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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 703 records · Page 39
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2015

Investigation of Asymmetric Thrust Detection with Demonstration in a Real-Time Simulation Testbed

The purpose of this effort is to develop, demonstrate, and evaluate three asymmetric thrust detection approaches to aid in the reduction of asymmetric thrust-induced aviation accidents. This paper presents the results from that effort and their evaluation in simulation studies, including those from a real-time flight simulation testbed. Asymmetric thrust is recognized as a contributing factor in several Propulsion System Malfunction plus Inappropriate Crew Response (PSM+ICR) aviation accidents. As an improvement over the state-of-the-art, providing annunciation of asymmetric thrust to alert the crew may hold safety benefits. For this, the reliable detection and confirmation of asymmetric thrust conditions is required. For this work, three asymmetric thrust detection methods are presented along with their results obtained through simulation studies. Representative asymmetric thrust conditions are modeled in simulation based on failure scenarios similar to those reported in aviation incident and accident descriptions. These simulated asymmetric thrust scenarios, combined with actual aircraft operational flight data, are then used to conduct a sensitivity study regarding the detection capabilities of the three methods. Additional evaluation results are presented based on pilot-in-the-loop simulation studies conducted in the NASA Glenn Research Center (GRC) flight simulation testbed. Data obtained from this flight simulation facility are used to further evaluate the effectiveness and accuracy of the asymmetric thrust detection approaches. Generally, the asymmetric thrust conditions are correctly detected and confirmed.

gas turbine engines↗
NASA NTRS2016

Investigation of Asymmetric Thrust Detection with Demonstration in a Real-Time Simulation Testbed

The purpose of this effort is to develop, demonstrate, and evaluate three asymmetric thrust detection approaches to aid in the reduction of asymmetric thrust-induced aviation accidents. This paper presents the results from that effort and their evaluation in simulation studies, including those from a real-time flight simulation testbed. Asymmetric thrust is recognized as a contributing factor in several Propulsion System Malfunction plus Inappropriate Crew Response (PSM+ICR) aviation accidents. As an improvement over the state-of-the-art, providing annunciation of asymmetric thrust to alert the crew may hold safety benefits. For this, the reliable detection and confirmation of asymmetric thrust conditions is required. For this work, three asymmetric thrust detection methods are presented along with their results obtained through simulation studies. Representative asymmetric thrust conditions are modeled in simulation based on failure scenarios similar to those reported in aviation incident and accident descriptions. These simulated asymmetric thrust scenarios, combined with actual aircraft operational flight data, are then used to conduct a sensitivity study regarding the detection capabilities of the three methods. Additional evaluation results are presented based on pilot-in-the-loop simulation studies conducted in the NASA Glenn Research Center (GRC) flight simulation testbed. Data obtained from this flight simulation facility are used to further evaluate the effectiveness and accuracy of the asymmetric thrust detection approaches. Generally, the asymmetric thrust conditions are correctly detected and confirmed.

propulsion system performance↗
NASA NTRS2004

Lessons Learned Study Final Report for the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate

This report is the final product of a 90-day study performed for the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate. The study was to assemble lessons NASA has learned from previous programs that could help the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate pursue the Exploration vision. It focuses on those lessons that should have the greatest significance to the Directorate during the formulation of program and mission plans. The study team reviewed a large number of lessons learned reports and data bases, including the Columbia Accident Investigation Board and Rogers Commission reports on the Shuttle accidents, accident reports from robotic space flight systems, and a number of management reviews by the Defense Sciences Board, Government Accountability Office, and others. The consistency of the lessons, findings, and recommendations validate the adequacy of the data set. In addition to reviewing existing databases, a series of workshops was held at each of the NASA centers and headquarters that included senior managers from the current workforce as well as retirees. The full text of the workshop reports is included in Appendix A. A lessons learned website was opened up to permit current and retired NASA personnel and on-site contractors to input additional lessons as they arise. These new lessons, when of appropriate quality and relevance, will be brought to the attention of managers. The report consists of four parts: Part 1 provides a small set of lessons, called the Executive Lessons Learned, that represent critical lessons that the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate should act on immediately. This set of Executive Lessons and their supporting rationale have been reviewed at length and fully endorsed by a team of distinguished NASA alumni; Part 2 contains a larger set of lessons, called the Selected Lessons Learned, which have been chosen from the lessons database and center workshop reports on the basis of their specific significance and relevance to the near-term work of the Exploration Directorate. These lessons frequently support the Executive lessons but are more general in nature; Part 3 consists of the reports of the center workshops that were conducted as part of this activity. These reports are included in their entirety (approximately 200 pages) in Appendix G and have significance for specific managers; Part 4 consists of the remainder of the lessons that have been selected by this effort and assembled into a database for the use of the Explorations Directorate. The database is archived and hosted in the Lessons Learned Knowledge Network, which provides a flexible search capability using a wide variety of search terms. Finally, a spreadsheet lists databases searched and a bibliography identifies reports that have been reviewed as sources of lessons for this task. NASA has been presented with many learning opportunities. We have conducted numerous programs, some extremely successful and others total failures. Most have been documented with a formal lessons learned activity, but we have not always incorporated these learning opportunities into our normal modes of business. For example, the Robbins Report of 2001 clearly indicates that many project failures of the past two decades were the result of violating well documented best practices, often in direct violation of management instructions and directives. An overarching lesson emerges: that disciplined execution in accordance with proven best practices is the greatest single contributor to a successful program. The Lessons Learned task team offers a sincere hope that the lessons presented herein will be helpful to the Exploration Systems Directorate in charting and executing their course. The success of the Directorate and of NASA in general depends on our collective ability to move forward without having to relearn the lessons of those who have gone before.

Van Laak, Jim↗
NASA NTRS2016

Pilot Critical Incident Reports as a Means to Identify Human Factors of Remotely Piloted Aircraft

It has been estimated that aviation accidents are typically preceded by numerous minor incidents arising from the same causal factors that ultimately produced the accident. Accident databases provide in-depth information on a relatively small number of occurrences, however incident databases have the potential to provide insights into the human factors of Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (RPAS) operations based on a larger volume of less-detailed reports. Currently, there is a lack of incident data dealing with the human factors of unmanned aircraft systems. An exploratory study is being conducted to examine the feasibility of collecting voluntary critical incident reports from RPAS pilots. Twenty-three experienced RPAS pilots volunteered to participate in focus groups in which they described critical incidents from their own experience. Participants were asked to recall (1) incidents that revealed a system flaw, or (2) highlighted a case where the human operator contributed to system resilience or mission success. Participants were asked to only report incidents that could be included in a public document. During each focus group session, a note taker produced a de-identified written record of the incident narratives. At the end of the session, participants reviewed each written incident report, and made edits and corrections as necessary. The incidents were later analyzed to identify contributing factors, with a focus on design issues that either hindered or assisted the pilot during the events. A total of 90 incidents were reported. Human factor issues included the impact of reduced sensory cues, traffic separation in the absence of an out-the-window view, control latencies, vigilance during monotonous and ultra-long endurance flights, control station design considerations, transfer of control between control stations, the management of lost link procedures, and decision-making during emergencies. Pilots participated willingly and enthusiastically in the study, and generally had little difficulty recalling critical incidents. The results suggest that pilot interviews can be a productive method of gathering information on incidents that might not otherwise be reported. Some of the issues described in the reports have received significant attention in the literature, or are analogous to human factors of manned aircraft. In other cases, incident reports involved human factors that are poorly understood, and have not yet been the subject of extensive study. Although many of the reported incidents were related to pilot error, the participants also provided examples of the positive contribution that humans make to the operation of highly-automated systems.

unmanned aircraft systems↗
NASA NTRS2016

C2-Related Incidents Reported by UAS Pilots

It has been estimated that aviation accidents are typically preceded by numerous minor incidents arising from the same causal factors that ultimately produced the accident. Accident databases provide in-depth information on a relatively small number of occurrences, however incident databases have the potential to provide insights into the human factors of Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (RPAS) operations based on a larger volume of less-detailed reports. Currently, there is a lack of incident data dealing with the human factors of unmanned aircraft systems. An exploratory study is being conducted to examine the feasibility of collecting voluntary critical incident reports from RPAS pilots. Twenty-three experienced RPAS pilots volunteered to participate in focus groups in which they described critical incidents from their own experience. Participants were asked to recall (1) incidents that revealed a system flaw, or (2) highlighted a case where the human operator contributed to system resilience or mission success. Participants were asked to only report incidents that could be included in a public document. During each focus group session, a note taker produced a de-identified written record of the incident narratives. At the end of the session, participants reviewed each written incident report, and made edits and corrections as necessary. The incidents were later analyzed to identify contributing factors, with a focus on design issues that either hindered or assisted the pilot during the events. A total of 90 incidents were reported. This presentation focuses on incidents that involved the management of the command and control (C2) link. The identified issues include loss of link, interference from undesired transmissions, voice latency, accidental control transfer, and the use of the lost link timer, or lost link OK features.

unmanned aircraft systems↗
NASA NTRS2017

Design Considerations for Attitude State Awareness and Prevention of Entry into Unusual Attitudes

Loss of control - inflight (LOC-I) has historically represented the largest category of commercial aviation fatal accidents. A review of the worldwide transport airplane accidents (2001-2010) evinced that loss of attitude or energy state awareness was responsible for a large majority of the LOC-I events. A Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST) study of 18 worldwide loss-of-control accidents and incidents determined that flight crew loss of attitude awareness or energy state awareness due to lack of external visual reference cues was a significant causal factor in 17 of the 18 reviewed flights. CAST recommended that "Virtual Day-Visual Meteorological Condition" (Virtual Day-VMC) displays be developed to provide the visual cues necessary to prevent loss-of-control resulting from flight crew spatial disorientation and loss of energy state awareness. Synthetic vision or equivalent systems (SVS) were identified for a design "safety enhancement" (SE-200). Part of this SE involves the conduct of research for developing minimum aviation system performance standards (MASPS) for these flight deck display technologies to aid flight crew attitude and energy state awareness similar to that of a virtual day-VMC-like environment. This paper will describe a novel experimental approach to evaluating a flight crew's ability to maintain attitude awareness and to prevent entry into unusual attitudes across several SVS optical flow design considerations. Flight crews were subjected to compound-event scenarios designed to elicit channelized attention and startle/surprise within the crew. These high-fidelity scenarios, designed from real-world events, enable evaluation of the efficacy of SVS at improving flight crew attitude awareness to reduce the occurrence of LOC-I incidents in commercial flight operations.

Ellis, Kyle K. E.↗
NASA NTRS2016

Human Factors of Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems: Lessons from Incident Reports

It has been estimated that aviation accidents are typically preceded by numerous minor incidents arising from the same causal factors that ultimately produced the accident. Accident databases provide in-depth information on a relatively small number of occurrences, however incident databases have the potential to provide insights into the human factors of Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (RPAS) operations based on a larger volume of less-detailed reports. Currently, there is a lack of incident data dealing with the human factors of unmanned aircraft systems. An exploratory study is being conducted to examine the feasibility of collecting voluntary critical incident reports from RPAS pilots. Twenty-three experienced RPAS pilots volunteered to participate in focus groups in which they described critical incidents from their own experience. Participants were asked to recall (1) incidents that revealed a system flaw, or (2) highlighted a case where the human operator contributed to system resilience or mission success. A total of 90 incidents were reported. This presentation begins with an overview of RPAS human factors and then considers the emerging issues identified by pilot reports.

incidents↗
NASA NTRS2019

Human Performance Contributions to Safety in Commercial Aviation

In the commercial aviation domain, large volumes of data are collected and analyzed on the failures and errors that result in infrequent incidents and accidents, but in the absence of data on behaviors that contribute to routine successful outcomes, safety management and system design decisions are based on a small sample of non- representative safety data. Analysis of aviation accident data suggests that human error is implicated in up to 80% of accidents, which has been used to justify future visions for aviation in which the roles of human operators are greatly diminished or eliminated in the interest of creating a safer aviation system. However, failure to fully consider the human contributions to successful system performance in civil aviation represents a significant and largely unrecognized risk when making policy decisions about human roles and responsibilities. Opportunities exist to leverage the vast amount of data that has already been collected, or could be easily obtained, to increase our understanding of human contributions to “things going right” in commercial aviation. The principal focus of this assessment was to identify current gaps and explore methods for identifying human “success” data generated by the aviation system, from personnel and within the supporting infrastructure.

Holbrook, Jon B.↗
NASA NTRS2020

Monitoring for Flight Path Management: Inputs to Pilot Monitoring Training

The commercial aviation industry world-wide has identified a need for improved pilot monitoring (e.g., ICAO, 2016). More specifically, aviation safety data indicate that failures in pilots' monitoring for flight path management (FPM) have contributed to a range of undesired outcomes: accidents, major upsets, and non-compliance with ATC guidance. The FAA has further stated that these types of FPM failures are likely to worsen with the increasingly complex air traffic control systems and FPM concepts proposed for NextGen (https://www.faa.gov/nextgen/what_is_nextgen/) operations (e.g., see Hah et al., 2017). An important element of this additional complexity will be the introduction of new automation or artificial intelligence that is intended to work with the flight crew but can add additional monitoring burdens. One potential mitigation for this situation is to enhance pilot training for effective monitoring. NASA Ames Research Center was asked to identify and evaluate training approaches that have the potential to enhance pilots' ability to effectively monitor for FPM (with the result of improved awareness). The focus of this work is to identify, develop or validate training guidance to improve pilot monitoring/awareness regarding FPM and mitigate the recent trend of accidents and incidents, especially Loss of Control (LOC) events. The result of this work should be guidance for FAA training and standards organizations—such as the Air Carrier Training Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ACT ARC)—to aid in reducing the risk of incidents and accidents due to inadequate pilot monitoring/awareness.

Feary, Mike↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Biocybernetic Closed-Loop System for Mitigating Hazardous States of Awareness

The past century of passenger flight has seen continuous improvement in aviation safety by the aerospace industry. However, while commercial aviation accident rates have continued to decline, human error-related incident and accident rates remain remarkably constant across all types of aviation (Shappell, et al., 2007). Unfortunately, this level of human error is unacceptable when considering projections for increased traffic volume (FAA, 2009), and is likely to yield more incidents and accidents unless a more complete understanding of operator error is achieved and remediations are implemented. One area of interest highlighted by researchers is Hazardous States of Awareness (HSAs) that can result from deficiencies in the design and inappropriate use of human-machine interfaces. Identifying and mitigating HSAs is critical for reducing operator errors. One promising approach uses psychophysiological measures which enable automated systems to adapt to the operator?s state and modify modes of operation to support optimal human performance (Scerbo, 2007). This paper will survey previous research and describe future directions for the application of psychophysiological measures of operators derived from cortical and autonomic assessment to perform real-time adaptive modulation of human-automation task mode mixes. The authors will present a summary of previous work done at NASA LaRC and Old Dominion University using a Psychophysiologically Adaptive System (PAS) in which the level of automation of the NASA Multi-Attribute Task Battery was modulated based on Engagement Indices derived from the users? electroencephalogram (Pope, Bogart, & Bartolome, 1995; for review see, Scerbo, Freeman, & Mikulka, 2003). Future theoretical and methodological directions for this type of closed-loop research will be discussed. Specifically, the capacity for this type of PAS to maintain effective operator state and to enable validation of candidate physiological indices will be described. Consideration will also be given to critical system characteristics (e.g., engagement indices, methods for invoking changes among system states, individual differences among users, etc.) that have been or still need to be studied. The potential of the PAS approach for interactive system design and prototyping will also be described. Examples of adaptive automation flight deck concepts in recent experiments will be highlighted and discussed.

Chad L Stephens↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Data-Driven Approach to Recognizing and Understanding Human Contributions to Aviation Safety

Data-driven decisions about safety management and design of safety-critical systems are limited by the available data, which influence, and are influenced by, how decision makers characterize problems and identify solutions. In the commercial aviation domain, large volumes of data are collected and analyzed on the failures and errors that result in infrequent incidents and accidents, but in the absence of data on safety-producing behaviors, safety management and system design decisions are based on a small sample of non-representative safety data. Analysis of aviation accident data suggests that human error is implicated in up to 80% of accidents, which has been used to justify future visions for aviation in which the roles of human operators are greatly diminished or eliminated in the interest of creating a safer aviation system. However, failure to fully consider the human contributions to aviation safety represents a significant and largely unrecognized risk when making policy decisions about safety management and system design. Opportunities exist to leverage the vast amount of data that have already been collected, or could be easily obtained, to increase our understanding of human contributions to safety in commercial aviation. This presentation will focus on those opportunities as well as the challenges associated with collecting and analyzing data on operators’ safety-producing behaviors.

Safety↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Revisiting the Soyuz-1 Parachute Failure in the Context of Safety in the Modern Era

The Soyuz‑1 accident remains one of the most consequential parachute related failures in human spaceflight history and provides enduring lessons for modern Entry, Descent, and Landing (EDL) system design. Occurring during the height of the Cold War and the Space Race, the mission unfolded under extraordinary political and schedule pressure as the Soviet Union sought to maintain its early leadership in space achievements following the death of chief designer Sergei Korolev. Despite unresolved propulsion, electrical, and parachute system deficiencies, Soyuz‑1 proceeded to launch and immediately encountered critical inflight anomalies, including a failed solar panel deployment, attitude control issues, and communication dropouts. Upon reentry, a malfunction in the parachute system, driven by a primary main canopy that failed to deploy, and subsequent entanglement of the reserve main canopy with the primary drogue parachute, resulted in insufficient deceleration and the fatal crash of cosmonaut Vladimir Komarov. Subsequent investigations revealed deep rooted cultural and organizational issues within the Soviet space program, including inadequate testing, suppression of dissent, undocumented last minute design changes, and the absence of integrated parachute system verification. More than 200 design flaws were identified after the accident, and firsthand accounts, including those from Yuri Gagarin, highlighted widespread concern prior to launch. Over time, the Soviet program implemented substantial reforms: systematic design corrections, rigorous process documentation, and an extensive series of drop tests that ultimately transformed the Soyuz system into one of the world’s most reliable human-rated return vehicles. This paper examines the technical architecture of the Soyuz‑1 parachute system, reconstructs the likely deployment sequence and failure mechanism, and analyzes the cultural contributors that shaped the accident. The study draws parallels to modern spacecraft parachute development, emphasizing the critical importance of integrated system testing, transparent engineering culture, and continuous hardware surveillance. These lessons remain directly relevant to today’s NASA and Commercial Crew Programs (CCP), where the Government continues to refine its understanding of aggregate risk and strengthen overall astronaut safety in the face of increasingly complex parachute systems.

Aaron L Morris↗
DOE OSTI2020

Two decades of DOE investment lays the foundation for TRISO-fueled reactors

Tristructural isotropic (TRISO) coated particle fuel is a robust, microencapsulated fuel form developed originally for use in high-temperature gas-cooled reactors (HTGRs). The particles consist of a spherical fissile kernel surrounded by several layers of pyrocarbon and a silicon carbide (SiC) layer (Figure 1). The particles are formed into cylindrical or spherical fuel forms using a resinated graphite matrix material for insertion into an HTGR. The kernel and coating layers together act to retain fission products within the particle during normal reactor operation and during postulated accidents; TRISO particles can maintain structural integrity at extremely high temperatures, reaching as high as approximately 1,600°C in limiting HTGR accidents. This limits the fission product activity circulating in the helium coolant and the activity released to the environment during accidents. Acceptable performance of TRISO particles is therefore essential for reactor safety.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Domestic and International Standards for Nuclear Criticality Safety – Overview and Status

The domestic and international consensus standards for nuclear criticality safety (NCS) have provided guidance for staff performing hands-on work in operations with fissionable materials. These consensus standards have contributed directly to the significant reduction in the rate of criticality accidents in process facilities since the 1940s. The last known criticality accident inside the United States was in 1978 (nearly 43 years ago) at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant, and outside the United States, an accident occurred at Tokai-mura, Japan, in 1999 (23 years ago). The domestic consensus standards for NCS include the American Nuclear Society (ANS) standards. The ANS Standards Board, the NCS Consensus Committee, and the ANS-8 Subcommittee oversee the development and maintenance of these standards. There are currently eighteen standards in the ANS-8 series. Currently, there are six ANS-8 standards in revision mode and eleven in a maintenance mode with one new standard under development. The international consensus standards for NCS calculations, procedures, and practices are maintained and developed within the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), Technical Committee 85 on Nuclear Energy, Subcommittee 5 on Nuclear Fuel Technology, and Working Group 8, “Nuclear Criticality Safety.” Eleven standards are currently available, three standards are in revision mode, and two standards are development. This paper provides the NCS community with an overview and status report of domestic and international NCS consensus standards to stimulate interest and to support their continued development.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Domestic and International Standards for Nuclear Criticality Safety - Overview & Status [Abstract]

The domestic and international consensus standards for nuclear criticality safety (NCS) have provided guidance for staff performing hands-on work in operations with fissionable materials. These consensus standards have contributed directly to the significant reduction in the rate of criticality accidents in process facilities since the 1940s. The last known criticality accident inside the United States was in 1978 (nearly 43 years ago) at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant, and outside the United States, an accident occurred at Tokai-mura, Japan, in 1999 (22 years ago). The domestic consensus standards for NCS include the American Nuclear Society (ANS) standards. The ANS Standards Board, the NCS Consensus Committee, and the ANS-8 Subcommittee oversee the development and maintenance of these standards. There are currently eighteen standards in the ANS-8 series. Currently, there are six ANS-8 standards in re- vision mode and eleven in a maintenance mode with one new standard under development. The international consensus standards for NCS calculations, procedures, and practices are maintained and developed within the International Organization for Standardization, Technical Committee 85 on Nuclear Energy, Subcommittee 5 on Nuclear Fuel Technology, and Working Group 8, “Nuclear Criticality Safety.” Eleven standards are currently available, three standards are in revision mode, and two standards are development. This paper provides the NCS community with an overview and status report of domestic and international NCS consensus standards to stimulate interest and to support their continued development.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗
DOE OSTI2022

Thermal-hydraulic and Fuel Performance Scoping Studies of a Flowing Water Capsule in TREAT

The restart of the Transient Reactor Test (TREAT) facility has provided a much needed capability for integral transient testing of nuclear fuel. This testing is necessary to qualify new fuel concepts such as those developed under the Accident Tolerant Fuel (ATF) program, increasing the burnup limit of light water reactor (LWR) fuels, or a variety of other programs under the Advanced Fuels Campaign (AFC). The ATF campaign has been the main driver behind the development and implementation of a variety of capsules for TREAT experiments. The Separate-Effect Test Holder (SETH) was a dry capsule that enabled testing of ATF concepts under reactivity-initiated accident (RIA) heating conditions. Following SETH, the Static Environment Rodlet Transient Test Apparatus (SERTTA) was developed to enable RIA testing in a static water environment. In efforts to support the need for future Loss-of-Coolant Accident (LOCA) tests, the Transient Water Irradiation System for TREAT (TWIST) capsule has been developed that allows for water to drain from around the fuel rod and lower the pressure to simulate LOCA conditions. All these capsules that have been developed for LWR fuel testing all lack the capability for forced convective cooling which in some applications may limit their ability to test under prototypic conditions. A design and modeling effort has been started to modify the TWIST capsule by adding a flow tube and impeller that can create flowing coolant conditions for the fuel rod. RELAP5-3D and BISON models are being used to study the differences between RIA, LOCA, Anticipated Operational Occurrences (AOO), LWR power cycling, and other transient scenarios under flowing conditions capable in the flowing capsule and the current stagnant water capsules (SERTTA and TWIST). The scoping study will provide guidance on the needed capabilities for the flowing capsule and the limitations of the currently developed capsule for LWR testing in TREAT.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Initial development of a generic fluoride salt-cooled reactor model

Fluoride high-temperature reactors (FHRs) are high-temperature, low-pressure reactor concepts that use tri-structural isotropic (TRISO) fuel and molten fluoride salt coolant. These reactors have the potential to provide both electrical power and high-temperature process heat. We used generic FHR parameters for a pebble-bed FHR to develop an initial model with fresh fuel for a generic FHR (gFHR) in MELCOR and SCALE (NEWT and KENO). In this paper, we present the development of our gFHR models, which will serve as the baseline for a sensitivity and uncertainty analysis to quantify the range of possible source terms for FHRs in severe accidents. We present MELCOR results for fuel and coolant temperatures through the core, a nodalization study for the steady-state thermal hydraulic model, and development of reactor physics models in SCALE. As this work progresses, these models will be used to calculate source terms for a loss-of-forced-flow accident and to conduct a sensitivity study on this accident to establish a range of possible source terms. SCALE will provide reactor physics parameters like isotopic inventory, decay heat generation, and temperature coefficients of reactivity. Using the uncertainty quantification tools within SCALE, we will generate distributions for those parameters and will use the uncertainty quantification code RAVEN or DAKOTA to sample those distributions in MELCOR to quantify the impact of reactor physics and thermal hydraulic uncertainties on FHR source terms. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Application of Constellation's best estimate alternate source term methodology

Safety analyses for a nuclear power plants need to consider postulated accidents that results in a risk of accidental release of radiation. The regulations require plant specific safety analysis reports to include an evaluation of the requirements of 10CFR50.67. Such a safety analysis report mandates limits such that calculated radiological consequences at certain locations do not exceed established limits in 10CFR50.67 following a postulated release of radioactivity. Analyses should demonstrate, with reasonable assurance, that these prescribed limits are complied with. Conventional methodologies utilize conservative approaches to address lack of uncertainty quantification in the utilized approaches, methods, and/or inputs. These built-in excess conservatisms often result in with compounding effects and hence overly conservative results in the estimated radiological consequences, which leads to inaccurate margin evaluation for operation and accident mitigation. Therefore, evaluating accurate dose consequences is needed for both operational and safety reasons. This paper illustrates the use of the best estimate source term (BEAST) methodology to the case of the loss of coolant accident (LOCA) dose analysis.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗