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This presentation discusses the differences between information systems (IT) and operational systems (OT) and why that difference is important in the context of cybersecurity for the energy sector.
The Internet of Things (IoT) encompasses a vast network of interconnected devices embedded with software, sensors, and network connectivity, enabling data collection and exchange. While IoT technology revolutionizes various industries, it also introduces significant security challenges. This research focuses on enhancing IoT security through the implementation of Zero Trust Architecture concepts, specifically targeting the Network and Device pillars of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency’s Zero Trust Maturity Model. By generating Codified Attack Surfaces (CAS) using custom Structured Threat Information eXpression bundles, this project aims to provide enhanced visibility into network communications, detect vulnerabilities in device firmware, and improve the overall security posture for IoT devices and networks. The methodology involves defining custom STIX schema and objects, collecting data from intra-IoT traffic, external network traffic, and firmware analysis, and automating the conversion and correlation of this data into STIX bundles. The automated generation of attack surfaces offers comprehensive insights into activity, vulnerabilities, and anomalies within an IoT environment, enabling proactive threat identification and mitigation.
The INL TADA GETs Cohort Session 1, held on November 4, 2025, convened experts to address the integration of advanced transmission technologies, including Grid-Enhancing Technologies (GETs) and High Performance Conductors (HPCs), with a focus on digital assurance challenges. The session highlighted the growing importance of cybersecurity, supply chain transparency, reliability, and business risk management in deploying GETs, especially Dynamic Line Ratings (DLRs). Participants examined how expanded attack surfaces, limited vendor pools, and new regulatory requirements—such as FERC Orders 881, 2023, and 1920—are influencing utilities and technology providers. The workshop underscored the need for cyber-informed engineering, secure-by-design principles, and practical risk management strategies, while fostering collaboration and knowledge sharing among industry peers. Technical discussions covered the evolution from static to dynamic line ratings, complexities of cloud-based architectures, and NERC CIP compliance challenges. The session concluded with a collaborative risk exercise and a preview of future workshops on advanced power flow control and transmission topology optimization, reinforcing the cohort’s commitment to advancing digital assurance in the energy sector.
The TADA BESS Supply Chain Workshops are designed to equip participants with the knowledge and tools necessary to address the evolving challenges at the intersection of battery energy storage systems (BESS), cybersecurity, and supply chain vulnerabilities. The workshops emphasize the application of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) principles using INL’s procurement guide and the CIE-BAT tool. Attendees will develop risk-based security strategies and actionable compliance roadmaps tailored to their BESS projects. Additionally, the program fosters a collaborative network of practitioners and provides guidance on navigating emerging regulatory requirements, including FEOC rules under the OBBB framework, to assess and enhance organizational readiness. This is Session 1 of 3.
Large Load Integration Tasks: Task 1 – Workshops Support stakeholder engagement across industry to promote collaboration and identify solutions to challenges that will guide other work Task 2 – Ancillary Services Characterize different types of large loads to assess under what conditions they may be utilized to provide grid stability services Task 3 – Communications Explore the cybersecurity and communications infrastructure required to enable large loads to interface with grid operations to provide ancillary services Task 4 – Nuclear Integration Explore risks and methods for supporting large load energy needs with SMRs and incorporating them into the wider power system Task 5 – Decision Support and TA Provide support to stakeholders through the creation of planning tools and direct technical assistance.
This document provides a comprehensive Digital Assurance Checklist for securing behind-the-meter energy assets, focusing on both installers and homeowners. As distributed energy resources (DERs) such as solar PV and battery storage become integral to residential energy systems, cybersecurity emerges as a critical component of reliability and safety. The guide outlines actionable steps for installers during pre-installation, commissioning, and post-installation phases, emphasizing practices like network segmentation, credential management, firmware validation, and homeowner education. For homeowners, the document introduces a tiered approach to cyber hygiene—from essential measures like strong Wi-Fi credentials and automatic updates to advanced strategies such as network segmentation, DNS filtering, and intrusion detection. By adopting these practices, stakeholders can mitigate cyber risks, safeguard energy infrastructure, and ensure resilient, secure operation of DER systems. Additional resources and references to industry standards are included to support implementation.
Autonomous vehicles (AVs) are vulnerable to cyberattacks targeting both internal communication networks and external perception sensors. While edge-based intrusion de- tection for Controller Area Network (CAN) buses offers real-time protection, it cannot detect cross-modal threats. Conversely, multi-modal fusion approaches improve coverage but often lack efficiency for in-vehicle deployment. This thesis integrates two complemen- tary solutions: (1) a lightweight, edge-deployable machine learning framework for CAN bus intrusion detection, and (2) a late-fusion system combining CAN FD and LiDAR data. Together, they form a hierarchical defense capable of handling single-modality and coordi- nated attacks. Simulations show that CAN-only models reach 93% accuracy on simulated DoS, spoofing, replay, and fuzzy attacks, while the fusion system achieves 0.87 AUC and 0.82 F1-score at 2 ms latency. This unified framework establishes a scalable, explainable, and field-ready strategy for AV cybersecurity.
The TADA BESS Supply Chain Workshops are designed to equip participants with the knowledge and tools necessary to address the evolving challenges at the intersection of battery energy storage systems (BESS), cybersecurity, and supply chain vulnerabilities. The workshops emphasize the application of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) principles using INL’s procurement guide and the CIE-BAT tool. Attendees will develop risk-based security strategies and actionable compliance roadmaps tailored to their BESS projects. Additionally, the program fosters a collaborative network of practitioners and provides guidance on navigating emerging regulatory requirements, including FEOC rules under the OBBB framework, to assess and enhance organizational readiness. This is Session 1 of 3. (Full Version)
This thesis presents the development of a laboratory-scale cyber–physical midstream pipeline testbed designed to address this gap and support research in industrial control systems security. The platform integrates pumps, valves, sensors, programmable logic controllers (PLCs), and a human–machine interface (HMI) to emulate the monitoring and control architecture of real pipeline operations. The physical process is implemented as a closed-loop liquid circulation system designed to replicate flow behavior characteristic of midstream pipeline infrastructure. The testbed enables real-time data acquisition of key process variables, including flow rate and pressure facilitating the generation of datasets representative of normal pipeline operation. A threat model encompassing common ICS attack vectors was developed, including sensor spoofing, command injection, false data injection, denial-of-service attacks, and relay manipulation. Multiple attack scenarios were implemented and evaluated to demonstrate how cyber intrusions targeting sensors, actuators, networks, and software propagate into measurable physical consequences in pipeline flow and pressure. The developed platform serves as a practical, cost-effective environment for experimentation, education, and future cybersecurity research in midstream pipeline systems.
Scholars worldwide leverage science gateways/virtual research environments (VREs) for a wide variety of research and education endeavors spanning diverse scientific fields. Evaluating the value of a given science gateway/VRE to its constituent community is critical in obtaining the financial and human resources necessary to sustain operations and increase adoption in the user community. In this article, we feature a variety of exemplar science gateways/VREs and detail how they define impact in terms of, for example, their purpose, operation principles, and size of user base. Further, the exemplars recognize that their science gateways/VREs will continuously evolve with technological advancements and standards in cloud computing platforms, web service architectures, data management tools and cybersecurity. We also present a number of technology advances that could be incorporated in next-generation science gateways/VREs to enhance their scope and scale of their operations for greater success/impact. The exemplars are selected from owners of science gateways in the Science Gateways Community Institute (SGCI) clientele in the United States, and from the owners of VREs in the International Virtual Research Environment Interest Group (VRE-IG) of the Research Data Alliance. Thus, community-driven best practices and technology advances are compiled from diverse expert groups with an international perspective to envisage futuristic science gateway/VRE innovations.
The clean energy transformation includes the integration of distributed energy resources with the power grid, which has led to a substantial increase in the complexity of power grids infrastructure and the underlying operational technology environment. Power grids infrastructure represents an operational technology environment that has become a system of systems, integrating heterogeneous devices which are both software-and hardware-intensive; as a result, there are increasing demands to exploit advances in the commodity of software-hardware infrastructures to improve energy systems requirements such as cybersecurity and resilience. In such a setting, system requirements at different levels mix, which leads to vulnerabilities and undesirable outcomes. The use of formal methods to characterize and prove system requirements removes ambiguity, increases automation, and provides high levels of assurance and reliability. In this paper, we contribute a methodology and a framework for the system-level verification of zero trust architecture requirements in operational technology environments. We define a formal specification for the core functionalities of operational technology environments, the corresponding invariants, and security proofs. Of particular note is our modular approach for the formal verification of asynchronous interactions in operational technology environments. The formal specification and the proofs have been mechanized using the interactive theorem proving environment Isabelle/HOL.
Abstract To accomplish net-zero carbon emissions in the built environment by 2050, we must equitably decarbonize commercial buildings, including reducing plug and process loads (PPLs). PPLs are plug-in or hardwired electric and gas loads that are not associated with major building end uses like lighting and HVAC. Research shows PPL energy reduction strategies and control technologies have the potential to save energy. But even when implemented, these savings have rarely been achieved and there has not been widespread uptake in U.S. commercial buildings. We investigate why these technologies and strategies have not seen widespread adoption and identify behavior and technology pathways to increase PPL reduction in U.S. commercial buildings. We examined behaviors of commercial building stakeholders through 44 interviews and cross-referenced qualitative analysis findings with in-depth technical knowledge of existing PPL control technologies and reduction strategies. PPL control implementation must be paired with management strategies, such as occupant engagement and training, to achieve optimal savings, and best practices should be disseminated across the industry. We found that increasing access to cost and energy savings data will promote uptake of PPL control technologies and allow designers to better incorporate PPLs into building design. Improving access to funding for PPL energy efficiency projects and addressing the split-incentive problem will increase adoption of PPL efficiency and control. Code bodies should continue to include PPL monitoring and reduction measures in energy codes. Key building stakeholders, including cybersecurity and information technology teams, should be involved in PPL monitoring and reduction strategy processes for successful implementation.
Microgrids are an emerging alternative as an energy backup system for critical electric loads and have improved performance compared to the traditional architecture where a single emergency diesel generator is tied to an individual building. Both architectures are dependent on the reliability of their individual generators and a quantitative and realistic comparison of the overall system reliability of the two architectures is lacking. Using recently published work on emergency diesel generator finite reliability, a quantitative methodology is presented to compare the reliability of a microgrid architecture based on centralized emergency diesel generators to the traditional approach of generators tied to individual buildings. Three system reliability performance metrics are calculated as a function of outage duration: (1) probability to meet 100% of the critical load; (2) expected fraction of lost load; and (3) probability to meet the highest priority critical loads. It is shown that stand-alone building-tied emergency diesel generators systems, even when two emergency diesel generators are used per building, cannot provide the reliability required to sustain critical loads for a grid outage lasting multiple days. Due to their network configuration and ability to share load, diesel generator-based microgrid configurations are estimated to have = 93% probability of powering all buildings for a 2-week outage there the individual building-tied emergency diesel generator architecture has a =20% probability. Microgrids do present other susceptibilities that are site specific and should be considered including vulnerabilities associated with the on-campus distribution system and cybersecurity.
This paper proposes a reference framework for a transactive energy market based on blockchain. The framework was designed based on the engineering requirements of a distribution-scale market; including participant needs, expected market transactions, and the cybersecurity constructs required to support a fair, secure and efficient market operation. It leverages the existing blockchain primitives to provide clear value propositions to the transactive market, including identity management (access control), data security (integrity), resiliency (decentralization, scalability and performance). The validity of the proposed framework is demonstrated using a real-time 5-min double-auction market. The results highlight its benefits while providing strong validation of applicability to blockchain within transactive energy systems.
Attacks exploiting human attentional vulnerability have posed severe threats to cybersecurity. In this work, we identify and formally define a new type of proactive attentional attacks called Informational Denial-of-Service (IDoS) attacks that generate a large volume of feint attacks to overload human operators and hide real attacks among feints. Here, we incorporate human factors (e.g., levels of expertise, stress, and efficiency) and empirical psychological results (e.g., the Yerkes-Dodson law and the sunk cost fallacy) to model the operators’ attention dynamics and their decision-making processes along with the real-time alert monitoring and inspection. To assist human operators in dismissing the feints and escalating the real attacks timely and accurately, we develop a Resilient and Adaptive Data-driven alert and Attention Management Strategy (RADAMS) that de-emphasizes alerts selectively based on the abstracted category labels of the alerts. RADAMS uses reinforcement learning to achieve a customized and transferable design for various human operators and evolving IDoS attacks. The integrated modeling and theoretical analysis lead to the Product Principle of Attention (PPoA), fundamental limits, and the tradeoff among crucial human and economic factors. Experimental results corroborate that the proposed strategy outperforms the default strategy and can reduce the IDoS risk by as much as 20%. Besides, the strategy is resilient to large variations of costs, attack frequencies, and human attention capacities. We have recognized interesting phenomena such as attentional risk equivalency, attacker’s dilemma, and the half-truth optimal attack strategy.
As modern systems become increasingly reliant on cyber-technologies and continue to be integrated with physical systems, managing risks from deliberate and non-deliberate sources is a significant research challenge. Unlike strictly physical systems, cyber-enabled physical systems are influenced by dynamic and evolving technologies, environments, and attack mechanisms. As a result, vulnerabilities are rapidly changing and difficult to detect and manage. While there is recent interest in the dynamic properties of performance through resilience analysis, limited research addresses the dynamic nature of cyber-system vulnerability. This paper presents a dynamic iterative learning approach to evaluate the state of health for systems as related to cyber-vulnerabilities. These time-varying system health characteristics may not be visible, but can be inferred using observable characteristics. The approach recognizes that multiple types of vulnerabilities need to be included in a holistic system health assessment. The methods are applied to the Common Vulnerability Scoring System database containing over 100,000 documented cybersecurity vulnerabilities. This work is the first to acknowledge the dynamic properties of cyber-vulnerability, while also inferring system health using observable data and hidden states of system health. This work will be of interest to managers of large-scale cyber-enabled physical systems who are seeking to prioritize system health investments.
The rapid growth of the Internet of Things (IoT) and Edge Computing (EC) has brought significant conveniences to modern society but has also greatly expanded the cyber attack surfaces, particularly as these technologies are being increasingly integrated into critical systems such as power grids, healthcare, and smart homes. Here, to improve IoT/EC’s cybersecurity posture, we leveraged Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning (ML) by employing tinyML to monitor voluminous IoT data for cyber threats while addressing devices’ resource constraints, and utilizing Federated Learning (FL) to share local detection knowledge across the system while preserving privacy. Building on our three-layer architecture combining tinyML and FL to enhance autonomous cyber attack detection, this paper demonstrated that the architecture improves detection accuracy, reduces resource consumption, and enables lightweight, secure IoT device monitoring. These results were validated using the public N-BaIoT dataset as well as real IoT network traffic data collected under multiple attack scenarios from our testbeds. Additionally, we introduced an enhanced FL methodology with a novel preprocessing stage, including federated feature selection and global preprocessor construction, to address IoT/EC data heterogeneity. We developed a physical IoT testbed for attack simulations and data collection, implemented a tinyML-powered detector for realistic model validation, and also built a virtual testbed for scalable evaluations of FL models across diverse network environments.
Abstract With the ongoing development of Distributed Energy Resources (DER) communication networks, the imperative for strong cybersecurity and data privacy safeguards is increasingly evident. DER networks, which rely on protocols such as Distributed Network Protocol 3 and Modbus, are susceptible to cyberattacks such as data integrity breaches and denial of service due to their inherent security vulnerabilities. This paper introduces an innovative Federated Learning (FL)‐based anomaly detection system designed to enhance the security of DER networks while preserving data privacy. Our models leverage Vertical and Horizontal Federated Learning to enable collaborative learning while preserving data privacy, exchanging only non‐sensitive information, such as model parameters, and maintaining the privacy of DER clients' raw data. The effectiveness of the models is demonstrated through its evaluation on datasets representative of real‐world DER scenarios, showcasing significant improvements in accuracy and F1‐score across all clients compared to the traditional baseline model. Additionally, this work demonstrates a consistent reduction in loss function over multiple FL rounds, further validating its efficacy and offering a robust solution that balances effective anomaly detection with stringent data privacy needs.