SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “design challenges”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

SourceResearch connectionFrom yearThrough year

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 703 records · Page 39

All sources NASA NTRS DOE OSTI

NASA NTRS1991

Lunar transit telescope lander design

The Program Development group at NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center has been involved in studying the feasibility of placing a 16 meter telescope on the lunar surface to scan the skies using visible/ Ultraviolet/ Infrared light frequencies. The precursor telescope is now called the TRANSIT LUNAR TELESCOPE (LTT). The Program Development Group at Marshall Space Flight Center has been given the task of developing the basic concepts and providing a feasibility study on building such a telescope. The telescope should be simple with minimum weight and volume to fit into one of the available launch vehicles. The preliminary launch date is set for 2005. A study was done to determine the launch vehicle to be used to deliver the telescope to the lunar surface. The TITAN IV/Centaur system was chosen. The engineering challenge was to design the largest possible telescope to fit into the TITAN IV/Centaur launch system. The telescope will be comprised of the primary, secondary and tertiary mirrors and their supporting system in addition to the lander that will land the telescope on the lunar surface and will also serve as the telescope's base. The lunar lander should be designed integrally with the telescope in order to minimize its weight, thus allowing more weight for the telescope and its support components. The objective of this study were to design a lander that meets all the constraints of the launching system. The basic constraints of the TITAN IV/Centaur system are given.

Omar, Husam A.↗

NASA NTRS1992

Lunar transit telescope lander design

Omar, Husam A.↗

NASA NTRS1996

Advanced Air Traffic Management Research (Human Factors and Automation): NASA Research Initiatives in Human-Centered Automation Design in Airspace Management

NASA has initiated a significant thrust of research and development focused on providing the flight crew and air traffic managers automation aids to increase capacity in en route and terminal area operations through the use of flexible, more fuel-efficient routing, while improving the level of safety in commercial carrier operations. In that system development, definition of cognitive requirements for integrated multi-operator dynamic aiding systems is fundamental. The core processes of control and the distribution of decision making in that control are undergoing extensive analysis. From our perspective, the human operators and the procedures by which they interact are the fundamental determinants of the safe, efficient, and flexible operation of the system. In that perspective, we have begun to explore what our experience has taught will be the most challenging aspects of designing and integrating human-centered automation in the advanced system. We have performed a full mission simulation looking at the role shift to self-separation on board the aircraft with the rules of the air guiding behavior and the provision of a cockpit display of traffic information and an on-board traffic alert system that seamlessly integrates into the TCAS operations. We have performed and initial investigation of the operational impact of "Dynamic Density" metrics on controller relinquishing and reestablishing full separation authority. (We follow the assumption that responsibility at all times resides with the controller.) This presentation will describe those efforts as well as describe the process by which we will guide the development of error tolerant systems that are sensitive to shifts in operator work load levels and dynamic shifts in the operating point of air traffic management.

Corker, Kevin M.↗

NASA NTRS1989

Design of a spanloader cargo aircraft

With a growing demand for fast international freight service, the slow-moving cargo ships currently in use will soon find a substantial portion of their clients looking elsewhere. One candidate for filling this expected gap in the freight market is a span-loading aircraft (or 'flying wing') capable of long-range operation with extremely large payloads. This report summarizes the design features of an aircraft capable of fulfilling a long-haul, high-capacity cargo mission. The spanloader seeks to gain advantage over conventional aircraft by eliminating the aircraft fuselage and thus reducing empty weight. The primary disadvantage of this configuration is that the cargo-containing wing tends to be thick, thus posing a challenge to the airfoil designer. It also suffers from stability and control problems not encountered by conventional aircraft. The result is an interesting, challenging exercise in unconventional design. The report that follows is a student written synopsis of an effort judged to be the best of eight designs developed during the year 1988-1989.

Source record↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Mars Sample Return Mars Ascent Vehicle Separation Analysis Utilizing the CLVTOPS Toolchain

A key element of the joint NASA and European Space Agency (ESA) Mars Sample Return (MSR) Campaign is the Mars Ascent Vehicle (MAV), which is being developed primarily by NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC), in association with NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) and Langley Research Center (LaRC). The MAV is a Mars-launched rocket that is responsible for transporting soil samples collected by the Perseverance rover from the Martian surface into orbit, where they will be captured by ESA's Earth Return Orbiter (ERO) for the return journey to Earth. The MAV design concept developed during the MAV Systems Requirement Cycle (SRC) and Preliminary Design Cycle (PDC) consisted of a two-solid-stage configuration, where the second stage is completely unguided in order to reduce vehicle and overall mission mass. The unguided second stage design presents technical challenges for the stage separation event, as the second stage trajectory and the payload’s ability to rendezvous with the ERO is extremely sensitive to disturbances during vehicle staging. The MSFC-developed CLVTOPS multibody dynamics toolchain was utilized to quickly assess multiple stage separation hardware options and to optimize the separation Concept of Operations (ConOps) in order to ensure successful near-field stage separation performance and maximize the orbital accuracy of the payload. This paper will describe how the CLVTOPS toolchain was used to assess the MAV stage separation event and help inform and optimize the MAV design and ConOps.

MSR↗

NASA NTRS2008

Nonlinear Reduced-Order Analysis with Time-Varying Spatial Loading Distributions

Oscillating shocks acting in combination with high-intensity acoustic loadings present a challenge to the design of resilient hypersonic flight vehicle structures. This paper addresses some features of this loading condition and certain aspects of a nonlinear reduced-order analysis with emphasis on system identification leading to formation of a robust modal basis. The nonlinear dynamic response of a composite structure subject to the simultaneous action of locally strong oscillating pressure gradients and high-intensity acoustic loadings is considered. The reduced-order analysis used in this work has been previously demonstrated to be both computationally efficient and accurate for time-invariant spatial loading distributions, provided that an appropriate modal basis is used. The challenge of the present study is to identify a suitable basis for loadings with time-varying spatial distributions. Using a proper orthogonal decomposition and modal expansion, it is shown that such a basis can be developed. The basis is made more robust by incrementally expanding it to account for changes in the location, frequency and span of the oscillating pressure gradient.

Prezekop, Adam↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

The Challenger tragedy was caused by an Apollo mistake, terminating risk analysis

NASA’s view of risk changed between early Apollo and the Space Shuttle. Risk was a known serious problem at the beginning of Apollo and the risk estimates were disturbingly high. To avoid public concern, risk analysis was discontinued. Risk analysis was avoided in Shuttle, leading to an unnecessarily risky design. The immediate cause of the Challenger tragedy was the mistaken decision to launch in cold weather. The fundamental cause was the high risk of the Shuttle design. Before Challenger, management thought and testified that the probability of an accident was 1 in 100,000. After Challenger, Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) found a roughly 1 in 100 chance of a Shuttle failure. The recent Orion design uses the safer Apollo approach, with a hardened capsule, launch abort escape, and the crew placed above the rocket tanks and engines. During Apollo it was estimated that, “assuming all elements from propulsion to rendezvous and life support were done as well or better than ever before, that 30 astronauts would be lost before 3 were returned safely to the Earth.” The chance of astronaut survival was only 10%. After the Apollo 1 tragedy, the awareness of risk led to an intense focus on achieving safety. “The only possible explanation for the astonishing success – no losses in space and on time – was that every participant at every level in every area far exceeded the norm of human capabilities.” During Apollo, a NASA PRA found that the chance of success was “less than 5 percent.” The NASA Administrator felt that “the numbers could do irreparable harm,” and discontinued numerical risk assessment. This led to decreasing understanding of risk. The head of Apollo reliability and safety decided, “Statistics don’t count for anything,” and that risk is reduced by “attention taken in design.” The great and initially unexpected success of Apollo appeared to validate the neglect of PRA. Continuing to neglect the mathematical estimation of risk led Shuttle into a high risk design that produced tragic results. The initial design of the Shuttle emphasized increasing capability and reducing cost without analysis or even mention of risk. A retired NASA official stated, “some NASA people began to confuse desire with reality. … One result was to assess risk in terms of what was thought acceptable without regard for verifying the assessment. … Note that under such circumstances real risk management is shut out.” Not computing risk led to removing launch abort, removing crew escape, selecting less reliable Solid Rocket Boosters, placing the crew compartment next to the rocket boosters, and accepting more stressed shielding tile designs. Accepting these specific risks directly caused the shuttle disasters. The Challenger tragedy is frequently taught as a case of management failure. The focus is on the Challenger launch decision hours before, which is a dramatic example of bad management. However, the true cause of the Challenger disaster occurred decades earlier in the Apollo era. When the easily predictable failures occurred, failure investigations focused on how they might have been avoided. The Shuttle was cancelled after the space station was completed because of its high risk. The ultimate cause of the Shuttle tragedies was the choice by the Apollo-era NASA administrator to avoid a negative public reaction to realistic risk analysis.

Harry W. Jones↗

NASA NTRS1994

Lean spacecraft avionics trade study

Spacecraft design is generally an exercise in design trade-offs: fuel vs. weight, power vs. solar cell area, radiation exposure vs. shield weight, etc. Proper analysis of these trades is critical in the development of lightweight, efficient, 'lean' satellites. The modification of the launch plans for the Magnetosphere Imager (MI) to a Taurus launcher from the much more powerful Delta has forced a reduction in spacecraft weight availability into the mission orbit from 1300 kg to less than 500 kg. With weight now a driving factor it is imperative that the satellite design be extremely efficient and lean. The accuracy of engineering trades now takes on an added importance. An understanding of spacecraft subsystem interactions is critical in the development of a good spacecraft design, yet it is a challenge to define these interactions while the design is immature. This is currently an issue in the development of the preliminary design of the MI. The interaction and interfaces between this spacecraft and the instruments it carries are currently unclear since the mission instruments are still under development. It is imperative, however, to define these interfaces so that avionics requirements ideally suited to the mission's needs can be determined.

Main, John A.↗

NASA NTRS2011

Orion Absolute Navigation System Progress and Challenges

The Orion spacecraft is being designed as NASA's next-generation exploration vehicle for crewed missions beyond Low-Earth Orbit. The navigation system for the Orion spacecraft is being designed in a Multi-Organizational Design Environment (MODE) team including contractor and NASA personnel. The system uses an Extended Kalman Filter to process measurements and determine the state. The design of the navigation system has undergone several iterations and modifications since its inception, and continues as a work-in-progress. This paper seeks to benchmark the current state of the design and some of the rationale and analysis behind it. There are specific challenges to address when preparing a timely and effective design for the Exploration Flight Test (EFT-1), while still looking ahead and providing software extensibility for future exploration missions. The primary measurements in a Near-Earth or Mid-Earth environment consist of GPS pseudorange and deltarange, but for future explorations missions the use of star-tracker and optical navigation sources need to be considered. Discussions are presented for state size and composition, processing techniques, and consider states. A presentation is given for the processing technique using the computationally stable and robust UDU formulation with an Agee-Turner Rank-One update. This allows for computational savings when dealing with many parameters which are modeled as slowly varying Gauss-Markov processes. Preliminary analysis shows up to a 50% reduction in computation versus a more traditional formulation. Several state elements are discussed and evaluated, including position, velocity, attitude, clock bias/drift, and GPS measurement biases in addition to bias, scale factor, misalignment, and non-orthogonalities of the accelerometers and gyroscopes. Another consideration is the initialization of the EKF in various scenarios. Scenarios such as single-event upset, ground command, pad alignment, cold start are discussed as are strategies for whole and partial state updates as well as covariance considerations. Strategies are given for dealing with latent measurements and high-rate propagation using multi-rate architecture. The details of the rate groups and the data ow between the elements is discussed and evaluated.

Holt, Greg N.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Design and Assembly Process Implementation for Embedding Passive and Active Components Introduction to IPC-7092

"This presentation describes the design and assembly challenges for implementing passive and active components, in either formed or inserted methodology, into a printed board. The completed structure including internal electronic components is ready for surface mount and/or through-hole component attachment. The multilayered structure becomes a complete product ready for further processing in an assembly process and be made from organic, inorganic (ceramic) or both types of material."

embedded circuitry↗

NASA NTRS2011

Traffic Flow Management Wrap-Up

Traffic Flow Management involves the scheduling and routing of air traffic subject to airport and airspace capacity constraints, and the efficient use of available airspace. Significant challenges in this area include: (1) weather integration and forecasting, (2) accounting for user preferences in the Traffic Flow Management decision making process, and (3) understanding and mitigating the environmental impacts of air traffic on the environment. To address these challenges, researchers in the Traffic Flow Management area are developing modeling, simulation and optimization techniques to route and schedule air traffic flights and flows while accommodating user preferences, accounting for system uncertainties and considering the environmental impacts of aviation. This presentation will highlight some of the major challenges facing researchers in this domain, while also showcasing recent innovations designed to address these challenges.

Grabbe, Shon↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

CFD 2030 Grand Challenge: CFD-in-the-Loop Monte Carlo Simulation for Space Vehicle Design

Explore the source record for details and available documents.

CFD↗

NASA NTRS2018

A Persistent Simulation Environment for Autonomous Systems

The age of Autonomous Unmanned Aircraft Systems (AUAS) is creating new challenges for the accreditation and certification requiring new standards, policies and procedures that sanction whether a UAS is safe to fly. Establishing a basis for certification of autonomous systems via research into trust and trustworthiness is the focus of Autonomy Teaming and TRAjectories for Complex Trusted Operational Reliability (ATTRACTOR), a new NASA Convergent Aeronautics Solution (CAS) project. Simulation Environments to test and evaluate AUAS decision making may be a low-cost solution to help certify that various AUAS systems are trustworthy enough to be allowed to fly in current general and commercial aviation airspace. NASA is working to build a peer-to-peer persistent simulation (P3 Sim) environment. The P3 Sim will be a Massively Multiplayer Online (MMO) environment were AUAS avatars can interact with a complex dynamic environment and each other. The focus of the effort is to provide AUAS researchers a low-cost intuitive testing environment that will aid training for and assessment of decisions made by autonomous systems such as AUAS. This presentation focuses on the design approach and challenges faced in development of the P3 Sim Environment is support of investigating trustworthiness of autonomous systems.

Kelley, Benjamin N.↗

NASA NTRS2017

Damage Simulation in Composite Materials: Why It Matters and What Is Happening Currently at NASA in This Area

Use of lightweight composite materials in space and aircraft structure designs is often challenging due to high costs associated with structural certification. Of primary concern in the use of composite structures is durability and damage tolerance. This concern is due to the inherent susceptibility of composite materials to both fabrication and service induced flaws. Due to a lack of general industry accepted analysis tools applicable to composites damage simulation, a certification procedure relies almost entirely on testing. It is this reliance on testing, especially compared to structures comprised of legacy metallic materials where damage simulation tools are available, that can drive costs for using composite materials in aerospace structures. The observation that use of composites can be expensive due to testing requirements is not new and as such, research on analysis tools for simulating damage in composite structures has been occurring for several decades. A convenient approach many researchers/model-developers in this area have taken is to select a specific problem relevant to aerospace structural certification and develop a model that is accurate within that scope. Some examples are open hole tension tests, compression after impact tests, low-velocity impact, damage tolerance of an embedded flaw, and fatigue crack growth to name a few. Based on the premise that running analyses is cheaper than running tests, one motivation that many researchers in this area have is that if generally applicable and reliable damage simulation tools were available the dependence on certification testing could be lessened thereby reducing overall design cost. It is generally accepted that simulation tools if applied in this manner would still need to be thoroughly validated and that composite testing will never be completely replaced by analysis. Research and development is currently occurring at NASA to create numerical damage simulation tools applicable to damage in composites. The Advanced Composites Project (ACP) at NASA Langley has supported the development of composites damage simulation tools in a consortium of aerospace companies with a goal of reducing the certification time of a commercial aircraft by 30%. And while the scope of ACP does not include spacecraft, much of the methodology and simulation capabilities can apply to spacecraft certification in the Space Launch System and Orion programs as well. Some specific applications of composite damage simulation models in a certification program are (1) evaluation of damage during service when maintenance may be difficult or impossible, (2) a tool for early design iterations, (3) gaining insight into a particular damage process and applying this insight towards a test coupon or structural design, and (4) analysis of damage scenarios that are difficult or impossible to recreate in a test. As analysis capabilities improve, these applications and more will become realized resulting in a reduction in cost for use of composites in aerospace vehicles. NASA is engaged in this process from both research and application perspectives. In addition to the background information discussed previously, this presentation covers a look at recent research at NASA in this area and some current/potential applications in the Orion program.

McElroy, Mack↗

NASA NTRS2018

Potential Advantages of Conducting Short Duration Visits to the Martian Surface

Recent NASA concepts for human missions to Mars, including the Evolvable Mars Campaign and Design Reference Architecture 5.0, have focused on the conduct of missions with long duration stays on the Martian surface. The decision to focus on long duration missions (typically to a single site) is driven by a desire to increase the perceived sustainability of the human Mars campaign, predicated on the assumption that sustainability is best achieved by maximizing the level of activity on the surface, providing for continuous growth in operations, and promoting pioneering of Mars. However, executing a series of long duration missions to a single site is not the only option for human exploration of Mars that has been proposed. Other architectures have been evaluated that focus on missions with short duration surface stays, with each mission visiting a separate site on the surface. This type of architecture is less efficient in that elements are not typically reused from one mission to the next but requires a far less complex surface architecture. There are potentially valid arguments to be made that a short duration, multiple site approach could result in different types of advantages when compared to the long duration, single site approach to Mars exploration, particularly for initial human missions to Mars. These arguments revolve around four areas: Achieved Value, Risk Mitigation, Developmental Affordability, and Operational Affordability & Flexibility. The question of Achieved Value relates to the prioritization of goals for Martian exploration. As discussed, goals related to pioneering and expanding human presence are often referenced as justifications for the long duration approach. However, there are other competing goals, including science and exploration. While there is not a clear consensus among planetary scientists, many have argued that the value of being able to visit multiple sites could outweigh the value of continually visiting a single site. Risk Mitigation is a major concern for initial human missions to Mars. There are a number of hazards related to operating on the Martian surface that are not well characterized. It may be desirable to conduct a series of short duration missions to better understand the nature of these risks prior to committing to a long duration mission. Developmental Affordability relates to the ability of NASA and its partners to develop and deploy the proposed architecture. Any human missions to Mars will be among the most complex endeavors ever undertaken. The capabilities that must be developed to enable any human Mars missions are extremely challenging. The total design, development, test, and evaluation (DDT&E) budget required to develop just the essential capabilities alone will be substantial. If additional surface capabilities are required to support long duration surface stays, the development effort could be unaffordable. Operational Affordability & Flexibility relates to the continued costs to execute the Mars campaign. Long duration missions, even with some amount of in-situ resource utilization, require a significant level of resupply for every mission. This requires additional launches and in-space transportation assets, increasing the operational complexity and total operational cost. This paper will explore each of the four potential advantages of short duration missions in detail. The authors will present comparisons between proposed long duration and short duration architectures through an evaluation of relevant performance, cost, and risk metrics.

Stromgren, Chel↗

NASA NTRS2009

Employing Earned Value Management in Government Research and Design - Lessons Learned from the Trenches

To effectively manage a project, the project manager must have a plan, understand the current conditions, and be able to take action to correct the course when challenges arise. Research and design projects face technical, schedule, and budget challenges that make it difficult to utilize project management tools developed for projects based on previously demonstrated technologies. Projects developing new technologies by their inherent nature are trying something new and thus have little to no data to support estimates for schedule and cost, let alone the technical outcome. Projects with a vision for the outcome but little confidence in the exact tasks to accomplish in order to achieve the vision incur cost and schedule penalties when conceptual solutions require unexpected iterations or even a reinvention of the plan. This presentation will share the project management methodology and tools developed through trial and error for a NASA research and design project combining industry, academia, and NASA inhouse work in which Earned Value Management principles were employed but adapted for the reality of the government financial system and the reality of challenging technology development. The priorities of the presented methodology are flexibility, accountability, and simplicity to give the manager tools to help deliver to the customer while not using up valuable time and resources on extensive planning and analysis. This presentation will share the methodology, tools, and work through failed and successful examples from the three years of process evolution.

Simon, Tom↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

The Challenger disaster was caused by an Apollo decision

Harry W Jones↗

NASA NTRS1979

Space Shuttle Orbiter payload bay door mechanisms

The opening, closing, and latching of the first large clamshell door to operate in space presented some unusual challenges for the mechanism designer of the Space Shuttle Program. The requirements, hardware configuration, design trade-offs, and qualification testing in process to meet the challenge and to make the system operational for the Shuttle orbiter's approaching first orbital flight are described.

Mcanally, B. M.↗