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Second Quarter Transportation Report Fiscal Year 2019 Waste Shipments to and from the Nevada National Security Site, Radioactive Waste Management Complex

This report satisfies the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) commitment to prepare a quarterly summary of waste shipments to the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC) in Area 3 and Area 5. This report summarizes the second quarter of fiscal year (FY) 2019 and serves as a quarterly report for the following types of shipments: Low-Level Radioactive Waste (LLW), Mixed Low-Level Radioactive Waste (MLLW), Classified Non-Radioactive (CNR) Waste, Classified Non-Radioactive Hazardous (CNRH) Waste.

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3rd Quarter Transportation Report FY2017 Waste Shipments To and From the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), Radioactive Waste Management Complex

This report satisfies the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) commitment to prepare a quarterly summary report of waste shipments to the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC) at Area 5. This report summarizes the 3rd quarter of fiscal year (FY) 2017 low-level radioactive waste (LLW), mixed low-level radioactive waste (MLLW), which includes classified LLW and MLLW, classified non-radioactive (CNR) and classified non-radioactive hazardous (CNRH) shipments. There were no shipments sent for offsite treatment from a NNSS facility and returned to the NNSS this quarter of FY2017. Tabular summaries are provided, which include the following: Sources of and carriers for LLW, MLLW and CNR/CNRH shipments to and from the NNSS; Number and external volume of LLW, MLLW and CNR/CNRH shipments; Highway routes used by carriers; and Incident/accident data applicable to LLW, MLLW and CNR/CNRH shipments.

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Waste Shipments to and from the Nevada National Security Site, Radioactive Waste Management Complex (Q3 Transportation Report, FY 2019)

This report satisfies the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) commitment to prepare a quarterly summary of waste shipments to the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC) in Area 3 and Area 5. This report summarizes the third quarter of fiscal year (FY) 2019 and serves as a quarterly report for the following types of shipments: • Low-Level Radioactive Waste (LLW), • Mixed Low-Level Radioactive Waste (MLLW), • Classified Non-Radioactive (CNR) Waste, and • Classified Non-Radioactive Hazardous (CNRH) Waste. Tabular summaries are provided that include the following: • Number and external volume of LLW, MLLW, and CNR/CNRH shipments, • Waste generators for LLW, MLLW, and CNR/CNRH shipments to and on the NNSS, • Carriers for LLW, MLLW, and CNR/CNRH shipments to and on the NNSS, • Waste generator shipments by quarter, • Highway routes used by carriers, and • Incident and accident data applicable to LLW, MLLW, and CNR/CNRH shipments. In this report, shipments are accounted for upon arrival at the NNSS, while disposal volumes are accounted for upon waste burial. Volume reports using the Low-Level Waste Information System showing cubic feet (ft 3 ) of waste generated may vary slightly due to rounding conventions for conversions from cubic meters to ft 3 .

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Nevada Test Site National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants Calendar Year 2007

The Nevada Test Site (NTS) is operated by the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office. From 1951 through 1992, the NTS was operated as the nation's site for nuclear weapons testing. The release of man-made radionuclides from the NTS as a result of testing activities has been monitored since the first decade of atmospheric testing. After 1962, when nuclear tests were conducted only underground, the radiation exposure to the public surrounding the NTS was greatly reduced. After the 1992 moratorium on nuclear testing, radiation monitoring on the NTS focused on detecting airborne radionuclides which come from historically contaminated soils resuspended into the air (e.g., by winds) and tritium-contaminated soil moisture emitted to the air from soils through evapotranspiration. To protect the public from harmful levels of man-made radiation, the Clean Air Act, National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP) (Title 40 Code of Federal Regulations [CFR] Part 61 Subpart H) limits the release of radioactivity from a U.S. Department of Energy facility (e.g., the NTS) to 10 millirem per year (mrem/yr) effective dose equivalent to any member of the public. This is the dose limit established for someone living off of the NTS from radionuclides emitted to air from the NTS. This limit does not include the radiation doses that members of the public may receive through the intake of radioactive particles unrelated to NTS activities, such as those that come from naturally occurring elements in the environment (e.g., naturally occurring radionuclides in soil or radon gas from the earth or natural building materials), or from other man-made sources (e.g., medical treatments). The NTS demonstrates compliance using environmental measurements of radionuclide air concentrations at critical receptor locations. This method was approved by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency for use on the NTS in 2001 and has been the sole method used since 2005. There are six critical receptor locations on the NTS that are actually pseudocritical receptor locations because they are hypothetical receptor locations; no person actually resides at these onsite locations. Annual average concentrations of detected radionuclides are compared with Concentration Levels (CL) for Environmental Compliance values listed in 40 CFR 61, Appendix E, Table 2. Compliance is demonstrated if the sum of fractions (CL/measured concentrations) of all detected radionuclides at each pseudo-critical receptor location is less than one. In 2007, as in all previous years for which this report has been produced, the NTS has demonstrated that the potential dose to the public from radiological emissions to air from current and past NTS activities is well below the 10 mrem/yr dose limit. Air sampling data collected onsite at each of the six pseudo-critical receptor stations on the NTS had average concentrations of nuclear test-related radioactivity that were a fraction of the limits listed in Table 2 in Appendix E of 40 CFR 61. They ranged from less than 1 percent to a maximum of 20 percent of the allowed NESHAP limit. Because the nearest member of the public resides approximately 20 kilometers (12 miles) from the NTS boundary, concentrations at this location would be only a small fraction of that measured on the NTS.

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Nevada Test Site Radiation Protection Program - Revision 1

Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 835, 'Occupational Radiation Protection,' establishes radiation protection standards, limits, and program requirements for protecting individuals from ionizing radiation resulting from the conduct of U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) activities. 10 CFR 835.101(a) mandates that DOE activities be conducted in compliance with a documented Radiation Protection Program (RPP) as approved by DOE. This document promulgates the RPP for the Nevada Test Site (NTS), related (on-site or off-site) U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO) operations, and environmental restoration off-site projects. This NTS RPP promulgates the radiation protection standards, limits, and program requirements for occupational exposure to ionizing radiation resulting from NNSA/NSO activities at the NTS and other operational areas as stated in 10 CFR 835.1(a). NNSA/NSO activities (including design, construction, operation, and decommissioning) within the scope of this RPP may result in occupational exposures to radiation or radioactive material. Therefore, a system of control is implemented through specific references to the site-specific NV/YMP RCM. This system of control is intended to ensure that the following criteria are met: (1) occupational exposures are maintained as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA), (2) DOE's limiting values are not exceeded, (3) employees are aware of and are prepared to cope with emergency conditions, and (4) employees are not inadvertently exposed to radiation or radioactive material.

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Economic Benefits, Carbon Dioxide (CO2) Emissions Reductions, and Water Conservation Benefits from 1,000 Megawatts (MW) of New Wind Power in Nevada (Fact Sheet)

The U.S. Department of Energy?s Wind Powering America Program is committed to educating state-level policymakers and other stakeholders about the economic, CO2 emissions, and water conservation impacts of wind power. This analysis highlights the expected impacts of 1000 MW of wind power in Nevada. Although construction and operation of 1000 MW of wind power is a significant effort, six states have already reached the 1000-MW mark. We forecast the cumulative economic benefits from 1000 MW of development in Nevada to be $1.1 billion, annual CO2 reductions are estimated at 2.3 million tons, and annual water savings are 944 million gallons.

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Analysis of the Variability of Classsified and Unclassified Radiological Source term Inventories in the Frenchman Flat Area, Nevada test Site

It has been proposed that unclassified source terms used in the reactive transport modeling investigations at NTS CAUs should be based on yield-weighted source terms calculated using the average source term from Bowen et al. (2001) and the unclassified announced yields reported in DOE/NV-209. This unclassified inventory is likely to be used in unclassified contaminant boundary calculations and is, thus, relevant to compare to the classified inventory. They have examined the classified radionuclide inventory produced by 10 underground nuclear tests conducted in the Frenchman Flat (FF) area of the Nevada Test Site. The goals were to (1) evaluate the variability in classified radiological source terms among the 10 tests and (2) compare that variability and inventory uncertainties to an average unclassified inventory (e.g. Bowen 2001). To evaluate source term variability among the 10 tests, radiological inventories were compared on two relative scales: geometric mean and yield-weighted geometric mean. Furthermore, radiological inventories were either decay corrected to a common date (9/23/1992) or the time zero (t{sub 0}) of each test. Thus, a total of four data sets were produced. The date of 9/23/1992 was chosen based on the date of the last underground nuclear test at the Nevada Test Site.

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Analysis of the Variability of Classified and Unclassified Radiological Source term Inventories in the Rainier Mesa/Shoshone Mountain Area, Nevada Test Site

It has been proposed that unclassified source terms used in RM/SM reactive transport modeling investigations should be based on yield-weighted source terms calculated using the RM/SM average source term from Bowen et al. (2001) and the unclassified announced yields reported in DOE/NV-209. This unclassified inventory is likely to be used in unclassified contaminant boundary calculations and is, thus, relevant to compare to the classified inventory. They have examined the classified radionuclide inventory produced by 73 underground nuclear tests conducted in the Rainier Mesa/Shoshone Mountain (RM/SM) area of the Nevada Test Site. The goals were to (1) evaluate the variability in classified radiological source terms among the 73 tests and (2) and compare that variability and inventory uncertainties to an average unclassified inventory (e.g. Bowen 2001). To evaluate source term variability among the 73 tests, radiological inventories were compared on two relative scales: geometric mean and yield-weighted geometric mean. Furthermore, radiological inventories were either decay corrected to a common date (9/23/1992) or the time zero (t{sub 0}) of each test. Thus, a total of four data sets were produced. The date of 9/23/1992 was chosen based on the date of the last underground nuclear test at the Nevada Test Site.

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Uncertainty and Sensitivity of Contaminant Travel Times from the Upgradient Nevada Test Site to the Yucca Mountain Area

Yucca Mountain (YM), Nevada, has been proposed by the U.S. Department of Energy as the nation’s first permanent geologic repository for spent nuclear fuel and highlevel radioactive waste. In this study, the potential for groundwater advective pathways from underground nuclear testing areas on the Nevada Test Site (NTS) to intercept the subsurface of the proposed land withdrawal area for the repository is investigated. The timeframe for advective travel and its uncertainty for possible radionuclide movement along these flow pathways is estimated as a result of effective-porosity value uncertainty for the hydrogeologic units (HGUs) along the flow paths. Furthermore, sensitivity analysis is conducted to determine the most influential HGUs on the advective radionuclide travel times from the NTS to the YM area. Groundwater pathways are obtained using the particle tracking package MODPATH and flow results from the Death Valley regional groundwater flow system (DVRFS) model developed by the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS). Effectiveporosity values for HGUs along these pathways are one of several parameters that determine possible radionuclide travel times between the NTS and proposed YM withdrawal areas. Values and uncertainties of HGU porosities are quantified through evaluation of existing site effective-porosity data and expert professional judgment and are incorporated in the model through Monte Carlo simulations to estimate mean travel times and uncertainties. The simulations are based on two steady-state flow scenarios, the pre-pumping (the initial stress period of the DVRFS model), and the 1998 pumping (assuming steady-state conditions resulting from pumping in the last stress period of the DVRFS model) scenarios for the purpose of long-term prediction and monitoring. The pumping scenario accounts for groundwater withdrawal activities in the Amargosa Desert and other areas downgradient of YM. Considering each detonation in a clustered region around Pahute Mesa (in the NTS operational areas 18, 19, 20, and 30) under the water table as a particle, those particles from the saturated zone detonations were tracked forward using MODPATH to identify hydraulically downgradient groundwater discharge zones and to determine the particles from which detonations will intercept the proposed YM withdrawal area. Out of the 71 detonations in the saturated zone, the flowpaths from 23 of the 71 detonations will intercept the proposed YM withdrawal area under the pre-pumping scenario. For the 1998 pumping scenario, the flowpaths from 55 of the 71 detonations will intercept the proposed YM withdrawal area. Three different effective-porosity data sets compiled in support of regional models of groundwater flow and contaminant transport developed for the NTS and the proposed YM repository are used. The results illustrate that mean minimum travel time from underground nuclear testing areas on the NTS to the proposed YM repository area can vary from just over 700 to nearly 700,000 years, depending on the locations of the underground detonations, the pumping scenarios considered, and the effective-porosity value distributions used. Groundwater pumping scenarios are found to significantly impact minimum particle travel time from the NTS to the YM area by altering flowpath geometry. Pumping also attracts many more additional groundwater flowpaths from the NTS to the YM area. The sensitivity analysis further illustrates that for both the pre-pumping and 1998 pumping scenarios, the uncertainties in effective-porosity values for five of the 27 HGUs considered account for well over 90 percent of the effective-porosity-related travel time uncertainties for the flowpaths having the shortest mean travel times to YM.

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AMS/CEA Joint Aerial Campaign: Nevada Test Site AMS Data Analysis Procedure

The United States NNSA AMS (Aerial Measuring Systems) and the French Commissariat à l’Énergie Atomique (CEA) participated in joint aerial survey activities during the period November 6-19, 2007. Survey activities were conducted near Las Vegas, Nevada, and at selected areas of the Nevada Test Site (NTS) under the auspices of the Accident Response Working Group (ARWG). The intent of the activities was to compare technologies, procedures, and data analysis techniques related to specific AMS and the CEA aerial radiation detection systems.

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Final Report for the MANNRRSS II Program Management of Nevada's Natural Resources with Remote Sensing Systems, Beatty, NV

This document provides the Final Report on the Management of Nevada’s Natural Resources with Remote Sensing Systems (MANNRRSS) II program. This is a U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)-funded project tasked with utilizing hyperspectral and ancillary electro-optical instrumentation data to create an environmental characterization of an area directly adjacent to the Nevada Test Site (NTS).

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Nevada Test Site Environmental Report 2008

The Nevada Test Site Environmental Report (NTSER) 2008 was prepared to meet the information needs of the public and the requirements and guidelines of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) for annual site environmental reports. It was prepared by National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec), for the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO). This and previous years’ NTSERs are posted on the NNSA/NSO website at http://www.nv.doe.gov/library/publications/aser.aspx.

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Nevada Test Site Environmental Report 2008 Attachment A: Site Description

This attachment expands on the general description of the Nevada Test Site (NTS) presented in the Introduction to the Nevada Test Site Environmental Report 2008 (National Security Technologies, LLC [NSTec], 2009a). Included are subsections that summarize the site’s geological, hydrological, climatological, and ecological setting. The cultural resources of the NTS are also presented. The subsections are meant to aid the reader in understanding the complex physical and biological environment of the NTS. An adequate knowledge of the site’s environment is necessary to assess the environmental impacts of new projects, design and implement environmental monitoring activities for current site operations, and assess the impacts of site operations on the public residing in the vicinity of the NTS. The NTS environment contributes to several key features of the site that afford protection to the inhabitants of adjacent areas from potential exposure to radioactivity or other contaminants resulting from NTS operations. These key features include the general remote location of the NTS, restricted access, extended wind transport times, the great depths to slow-moving groundwater, little or no surface water, and low population density. This attachment complements the annual summary of monitoring program activities and dose assessments presented in the main body of this report.

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Nevada Test Site Environmental Report 2008 Summary

The Nevada Test Site Environmental Report (NTSER) 2008 was prepared to meet the information needs of the public and the requirements and guidelines of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) for annual site environmental reports. It was prepared by National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec), for the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO). This and previous years’ NTSERs are posted on the NNSA/NSO website at http://www.nv.doe.gov/library/publications/aser.aspx.

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Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 482: Area 15 U15a/e Muckpiles and Ponds Nevada Test Site

This Corrective Action Decision Document /Closure Report (CADD/CR) was prepared by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 482 U15a/e Muckpiles and Ponds. This CADD/CR is consistent with the requirements of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order agreed to by the State of Nevada, the U.S. Department of Energy, and the U.S. Department of Defense. Corrective Action Unit 482 is comprised of three Corrective Action Sites (CASs) and one adjacent area: CAS 15-06-01, U15e Muckpile; CAS 15-06-02, U15a Muckpile; CAS 15-38-01, Area 15 U15a/e Ponds; and Drainage below the U15a Muckpile. The purpose of this CADD/CR is to provide justification and documentation supporting the recommendation for closure with no further corrective action, by placing use restrictions on the three CASs and the adjacent area of CAU 482. To support this recommendation, a corrective action investigation (CAI) was performed in September 2002. The purpose of the CAI was to fulfill the following data needs as defined during the Data Quality Objective (DQO) process: (1) Determine whether contaminants of concern (COCs) are present. (2) If COCs are present, determine their nature and extent. (3) Provide sufficient information and data to determine appropriate corrective actions. The CAU 482 dataset from the CAI was evaluated based on the data quality indicator parameters. This evaluation demonstrated the quality and acceptability of the dataset for use in fulfilling the DQO data needs. Analytes detected during the CAI were evaluated against final action levels (FALs) established in this document. Tier 2 FALS were determined for the hazardous constituents of total petroleum hydrocarbons (TPH)-diesel-range organics (DRO) and the radionuclides americium (Am)-241, cesium (Cs)-137, plutonium (Pu)-238, and Pu-239. The Tier 2 FALs were calculated for the radionuclides using site-specific information. The hazardous constituents of TPH-DRO were compared to the PALs defined in the CAIP, and because none of the preliminary action levels (PALs) were exceeded, the PALs became the FALs. The radionuclide FALs were calculated using the Residual Radioactive (RESRAD) code (version 6.21). The RESRAD calculation determined the activities of all radionuclides that together would sum to an exposure dose of 25 millirem per year to a site receptor (based on their relative abundances at each CAS). Based on the field investigation, the following contaminants were determined to be present at concentrations exceeding their corresponding FALs: (1) CAS 15-06-01 - None. (2) CAS 15-06-02 - Cs-137 and Pu-239. (3) CAS 15-38-01 - Am-241, Cs-137, Pu-238, and Pu-239. (4) Drainage below CAS 15-06-02 - Cs-137 and Pu-239. Based on the data and risk evaluations, the DQO data needs presented in the Corrective Action Investigation Plan were met, and the data accurately represent the radiological and chemical risk present at CAU 482. Based on the results of the CAI data evaluation, it was determined that closure in place with use restrictions is the appropriate corrective action for CAU 482 and that use restrictions will effectively control exposure to future land users. This is based on the fact that even though the FALs were exceeded in a few samples, this remote, controlled access site poses only limited risk overall to public health and the environment. Given the relatively low levels of contamination present, it would create a greater hazard to worker safety, public health, and the environment to remove the contamination, transport it, and bury it at another location. Therefore, DTRA provides the following recommendations: (1) Close COCs in place at CAS 15-06-02, CAS 15-38-01, and the drainage below CAS 15-06-02 with use restrictions. (2) No further action for CAU 482. (3) A Notice of Completion be issued to DTRA by the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection for closure of CAU 482. (4) Move CAU 482 from Appendix III to Appendix IV of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order.

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Simulating 3-D radiative transfer effects over the Sierra Nevada Mountains using WRF

A surface solar radiation parameterization based on deviations between 3-D and conventional plane-parallel radiative transfer models has been incorporated into the Weather Research and Forecasting (WRF) model to understand the solar insolation over mountain/snow areas and to investigate the impact of the spatial and temporal distribution and variation of surface solar fluxes on land-surface processes. Using the Sierra-Nevada in the western United States as a testbed, we show that mountain effect could produce up to -50 to + 50 W m -2 deviations in the surface solar fluxes over the mountain areas, resulting in a temperature increase of up to 1 °C on the sunny side. Upward surface sensible and latent heat fluxes are modulated accordingly to compensate for the change in surface solar fluxes. Snow water equivalent and surface albedo both show decreases on the sunny side of the mountains, indicating more snowmelt and hence reduced snow albedo associated with more solar insolation due to mountain effect. Soil moisture increases on the sunny side of the mountains due to enhanced snowmelt, while decreases on the shaded side. Substantial differences are found in the morning hours from 8–10 a.m. and in the afternoon around 3–5 p.m., while differences around noon and in the early morning and late afternoon are comparatively smaller. Variation in the surface energy balance can also affect atmospheric processes, such as cloud fields, through the modulation of vertical thermal structure. Negative changes of up to -40 g m -2 are found in the cloud water path, associated with reductions in the surface insolation over the cloud region. The day-averaged deviations in the surface solar flux are positive over the mountain areas and negative in the valleys, with a range between -12~12 W m -2 . Changes in sensible and latent heat fluxes and surface skin temperature follow the solar insolation pattern. Differences in the domain-averaged diurnal variation over the Sierras show that the mountain area receives more solar insolation during early morning and late afternoon, resulting in enhanced upward sensible heat and latent heat fluxes from the surface and a corresponding increase in surface skin temperature. During the middle of the day, however, the surface insolation and heat fluxes show negative changes, indicating a cooling effect. Hence overall, the diurnal variations of surface temperature and surface fluxes in the Sierra-Nevada are reduced through the interactions of radiative transfer and mountains. Finally, the hourly differences of the surface solar insolation in higher elevated regions, however, show smaller magnitude in negative changes during the middle of the day and possibly more solar fluxes received during the whole day.

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2nd Quarter Transportation Report FY2015: Radioactive Waste Shipments to and from the Nevada National Security Site

This report satisfies the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) commitment to prepare a quarterly summary report of radioactive waste shipments to and from the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC) at Area 5. There were no shipments sent for offsite treatment and returned to the NNSS this quarter. This report summarizes the 2nd quarter of Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 low-level radioactive waste (LLW) and mixed low-level radioactive waste (MLLW) shipments.

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RCRA PART B Permit Application Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) for Waste Management Activities at the NNSS Explosive Ordnance Disposal Unit (EODU)

This volume of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) permit application by the Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) seeks continued operation of the Explosive Ordnance Disposal Unit (EODU) at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Explosives, explosive materials, and unexploded ordnance are declared waste explosives if they are damaged, are defective, have exceeded their shelf life, are the result of environmental restoration (legacy), or are discarded explosive material from research or testing projects. This document provides a description of the regulated waste codes accepted for treatment (controlled detonations), the general design of the unit, and the processes used to safely detonate onsite-generated waste explosives and unexploded ordnance, which are defined as hazardous waste under specific regulations. The Area 11 EODU consists of a firing point (controlled access area where firing of explosives is conducted), firing pad (prepares site where explosives hazardous waste is fired), and ancillary equipment that includes an explosives magazine and firing point area. Additionally, live explosives training is conducted to ensure proficiency of the EODU operations personnel, explosives handlers, and the firing system components. Training detonations do not include waste explosives and are limited in respect to explosives volume and frequency personnel, explosives handlers, and the firing system components. Training detonations do not include waste explosives and are limited in respect to explosives volume and frequency. For safety and security reasons, some of the contents of the full application are not available for public viewing. This public version of the application contains most, but not all, of the contents as submitted to the regulatory agencies.

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