Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “defense”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 703 records · Page 39
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2023

Tommy Morris’ Comments on Nuclear Explosive Safety

Nuclear explosives and weapon systems require special consideration because of their political and military importance, their destructive power, and the potential consequences of an accident. The special consideration translates into specific requirements promulgated by Department of Energy (DOE) O 452.1E “Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Surety,” and Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 3150.02 “DoD Nuclear Weapon System Safety Program.” The Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) W-Division Nuclear Explosive Safety Office mission is to coordinate LANL participation in Nuclear Explosive Safety Studies (NESS) and Nuclear Weapon System Safety Studies (NWSS); to provide qualified members and advisors to the studies; to liaise with the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), the DoD, other national laboratories, the Nevada Test Site, and Pantex Plant with regards to nuclear explosive and weapon system safety. These orders and directives define nuclear detonation as an energy release through a nuclear process, during a period of time on the order of 1 microsecond, in an amount equivalent to the energy released by detonating 4 or more pounds of trinitrotoluene (TNT).

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2023

W-13 Advanced Engineering Analysis Group Overview [Slides]

W-13 provides the Nuclear Weapons Program at Los Alamos National Laboratory with excellence in engineering analysis, predictive modeling, validated simulations, and the quantification of margins and uncertainty. Our customers include the nuclear weapons program, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of Defense, among others.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2024

Strategic Analyses and Assessments Office Annual Report 2023

The past year has seen a significant increase in focus on strategic issues with the continued aggression by Russia, the rapid expansion of China’s military—particularly their nuclear capabilities, North Korea’s rapid improvements in intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) technology, and the increase in Iranian fuel enrichment. The U.S. continues to modernize Nuclear Command Control and Communication and all three legs of its nuclear Triad—Columbia-class submarines, Sentinel ICBMs, and B-21 bombers—for the Department of Defense (DOD). At the same time, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is updating its stockpile, producing the B61-12, the new B61-13, the W88 Alteration, the W87-1—with new pits, and the W80-4. This rework of the nuclear enterprise represents the most aggressive expansion of our capabilities and infrastructure in the modern era. At the same time, the Strategic Posture Commission completed its report to Congress and reported that the current modernization program, although clearly necessary, is insufficient to meet the threats that are emerging.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2024

Multi-phenomenology Yield Characterization

This report serves as the first delivery of a four-year applied science effort to transform and advance the error bounds for the yield estimate of an explosion. Each year’s delivery will be in this form, culminating in the submission of this work for peer review to a scientific journal. Importantly, the yearly progress reports can then also be viewed as expanding drafts working towards a formal journal article submission. For the first tranche of funding, we collaborated with Air Force Technical Applications Center (AFTAC) scientists to identify unclassified real-world data that demonstrate and validate our advanced error propagation methods. Collaboration includes visits to AFTAC and telecons. For this development, we illustrate the fusion of seismic, acoustic, optical, and surface effect signatures from an explosion. The mathematics and code being adapted to this specific application (Williams et al., 2021) involves physics models of multiple sensor signatures. We have also identified related physics models and have integrated them into code. Current methods of underground explosion yield estimation for the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) have served the US treaty monitoring mission well for decades. A research objective of the Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Development (DNN R&D) office of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has always been to provide new technical capabilities for monitoring lower thresholds. The general model and error propagation code to be developed in this project is based on significant advances in error modeling and propagation needed to analyze data at lower detection thresholds. The second tranche of funding for this project began on May 1, 2022, and planned work for the second tranche includes: i) completing the integration of physical model code into the general error model framework; this code accommodates a wide range of linear/nonlinear source models, fixed/ random effects, and frequentist/Bayesian analyses (the purpose of which is not to dictate to users how to analyze data, but instead to allow users the maximum flexibility in their work); ii) illustrative application of code to identified data, and; iii) initial planning with AFTAC researchers on delivery of code to the Common Development Environment at AFTAC, and continued writing of the planned final journal article submission (year two of this progress report), with particular emphasis on descriptions of data identified for this effort.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2024

Sigma Division Capability Strategy

Sigma Division maintains a unique manufacturing science capability at Los Alamos National Laboratory that has made substantial contributions to weapons component process development for more than 70 years. This mission requires the ability to handle a range of radiological and hazardous materials, work with a variety of metallic and non-metallic components, and process materials systems with elements spanning hydrogen to uranium. Today, Sigma serves as a national resource for uranium research and development, provides hardware for experimental campaigns, supports production by demonstrating modern fabrication technologies, and conducts manufacturing science research primarily for customers across the nuclear weapons complex, including the Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, and Office of Defense Programs.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2024

The Delicate Balance Redux: The Role of Nuclear Forces, Damage Limitation and Uncertainty in Future U.S.-China Crises

What is the impact of damage limitation capabilities like counterforce and missile defenses on deterrence, when their efficacy in stopping an adversary nuclear attack is uncertain? This is a key unanswered question to understand “how much is enough” for the United States to deter China and Russia in future nuclear crises. In this paper we extend an established, single move game theory model to capture the dynamics of two players in a nuclear crisis having varying damage limitation capabilities with uncertain effectiveness. Our model formalizes the logic of the “delicate balance” school of deterrence, which states that leverage in a crisis is driven by the risk each player can take with their combined strategic forces, and that those risks carry uncertainty as nuclear forces are hard to deliver against technologically advanced adversaries. Our model shows that damage limitation capabilities—even those with significant uncertainty around them like cyber or electronic warfare—can drive bargaining outcomes in an array of nuclear crises. We then apply these bargaining outcomes to the expected U.S.-China strategic balance as China builds out its nuclear force through 2035. We apply published force exchange models to determine the expected damage each side will be able to deliver, and we use these values to determine the likelihood that the U.S. can prevail in crises of varying stakes. Last, we show that U.S. policymakers have an array of options to improve future bargaining outcomes, evaluating how additional nuclear forces trade against improvements in damage limitation.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2024

Samoa Updater: An Application of the Levenberg-Marquardt Method to Update DELFIC Predictions Using Field Measurements

The US Department of Energy (DOE) Forensics Operations (DFO) is a member of the Ground Collections Task Force (GCTF), which is responsible for sample collection of radiological debris for attribution should a nuclear detonation ever occur in the United States. The DFO runs the Defense Land Fallout Interpretive Code (DELFIC) Fallout Planning Tool to predict the deposition of fallout from a nuclear detonation. This prediction is refined using the DELFIC Updater tool, which takes ground measurements and adjusts DELFIC inputs to minimize the difference between prediction and observation, yielding improved predictions of fallout in locations both measured and not yet measured. Samoa, a framework for uncertainty analysis and optimization, is used to improve DELFIC predictive fallout modeling. This new capability using Samoa, dubbed “Samoa Updater,” is compared with the current DELFIC Updater, a brute-force sampling approach. Samoa Updater uses the Levenberg– Marquardt (LM) method, a gradient-based nonlinear least squares approach that uses the functional shape of the input space to increase optimization speed. In simulated test cases Samoa Updater yields faster and more accurate solutions than the current Updater.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2025

Zero Trust Strategies for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Detection Systems: D.1 Cyber Scenarios

The evolving landscape of cybersecurity necessitates a paradigm shift to a Zero Trust (ZT) model, which assumes breaches and continuously verifies trust. This approach reshapes how trust boundaries are established, focusing on identities, devices, networks, applications, and data, rather than solely relying on perimeter defenses such as firewalls. Central to this transformation is the National Institute of Standards and Technology's (NIST) Special Publication 800-207, outlining the Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA), along with Executive Order 14028, which mandates federal agencies to adopt ZT principles. Complementary to these efforts, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) developed the Zero Trust Maturity Model (ZTMM), providing a framework with five pillars and three cross-cutting capabilities to guide agencies toward enhanced cybersecurity maturity. In support of these initiatives, the DHS Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office (CWMD) is applying ZT principles to secure Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) detection systems. Recognizing the diverse deployment models and network connectivity of these systems—from stationary, non-networked units to mobile, cloud-connected devices—the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) is developing cybersecurity scenarios specifically for CBRN environments. These scenarios examine various configurations and technological capabilities, offering insights into the application of ZTMM pillars in enhancing the security postures of CBRN devices. The cybersecurity scenarios presented by PNNL are hypothetical, crafted to explore theoretical situations and stimulate discussion on the potential use or compromise of CBRN detection systems in varied contexts. These narratives are illustrative and do not reference any real events or actual networks. Instead, they employ generalized reference models to highlight concepts and potential issues within CBRN security, focusing on how Zero Trust strategies can be adapted to address these challenges effectively.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2025

How Quantum Sensing Will Help Solve GPS Denial in Warfare

The U.S. military’s ability to posture, deter, and prevail in future conflicts may rest on the quantum sensing position, navigation, and timing (PNT) capabilities that are currently being developed. Heavy reliance on GPS signals for PNT has become a critical vulnerability for the U.S. military. Meanwhile, the conflict in Ukraine has demonstrated that GPS denial and electronic warfare (EW) is now a key component of modern combat and satellite-guided munitions are reportedly being rendered ineffective. The Department of Defense (DOD) is focusing on upgrading GPS to use stronger, military-specific signals, which will still be vulnerable to EW and anti-satellite capabilities. A more diverse and resilient alternate-PNT strategy is needed to ensure mission success.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2025

Mil-Std-464C and Mil-Std-464D Electromagnetic Radiation Environment Evaluation

Many systems derive their electromagnetic radiation (EMR) environments from Mil-Std-464C or Mil-Std-464D, Electromagnetic Environmental Effects Requirements for Systems. This standard defines several EMR environments based on the type of system and expected application. Many nuclear weapon (NW) systems reference the ordnance environments as the starting point for their functional EMR requirements, since any item intended to go into Department of Defense (DOD) custody is expected to be certified hazards of electromagnetic radiation to ordnance (HERO) safe when exposed to the environments listed in Mil-Std-464 Table 9. This environment is defined as the envelope of all sources any system in DOD custody may ever encounter, however, and may include sources that are not relevant for a particular system. This document is intended to provide additional clarity on the Mil-Std-464C and Mil-Std-464D EMR environments, specifically the driving sources for the maximum ordnance levels. This supplementary information may be used to guide tailoring of relevant environments or application to different systems with the additional consideration of any shielding that may reduce the external environments defined in the military standard.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2025

NCERC 2024 Highlights

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is entrusted with ensuring the safety, security, and reliability of the nation’s nuclear weapons stockpile while advancing programs aimed at reducing global nuclear proliferation. These critical mission objectives are achieved through the expertise of a highly skilled team of professionals. The operations at the National Criticality Experiments Research Center (NCERC) play a vital role in developing and enhancing knowledge and expertise in advanced nuclear technologies. NCERC supports a wide range of mission areas, including nuclear criticality safety, nuclear emergency response, and nuclear nonproliferation, safeguards, and arms control. It also provides support to the Department of Homeland Security, advances stockpile stewardship science, and delivers scientific expertise to other government agencies, such as NASA and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. NCERC conducts experiments utilizing diverse nuclear materials, from small neutron-emitting sources for testing radiation detection equipment to larger quantities of uranium and plutonium for criticality experiments. A cornerstone of NCERC's mission portfolio includes the operation of four critical mass assembly machines—Planet, Comet, Flattop, and Godiva-IV—which are instrumental in advancing nuclear science and ensuring the nation’s nuclear security objectives.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Zero Trust Framework: CWMD Zero Trust Principles Model

The research focuses on the critical need for enhanced cybersecurity within the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Office, specifically targeting Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear devices. Traditional perimeter-based security models are insufficient against modern cyber threats, prompting a shift toward Zero Trust principles (ZTP) that emphasize continuous verification and stringent security for all devices. Federal directives mandate the adoption of Zero Trust (ZT) across agencies, supported by guidelines from National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and National Security Agency (NSA). The research involved mapping ZT guidance from these agencies to develop tailored CWMD ZTP. The study identified gaps and areas for improvement, including clear transitional guidance from traditional to ZT architectures and the focus on explicit cross cutting capabilities. Design improvements are recommended to ensure increased comprehensive protection and resilience against sophisticated cyber threats for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) devices. Collaborative efforts among federal agencies are essential for the successful deployment of an optimized ZT guidance.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2026

Watching for light: An enterprise roadmap for trustworthy laser threat warning (LTW) to protect national assets

Comprehensive space force protection must include effective and trustworthy laser threat warning (LTW). Effective LTW will detect and characterize threats to space assets and thus enhance space deterrence. LTW must be trustworthy: able to categorize threats and non-threats by being both sensitive to true events and resistant to false alarms. Outside of the laboratory, the statistics and even the roles of lasers become unclear. In the chain of events leading to an attack, the laser may be the last link to be understood. Human situational awareness and informal reasoning must blend statistics with circumstantial evidence to visualize these chains before they are clear. This paper sets out an industrial model for an enterprise that will routinely produce trustworthy LTW. By incorporating psychology and economics, this enterprise can overcome the difficulties and perils of cooperation in networked defense and intelligence. This roadmap suggests how the enterprise can incentivize distracted actors with different goals to share what they know and coordinate what they do.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2021

The Hyperthermophilic Restriction-Modification Systems of Thermococcus kodakarensis Protect Genome Integrity

Thermococcus kodakarensis (T. kodakarensis), a hyperthermophilic, genetically accessible model archaeon, encodes two putative restriction modification (R-M) defense systems, TkoI and TkoII. TkoI is encoded by TK1460 while TkoII is encoded by TK1158. Bioinformative analysis suggests both R-M enzymes are large, fused methyltransferase (MTase)-endonuclease polypeptides that contain both restriction endonuclease (REase) activity to degrade foreign invading DNA and MTase activity to methylate host genomic DNA at specific recognition sites. In this work, we demonsrate T. kodakarensis strains deleted for either or both R-M enzymes grow more slowly but display significantly increased competency compared to strains with intact R-M systems, suggesting that both TkoI and TkoII assist in maintenance of genomic integrity in vivo and likely protect against viral- or plasmid-based DNA transfers. Pacific Biosciences single molecule real-time (SMRT) sequencing of T. kodakarensis strains containing both, one or neither R-M systems permitted assignment of the recognition sites for TkoI and TkoII and demonstrated that both R-M enzymes are TypeIIL; TkoI and TkoII methylate the N 6 position of adenine on one strand of the recognition sequences GTGAAG and TTCAAG, respectively. Further in vitro biochemical characterization of the REase activities reveal TkoI and TkoII cleave the DNA backbone GTGAAG(N) 20 /(N) 18 and TTCAAG(N) 10 /(N) 8 , respectively, away from the recognition sequences, while in vitro characterization of the MTase activities reveal transfer of tritiated S-adenosyl methionine by TkoI and TkoII to their respective recognition sites. Together these results demonstrate TkoI and TkoII restriction systems are important for protecting T. kodakarensis genome integrity from invading foreign DNA.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2020

Lectin Receptor-Like Kinases: The Sensor and Mediator at the Plant Cell Surface

Lectin receptor-like kinases (LecRLKs), a plant-specific receptor-like kinase (RLK) sub-family, have been recently found to play crucial roles in plant development and responses to abiotic and biotic stresses. In this review, we first describe the classification and structures of Lectin RLKs. Then we focus on the analysis of functions of LecRLKs in various biological processes and discuss the status of LecRLKs from the ligands they recognize, substrate they target, signaling pathways they are involved in, to the overall regulation of growth-defense tradeoffs. LecRLKs and the signaling components they interact with constitute recognition and protection systems at the plant cell surface contributing to the detection of environmental changes monitoring plant fitness.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2025

A Curated Dataset of Regional Meteor Events with Simultaneous Optical and Infrasound Observations (2006–2011)

We present a curated, openly accessible dataset of 71 regional meteor events simultaneously recorded by optical and infrasound instrumentation between 2006 and 2011. These events were captured during an observational campaign using the all-sky cameras of the Southern Ontario Meteor Network and the co-located Elginfield Infrasound Array. Each entry provides optical trajectory measurements, infrasound waveforms, and atmospheric specification profiles. The integration of optical and acoustic data enables robust linkage between observed acoustic signals and specific points along meteor trajectories, offering new opportunities to examine shock wave generation, propagation, and energy deposition processes. This release fills a critical observational gap by providing the first validated, openly accessible archive of simultaneous optical–infrasound meteor observations that supports trajectory reconstruction, acoustic propagation modeling, and energy deposition analyses. By making these data openly available in a structured format, this work establishes a durable reference resource that advances reproducibility, fosters cross-disciplinary research, and underpins future developments in meteor physics, atmospheric acoustics, and planetary defense.

astrometry↗
DOE OSTI2023

Dynamic Reconfiguration of Switchgrass Proteomes in Response to Rust ( Puccinia novopanici ) Infection

Switchgrass (Panicum virgatum L.) can be infected by the rust pathogen (Puccinia novopanici) and results in lowering biomass yields and quality. Label-free quantitative proteomics was conducted on leaf extracts harvested from non-infected and infected plants from a susceptible cultivar (Summer) at 7, 11, and 18 days after inoculation (DAI) to follow the progression of disease and evaluate any plant compensatory mechanisms to infection. Some pustules were evident at 7 DAI, and their numbers increased with time. However, fungal DNA loads did not appreciably change over the course of this experiment in the infected plants. In total, 3830 proteins were identified at 1% false discovery rate, with 3632 mapped to the switchgrass proteome and 198 proteins mapped to different Puccinia proteomes. Across all comparisons, 1825 differentially accumulated switchgrass proteins were identified and subjected to a STRING analysis using Arabidopsis (A. thaliana L.) orthologs to deduce switchgrass cellular pathways impacted by rust infection. Proteins associated with plastid functions and primary metabolism were diminished in infected Summer plants at all harvest dates, whereas proteins associated with immunity, chaperone functions, and phenylpropanoid biosynthesis were significantly enriched. At 18 DAI, 1105 and 151 proteins were significantly enriched or diminished, respectively. Many of the enriched proteins were associated with mitigation of cellular stress and defense.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗