Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “Safety”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 703 records · Page 39

Risk Informed Margins Management as part of Risk Informed Safety Margin Characterization

The ability to better characterize and quantify safety margin is important to improved decision making about Light Water Reactor (LWR) design, operation, and plant life extension. A systematic approach to characterization of safety margins and the subsequent margin management options represents a vital input to the licensee and regulatory analysis and decision making that will be involved. In addition, as research and development in the LWR Sustainability (LWRS) Program and other collaborative efforts yield new data, sensors, and improved scientific understanding of physical processes that govern the aging and degradation of plant SSCs needs and opportunities to better optimize plant safety and performance will become known. To support decision making related to economics, readability, and safety, the Risk Informed Safety Margin Characterization (RISMC) Pathway provides methods and tools that enable mitigation options known as risk informed margins management (RIMM) strategies.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Overview of the U.S. DOE Hydrogen Safety, Codes and Standards Program. Part 4: Hydrogen Sensors; Preprint

Hydrogen sensors are recognized as a critical element in the safety design for any hydrogen system. In this role, sensors can perform several important functions including indication of unintended hydrogen releases, activation of mitigation strategies to preclude the development of dangerous situations, activation of alarm systems and communication to first responders, and to initiate system shutdown. The functionality of hydrogen sensors in this capacity is decoupled from the system being monitored, thereby providing an independent safety component that is not affected by the system itself. The importance of hydrogen sensors has been recognized by DOE and by the Fuel Cell Technologies Office's Safety and Codes Standards (SCS) program in particular, which has for several years supported hydrogen safety sensor research and development. The SCS hydrogen sensor programs are currently led by the National Renewable Energy Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. The current SCS sensor program encompasses the full range of issues related to safety sensors, including development of advance sensor platforms with exemplary performance, development of sensor-related code and standards, outreach to stakeholders on the role sensors play in facilitating deployment, technology evaluation, and support on the proper selection and use of sensors.

30 DIRECT ENERGY CONVERSION↗

Re-Evaluating the Current Safety Goals

The Safety Goals adopted by the US NRC consist of two qualitative safety goals (QSGs) backed up by two quantitative health objectives (QHOs). The QHOs establish risk limits for severe accidents in terms of their radiological consequences, in particular, the average individual health risks of early fatality and latent cancers from radiation exposure of members of the public living in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant. This paper is devoted to a re-examination of the coverage of the current safety goals in evaluating the actual risk posed by nuclear power plant operation. Experience of recent Level 3 PRAs suggests that given a high likelihood of evacuation of the close-in population before any release occurs, the current QHOs are satisfied by large margins. However, the experience of an actual severe accident at Fukushima showed that actual human health effects from released radiation were not the dominant consequences; there were no early fatalities and no measurable increases expected in cancer rates above the baseline rates in the Japanese population. Hence, regardless of accident probability, Fukushima-type accidents would satisfy the NRC’s health-related safety goals. However, there were very significant societal costs, in that large numbers of people were relocated for long periods. We argue that, in addition to the risks addressed in current safety goals, societal risk should also be evaluated. The paper discusses specific possibilities for a goal and an associated quantitative objective.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Developing a New Criticality Safety Hands-On Training Utilizing ZPPR Plates

Nuclear criticality safety is an extremely important part of the work at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). As part of the work LANL performs to continue to keep criticality safety a top priority, LANL has developed and regularly teaches nuclear criticality safety training classes for both the United States Department of Energy Nuclear Criticality Safety Program as well as internal trainings for LANL employees. A portion of the training classes is comprised of hands-on demonstrations, where students get the opportunity to handle special nuclear material at the National Criticality Experiments Research Center (NCERC). One hands-on demonstration uses the “Class foils,” thin HEU foils which are stacked with lucite moderator plates. A hand-stack is performed until the multiplication reaches the “three-quarters rule,” where the demonstration is continued remotely on a vertical lift assembly up until the system is critical. This hands-on demonstration eventually achieves a critical configuration and follows the ANS-1 guidelines on an approach to critical. Another hands-on demonstration involves handling clad plutonium and neptunium spheres, and follows procedures using criticality safety evaluations to ensure that the hands-on demonstrations remain subcritical.This hands-on demonstration also involves the use of polyethylene shells around the plutonium sphere to demonstrate how additional reflector increases the criticality of a system. This paper is focused on developing a new hands-on demonstration using Zero Power Physics Reactor (ZPPR) plates. This new hands-on demonstration will follow the ANS-8 standards as it is not desired to achieve criticality with the ZPPR plates during the hands-on demonstration. A hands-on demonstration using multiple plutonium parts will likely be more applicable to personnel who handle plutonium on a daily basis, such as LANL glovebox operators.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

The LLWR's 2011 Environmental Safety Case - 12143

The Low Level Waste Repository (LLWR) is the United Kingdom's principal facility for the disposal of LLW. The LLWR recently submitted an Environmental Safety Case (ESC), which will support applications to regulatory and government authorities to dispose of LLW and to start to install final closure engineering. The ESC is a major submission, with important implications for the future of the LLWR and the United Kingdom's management of LLW. The paper describes the context of the ESC, the ESC, its results and conclusions, and its implementation. The description shows that our ESC is a modern safety case developed as a range of safety arguments concerning our management, scientific and technical understanding, optimisation of the facility, as well as assessment calculations. The LLWR's 2011 ESC is a major submission, with important implications for the future of the LLWR and the United Kingdom's management of LLW. The description given of the scope of the ESC shows that it is a modern safety case developed as a range of safety arguments concerning our management, scientific and technical understanding, optimisation of the facility, as well as assessment calculations. A number of key advances have been made since the previous submission. In particular, the 2011 ESC addresses the criticisms made by the regulator on the previous submission in 2002, including those relating to lack of demonstration of optimisation, high calculated doses and risks compared with guidance levels, treatment of coastal erosion, and treatment of uncertainty. The ESC is being reviewed by the environmental regulator and it is hoped that a new permit for disposal of LLW and installation of closure engineering, along with the appropriate planning permission, will be obtained during 2013. The ESC, including its proposed waste acceptance arrangements, is already being implemented by the LLWR where consistent with our current Permit. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

The use of underground research facilities for the demonstration of safety of geological disposal - 15094

Many countries are progressing towards developing research programmes related to the development of geological disposal facilities and as part of these research programmes many countries have constructed or are planning to construct Underground Research Facilities (URFs). The development of the safety case for geological disposal facilities, which covers both the operational phase and the post-closure phase, is built on the acquisition and integration of all necessary data including data on the natural and engineered barriers, on the facility itself (design), on the operation of the disposal facility, and in the specific case of geological disposal facilities, the conditions at the depth of disposal relevant for both in-situ and waste emplacement states. Taking these conditions into account can make the demonstration of safety more complex and demanding than for near surface disposal facilities. Most if not all of the countries well advanced in the development of geological disposal facilities have also developed underground research facilities to support the decision processes within their disposal facility development programme. Underground Research Facilities play an essential role in the demonstration of safety of geological disposal facilities and a distinction has to be made between data acquired from surface based investigations and boreholes and those data and experiments carried out in-situ. The use of in-situ data contribute to build confidence in the demonstration of safety and contribute to public confidence and acceptance of geological disposal facilities. Further discussion will elaborate on whether to use the URF as part of a future disposal facility or not, with an emphasis on the transposition of data from the experimental site to the disposal site and how this is addressed and validated in the demonstration of safety. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Advanced Computational Accident Scenario Modeling for Safety Margin Economic Analysis

The intent of this research is to establish a new tool in the Risk Informed Safety Margin Characterization (RISMC) tool-kit for the fiscal analysis of potential power plant upgrades. This is being done by providing proof-of-concept of the Safety Margin Economic Evaluation (SMEE) methodology of performing cost-benefit analyses of potential Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) upgrades to allow for more data-driven decision making with regards to nuclear safety. To this end, the RAVEN code developed by the Idaho National Laboratory is being used to perform a cost-benefit analysis of several potential power plant safety upgrades to compare the material cost of the upgrades with the probabilistic benefit of avoiding accident scenario consequences to find the most cost effective safety upgrades. Additionally, the MELCOR and MACCS2 codes developed by the Sandia National Laboratory are being used for accident scenario modeling. Evaluating potential NPP upgrades is concluded by doing a detailed cost-benefit analysis of the upgrades. The cost of the upgrade is the direct material cost of implementing, maintaining, and operating the upgrade at an NPP for the projected duration of its lifetime. The benefit of the upgrade is more complex, and is essentially the Risk avoided, where Risk is defined as Consequences multiplied by Probability. Here, Consequences is the economic impact of a severe accident and/or nuclear release and Probability is the likelihood that an NPP upgrade will prevent or mitigate a severe accident, reducing or even eliminating its Consequences. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Operational Safety Analysis for Disposal Period of the Future Belgian Geological Disposal Facility - 19249

For more than 40 years, ONDRAF/NIRAS (the federal agency responsible for managing radioactive waste and enriched fissile materials in Belgium) has been studying the concept of a geological disposal facility (GDF) in poorly indurated clays as an option for the long-term management of both category B waste (low-level and intermediate-level long-lived waste - LILW-LL) and category C waste (high-level waste - HLW and spent fuel). In the absence of a policy decision, the proposed Belgian reference option for disposal of such waste is a GDF in poorly indurated clays, located at a depth between 200 m and 600 m. ONDRAF/NIRAS has developed a reference disposal concept for research, development and demonstration (RD and D) purposes. At the current stage of this program, the primary objective of ONDRAF/NIRAS is to establish the safety and feasibility of constructing, operating and closing a Geological Disposal Facility (GDF) at the conceptual design level, without any presumption about the exact location of the facility. This will be evaluated in a first version of the safety and feasibility case (SFC-1 V1) for the geological disposal of category B and C radioactive wastes. Analysis of the operational safety is an important part of the SFC-1 V1. ONDRAF/NIRAS, supported by BGE Technology GmbH, has prepared an operational safety analysis of the current GDF reference design and the processes occurring during the operation and closure period. A SWIFT methodology (Structured What If Technique) is used to identify risks and the measures required to mitigate their consequences. In parallel to this SWIFT analysis, specific attention is also given to fire risk, especially in the blind-ending disposal galleries (DG). Based on understanding of fire risk analysis, recommendations suggest using exclusively electrically driven equipment to reduce fire loads and minimize the fire hazard. In addition, strict working procedures could prevent the presence of workers between the DG dead end and equipment presenting significant fire load. The use of mobile refuge chambers should also be part of the safety concept. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

WIPP Operational and Safety Lessons Learned from the 2014 Fire and Radiological Events - 19389

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) experienced two accident events in 2014 within 9 days of each other (salt haul truck fire and a radiological release). The repository was designed in the 1980's for high level waste and started operations in late 1990's for defense related transuranic (TRU) waste. Several long-standing technical issues from competing requirements between an underground facility (mine), nuclear safety, and environmental requirements lead to design, operations, and safety weaknesses that were not resolved prior to the two accident events. Other design issues and actions during early recovery efforts were identified as lessons learned for the Safety Significant Confinement Ventilation System (SSCVS) and Utility Shaft (US) capital asset projects and for future planning efforts. The infrastructure at WIPP was significantly degraded at the time of the events with key safety related items that had been out of service or not maintained for years. The emergency response to the two accident events was less than adequate and caused concerns with stakeholders. There are many operational and safety lessons learned from these two events and their corrective actions that will be valuable for all future planning of deep geological repositories (DGR). (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Review Guidelines for Biosphere Safety Assessment of Low-Level Waste Disposal Repository in Taiwan - 19606

Conducting reviews of radiological dose assessments is a crucial step toward the approval of long-term radiological safety requirements for low-level radioactive waste (LLW) disposal facilities. However, the concentration of radionuclides released from the near field into the biosphere and the radiation exposure levels to an individual can influence the performance acceptability of the LLW disposal facility and safety of the disposal environment. Therefore, all LLW must be managed and disposed of such that it minimizes risk to individuals and the environment. A dose of 0.25 mSv/year is the limit for individuals expected to receive the highest level of exposure to residual radioactivity. In Taiwan, a review for license applications has been proposed for LLW disposal facilities. These review guidelines are based on the Standard Review Plan (NUREG-1200) and are amended according to the environmental conditions in Taiwan. These guidelines can help reviewers to perform safety assessment reviews of applications for the construction and operation of LLW disposal facilities. The review guidelines for biosphere safety assessment include radiological dose assessment, description of waste characteristics, radionuclide transport characteristics, radiation dose under normal and unusual conditions, radionuclide release into the biosphere, and interpretation of evaluation results in various transfer mechanisms. These guidelines can also serve as references for regulatory departments conducting safety assessments of radiological doses in LLW disposal facilities in Taiwan. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Integrating Commercial Ready Autonomous Robotic Platforms to Enhance Worker Safety and Efficiency - 20053

This paper will explore the challenges and triumphs of implementing advanced robotic systems and the supporting technology for the waste management industry. Deployment-ready solutions for autonomous robotic platforms are new to the radioactive waste management industry and have been slow to implement across the complex. Specifically, it will explore Hanford Tank Operations Contractor's implementation of ground-based autonomous robotic platforms to enhance workforce safety and efficiency. The first objective of the project is to demonstrate safe operation of autonomous instrumented robots, followed by a scaling up of capabilities for the platform to meet any additional requests of internal stakeholders. Autonomous robotics platforms offer a fantastic range of capabilities that will aid in decreasing long-term liability of radioactive waste management industry by enhancing clean-up efforts and worker safety. Over the past five years, deployment-ready solutions for autonomous robotic platforms have come a long way. Autonomous robotic platforms are increasingly available to purchase from many vendors, often for prices under $100,000. Additionally, the vendors who produce these products are efficient in accommodating customized solutions to unique challenges, such as those often found in the radioactive waste management industry. However, the newness of this technology to the radioactive waste management industry and has resulted in a slow implementation across the complex. This paper will explore the challenges and triumphs of implementing advanced robotic systems and supporting technology for the waste management industry. Specifically, it will explore Hanford Tank Operations Contractor's implementation of ground based autonomous robotic platforms to enhance workforce safety and efficiency. While the company has utilized robots in many parts of the tank farms mission, this was first attempted in the deployment of an autonomous platform that required no operator with only minor maintenance and created challenges not yet encountered. These challenges included stakeholder buy-in, operational safety, procurement uncertainties, adaption of 'off the shelf products, overcoming the 'Fukushima complexity' perception, security concerns, and the initial criteria down select. Hanford Tank Operations Contractor's management identified the need for a workforce protecting low cost robotics solution in the fall of 2017. The project scope generated was part of the response to the Tank Vapor Assessment Team recommendation to enhance the safety of the workforce by utilizing new technology. Since the projects inception, it has been incorporated into the Tank Stewardship Plan. This project was unique to Hanford Tank Operations Contractor, as the company does not frequently incorporate advanced technology for field deployment quickly. The project was also progressive to the Hanford Tank Operations Contractor as it functions as a partnership project with a local university. The first objective of the project is to demonstrate safe operations of autonomous instrumented robotics, monitoring and collecting data, and the wireless transmission of data to a central computing system. Following the completion of this first objective, the project will scale up capabilities of the platform to meet the requests of additional internal stakeholders throughout the tank farms - including completion of specific in-field tasks. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Development of Real-Time Quantitative Safety Evaluation Method for Nuclear Power Plants

Human operators involved with large process control systems such as nuclear power plants (NPPs) perform significant roles in the operation of systems. In this reason, deficiencies in human factors such as poor HSI (Human System Interface) design, procedure, and training, are significant contributing factors to NPPs incidents and accidents. In this regard, many kinds of studies including human reliability analysis (HRA), operation support system, automation, have been conducted in order to reduce human errors. Among these fields of studies, automation has its own specialty since it mainly focuses on eliminating the human error-inducing tasks to reduce human error, while other topics are primarily focusing on reducing human error by aiding human operators during operation. It is commonly believed that replacing human operators to the automated system would guarantee greater efficiency, lower workloads, and fewer human errors. However, these beliefs are not always true in large and complex systems such as NPP, since excessive automation can generate new roles for human operators, change human operators' activities in unexpected ways, and inducing 'out-of-the-loop' (OOTL) problem. Especially, although human error probability drastically increases during abnormal situations in NPP due to overload of information, high workload, and short time available for diagnosis, automation is not actively adopted since conventional machine learning techniques are neither capable nor reliable to handle overwhelmingly complex abnormal situations in NPP. Recently, newly developed 'deep learning' techniques have been actively applied to many fields, and some of these studies proved that the artificial intelligences (AI) based on deep learning techniques show better performance than that of human being. In 2015, deep Q-network (DQN) which is one of the deep learning techniques was developed and applied to train AI that automatically plays various Atari 2800 games, and this AI surpassed the human-level playing in many kind of games. Also in 2016, 'AlphaGo', which was developed by 'Google Deepmind' based on deep learning technique to play the game of Go, was defeated Se-dol Lee who is the World Go champion with score of 4:1. In the point of view that the game of Go is considered as one of the challenging area in machine learning field, it is verified that these new machine learning techniques can perform well, even better than the human being in high-complexity tasks. Previously, most of AI applications in nuclear field were focusing on supporting human operators' tasks such as diagnosis and decision making by rapid classification and prediction, based on fixed training data sets. However, it is expected that AI can be applied to solve more complicated problems (i.e. automation during abnormal states in NPP) by adopting advanced machine learning methodologies. In order to apply the automation system in NPP, firstly it is needed to evaluate the status of the plant quantitatively in real-time, since the information about which state is better (i.e. safe) or worse (i.e. unsafe) is essential for training properly working automation AI. Currently, there are several methodologies for NPP safety evaluation such as probabilistic safety assessment (PSA), safety performance indicator (SPI). However, existing methodologies are not feasible for development of automated system since they are not capable for the cases which are not included in the underlying model, not able to consider delicate changes in the NPP, and hard to evaluate in real-time. Therefore, development of new NPP safety evaluation methodology which can cover previously mentioned requirements is needed to conduct the study on NPP automation further. In this study, the concept of early warning score (EWS) in medical field was adopted to develop the methodology which can evaluate the safety level of the NPP quantitatively and in real-time. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Rethinking of Zircaloy Embrittlement Criteria for Improving Safety Margin of Light Water Reactor

Zircaloy embrittlement criteria have become a basis for the current emergency core cooling system (ECCS) criteria to maintain the coolable geometry. U.S. NRC has considered that retaining adequate cladding ductility is a simple and effective way for ensuring the structural integrity of fuel rods under the accident conditions. Considering this, the current ECCS criteria limits the peak cladding temperature(PCT) to be 1204 deg. C, and equivalent cladding reacted (ECR) to be 17%, calculated by the Baker-Just equation. However, the criteria were established based on the experimental investigations in early 1970's and it has inevitably limitations, in particular, about hydrogen embrittlement with burnup. As a consequence, the new draft-rule proposes a relation that gives rise to a decreasing ECR limit with respect to pre-transient hydrogen content by U.S NRC. The regulation of Japan is quite different from that of U.S. NRC. This rule is set to assure structural integrity of ruptured fuel rods upon water-quenching. Recently, Japanese Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) conducted integral fuel rod thermal shock tests with high burnup claddings. These investigations confirmed that the original criteria (PCT 1200 deg. C, ECR 15% calculated by Baker-Just equation ) still successfully guarantee fuel rod structural integrity upon thermal shock and concluded that the high-burnup effects are inconsiderable as the thermal-shock fracture boundary is not significantly reduced. Hence, there exists an obvious disagreement between the embrittlement-based and the thermal shock fracture-based criterion particularly when it comes to the high burnup consideration. The one of them can be adopted to define safety limit and safety margin which is the difference between the regulation limit and actual value of the parameter. Also, it is worth noting that the temperature limit (1204 deg. C) of the Zircaloy embrittlement criteria has not been altered since it was first determined in 1970's. Such a qualitative concern alone should not limit further discussions on the potential increase in the temperature limit. Indeed, there is ample experimental evidence that supports the possibility that Zircaloy ductility can be maintained beyond 1204 deg. C if it is oxidized for a limited time period. The increase in the temperature margin can lead to a reactor power uprate, or allow an increased accident coping time. This paper aims to achieve a comprehensive understanding of an engineering compatibility between nuclear fuel behaviors, safety system, and safety criteria, in the pursuit of increasing safety margin of LWRs. Specifically, this study presents a revision the current temperature limit (1204 deg. C) with adjustable ECR levels through an extensive literature review. And the impact of this temperature limit on the actual design basis accident margin is discussed. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Systems Engineering (SE) Approach of Developing A Passive Safety Injection System (PSIS) to Cope with APR1400 Extended Station Black-Out (SBO) Accident Using RELAP5

On 11 March 2011 the power supply and cooling of the three Fukushima Daiichi reactors were disabled by a major earthquake followed by a relatively high tsunami waves. The earthquake damaged the electrical grid which is the normal power supply for the reactors, then the tsunami waves disabled the emergency diesel generators of the Fukushima Daiichi reactors, which left the plant with no alternating current (AC) source. This condition is called 'Station Black-Out'. The reactors were tripped immediately, but due to the nuclear physics phenomena, the reactor cores were still producing thermal power, which is generated by the decay of radioactive fission products in the reactor core, known as decay heat. The decay heat had not been circulated to an external heat sink and eventually the accumulative heat produced in the core led to damage to the reactor cores. After the Fukushima Daiichi accident, Design Extension Condition (DEC) such as total loss of feed water (TLOFW), and prolonged Station Black-Out (SBO) attracted the attention of nuclear experts. The attention focuses on the defense in depth concept, redundancy and sustainability of the systems, and development of the passive safety systems, which rely on natural physics laws. The topic of this paper is to discuss the possibility of attaching a Passive Safety Injection System (PSIS) to the APR1400. The PSIS is a safety system which provides adequate cooling water to the steam generators after the loss of the Auxiliary Feed Water System (AFWS) during an extended SBO accident. The PSIS will be available while the power supply of the plant is being recovered and the active safety systems take over the functionality. The anticipated PSIS will be automatically actuated to enhance the engineered safety feature and to reduce the human errors. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Can a radiological event impact a criticality safety program: Lessons learned at WIPP - 14350

Any accident at a nuclear facility impacts all departments involved in the operation of the facility. The radiological release that occurred on February 14, 2014 has halted all waste disposal operations at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) and has resulted in detailed reviews of all safety management programs. This paper describes the initial reactions to the event, criticality issues with recovery operations, corrective actions for the criticality safety program from independent reviews, and the importance of configuration management to criticality safety. The nature, location, and timing of the event resulted in significant delays in determining the cause of the event. During this time multiple theories on the initiator of the event were postulated including and inadvertent criticality event. However, the timing of the event, average fissile gram equivalent (FGE) loading of waste containers compared to analyzed FGE loads, and isotopic analysis of fixed air samples taken during the event proved it was not an inadvertent criticality event. Recovery activities such as replacing contaminated high efficiency particulate (HEPA), filters and disposing of site generated waste have also been reviewed to prevent criticality safety issues. Post event corrective actions in all departments have impacted how future operations at WIPP will be conducted, including corrective actions for the criticality safety program. The event has also proven the importance of configuration management and the effect a change can have on a process. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

The conduct of the united states department of energy nuclear criticality safety program hands-on training and education courses - 14621

The United States Department of Energy (DOE) Nuclear Criticality Safety Program (NCSP), funded and managed by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), offers courses to educate nuclear criticality safety (NCS) engineers, process supervisors, and others, and to provide experimental, hands-on training addressing important characteristics of neutron multiplying systems. This training satisfies the American National Standard Institute/American Nuclear Society (ANSI/ANS)-8.26-2007 requirement for participating in hands-on experiments with fissionable materials and provides awareness and understanding of DOE Orders, Guides and Rules, ANS standards, and hazard identification techniques, as well as control design, implementation, and maintenance in criticality safety evaluations. Since the pilot course was developed in 2011, a variety of courses have been developed for NCS practitioners and process supervisors. Attendees have come from several US and international sites. Through NCSP international collaborations and relationships, students from the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) in the United Kingdom, Atomic Energy of Canada, and the Institute for Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety in France have participated in these courses in the US. Manager courses are available for process supervisors and operations managers with NCS responsibilities in their daily jobs. Manager courses are taught at Sandia National Laboratory (SNL) and the National Criticality Experiments Research Center (NCERC); they offer a combination of hands-on experiments and classroom discussions. A two-week course is also offered for NCS practitioners, with a week of classroom instruction at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) focused on generation of NCS evaluations, and a week of hands-on training utilizing the critical assemblies at either SNL or NCERC. Cleared students can attend the hands-on training at either SNL or NCERC, and uncleared students can attend at SNL. Courses continue to evolve and continuously improve as important elements of NCS evaluations (e.g., human factors, non-destructive assay (NDA) techniques, process criticality accident lessons-learned, and hand calculation methods) are integrated with criticality safety evaluation exercises. Courses include tours of process operations at SNL, NCERC, and LANL, and interaction with instructors experienced in conducting critical experiments and working in NCS. The NNSA NCSP provides management, funding, and technical direction for these courses and makes them available with no tuition cost to NCS practitioners. This paper provides a status report to the NCS community on the conduct of these courses and how they will likely evolve in the future. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

An international perspective on nuclear criticality safety

Full text of publication follows: As one of the standing technical committees within the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) the Nuclear Science Committee overseas a programme of work aimed at delivering the following key objectives: - the advancement of scientific knowledge needed to enhance the performance and safety of current nuclear systems; - building a solid scientific and technical basis for the development of future-generation nuclear systems; - the preservation of essential knowledge in the field of nuclear science. Criticality safety is an important aspect of all three of these objectives, and the NEA Nuclear Science Working Party on Nuclear Criticality (WPNCS) coordinates many international activities under its programme of work. An overview of the WPNCS is given in the following presentation, and many of the papers presented during the ICNC 2015 technical sessions will be giving details of the outputs from the various projects and activities which make up the WPNCS programme of work. This presentation focuses on issues associated with knowledge management, particularly on how an international framework for nuclear science and criticality safety activities can provide a very effective means of transferring knowledge across technical disciplines, and between different generations of engineers and scientists. To ensure that it is the essential knowledge that is preserved and transferred, we need to understand current trends and future requirements in criticality safety. In this respect, an international framework provides both the broad scope as well as the long-term perspective needed to make an informed judgement on which information/knowledge will be of most relevance to future practitioners of criticality safety. (author)

42 ENGINEERING↗

Overview of International Activities in Hydrogen System Safety in IEA Hydrogen TCP Task 43

Safety and reliability have long been recognized as key issues for the development, commercialization, and implementation of new technologies and infrastructure, and hydrogen systems are no exception to this rule. Reliability engineering, quantitative risk assessment (QRA), and knowledge exchange each play a key role in proactive addressing safety - before problems happen - and help us learn from problems if they happen. Many international research activities are focusing on both reliability and risk assessment for hydrogen systems. However, the element of knowledge exchange is sometimes less visible. To support international collaboration and knowledge exchange, the International Energy Agency (IEA) convened a new Technology Collaboration Program, "Task 43: Safety and Regulatory Aspects of Emerging Large Scale Hydrogen Energy Applications" started in June 2022. Within Task 43, Subtask E focuses on Hydrogen Systems Safety. This paper discusses the structure of the Hydrogen Systems Safety subtask and the aligned activities and introduces opportunities for future work.

HYDROGEN↗