In addition, waste storage activities at Hanford have required transferring and blending waste within the tank system and these activities have potentially altered the concentrations of the hazardous constituents. The LDR dilution prohibition found in 40 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 268.3 states that “… no generator, transporter, handler, or owner or operator of a treatment, storage, or disposal facility shall in any way dilute a restricted waste or the residual from treatment of a restricted waste as a substitute for adequate treatment …”. Hence, if LAW is to be treated using low temperature stabilization (such as cementation), then it is important to demonstrate both how past storage activities have contributed to the removal (by vacuum evaporation), or destruction (by in situ decomposition) of the LDR organics and how future retrieval and waste feed preparation will contribute to their removal (by filtration and ion exchange). Demonstrating these processes helps validate that cementation without additional organic treatment does not necessarily represent impermissible dilution. To aid in implementing cementitious solidification of Low Activity Waste (LAW), WRPS has been developing a regulatory and processing LDR treatment variance strategy termed “Sampleand-Send” that relies, in part, on demonstrating that in situ decomposition reactions along with historic evaporation of tank waste has destroyed or removed most of the LDR organics possibly associated with Hanford Tank Waste (SRNL-STI-2020-00582, SRNL-STI-2021-00453, SRNL-STI-2022-00391). Under the Sample-and-Send concept, Hanford tank waste would be retrieved, processed through a Tank-Side Cesium Removal-like system, and staged as a candidate feed that would then be sampled to confirm the waste acceptance criteria is met for solidification in an LAW cementitious treatment facility. If it can be shown that LDR organics are at concentrations below the waste acceptance criteria (WAC) for cementitious stabilization and have been sufficiently removed (by historic evaporation or by filtration and ion exchange during Cs removal), destroyed (by historic in situ decomposition), or are not soluble in LAW above the WAC then additional organic treatment is not needed prior to creating a cementitious final waste form and the concept of Sample-and-Send would be proposed to establish a non-rulemaking site-specific treatment variance using the specified method of treatment “STABL” to remove sampling requirements of the waste form after treatment. Waste not meeting the WAC could either be routed to the Hanford Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant for LAW vitrification, or further processed by evaporation or chemical oxidation before solidifying in a cementitious waste form. A key component in implementing the Sample-and-Send strategy is identifying which of the 207 LDR organic compounds associated with the RCRA Part A permit application waste codes for the Double Shell Tanks (DSTs) and Single Shell Tanks (SSTs) and any applicable Underlying Hazardous Constituents (UHCs) from 40 CFR 268.48 should be considered as potentially present and thus subject to regulation. In addition, it is also necessary to understand the solubility volatility, and reactivity of these compounds in LAW to identify which of the potentially present LDR organic compounds are not soluble above regulatory levels or are likely to have been removed by historic evaporation or destroyed by in situ decomposition reactions. If there are potentially present LDR organic compounds that have not been removed or destroyed and are soluble above regulatorily significant concentrations then a treatability variance may be needed for these species to eliminate any concerns pertaining to impermissible dilution. The spreadsheet accompanying this calculation report contains the data and logic computations needed to screen the list of 207 LDR organics associated with Hanford tank waste to identify those potentially present and to indicate which compounds may need to be included in a treatability variance.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2023

Initiating Event Rates at U.S. Nuclear Power Plants: 2022 Update

Analyzing initiating event rates is important because it indicates trends and patterns of plant performance and provides inputs to several U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) risk-informed regulatory activities. This report presents an analysis of initiating event frequencies at U.S. commercial nuclear power plants from calendar year 1988 through 2022, as reported in licensee event reports. Engineers with nuclear power plant experience reviewed each event report since the last update to this report to categorize and characterize reactor trips. To be included in this study, an event had to meet all of the following criteria: (1) the event included an unplanned reactor trip (not a scheduled reactor trip on the daily operations schedule), (2) the sequence of events started when the reactor was critical and at or above the point of adding heat, (3) the event occurred at a U.S. commercial nuclear power plant (excluding Fort St. Vrain and LaCrosse), and (4) the event was reported by a licensee event report. Sixteen initiating event groupings are trended and displayed. For some of the categories, relevant events are plotted separately for boiling-water reactors (BWR) and pressurized-water reactors (PWR). P-values are given for the possible presence of a trend over the most recent 10 years.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2024

MARVEL Reactor Fuel Performance Report (Rev.2)

The Microreactor Applications Research Validation and EvaLuation (MARVEL) project is producing a high temperature liquid metal-cooled nuclear test bed at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) to ultimately improve the integration of microreactors to end-user applications. This ambitious effort seeks to design, authorize, construct, test, and operate the reactor within five years. In order to construct and operate the MARVEL reactor in a timely manner, the system will utilize materials and component designs which have already been used, qualified, or licensed from previous reactors. The MARVEL reactor will be located at the INL Transient Reactor Test (TREAT) facility in the north high-bay equipment pit and will use the existing 304 stainless steel-clad U-ZrH1.6 pin-type fuel system developed by General Atomics and purchased from TRIGA International. This fuel has been previously qualified under the United States Department of Energy’s (US DOE) Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) Program. Even though the regulator of the MARVEL reactor is the US DOE, the standards and overall approach recommended by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is well-defined and utilized here. Following NUREG-1537 regulatory guidance, this report documents the authorization case for the MARVEL fuel system’s application to MARVEL and establishes stable and predictable fuel performance during the most thermophysically unfavorable conditions achievable in the MARVEL reactor. To that end, this report provides a comprehensive survey of the known thermophysical properties, performance, and quantitative relationships associated with the MARVEL reactor fuel element and uses this information to determine its mechanical integrity and risk of reaching unacceptable conditions during the most extreme accident scenarios predicted for the reactor using the most conservative assumptions available. The information contained herein is compiled from a combination of historical reports and peer reviewed scientific publication manuscripts. Known mechanisms under which the fuel is susceptible to failure are highlighted and compared to conditions that could exist in the MARVEL reactor during an unanticipated transient or accident scenario. The two scenarios considered for analysis in this report are (1) an unprotected loss of flow accident and (2) a hypothetical unprotected loss of coolant accident during the loss of flow accident. Preliminary 2D steady-state analyses herein indicate that both fuel-cladding chemical interactions and fuel-cladding mechanical interactions are negligible throughout the fuel’s operational cycle under both normal and high temperature accident scenario conditions. Although higher fidelity 3D time-dependent modeling and simulations are planned, the following may be concluded presently. The MARVEL fuel element maintains its geometric stability and structural integrity during the most extreme accident scenarios predicted for the MARVEL reactor. The hoop stress during the unprotected loss of flow accident reaches about -1.27 MPa; this negative stress indicates that it is compressive rather than tensile. The compressive stress is a result of the NaK pressure on the outside of the fuel element, caused by the restricted thermal expansion of the NaK coolant, exceeding the internal pressures generated inside of the fuel element. The hoop stress generated in the cladding during the unprotected loss of coolant accident reaches a maximum of about approximately 10 MPa, which is nearly an order of magnitude less than the predicted yield strength of the cladding under high-temperature accident scenario conditions. Calculations were compared with results from high performance computational simulations using BISON and are in very close agreement. A conservative MARVEL fuel meat peak temperature limit of 900 °C is recommended presently, which is about 180 °C higher than the peak fuel temperature predicted to occur during the most extreme accident. Based on the known properties and behavior of the MARVEL fuel element, the fuel successfully meets its design and safety requirements under normal and most extreme accident conditions with a large safety margin.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗