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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2020

High-Level Considerations for Access and Access Controls by Design

Nuclear power plants must be, by design and construction, robust structures and difficult to penetrate. Limiting access with difficult-to-penetrate physical barriers is going to be key for staffing reduction. Ideally, for security, the reactors would be sited underground, beneath a massive solid block, too thick to be penetrated by tools or explosives with all communications and power transfer lines also underground and fortified. Having the minimal possible number of access points and methods to completely block access from these points if a threat is detected will greatly help us justify staffing reduction.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2020

State-of-the-Art Reactor Consequence Analysis Project: Sensitivity Analysis Using Dakota

The State-of-the-Art Reactor Consequence Analyses (SOARCA) project has focused on best estimate analyses and uncertainty analysis for postulated accidents at specific nuclear power plants. The consequences of these accidents are estimated using the simulation tools MELCOR and MACCS. To understand which uncertain input variables are important to determining these consequences, analysts have performed sensitivity analyses. The tool used to perform these sensitivity analyses in previous SOARCA work, CompModSA, is no longer supported. Therefore, the current work focuses on migrating these analyses to another tool and evaluating its performance. Dakota, which is a tool developed at Sandia National Laboratories, is used in this work. Sensitivity results are created for three analyses from the SOARCA Surry UA. Though CompModSA and Dakota vary slightly in their algorithms and implementation, their sensitivity results generally agree, which gives confidence in the Dakota approach and increases confidence in the original analyses. It is likely that this methodology is extendable to the rest of SOARCA analyses.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2026

Reassessing Double-Ended Guillotine Break Requirements: Evidence-Based Analysis of Regulatory Assumptions After Five Decades of Nuclear Operation

After five decades of nuclear power operation encompassing more than 20,000 reactor-years across 35 countries and 647 reactors, zero double-ended guillotine breaks (DEGBs) have been documented in commercial reactor coolant systems—despite DEGB being the fundamental design-basis assumption driving Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) sizing, structural protection requirements, and containment design specifications. This report examines the basis for DEGB requirements in nuclear power plant design. The DEGB postulate assumes the instantaneous, complete circumferential severance of the largest diameter pipes in reactor coolant systems, driving major design requirements under 10 Code of Federal Regulations 50.46, General Design Criterion 4 and containment design specifications. The United States (4,880 reactor-years) and France (2,505 reactor-years) contribute the largest operational datasets. Probabilistic assessments estimate direct DEGB occurrence probabilities with extremely low event frequencies, far below the 10-5/reactor-year thresholds typically used to define non-credible events in nuclear-safety analyses; i.e., events with probability this low fall into beyond-design-basis events. Current material-science knowledge demonstrates that the ductile steel materials used in nuclear piping systems exhibit stable crack-growth behavior fundamentally incompatible with instantaneous severance. International regulatory experience, particularly Germany’s comprehensive break-preclusion implementation, and successful leak-before-break (LBB) applications in almost all of U.S. pressurized water reactor units validate that alternatives can maintain safety performance while reducing economic burden. Current DEGB protection systems impose estimated lifetime costs of hundreds of millions of dollars per unit, over the life of a plant across the nuclear industry (including ongoing costs), representing substantial resource allocation toward scenarios with extremely low probability. Although this report acknowledges uncertainties regarding long-term aging effects, potential synergistic degradation mechanisms, and site-specific seismic considerations that warrant continued evaluation as regulatory policy evolves, there remains no documented evidence that a DEGB has occurred as a consequence of the conditions or mechanisms described in this report. This report acknowledges the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC’s) recent efforts—outlined in the draft Interim Staff Guidance (ISG) NRC-DSS-ISG-2025-XX (“Treatment of Certain Loss-of-Coolant Accident Locations as Beyond-Design-Basis Accidents Draft Interim Staff Guidance”)—to reduce overly conservative requirements for large-break loss of coolant accidents through technical justifications and exemptions. However, extensive operating experience and validated methodologies—such as LBB and in-service inspection programs—demonstrate that the probability of a DEGB in reactor coolant-loop piping is extremely low, even under seismic conditions. The authors and reviewers of this report recommend that DEGB be removed as a design-basis event through formal rulemaking, rather than case-by-case exemptions, to better reflect credible failure modes, align with current data, and align with modern, risk-informed safety analysis.

22 - GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
NASA NTRS1972

Emerging needs for mobile nuclear powerplants

Incentives for broadening the present role of civilian nuclear power to include mobile nuclear power plants that are compact, lightweight, and safe are examined. Specifically discussed is the growing importance of: (1) a new international cargo transportation capability, and (2) the capability for development of resources in previously remote regions of the earth including the oceans and the Arctic. This report surveys present and potential systems (vehicles, remote stations, and machines) that would both provide these capabilities and require enough power to justify using mobile nuclear reactor power plants.

Anderson, J. L.↗
DOE OSTI2021

Multicriterion Benefit Evaluation of Deploying New Battery Technology with Increased Capacity at a Generic Nuclear Power

Nuclear power plant (NPP) safety improvements are routinely made by plant licensees and regulators. Examples of plant improvements include accident-tolerant fuel, diverse and flexible coping strategies, passive cooling systems, and increased battery capacity. A combined use of these plant improvements could lead to plant designs with enhanced resilience, allowing NPPs to better cope with both internal and external hazards and keep the plant operating safely, efficiently, and economically. This paper focuses on increased battery capacity and evaluates the potential costs and benefits of deploying batteries with increased capacities at a generic boiling water reactor (BWR) NPP. A multicriterion benefit evaluation methodology is used for the cost-benefit analysis. Ten alternatives for extending battery capacity are developed, including nine alternatives to provide additional direct-current power and one alternative to provide additional alternating-current power. Potential benefits of reducing plant risk are quantified through incorporating the alternatives into loss-of-offsite-power scenarios of the generic BWR probabilistic risk assessment model. Potential costs of implementing the alternatives are qualitatively discussed and ranked. The alternatives are then compared based on their impacts on plant risk and economics.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2020

An Overview of the State-of-the-Art Reactor Consequence Uncertainty Assessment Accident Progression Insights

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) with Sandia National Laboratories (Sandia) have completed three uncertainty analyses (UAs) as part of the State-of-the-Art Reactor Consequence Analyses (SOARCA) program. The SOARCA UAs included an integrated evaluation of uncertainty in accident progression, radiological release, and offsite health consequence projections. The UA for Peach Bottom, a boiling-water reactor (BWR) with a Mark I containment located in the State of Pennsylvania, analyzed the unmitigated long-term station blackout SOARCA scenario. The UA for Sequoyah, a 4-loop Westinghouse pressurized-water reactor (PWR) located in the State of Tennessee, analyzed the unmitigated short-term station blackout SOARCA scenario, with a focus on issues unique to the ice condenser containment and the potential for early containment failure due to hydrogen deflagration. The UA for Surry, a 3-loop Westinghouse PWR with a sub-atmospheric large dry containment located in the State of Virginia, analyzed the unmitigated short-term station blackout SOARCA scenario including the potential for thermally-induced steam-generator tube rupture. These three UAs are currently documented in three NUREG/CR reports. This report provides input to planned NRC documentation on the insights and findings from the SOARCA UA program. The purpose of the summary report is to provide a useful reference for regulatory applications that require the evaluation of offsite consequence risk from beyond design basis event severe accidents. This report focuses on the accident progression and source term insights developed from the MELCOR analyses. MELCOR is the NRC's best-estimate, severe accident computer code used in the SOARCA UAs. In anticipation of the SOARCA UA insights work, NRC and Sandia benchmarked the response of the Peach Bottom model to selected reference calculations from the Peach Bottom SOARCA UA. Peach Bottom was the first SOARCA UA performed and was completed in 2015 using the MELCOR 1.8.6 code. The PWR SOARCA UAs evolved the original methodology and utilized the updated MELCOR 2.2 computer code. The Peach Bottom model has been systematically updated for other NRC research efforts and has been updated to MELCOR 2.2. computer code. The findings from the new reference calculations using the updated model with the MELCOR 2.2 code are also integrated into the report. A second objective is an assessment of the applicability of the results to the other nuclear reactors in the U.S. As the key findings are reviewed, judgments are presented on the applicability of the results to other U.S. nuclear power plants. An important objective of the SOARCA program relied on high- fidelity plant-specific modeling. However, the nature of the insights and conclusions allowed judgements to be made on the applicability of the various insights to the same general classification of plant (i.e., BWR or PWR) or the entire fleet of plants. Finally, the results from the SOARCA UA accident progression calculations contain a wealth of information not previously documented in the NUREG/CRs. This report includes new but related information that can be used to benchmark past or support future regulatory decisions related to severe accidents. The new work includes a benchmark of the NUREG-1465 licensing source term definitions, the variability of key accident progression events and timing to radionuclide release, and an improved understanding of the timing and source terms from consequential steam generator tube ruptures. iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The Sandia authors gratefully acknowledge the significant technical and programmatic contributions from the NRC SOARCA team which are reflected throughout the report. Dr. Tina Ghosh has been involved throughout the SOARCA UAs, providing the primary managerial and technical oversight. The long lists of NRC and Sandia contributors from the SOARCA UAs are cited in the three NUREG/CRs and are also gratefully acknowledged by the small team of authors compiling the results of their efforts. Significant technical contributions, advice, and reviews were provided by Dr. Hossein Esmaili, Dr. Alfred Hathaway, and Dr. Edward Fuller (retired) of the NRC. Dr. Randal Gauntt (retired), Mr. Patrick Mattie, Mr. Joseph Jones (retired), and Dr. Doug Osborn from Sandia are recognized as the SOARCA UA managers guiding the past efforts. There is a comparable list of project managers at the NRC including Ms. Patricia Santiago, Dr. Salman Haq, and Mr. Jon Barr. Sadly, we have lost Mr. Charlie Tinkler and Mr. Robert Prato, who were important contributors to the original SOARCA project. Finally, Mr. Kyle Ross and Mr. Mark Leonard have also retired but were significant technical contributors. Mr. Kyle Ross was the technical lead on all three SOARCA UAs and the original pressurized water reactor SOARCA study. Mr. Leonard was the technical lead on the original boiling water reactor SOARCA study and a key contributor to the first Peach Bottom SOARCA UA. iv

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DOE OSTI2023

What is Advanced Nuclear Energy - Basics

Advanced nuclear energy represents a spectrum of new talent, technologies, applications and business models designed around the use of atomic energy generated by nuclear power plants.

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DOE OSTI2023

Dispatch analysis of flexible power operation with multi-unit small modular reactors

The relevance of nuclear power plant flexible power operation (FPO) is rising due to increased penetration of variable renewables. Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) such as NuScale are envisaged to have multiple units on one site. This provides opportunities for coordinating FPO between units, but also introduces challenges as common services (e.g., refueling equipment) must be shared between units and fuel loadings may be standardized. It is therefore important to quantify whether FPO with SMRs is economically beneficial. Here, this paper quantifies the economics of FPO on different timescales to analyze refueling outages of such multi-unit SMRs. A 24-h price-taker profit maximization of SMR operation is first solved considering revenues from wholesale power and ancillary service (AS) markets. The results are then used to find the most profitable operation strategy over several years for multiple units at the site accounting for the physics and materials limits on NPP operation, including refueling outages. Results show a small but appreciable participation of nuclear into AS, contributing 4% of revenues. Due to the longer fuel cycle, over a decade of operation the units’ refueling outages drifted by 3 months, ultimately leading to refueling during summer.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2020

U.S. Effort Support to Examinations at Fukushima - Meeting Notes with Updated Information Requests (FY2020)

Much is still not known about the end-state of core materials in each unit that was operating on March 11, 2011 at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (Daiichi). Information obtained from Daiichi is required to inform Decontamination and Decommissioning (D&D) activities, improving the ability of the Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings, Incorporated (TEPCO Holdings) to characterize potential hazards and to ensure the safety of workers involved with cleanup activities. This document, which has been updated to include Fiscal Year 2020 (FY2020) information, summarizes results from a U.S. effort to review Daiichi information and extract insights to enhance the safety of existing and future nuclear power plant designs. This U.S. effort, which was initiated in 2014 by the Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE), is completed by a group of experts in reactor safety and plant operations that identify examination needs and evaluate recent Daiichi examination data to address these needs. Since its inception, comprehensive annual reports were issued that document significant safety insights being obtained in areas of special emphasis: system and component performance, radionuclide surveys and sampling, debris end-state location, combustible gas effects, and plant operations and maintenance. In addition to reducing uncertainties related to severe accident modeling progression, these insights have and continue to be used to update guidance for severe accident prevention, mitigation, and emergency planning. Reduced uncertainties in modeling the events at Daiichi improve the realism of reactor safety evaluations that inform future D&D activities. For FY2020, it was decided that the program would gain more benefit from a more concise report that emphasizes new information and insights that affect prior findings and recommendations from the U.S. experts participating in this effort. A key aspect of prior U.S. efforts, the updated list of information requests, is included in this letter report to ensure that they are transmitted to organizations within Japan. In addition, findings and associated recommendations are provided regarding information presented by TEPCO Holdings, Nuclear Damage Compensation and Decommissioning Facilitation Corporation (NDF), and the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA). This letter report also continues to emphasize how information obtained from the affected reactors at Daiichi has been and will continue to be used to update severe accident management strategies, improve maintenance activities (especially in areas of radiation protection) and reduce uncertainties in systems analysis code models. In addition, recommendations are included that would expand the use of this information to provide insights regarding maintenance, radiation protection, design, and siting activities of existing and new reactors.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2022

A Methodology to Support the Development of a New State Vision for the U.S. Nuclear Industry

Recent changes in natural gas prices combined with reduced capital costs for solar and wind systems has created challenges for the continued operation of existing nuclear power plants (NPPs) in the United States. A new strategy in the way in which U.S. NPPs are operated, maintained, and supported is needed. One such strategy is to transform the NPP operating model through a business-driven approach that leverages technology to enable new capabilities that improve performance and reduce costs. This paper presents a methodology for developing an achievable yet transformative new state vision that ensures the continued safe and efficient operations of the U.S. NPP fleet. Here this work builds on existing guidance and leverages previous research to comprehensively address both utility needs and high-level human factors engineering design principles when developing a new state vision. The proposed methodology is intended to provide industry-wide guidance for developing a new state vision that leverages both the selected vendor’s capabilities in a way that meets the utility’s modernization goals while ensuring state-of-the-art systems engineering and human factors engineering principles are applied that promote overall plant safety, performance, and efficiency.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Update on ASME AG-1 and Revision of the DOE Nuclear Air Cleaning Handbook - 20536

The American Society of Mechanical Engineers AG-1 Code on Nuclear Air and Gas Treatment is updated every two years. This paper provides an overview of issues being discussed within AG-1 committee meetings and revisions that will be included in the next version of the code. Additional information is provided on issues being discussed ranging from media velocity limits, control of airflow using actual versus and standard cubic feet per minute. Navigation and identification of applicable high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter code sections can be confusing for those unfamiliar with AG-1. A general reorganization of filtration code sections clarifies geometry, flow, and performance envelopes for nuclear grade HEPA filters. The initial step consists of establishment of Section FN covering qualification of conventional, ceramic, metal, and high strength fibrous glass media. Future filter sections are currently expected to be characterized by geometry and flow direction (axial vs. radial). The Department of Energy's (DOE) Nuclear Air Cleaning Handbook (NACH) is also undergoing revision. An update on the status of that effort, along with issues and changes being considered. The original charter of the AG-1 Code was specific to commercial nuclear power plants, and to safety-related air cleaning systems. This has evolved over the years to include normal non-safety ventilation systems and process gas systems. Corollary guidance for DOE facilities has been available in several editions of the Nuclear Air Cleaning Handbook, starting with ORNL-NSIC 65. The latest edition of the Handbook, 2003, is undergoing revision and modifications. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2020

Panel Session 69: Ensuring Strong Return on Investment for DOE EM Technology Development: Global Views

This panel focused on DOE and Non-US Technology Development Projects discussing how they approach tech development to maximize return on investment (ROI). Successful examples were discussed. After the individual panelist's presentations, the three panelists were joined by Kurt Gerdes in discussing the genesis of this panel and why it is important. Panelists with presentations: Ensuring a Strong Return on Investment for DOE EM Technology Development (Anthony Banford) DOE Technology Development Projects that Provided a Strong Return on Investment (ROI (Mark Lesinski) Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (Gerry Triani) Decommissioning Situation of Nuclear Power Plant in Japan (Teruyuki Hirai)

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DOE OSTI2023

Sizing and Selection of Pressure Relief Valves for High-Pressure Thermal–Hydraulic Systems

This study covers the critical concerns related to the sizing, selection, installation, maintenance, and testing of pressure safety valves (PSVs). The aim is to ensure the safety of pressurized systems, hydrostatic transmission systems, and hydraulic plants, including process plants, thermal power plants, and nuclear reactor systems. PSVs are devices that ensure the safety and reliability of pressurized vessels, lines, and systems during overpressure events. The task of selecting which PSV features are of greatest value for a specific purpose is complex—especially in the design of a high-pressure experimental thermal–hydraulic facility for hydrostatic and transient testing of the reactor system—when the systems are in the design and development phases and require qualification and demonstration to prove that they have reached a given level of technological readiness. The present study highlights the required steps for users to follow the associated rules, guidelines, and recommendations. As a part of this research, case studies are presented to help readers better understand the applicable strategy and standards. A discussion and a review of PSV performance degradation and failure are summarized to provide a better understanding of varied process applications and conditions, including fluid flow dynamics, boundary-layer formation and pressure drops, gas bubble formation and collapse, geometric configurations, inlet/outlet piping, abrupt pressure fluctuations, and acoustic resonance. Moreover, this study discusses the servicing and testing of PSVs in a multiphase pressurized system. Overall, it provides a basic overview of how PSVs ensure the safety of pressurized systems, supported by case studies and industrial practices.

02 PETROLEUM↗
DOE OSTI2020

Distribution Development for Residual Inventory at the New York West Valley Site - 20400

The New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) is the owner of the Western New York Nuclear Service Center (WNYNSC), a 1,351 ha site located approximately 48 km south of Buffalo, New York. In 1962, Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. (NFS) entered into Agreements with the Atomic Energy Commission and New York State to construct the first commercial reprocessing plant of nuclear fuel in the United States. NFS, a private company, built and operated the spent fuel reprocessing plant and waste disposal facilities, processing 640 Mg of spent nuclear fuel from 1966 to 1972 under an Atomic Energy Commission license. Nuclear fuel reprocessing operations ended in 1972 and never reopened, leaving behind radioactive and chemical wastes. Operations led to contamination in a number of facilities and locations. Some of that contamination has migrated from waste disposal zones to other layers, formations, and features on and off the WNYNSC. Phase I decommissioning activities are ongoing and involve the removal of a number of areas and structures that have been associated with contamination. The purpose of this work is to outline the approach for characterizing contamination not associated with disposed wastes, contaminated structures, or specific releases. In this work, the term, residual radiological activity, is used to describe environmental contamination that exists subsequent to the completion of Phase I decommissioning activities, that is not associated with disposed wastes, contaminated structures, or specific releases. Contamination from the Site was quantified relative to data that characterize the concentrations of radionuclides that exist in background. Background concentrations are those present in the area but having no influence from Site related activities. The existence of residual radiological activity that is elevated relative to background has the potential to contribute to future risks to human health and the environment. As a consequence, the residual inventory information is used to inform the West Valley Probabilistic Performance Assessment (PPA) model to characterize potential future risks to human health and the environment. The centralized West Valley Data Management System (DMS) was the source of information for the data assembled in this analysis. The DMS is a fairly large compilation consisting of thousands of records from investigation studies, with sample dates ranging from 1990 to present. Samples from monitoring wells, boreholes, geoprobe studies, surface water, surface soils, storm water outfalls, ventilation stack filters, plant and animal tissues, and more are included in the DMS. Results are typically reported in units of activity per unit volume. For the purpose of the analyses presented here, all results were converted into consistent units of pCi per unit volume. Since 1990, data have been collected from various locations across the WNYNSC at different times with varying frequency over the course of several decades. As a consequence, a number of potential issues can arise with respect to the assembly of a dataset that is deemed adequate for the characterization of residual radiological activity. These issues were assessed and resolved to the extent possible through careful consideration of the properties of the distributions. The intent was to use data which characterize the current state of the Site. Radionuclides can be designated to one of several groups depending on their origin. In this work the groups considered were 1) Naturally Occurring Radioactive Material (NORM), 2) fallout, and 3) Other (including power plant, medical research, etc). This grouping is a useful construct with respect to the interpretation of fixed laboratory results. For example, NORM radionuclides that exist within a decay chain should have approximately equivalent distributions of concentrations if they are representative of background conditions. Insights such as these can be used as a check to identify sample results that need to be further investigated or omitted due to issues associated with reported results from fixed laboratory analyses. This type of analysis provided a foundation for the assessment of the adequacy of sample results for use in subsequent components of an assessment. The general process for the assessment of residual radiological contamination at the Site consists of a sequence of several steps. First, for each analyte, several statistical tests were performed to assess the weight of evidence against the null hypothesis that the mean of the distribution of concentrations was equal to zero. If the mean of the distribution of concentrations for a given radionuclide was not found to be greater than zero, then it was removed from consideration as a component of the residual radiological contamination. If there was significant evidence to reject the hypothesis of the mean being equal to zero, the second step was to compare the distribution of the data from the Site to that of the corresponding background. A suite of tests was used to compare the distributions of the site and background data. The results of these tests were collectively used to determine if site data are elevated relative to background. The third step was to develop distributions using a Bayesian framework to characterize the distribution of mean of the increment present above background for each of the radionuclides. The Bayesian model implemented allowed for the comparison of site-specific records to background concentrations to better approximate contamination attributed to the Site. A final screening step was employed for radionuclides that exceed background. This screening step compared 95% upper confidence limits (UCLs) from the increment distribution developed in the previous step to the risk screening levels. This approach yields a list of analytes that were determined to be elevated relative to background.

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DOE OSTI2022

A SIMPLE TOOL TO EVALUATE COLOR FOR LEGIBILITY AND DISTINGUISHABILITY WHEN DESIGNING DIGITAL DISPLAYS

Color is important in helping users effectively process information like text and symbols when performing tasks on digital displays. Interface designers in safety- and mission-critical industries often utilize human factors design guidelines and standards to make important design decisions like the use of color for legibility and distinguishability. However, such guidance sometimes requires additional interpretation and calculation to readily apply to the design question at hand. This work describes a simple tool that can be used to evaluate the adequacy of color choices from a palette for being legible or distinguishable. The tool eliminates having to manually convert colors to a readable format while providing a specific set of colors that are acceptable from select human factors standards. This paper provides an exemplary case study applied to a digital modification at a nuclear power plant to highlight how the tool may be used in safety and mission-critical industries.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2021

A METHODOLOGY TO SUPPORT THE DEVELOPMENT OF A NEW STATE VISION FOR THE UNITED STATES NUCLEAR INDUSTRY

A new strategy in the way in which the United States nuclear power plants (NPPs) are operated, maintained, and supported is needed. One such strategy is to transform the NPP operating model through a business-driven approach that leverages technology to enable new capabilities that improve performance and reduce cost. This paper presents a methodology for developing an achievable yet transformative new state vision that ensures continued safe and efficient operations of the United States NPP fleet. This work builds on existing guidance and leverages previous research to comprehensively address both bottom-up (i.e., utility needs) and top-down (i.e., first principles) considerations important for developing a new state vision. The proposed methodology is intended to provide industry-wide guidance for developing a new state vision that leverages both the selected vendor’s capabilities in a way that meets the utility’s modernization goals while ensuring state-of-the-art systems engineering and human factors engineering principles are applied that promote overall plant safety, performance, and efficiency.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Preliminary Analysis of Nuclear-Powered Data Center Scenarios

This report provides a comprehensive analysis of the potential for nuclear energy to meet the growing energy demands of data centers (DCs). It evaluates the technical, economic, and socio-environmental implications of coupling Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) with DCs, providing initial responses to several key research questions: What is the potential increased energy demand from DCs in the U.S., in the short, medium and long term? The U.S. is experiencing a rapid increase in energy demand from DCs, with projections indicating a total increase of 24-74 GWy(e) by 2028. Meeting this demand with nuclear energy would require 27–85 GWe of installed capacity. While this surge is expected to slow in the long term, the DC industry needs reliable, scalable, and clean energy sources. How much nuclear capacity can be deployed to meet DC demand and in which timeframe? Several pathways for increasing nuclear capacity were identified, including uprates, restarts of recently retired reactors, power purchase agreements with existing fleet, and new construction. Approximately 20‒28 GWe of nuclear capacity could be dedicated to DCs by the early 2030s. How much High Assay Low Enriched Uranium (HALEU) would be needed to support some nuclear deployment scenarios for DCs? Meeting the deployment targets announced by Google and Amazon for the Kairos Power Fluoride-Salt-Cooled High-Temperature Reactor or KP-FHR (~500 MWe by 2035) and the Xe-100 (~1 GWe by 2040), respectively, requires ramping up 19.75% enriched HALEU production to ~6 t/yr by 2040. What types of nuclear energy/DC coupling options exist, and what are the different benefits/challenges? Five coupling options were analyzed, ranging from grid-connected configurations to colocated, behind-the-meter setups. Key design considerations include the proximity to high- and/or medium-voltage transmission lines, the desired internal fault tolerance, and the sources of alternative/backup power during outages. Each coupling option offers unique benefits and challenges in terms of reliability, system costs, regulation, timeline, etc. A list of NPP/DC deployment scenarios was developed, considering existing or newly built NPP or DC projects. Colocated DCs with new small modular reactors or large reactors on greenfield and brownfield sites are the focus of this report. What types of reactors, especially what size, may be incentivized by DCs? Reactor sizing optimization revealed that the ideal reactor size and number of units depend on DC demand, coupling configurations defined in this report, and other economic factors. Larger reactors are preferred for high-demand DCs and grid-connected systems, while larger number of smaller reactors are better suited for DC configurations without grid backup. Which sites may be compatible with co-located nuclear-powered DCs? Siting those projects is a complicated evaluation factoring local water resources, grid connection availability and reliability, IT infrastructure, local work force, proximity to population zones, etc. For this effort greenfield and brownfield sites such as retired coal-fired plants were used to evaluate this question. This evaluation is not meant to recommend any particular site but it highlights key siting criteria and demonstrates large-scale site availability. What are the socio-economic impacts of co-located nuclear-powered DCs? Those projects generate substantial economic benefits to the local economy, particularly in urban settings. Hyperscale DCs colocated with nuclear power plants (sized around 1 GW of power) can create nearly 1,700 jobs for annual operations and more than 7,300 jobs among the supply chain and local businesses as a result of increased household spending. Rural projects also provide significant benefits, but at lower magnitudes compared to urban deployments.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2020

A Data Processing Workflow for Fixed-wing Drone Based Radiation Mapping in the Chornobyl Exclusion Zone (CEZ) - 20119

April 2020 marks the 34. anniversary of the high-profile radiological release from the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant (ChNPP). The release of radioactive material from reactor number four began on the 26 April 1986 and continued over a period of about 10 days, releasing approximately 1700 PBq of radioactive material (including 85 PBq of 137-Cs) into the environment. To this day, the accident remains the most significant release of radioactive material since civil nuclear power generation began. In the years since the accident, automated and remote radiation monitoring technologies have advanced significantly in their capabilities. One such example of this is the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in radiation mapping investigations. In April 2019, a team of scientists from the University of Bristol showcased a novel radiation mapping system within the CEZ, specifically aiming to map radiation over a large portion of the area immediately surrounding the ChNPP. Over six days of data collection, the system flew a total distance of 583.8 km, covering an area of 14.6 sq.km with an exceptional spatial resolution (sub 20 m/pixel). The work presented herein outlines and explains the data processing procedure to convert the raw data into 137-Cs activity (kBq/sq.m) and cesium-equivalent dose-rate (CED) at 1 m above ground level (μSv/hr). A demonstration of the validity of the method is demonstrated through the successful reduction of the raw data into a single linear relationship between the measured {sup 137}Cs net peak intensity and the {sup 137}Cs activity. (authors)

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