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The FY2017 Department of Energy (DOE) Order 435.1, Radioactive Waste Management (DOE 1999c), Annual Review for the Savannah River Site (SRS) Composite Analysis (CA) is documented, herein.
The laboratory creates a variety of wastes, each with its own health and safety concerns, regulatory requirements, and disposal pathways. However, the basic process, from preplanning to waste disposal, is always essentially the same.
No abstract prepared.
This Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 annual summary report documents the continued adequacy of the performance assessment (PA), the composite analysis (CA) and associated operating disposal-authorization statement (ODAS) technical basis documents for the Remote Handled (RH) Low-Level Waste (LLW) Disposal Facility at Idaho National Laboratory. Annual review of the adequacy of the PA and CA for the RHLLW Disposal Facility ensures that conclusions of the analyses remain valid in accordance with requirements of Department of Energy (DOE) Order 435.1 Change 1, “Radioactive Waste Management.” In FY 2020, no significant operational changes or other activities occurred that would cause deviation from the assumptions in the PA and CA pertaining to disposal geometry, verification of waste characteristics, tracking disposal inventories against total limits, facility closure design, or institutional controls. Fifteen total waste-canister shipments were received at the RHLLW Disposal Facility, and 15 total waste canisters were emplaced.
Environmental monitoring data are collected at and around the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites (RWMSs) within the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). This report summarizes the 2021 environmental data to provide an overall evaluation of RWMS performance and to support environmental compliance and performance assessment (PA) activities.
This paper reviews thirty years of progress by the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Office (LLRWMO) in developing and implementing low-level radioactive waste (LLRW) remediation projects and environmentally safe co-existence strategies. It reports on the present status and the future of the national historic waste program in Canada. There are over two million cubic metres of historic LLRW in Canada. Historic LLRW is broadly defined as LLRW that was managed in the past in a manner that is no longer considered acceptable and for which the original owner cannot reasonably be held accountable. In many cases, the original owner can not be identified or no longer exists. The LLRWMO was established in 1982 as Canada's agent to carry out the responsibilities of the federal government for the management of historic LLRW. The LLRWMO is operated by Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) through a cost-recovery agreement with Natural Resources Canada (NRCan), the federal department that provides the funding and establishes national policy for radioactive waste management in Canada. The LLRWMO expertise includes project managers, environmental remediation specialists, radiation surveyors, communications staff and administrative support staff. The LLRWMO in providing all aspects of project oversight and implementation contracts additional resources supplementing core staff capacity as project/program demands require. (authors)
Highland Drive Landfill is an inactive Municipal Solid Waste (MSW) Landfill which received waste from the 1940's until its closure in 1991. During a portion of its active life, the Landfill received low-level radioactive waste (LLRW) which currently exists both in a defined layer and co-mingled with MSW. Remediation of this site to remove the LLRW to meet established cleanup criteria, forms part of the Port Hope Project being undertaken by Atomic Energy Canada Limited (AECL) and Public Works and Government Services Canada (PWGSC) as part of the Port Hope Area Initiative (PHAI). The total volume of LLRW and co-mingled LLRW/MSW estimated to require removal from the Highland Drive Landfill is approximately 51,900 cubic metres (m{sup 3}). The segregation and removal of LLRW at the Highland Drive Landfill presents a number of unique technical challenges due to the co-mingled waste and location of the Landfill in an urbanized area. Key challenges addressed as part of the design process included: delineation of the extent of LLRW, development of cut lines, and estimation of the quantity of co-mingled LLRW in a heterogeneous matrix; protection of adjacent receptors in a manner which would not impact the use of adjacent facilities which include residences, a recreational facility, and a school; coordination and phasing of the work to allow management of six separate material streams including clean soil, MSW, co-mingled LLRW/MSW, LLRW, un-impacted water, and impacted water/leachate within a confined environment; and development of a multi-tiered and adaptive program of monitoring and control measures for odour, dust, and water including assessment of risk of exceedance of monitoring criteria. In addition to ensuring public safety and protection of the environment during remedy implementation, significant effort in the design process was paid to balancing the advantages of increased certainty, including higher production rates, against the costs of attaining increased certainty. Many of these lessons may be applicable to other projects. (authors)
In 2010, Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) identified a requirement to implement revised management arrangements for the generation, storage and disposal of radioactive waste. A thorough review of the current arrangements/processes was undertaken which included both legal compliance requirements and the identification of business improvement opportunities. On completion of this review a suitable project team was established and in 2011 an integrated Radioactive Waste Management process was implemented throughout the business. Initial results have shown measurable improvements within Radioactive Waste management compliance, operator understanding and increased business efficiency. Through the development and implementation of the revised working arrangements AWE has been able to continue to demonstrate both legal compliance to its regulators along with business efficiency and effectiveness improvements. Simple to follow process maps have improved employees understanding of Radioactive Waste management requirements, provided them with easily accessible information and ensured the business operates in a single coherent manner. The implementation of a modern electronic data management system has ensured all waste related information is easily retrievable and appropriately maintained. The additional functions that have been built into the system have reduced the potential for human error and increased the overall efficiency of the Waste Management department through the use of the automated report generation functionality. (authors)
Westinghouse is currently executing a contract, awarded in June 2015 from Barsebaeck Kraft AB, to segment all the reactor vessel (RV) internal parts in the two units 1 and 2. The scope of work covers the dismantling and segmentation of the RV internals under water, including the upfront engineering studies and equipment manufacturing and qualification. It also includes the loading of the segmented parts into waste cassettes, handling the cassettes, reactor internals sampling (73 samples), complementary water filtration system to catch the segmentation chips and contribute to maintaining water clarity during the segmentation work. Before leaving the site, the pool environment must be restored to the initial condition and all equipment will be decontaminated and shipped off site. The site work started in August 2016 with the mobilization on the Unit 2 and the actual cutting of the first component (steam dryer) started in September. Cutting will be performed with different types of Westinghouse designed cutting equipment. This paper presents the conceptual design of the reactor internals segmentation and packaging process that will be implemented at Barsebaeck, including the planning, methodology, equipment, waste management and packaging strategy. A first feedback on the site work will be provided for the segmentation of the Unit 2 reactor internals. (authors)
Some defense High-Level Waste (HLW) at Hanford, and the Savannah River Site (SRS), and the Idaho National Laboratory, as well as similar waste in West Valley, NY also meet the definition of transuranic (TRU) waste. While this waste is currently defined under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) as HLW, managing and disposing of this waste as TRU has significant advantages. If a legislative clarification was drafted to resolve this ambiguity, significant progress could be made on the cleanup and disposal at Department of Energy (DOE) sites leading to lower taxpayer costs and less risk to human health and the environment. (authors)
US DOE-EM's new end-state contracting model, the ID/IQ (Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quality) approach, is intended to give EM the flexibility to better define discrete scopes of work for site closure or end states. This is the result of several years of dialogue between industry and DOE about the way to collectively improve the way to do business more safely, quickly and cost effectively. This model requires a fine balance between incentives and clearly defined end states, with the ability for contractors and DOE to react quickly to respond to changes. By March 6, DOE and industry were one month into the new end-state contracting model with two requests for proposals issued and contractors responding. The purpose of the panel was to hear from DOE and industry about the status so far. DOE and the contractor community are generally supportive of the new model, but it will require closer partnership and a new mindset and approach among DOE, contractors, regulator and the workforce. This panel focused on the implementation of DOE EM's new End State Contracting Model, which uses a single-award ID/IQ approach to give EM the flexibility to better define discrete scopes of work for site closure or end states. The panelists provided their perspective on the initial implementation of the new approach and the path forward for upcoming opportunities utilizing this model. Presentation proposed: DOE EM End State Contracting (Tamara Miles, US DOE (USA))
Radioactive Waste Management (RWM) is responsible for implementing geological disposal of the UK's higher activity wastes. These wastes include significant quantities of fissile nuclides and, therefore, demonstration of criticality safety under disposal conditions forms an important component of RWM's disposal system safety case. At the time of disposal, controls (e.g. fissile material limits and/or water barriers) will ensure that waste packages are sub-critical. These controls, plus the containment provided by the engineered barrier system of a geological disposal facility (GDF) will also ensure that criticality is prevented for a long time after disposal. However, over post-closure timescales conditions in the GDF will evolve, and therefore underpinning knowledge is required to demonstrate: under what conditions criticality could occur; what the likelihood of such conditions developing is; and what the consequences would be if a post-closure criticality did occur. These requirements are set out in the UK environment agencies' Guidance on Requirements for Authorisation of a GDF. This paper discusses the disposal of Pressurised Water Reactor fuel, as an example of a waste type that may require disposal. It briefly selects relevant research to combine and summarise results from three recent RWM research projects. The first 'Likelihood of Criticality' considered under what conditions post-closure criticality could occur, whilst a second 'Modelling of Consequences of Hypothetical Criticality' focused on understanding the local physical consequences (temperature rise, power and rock response) of hypothetical 'what-if' post-closure criticality. The paper then explains how this understanding is applied to make safety arguments as to why post-closure criticality is not a significant concern. This is achieved via a third, stream of work that has considered the effects of a potential criticality on pathways that might give rise to a post-closure risk in the future, such as transport of radionuclides in groundwater. Collectively RWMs post-closure criticality safety work allows us to conclude in our generic environmental safety case that a post closure criticality is a low likelihood event, and even if one of these low likelihood events was to occur its consequences would be insignificant to GDF performance. This paper also serves to give context to two companion UK post-closure criticality safety papers which communicate further information on our modelling development and more detailed results underpinning our demonstration of post-closure criticality safety. (authors)
Develop advanced nuclear fuel cycle separation and waste management technologies that improve current fuel cycle performance and enable a sustainable fuel cycle, with minimal processing, waste generation, and potential for material diversion.
The United Kingdom (UK) has generated commercial nuclear energy for over 60 years; generating a significant and varied inventory of higher activity radioactive waste (HAW). In accordance with international practice, UK Government policy for long-term management of HAW is disposal in a geological disposal facility (GDF). The nuclear materials comprising HAW include high level waste, intermediate level waste and some low level waste, not suitable for disposal to the Low Level Waste Repository. In addition, other nuclear materials may be reclassified as waste in the future and will require to be managed as HAW for disposal to a GDF; these include spent fuel, uranium and plutonium. The operator of a GDF will be required to obtain a nuclear site licence from the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR), as the nuclear safety and security regulator, in order to construct and operate the facility. In the period prior to submission of a licence application, ONR is working to develop its regulatory expectations and provide advice on its regulatory role with regards to a future GDF. ONR has developed regulatory guidance on operational safety, benchmarked against the relevant IAEA Safety Standards and the Western European Nuclear Regulators Association (WENRA) Safety Reference Levels for Disposal. This guidance draws upon ONR's current expectations for nuclear sites; including operational reactors, fuel manufacture and reprocessing facilities, and reactors undergoing decommissioning; and incorporates relevant good practice drawn from international programmes for geological disposal and related industries (eg mining). In addition to the technical assessment guidance, ONR has developed guidance on the licensing process specific to a GDF; providing clarity for example on when a licence will be required. A review of the standard licence conditions applied to all nuclear sites concluded no significant amendment would be required for application to a GDF. Through its voluntary agreement with Radioactive Waste Management Limited (RWM), the developer and future operator of a GDF in the UK, ONR exerts regulatory influence on the design and organisational development of the future licensee. As part of this scrutiny, ONR has assessed RWM's generic Disposal System Safety Case. Subjecting the generic design and safety case to regulatory review provides opportunity for early engagement to ensure the appropriate standards will be achieved. ONR will only grant the necessary regulatory permissions if RWM adequately demonstrates the GDF will be constructed, operated and closed safely. Future challenges faced by ONR with respect to a GDF include building and maintaining regulatory competence and confidence, and engaging effectively with the public as the UK begins its search for a suitable site to provide appropriate assurance that a GDF will be operated safely and securely. (authors)
Responding to the Department of Energy decision to try to withdraw the Yucca Mountain license application and the Administration actions to close down the Yucca Mountain project, Nye County undertook a number of activities to articulate its support for continuing the Yucca Mountain project. The activities included responding to inquiries from federal agencies, including investigations undertaken by the Government Accountability Office addressing other potential uses for the Yucca Mountain site, responding to a Draft Environmental Impact Statement on the possible use of Yucca Mountain for disposal of Greater than Class C wastes, testifying in hearings, and interacting with the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future. The paper summarizes Nye County's position on the Yucca Mountain repository, Nye County's perspectives on the various activities that were developed and considered by the Government Accountability Office, Nye County's concerns with the use of the Nevada National Security Site for Disposal of Greater than Class C Low-Level Radioactive Wastes, testimony of Nye County officials expressing local community support for the Yucca Mountain project, and Nye County's perspectives on recommendations provided by the Blue Ribbon Commission to move the nation's high-level radioactive waste disposal programs forward without consideration of the role Yucca Mountain could have served in those recommendations. Nye County believes that every effort should be made to, at a minimum, fund the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to complete the license application review. Then, if Congress does decide to change the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be valuable information available to support new policy development. This administration contends that Congressional language associated with the FY2010 and FY2011 appropriations and authorization process is sufficient evidence of its intent to terminate the Yucca Mountain repository program. The appropriation process needs to be explicit that, absent explicit language to the contrary, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act stands. It also should include language that requires the Department of Energy to preserve all necessary records until the Nuclear Waste Policy Act is amended or rescinded by specific Congressional action. (authors)
The plenary panel focused on government and industry world leaders speaking on the pressing issues facing radioactive waste management in 2020 and beyond. Panelists included an OECD/ NEA representative for the international community, a Huntington Ingalls Industries representative for the commercial sector, and the US DOE Senior Advisor to the Under Secretary of Science representing DOE Environmental Management. Panelists with presentations: WM2020 Speech (Michael Lempke); Optimization: A Better Path toward Managing Nuclear Decommissioning and Legacies (William Magwood); Update On the DOE Environmental Management Program (William White)
Cameco Corporation's (Cameco) Port Hope Conversion Facility (PHCF) was previously owned by the federal Crown Corporation, Eldorado Nuclear, which held a significant inventory of legacy waste material at the time Cameco was formed in 1988. Over time, Cameco's ongoing operations contributed to an increase in the volume of low-level radioactive waste managed onsite. Since 2011, Cameco has completed annual waste management campaigns with the goal of accelerating the recycle/disposal of accumulated legacy radioactive wastes stored at its Ontario operations. With disposal options for low-level radioactively contaminated wastes in Canada limited due to cost considerations and no commercially accessible landfills licensed for radioactive material. In recent years, Cameco has started to ship marginally contaminated wastes (<500 ppm uranium) to the United States for disposal in an appropriate landfill owned by US Ecology in Idaho. Numerous successful campaigns totaling over 1,000 successful shipments, have been completed to transport drummed and/or bagged material by rail in gondola cars to the disposal facility in Idaho since 2011. All shipments have been completed in compliance with all environmental regulations, with a perfect compliance record maintained to date. To achieve this excellent compliance record, the campaigns require careful planning by both organizations, as well as deployment of personnel from the Idaho facility during the campaign for project management, characterization and/or radiation monitoring support. As the accumulated waste inventory has been reduced through these projects, the scope and duration of each campaign has also decreased. In the last few years, road transport directly to the Idaho facility has also been utilized. This option allows for the deployment of small projects that may be completed for a smaller inventory of a specific waste type and to manage newly-generated low-level radioactive wastes on an ongoing basis. These projects have ranged from a single standard van shipment to multiple trucks running continuous loops between the Ontario and Idaho or Ontario and an intermediary site and have been utilized for marginally contaminated wastes (<500 ppm uranium) as well as marginally contaminated wastes with additional hazard classification. Cameco and US Ecology personnel have collaborated to develop characterization and shipment procedures that enable these projects to be executed in full compliance with all Canadian and US regulations, without deployment of personnel from the Idaho facility, while maintaining adequate oversight by both organizations to ensure that the waste is safely and compliantly managed. These protocols have been implemented and optimized for the Port Hope Conversion Facility and will be rolled out to other Cameco facilities in Ontario through 2019. Cameco expects to utilize the small project model for the long term to ensure that eligible marginally contaminated wastes (<500 ppm uranium) are managed appropriately to ensure that once the legacy material is eliminated, it remains so. (authors)
Since 1980, the Agency is responsible by law for the safe management of all radioactive waste produced in Belgium, including decommissioning wastes. By the law of 11 January 1991 and the implementing Royal Decree of 16/10/1991, ONDRAF/NIRAS has been entrusted with a mission concerning the decommissioning of nuclear facilities. This mission involves the collection and assessment of data concerning decommissioning forecasts for nuclear facilities, the approval of facilities' decommissioning programmes, the establishment - in consultation with operators - of financing conditions for decommissioning, as well as the implementation of these programmes on request by the operator, or in the case of its failure to do so. This is the case for the company Best Medical Belgium SA located at Fleurus (MDS Nordion SA, till April 2011), which produced radioisotopes for medical applications and went bankrupt in 2012. These installations have been entrusted to ONDRAF/NIRAS. A plan of action was developed for taking over the operations in the framework of remediation and decommissioning. Steps have been taken to integrate his new role as a nuclear operator. The installations of Best Medical Belgium SA are now referred to as the 'O/N - Site Fleurus.' Nuclear facility operators, or any person requesting to operate a nuclear facility, are obliged to provide ONDRAF/NIRAS, under their responsibility and in due time, with all the necessary information concerning these facilities' decommissioning forecasts, the nature, quantities and dates of transfer of the resulting waste, and the financing conditions for these facilities' decommissioning. In order to make the necessary funds available for decommissioning a nuclear facility when it will be shut down, operators are obliged to establish provisions during the facility's active life. These provisions are calculated in such a way that the total amount established at the time of the final shutdown covers all costs resulting from the facility's final phase, namely the preparation of decommissioning, decontamination, more or less long-term maintenance, dismantling, treatment, conditioning and disposal of waste produced during this phase. In order to face to multiple and repeated evaluation processes, the Agency, already in the early 90's, started with the implementation of its own integrated data processing system, recording the physical and radiological inventories of nuclear facilities, and allowing the evaluation of the quantities of decommissioning materials and wastes as well as of the decommissioning costs of these facilities. The cost evaluations cover all decommissioning activities from final shutdown of the facility until final release from nuclear control, as well as conventional demolition and site restoration if required. Beside the information related to the inventories, the database involves so called auxiliary tables integrating unit prices of the various decontamination and dismantling techniques, unit rates for radioactive waste processing, interim storage and final disposal. (authors)