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At least 703 records · Page 39

Los Alamos National Laboratory Floodplain Assessment for the West Road Post and Cable Fencing Project

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a semi-autonomous agency within the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), is proposing to take action at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) to install post and cable or in-kind barriers along West Road at selected locations near the Los Alamos County ice-skating rink in Los Alamos Canyon (Figure 1). The proposed project is intended to improve vehicular and pedestrian safety on West Road by reducing traffic hazards associated with unsafe roadside parking and reduce wildland fire hazards associated with vehicles driving and parking on vegetation. West Road crosses approximately 0.35 miles (mi.) (1,900 feet (ft.)) of the Los Alamos Canyon floodplain at the bottom of Los Alamos Canyon. Project activities within the floodplain include blocking access to the informal roadside parking along either side of West Road in Los Alamos Canyon.

42 ENGINEERING↗

CyTRICS™ Assessment Report: Whole Home Battery Applications

This report examines the software supply chain security posture of mobile applications developed for consumer whole-house battery and energy-management products. While these applications are not currently integrated with critical infrastructure, their growing role in connected energy domain spaces underscores the importance of understanding the external dependencies, permission structures, and runtime behaviors that could introduce systemic risk; particularly, if adoption expands into more critical environments.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗

Failure Impact Analysis of Key Management in AMI Using Cybernomic Situational Assessment (CSA)

In earlier work, we presented a computational framework for quantifying the security of a system in terms of the average loss a stakeholder stands to sustain as a result of threats to the system. We named this system, the Cyberspace Security Econometrics System (CSES). In this paper, we refine the framework and apply it to cryptographic key management within the Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) as an example. The stakeholders, requirements, components, and threats are determined. We then populate the matrices with justified values by addressing the AMI at a higher level, rather than trying to consider every piece of hardware and software involved. We accomplish this task by leveraging the recently established NISTR 7628 guideline for smart grid security. This allowed us to choose the stakeholders, requirements, components, and threats realistically. We reviewed the literature and selected an industry technical working group to select three representative threats from a collection of 29 threats. From this subset, we populate the stakes, dependency, and impact matrices, and the threat vector with realistic numbers. Each Stakeholder s Mean Failure Cost is then computed.

Algorithms↗

Guided Resilience Self Assessment Application

Reliable electricity access is vital for everything from hospitals to national security. When grid disturbances occur, it is crucial to minimize the amount of time it takes to recover. Grid resiliency considers both the preparation for and recovery from high-impact low-frequency disturbances (HILF) such as weather events and cyber attacks. The Department of Energy (DOE) Wind Energy Technologies Office (WETO) funds the multi-laboratory Microgrids, Infrastructure Resilience, and Advanced Control Launchpad (MIRACL) project to investigate technologies to support and grow distributed wind. Researchers at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) contribute to resilience and cybersecurity efforts for the project, and have produced a resilience framework to evaluate system resilience based on individual system specifications. In order to make this framework easy for anyone to apply, I have coded a web application that allows users to input their power system qualities, goals, and perceived risks and then receive suggestions on how to improve their grid resiliency. The web application follows the seven steps in the planning stage of the framework process, allowing the user to input information about their grid and select from common goals, metrics, and hazards, as well as add their own. The application currently provides information about how to complete each step, requiring minimal prior knowledge of the framework. Future work for this application will include allowing the user to submit line drawings of their system and incorporate modeling tools so that the hazard simulations of applying the framework is completed for the user.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Targeting Net Zero Energy at Fort Carson: Assessment and Recommendations

The U.S. Army's Fort Carson installation was selected to serve as a prototype for net zero energy assessment and planning. NREL performed the comprehensive assessment to appraise the potential of Fort Carson to achieve net zero energy status through energy efficiency, renewable energy, and electric vehicle integration. This report summarizes the results of the assessment and provides energyrecommendations. This study is part of a larger cross-laboratory effort that also includes an assessment of renewable opportunities at seven other DoD Front Range installations, a microgrid design for Fort Carson critical loads and an assessment of regulatory and market-based barriers to a regional secure smart grid.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗

Developing measurement indices to enhance protection and resilience of U.S. critical infrastructure and key resources.

The US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is developing indices to better assist in the risk management of critical infrastructures. The first of these indices is the Protective Measures Index - a quantitative index that measures overall protection across component categories: physical security, security management, security force, information sharing, protective measures and dependencies. The Protective Measures Index, which can also be recalculated as the Vulnerability Index, is a way to compare differing protective measures (eg fence versus security training). The second of these indices is the Resilience Index, which assesses a site's resilience and consists of three primary components: robustness, resourcefulness and recovery. The third index is the Criticality Index, which assesses the importance of a facility. The Criticality Index includes economic, human, governance and mass evacuation impacts. The Protective Measures Index, Resilience Index and Criticality Index are being developed as part of the Enhanced Critical Infrastructure Protection initiative that DHS protective security advisers implement across the nation at critical facilities. This paper describes two core themes: determination of the vulnerability, resilience and criticality of a facility and comparison of the indices at different facilities.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Uptake of Uranium from Seawater by Amidoxime-Based Polymeric Adsorbent: Field Experiments, Modeling, and Updated Economic Assessment

Uranium recovery from seawater has been investigated for several decades for the purpose of securing nuclear fuel for energy production. In this study, field column experiments have been performed at the Marine Sciences Laboratory of the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) using a laboratory-proven, amidoxime-based polymeric adsorbent developed at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). The adsorbent was packed either in in-line filters or in flow-through columns. The maximum amount of uranium uptake from seawater was 3.3 mg of U/g of adsorbent after 8 weeks of contact between the adsorbent and seawater. This uranium adsorption amount was about 3 times higher than the maximum amount achieved in this study by a leading adsorbent developed at the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA).

Kim, Jungseung↗

Taking Risk Assessment and Management to the Next Level: Program-Level Risk Analysis to Enable Solid Decision-Making on Priorities and Funding

A multi-level (facility and programmatic) risk assessment was conducted for the facilities in the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities (RTBF) Program and results were included in a new Risk Management Plan (RMP), which was incorporated into the fiscal year (FY) 2010 Integrated Plans. Risks, risk events, probability, consequence(s), and mitigation strategies were identified and captured, for most scope areas (i.e., risk categories) during the facilitated risk workshops. Risk mitigations (i.e., efforts in addition to existing controls) were identified during the facilitated risk workshops when the risk event was identified. Risk mitigation strategies fell into two broad categories: threats or opportunities. Improvement projects were identified and linked to specific risks they mitigate, making the connection of risk reduction through investments for the annual Site Execution Plan. Due to the amount of that was collected, analysis to be performed, and reports to be generated, a Risk Assessment/ Management Tool (RAMtool) database was developed to analyze the risks in real-time, at multiple levels, which reinforced the site-level risk management process and procedures. The RAMtool database was developed and designed to assist in the capturing and analysis of the key elements of risk: probability, consequence, and impact. The RAMtool calculates the facility-level and programmatic-level risk factors to enable a side-by-side comparison to see where the facility manager and program manager should focus their risk reduction efforts and funding. This enables them to make solid decisions on priorities and funding to maximize the risk reduction. A more active risk management process was developed where risks and opportunities are actively managed, monitored, and controlled by each facility more aggressively and frequently. risk owners have the responsibility and accountability to manage their assigned risk in real-time, using the RAMtool database.

Nelson, J. G.↗

Developing a Validation Methodology for Expert-Informed Bayesian Network Models Supporting Nuclear Nonproliferation Analysis

Under the auspices of Pacific Northwest National Laboratory’s Signature Discovery Initiative (SDI), the research team developed a series of Bayesian Network models to assess multi-source signatures of nuclear programs. A Bayesian network is a mathematical model that can be used to marshal evidence to assess competing hypotheses. The purpose of the models was to allow non-expert analysts to benefit from the use of expert-informed mathematical models to assess nuclear programs, because such assessments require significant technical expertise ranging from the nuclear fuel cycle, construction and engineering, imagery analysis, and so forth. One such model developed under this research was aimed at assessing the consistency of open-source information about a nuclear facility with the facility’s declared use. The model incorporates factors such as location, security and safety features among others identified by subject matter experts as crucial to their assessments. The model includes key features, observables and their relationships. The model also provides documentation, which serves as training materials for the non-experts.

White, Amanda M.↗

Maintaining the Stockpile

One of NNSA’s core missions is to ensure the United States maintains a safe, secure, and effective nuclear weapons stockpile through the application of unparalleled science, technology, engineering, and manufacturing. NNSA extends the service life of weapons that have reached the end of their original design life through Life Extension Programs (LEPs). Other modernization efforts include Alterations (ALTs), which do not change the weapon’s operational capabilities, and Modifications, which do change the weapon’s operational capabilities. NNSA also conducts surveillance and assessment to ensure that weapons currently in the stockpile remain safe, secure, and effective. Labs, plants, and sites across the Nuclear Security Enterprise work together on this enduring national security mission.

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Small Technology Business Incubation Needs

This report contains a summary of typical business incubation needs of small technology companies. This document will serve as a guide in the design and implementation of services offered by the National Security Technology Incubator (NSTI), an incubator program being designed and developed as part of the National Security Preparedness Project (NSPP), performed under a Department of Energy (DOE)/National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) grant. This report includes a brief description of the methodology used to perform the needs assessment and services proposed to meet the needs of client companies. The purpose of the NSPP is to promote national security technologies through business incubation, technology demonstration and validation, and workforce development. The NSTI will focus on serving businesses with national security technology applications by nurturing them through critical stages of early development. The vision of the NSTI is to be a successful incubator of technologies and private enterprise that assist the NNSA in meeting new challenges in national safety, security, and protection of the homeland.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Assessing the Strategic Effects of Artificial Intelligence (Workshop Summary)

On September 20-21, the Center for Global Security Research (CGSR) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), in collaboration with Technology for Global Security (Tech4GS), hosted a workshop to examine the implications of advances in artificial intelligence (AI) on international security and strategic stability. Participating policymakers, scholars, technical experts, and representatives of various private sector organizations addressed the central question of whether the United States government should consider adjusting its approach to nuclear deterrence and strategic stability in light of the wide range of developments in the AI field. The workshop examined the potential risks and opportunities presented by military applications of AI and assessed which of these require consideration in the near term—and which might be exaggerated. This report is a summary of workshop discussion. The views reported here are the personal views of individual participants and should not be attributed to the organizers, the National Nuclear Security Administration, the Department of Energy, or the United States government.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Evaluation Report on "The Department's Unclassified Cyber Security Program"

Industry experts report that security challenges and threats are continually evolving as malicious activity has become more web-based and attackers are able to rapidly adapt their attack methods. In addition, the number of data breaches continues to rise. In an effort to mitigate and address threats and protect valuable information, the Department of Energy anticipated spending about $275 million in Fiscal Year (FY) 2009 to implement cyber security measures necessary to protect its information technology resources. These systems and data are designed to support the Department's mission and business lines of energy security, nuclear security, scientific discovery and innovation, and environmental responsibility. The Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA) provides direction to agencies on the management and oversight of information security risks, including design and implementation of controls to protect Federal information and systems. As required by FISMA, the Office of Inspector General conducts an annual independent evaluation to determine whether the Department's unclassified cyber security program adequately protects its information systems and data. This memorandum and the attached report present the results of our evaluation for FY 2009. The Department continued to make incremental improvements in its unclassified cyber security program. Our evaluation disclosed that most sites had taken action to address weaknesses previously identified in our FY 2008 evaluation report. They improved certification and accreditation of systems; strengthened configuration management of networks and systems; performed independent assessments; and, developed and/or refined certain policies and procedures. In addition, the Department instituted a centralized incident response organization designed to eliminate duplicative efforts throughout the Department. As we have noted in previous reports, the Department continued to maintain strong network perimeter defenses against malicious intruders and other externals threats. These are positive accomplishments. However, in our judgment, additional action is required to further enhance the Department's unclassified cyber security program and help reduce risks to its systems and data. For example, our current review identified opportunities for improvements in areas such as security planning and testing, systems inventory, access controls, and configuration management. In particular, we issued a number of findings at sites managed by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). We also identified weaknesses across various Department program elements. Issues that warrant further attention include: (1) Weaknesses such as outdated security plans and not completing annual security control self-assessments were identified at several sites; (2) The Department had not yet resolved systems inventory issues and had yet to deploy a complex-wide automated asset management tool to help track information technology resources and identify interfaces between systems or networks; (3) Although certain improvements had been made to enhance access controls, we noted deficiencies such as a lack of periodic account reviews and inadequate password management at a number of sites; and (4) Previously identified weaknesses in configuration management had been corrected, however, we found problems related to weak administrator account settings and failure to install software patches, as well as incomplete implementation of the Federal Desktop Core Configuration. These internal control weaknesses existed, at least in part, because certain cyber security roles and responsibilities were not clearly delineated. Program officials also had not effectively performed monitoring and review activities essential for evaluating the adequacy of cyber security performance. In some cases, officials had not ensured that weaknesses discovered during audits and other evaluations were recorded and tracked to resolution in the organizations' Plans of Action and Milestones. Our testing disclosed that about 39 percent of existing corrective action milestones had missed estimated remediation dates, with many exceeding planned completion dates by at least one year. As a consequence, the risk of compromise to the Department's information and systems remained higher than necessary. To assist the continuing efforts to improve, we made several recommendations designed to help the Department's managers to strengthen the unclassified cyber security program and, thereby, protect its computer resources from unauthorized modification, loss, or disclosure of information. Due to security considerations, information on specific vulnerabilities and locations has been omitted from this report. Management officials at the sites evaluated were provided with detailed information regarding identified vulnerabilities, and, in many instances, initiated corrective actions.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Building Foundations for Nuclear Security Enterprise Analysis Utilizing Nuclear Weapon Data

The Nuclear Security Enterprise, managed by the National Nuclear Security Administration - a semiautonomous agency within the Department of Energy - has been associated with numerous assessments with respect to the estimating, management capabilities, and practices pertaining to nuclear weapon modernization efforts. This report identifies challenges in estimating and analyzing the Nuclear Security Enterprise through an analysis of analogous timeframe conditions utilizing two types of nuclear weapon data - (1) a measure of effort and (2) a function of time. The analysis of analogous timeframe conditions that utilizes only two types of nuclear weapon data yields four summary observations that estimators and analysts of the Nuclear Security Enterprise will find useful.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

NASA Aeronautics Research: An Assessment

The U.S. air transportation system is vital to the economic well-being and security of the United States. To support continued U.S. leadership in aviation, Congress and NASA requested that the National Research Council undertake a decadal survey of civil aeronautics research and technology (R&T) priorities that would help NASA fulfill its responsibility to preserve U.S. leadership in aeronautics technology. In 2006, the National Research Council published the Decadal Survey of Civil Aeronautics. That report presented a set of six strategic objectives for the next decade of aeronautics R&T, and it described 51 high-priority R&T challenges--characterized by five common themes--for both NASA and non-NASA researchers. The National Research Council produced the present report, which assesses NASA's Aeronautics Research Program, in response to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act of 2005 (Public Law 109-155). This report focuses on three sets of questions: 1. How well does NASA's research portfolio implement appropriate recommendations and address relevant high-priority research and technology challenges identified in the Decadal Survey of Civil Aeronautics? If gaps are found, what steps should be taken by the federal government to eliminate them? 2. How well does NASA's aeronautics research portfolio address the aeronautics research requirements of NASA, particularly for robotic and human space exploration? How well does NASA's aeronautics research portfolio address other federal government department/agency non-civil aeronautics research needs? If gaps are found, what steps should be taken by NASA and/or other parts of the federal government to eliminate them? 3. Will the nation have a skilled research workforce and research facilities commensurate with the requirements in (1) and (2) above? What critical improvements in workforce expertise and research facilities, if any, should NASA and the nation make to achieve the goals of NASA's research program? This report continues the good work begun by the Decadal Survey of Civil Aeronautics, and it expands that work to consider in more depth NASA aeronautics research issues related to the space program, non-civil applications, workforce, and facilities.

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National Nuclear Security Administration Strategic Vision Strengthening our Nation through Nuclear Security

The National Nuclear Security Administration’s enduring mission is to protect our nation by maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear weapons stockpile, reducing global nuclear threats, and providing our submarines and aircraft carriers with militarily effective nuclear propulsion. Although we have numerous strategic partners that enable, contribute to, and benefit from our efforts, no other organization, government or civilian, can accomplish our unique mission on behalf of the American people. In this area, we stand alone. This strategic vision pursues urgent change at a significant scale to develop creative approaches, make sustained investments, and be disciplined in our approach to develop a nuclear capability for our time and for the foreseeable future. It is incumbent on us to anticipate our future security challenges and ensure our country is ready to meet them. Not doing so would have far-reaching consequences. Failure to meet our vital mission objectives will erode confidence in the security that the United States strategic deterrent umbrella provides. In assessing the current mission environment in NNSA, we can count on one thing—change: The geopolitical environment for our deterrent is ever-changing Threats from rogue states and terrorists are evolving Our nuclear weapons and the infrastructure that supports them are aging Science and technology continue to move forward at an ever-increasing pace In this dynamic environment, it is not sufficient to remedy today’s situation and meet our current mission requirements. We must lean forward in the development, planning, and execution of programs that address our current challenges while developing the workforce, infrastructure, tools, and governance systems that will enable us to meet our deterrence, non-proliferation, and naval propulsion mission requirements for the next 50 years. We must embrace a next-generation enterprise that is flexible enough to respond to future challenges. With decades of stagnation following the end of the Cold War, we find ourselves in the unenviable position of implementing near-term fixes while using those lessons learned to better prepare for the future. Without sustained and predictable investments to restore and modernize our infrastructure, we will rapidly lose our ability to deliver on our promise of a safe and reliable nuclear weapons stockpile, which will degrade our deterrent capability and render legacy weapon systems irrelevant to the defense of our nation. We must not and will not allow the next generation of our nuclear security enterprise to simply maintain the status quo. We have a storied past that guides us. For 75 years our enterprise has overcome every challenge, led the country in incredible scientific and engineering endeavors and discoveries, and successfully ensured constant vigilance in maintaining an effective deterrent, reducing global nuclear threats, and powering our nuclear navy. Now is the time for us to take decisive action in forging the enterprise of the future. As I have traveled to all of our labs, plants, and sites and met with people across our complex, I have been left with one overwhelming impression: the incredible workforce that makes up our nuclear security enterprise is up to all of the challenges we have before us. Together we can and will ensure that those in the future workforce have the resources and the responsive, agile infrastructure they need to maintain the systems of today and to design and field the systems of tomorrow.

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Large-Scale Transport Model Uncertainty and Sensitivity Analysis: Distributed Sources in Complex Hydrogeologic Systems

The Underground Test Area (UGTA) Project of the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office is in the process of assessing and developing regulatory decision options based on modeling predictions of contaminant transport from underground testing of nuclear weapons at the Nevada Test Site (NTS). The UGTA Project is attempting to develop an effective modeling strategy that addresses and quantifies multiple components of uncertainty including natural variability, parameter uncertainty, conceptual/model uncertainty, and decision uncertainty in translating model results into regulatory requirements. The modeling task presents multiple unique challenges to the hydrological sciences as a result of the complex fractured and faulted hydrostratigraphy, the distributed locations of sources, the suite of reactive and non-reactive radionuclides, and uncertainty in conceptual models. Characterization of the hydrogeologic system is difficult and expensive because of deep groundwater in the arid desert setting and the large spatial setting of the NTS. Therefore, conceptual model uncertainty is partially addressed through the development of multiple alternative conceptual models of the hydrostratigraphic framework and multiple alternative models of recharge and discharge. Uncertainty in boundary conditions is assessed through development of alternative groundwater fluxes through multiple simulations using the regional groundwater flow model. Calibration of alternative models to heads and measured or inferred fluxes has not proven to provide clear measures of model quality. Therefore, model screening by comparison to independently-derived natural geochemical mixing targets through cluster analysis has also been invoked to evaluate differences between alternative conceptual models. Advancing multiple alternative flow models, sensitivity of transport predictions to parameter uncertainty is assessed through Monte Carlo simulations. The simulations are challenged by the distributed sources in each of the Corrective Action Units, by complex mass transfer processes, and by the size and complexity of the field-scale flow models. An efficient methodology utilizing particle tracking results and convolution integrals provides in situ concentrations appropriate for Monte Carlo analysis. Uncertainty in source releases and transport parameters including effective porosity, fracture apertures and spacing, matrix diffusion coefficients, sorption coefficients, and colloid load and mobility are considered. With the distributions of input uncertainties and output plume volumes, global analysis methods including stepwise regression, contingency table analysis, and classification tree analysis are used to develop sensitivity rankings of parameter uncertainties for each model considered, thus assisting a variety of decisions.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗