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At least 685 records · Page 38
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2011

Independent Review of U.S. and Russian Probabilistic Risk Assessments for the International Space Station Mini Research Module #2 Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris Risk

The Mini-Research Module-2 (MRM-2), a Russian module on the International Space Station, does not meet its requirements for micrometeoroid and orbital debris probability of no penetration (PNP). To document this condition, the primary Russian Federal Space Agency ISS contractor, S.P. Korolev Rocket and Space Corporation-Energia (RSC-E), submitted an ISS non-compliance report (NCR) which was presented at the 5R Stage Operations Readiness Review (SORR) in October 2009. In the NCR, RSC-E argued for waiving the PNP requirement based on several factors, one of which was the risk of catastrophic failure was acceptably low at 1 in 11,100. However, NASA independently performed an assessment of the catastrophic risk resulting in a value of 1 in 1380 and believed that the risk at that level was unacceptable. The NASA Engineering and Safety Center was requested to evaluate the two competing catastrophic risk values and determine which was more accurate. This document contains the outcome of the assessment.

Squire, Michael D.↗
NASA NTRS2011

Optical air data systems and methods

Systems and methods for sensing air includes at least one, and in some embodiments three, transceivers for projecting the laser energy as laser radiation to the air. The transceivers are scanned or aligned along several different axes. Each transceiver receives laser energy as it is backscattered from the air. A computer processes signals from the transceivers to distinguish molecular scattered laser radiation from aerosol scattered laser radiation and determines air temperatures, wind speeds, and wind directions based on the scattered laser radiation. Applications of the system to wind power site evaluation, wind turbine control, traffic safety, general meteorological monitoring and airport safety are presented.

Caldwell, Loren M.↗
NASA NTRS2015

Body of Knowledge (BOK) for Copper Wire Bonds

Copper wire bonds have replaced gold wire bonds in the majority of commercial semiconductor devices for the latest technology nodes. Although economics has been the driving mechanism to lower semiconductor packaging costs for a savings of about 20% by replacing gold wire bonds with copper, copper also has materials property advantages over gold. When compared to gold, copper has approximately: 25% lower electrical resistivity, 30% higher thermal conductivity, 75% higher tensile strength and 45% higher modulus of elasticity. Copper wire bonds on aluminum bond pads are also more mechanically robust over time and elevated temperature due to the slower intermetallic formation rate - approximately 1/100th that of the gold to aluminum intermetallic formation rate. However, there are significant tradeoffs with copper wire bonding - copper has twice the hardness of gold which results in a narrower bonding manufacturing process window and requires that the semiconductor companies design more mechanically rigid bonding pads to prevent cratering to both the bond pad and underlying chip structure. Furthermore, copper is significantly more prone to corrosion issues. The semiconductor packaging industry has responded to this corrosion concern by creating a palladium coated copper bonding wire, which is more corrosion resistant than pure copper bonding wire. Also, the selection of the device molding compound is critical because use of environmentally friendly green compounds can result in internal CTE (Coefficient of Thermal Expansion) mismatches with the copper wire bonds that can eventually lead to device failures during thermal cycling. Despite the difficult problems associated with the changeover to copper bonding wire, there are billions of copper wire bonded devices delivered annually to customers. It is noteworthy that Texas Instruments announced in October of 2014 that they are shipping microcircuits containing copper wire bonds for safety critical automotive applications. An evaluation of copper wire bond technology for applicability to spaceflight hardware may be warranted along with concurrently compiling a comprehensive understanding of the failure mechanisms involved with copper wire bonded semiconductor devices.

Body of Knowledge (BOK)↗
NASA NTRS2014

Investigating Detect-and-Avoid Surveillance Performance for Unmanned Aircraft Systems

Most unmanned aircraft systems will be required to be equipped with a Detect-and-Avoid (DAA) system with a surveillance component. The surveillance performance requirements of the DAA system to detect and track intruder aircraft will depend on the encounter geometries that unmanned aircraft are expected to have with other aircraft in the airspace. This presentation shows the analysis of the encounter geometries that were simulated using historical low-altitude traffic data and some proposed UAS missions. This analysis suggests how the overall safety and performance of a surveillance system may relate to surveillance parameters such as surveillance range, horizontal and vertical fields or regard. This study proposed and investigated potential safety and performance metrics for evaluating the performance of a surveillance system, such as the ratio of undetected and late-detected separation violations, and the time to violation at first detection for given sets of surveillance parameters.

UAS↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

System-Wide Error Attribution in Multi-Vehicle Operations: Theoretical Explanation, Implications, and Applications

In multi-vehicle aerial operation contexts, a single or several human operators (m) are responsible for managing multiple uncrewed vehicles (N). This is referred to as the m:N operational paradigm. When automation error occurs during m:N operations, especially if multiple vehicles exhibit automation error, a question is raised: What level of system globality will the error be attributed to? Globality refers to the levels within the conceptual hierarchy of a perceptual object. Significant costs could be incurred if the error is falsely attributed to a higher globality level than it should be (e.g., multiple groups of vehicles as opposed to a single vehicle), and those vehicles are subsequently subject to grounding and evaluation/maintenance. Likewise, it could be problematic if error is falsely attributed to a component (i.e., a lower globality level), resulting in ongoing, unsafe operation of vehicles that should be grounded or evaluated. Thus, to meet required safety standards and facilitate commercial viability, multi-vehicle operators must be capable of appropriately attributing the level of globality of automation error within the system they are responsible for.

Error↗
DOE OSTI2025

Internship Presentation: Integrating Safety and Cybersecurity: Security-by-Design with SOWT Analysis for Reactor Testing

This study covers leveraging reactor testing facilities that are primarily designed with a focus on safety to enhance cybersecurity testing. By incorporating reactor security-by-design with reactor safety-by-design principles and adopting defense-in-depth strategies that emphasize both safety and security, the research evaluates applicable cyber tools, models, and solutions. This includes simulating specific cyber-attack scenarios using reactor simulators and performing SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats) analysis to improve the cybersecurity of reactor systems.

21 - SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLAN↗
DOE OSTI2026

Modeling Radiolysis and Chemical Reactions during Dry Storage of Aluminum-clad Spent Nuclear Fuel

After aluminum-clad spent nuclear fuel (ASNF) is removed from the reactor, it is initially stored in spent fuel pools, which are specially designed water-filled basins that provide temporary cooling to reduce the temperature of the fuel assemblies and provide radiation shielding. ASNF continues to generate heat due to the radioactive decay of elements within the fuel, which persists for many years post-shutdown as the residual radioactive products decay into more stable elements. During the wet storage period, an oxyhydroxide layer composed of boehmite/bayerite forms on the surfaces of the aluminum cladding from exposure to water in the pools. Road-ready packaging for long-term disposition of the ASNF involves dry storage in helium backfilled DOE standard canisters (DSCs). When the ASNF is removed from water storage and dried, most of the water is removed, but some physisorbed and chemisorbed water remains in the oxyhydroxide layers. This residual water can produce hydrogen when exposed to radiation from the ASNF during dry storage. Predicting hydrogen accumulation over time in the DSCs is critical for long-term storage considerations. Previous modeling efforts have developed coupled computational fluid dynamics (CFD)-chemical models to simulate temperature, pressure, and gas phase concentrations within the DSCs. These models use the thermal field predicted by CFD as input to a radiolysis model for the gas phase and the surface oxyhydroxide layer chemistry. Given the long storage period of the DSCs and the impracticality of long-term experiments, a simulation-based approach is necessary to assess chemical evolution within the canisters. This study advances the development of a modeling framework designed to simulate the chemical evolution of spent fuel canisters. Both thermal and radiation-driven reactions are considered, with radiation kinetics quantified using G-values. Sensitivity analysis identifies key parameters influencing species composition. Reaction pathway diagrams offer insight into dominant species formation routes, enabling more effective comparisons between model predictions and experimental observations, particularly regarding the production of hydrogen. Results show that the model predicts significant hydrogen gas production with minimal oxygen generation, primarily due to hydrogen formation via boehmite pathways. These findings underscore the importance of accurately characterizing surface-bound species and radiolysis kinetics. A deeper understanding of these mechanisms is critical for evaluating the long-term safety of nuclear waste storage.

12 - MGMT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE WASTE↗
NASA NTRS2018

Simplified Aid for Extra-Vehicular Activity Rescue (SAFER) Battery Assessment

In 2013, the Boeing Company model 787-8 Dreamliner commercial aircraft experienced three catastrophic lithium (Li) battery failures. The cause of each failure resulted in a single-cell thermal runaway (TR) condition, which propagated to adjacent battery cells. Two of the failures involved rechargeable lithium-ion (Li-Ion) batteries, and the third event involved a nonrechargeable lithium-manganese dioxide (Li-MnO2) battery. In response to these Li battery failures, the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) approved a technical assessment of the International Space Station Simplified Aid for Extra-Vehicular Activity Rescue (SAFER) Li non-rechargeable battery. This assessment was conducted to evaluate the SAFER Li nonrechargeable battery safety design features against Boeing 787 Dreamliner Li battery failure lessons learned. Specifically, this investigation focused on assessing the severity of a SAFER battery TR hazard conditions.

Iannello, Christopher J.↗
DOE OSTI2022

Impact of nuclear data covariance libraries on uncertainty quantification of sodium cooled fast reactor simulation

Uncertainty quantification in core modelling to assess reactor performance is a regular practice to identify design safety limits. Best-estimate plus uncertainty (BEPU) methods are commonly used to propagate uncertainties to core responses from input parameters, characterized by variance-covariance libraries. This study evaluates the impact of different covariance libraries on the uncertainty associated with core safety parameters and their propagation through reactor transient modelling for a metallic core (ABR-1000). The COMAC-1.0, COMMARA-2.0, and COMMARA-2.1 covariance libraries are used to propagate nuclear data uncertainties to neutron feedback coefficients using the Generalized Perturbation Theory, then through transient safety analyses to establish the confidence interval for safety performance of the reactor using stochastic sampling. The considered transients include Unprotected Transient Over Power and Unprotected Loss Of Flow. Most influential nuclide and reaction pairs in different variance-covariance libraries are identified and their impact on the uncertainty of safety parameters are evaluated. Significant differences were observed between uncertainties from COMAC compared to COMMARA libraries. Uncertainties from COMMARA libraries were consistently larger than COMAC for all cases. For structure, coolant density feedback coefficients and control rod worth, total nuclear data uncertainties were approximately 50% larger for COMMARA than COMAC. Differences were also observed in identification of top contributors of uncertainty in terms of reaction-cross sections. For instance, largest contribution to total uncertainty of radial expansion coefficient from COMMARA-2.0 and 2.1 originates from Na{sup 23} P1 Elastic cross section (0.81%) but from Pu{sup 239} Fission (0.53%) with COM C-1.0. Such differences are evaluated in this research for all quantities of interest. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Moon to Mars (M2M): Exploration Atmosphere

As humans leave the bounds of Earth to explore the lunar surface and beyond, crew will don extravehicular activity (EVA) suits to learn more about these extraterrestrial environments, establish sustained presence, and perform needed upgrades and maintenance to their space vehicle and habitation systems. Spacefaring vehicle and habitation design will need to support these EVA excursions while ensuring crew health and safety. A crucial technological design advancement towards this goal is the use of a lower pressure exploration atmosphere (EA) that enables high efficiency EVA, rather than the sea level atmosphere of 14.7 psia, 21% oxygen (O 2 ) found on the International Space Station, Shuttle, and most other Russian and Chinese space vehicles and stations. Early space vehicles (Mercury through Apollo Programs) used a 5 psia, 100% O 2 environment, which eliminated the need for pre-EVA denitrogenation protocols, simplified the life support system to a single gas, and saved structural mass. For longer duration missions (Skylab), a diluent gas was added, changing the atmosphere to 5 psia, 70-74% O 2 to prevent atelectasis while remaining normoxic. As in-flight science became a top priority, Shuttle and ISS atmospheres were chosen to operate at sea level allowing for simpler ground-based study control conditions. Consequently this led to long pre-EVA denitrogenation protocols involving up to 4 hours of O 2 prebreathe because the EVA suit still operated at a low pressure of 4.3 psid. To increase operational efficiency, the Shuttle was retroactively certified to operate using 10.2 psia, 26.5% O 2 , reducing O 2 prebreathe time to 40-75 min. Current plans for M2M habitats on the Lunar surface require EVA, thus EA recommendation became 8 psia and 32% O 2 but was revised to 8.2 psia and 34% O 2 to decrease hypoxia exposure. Unfortunately, the benefits of EA in support of safe and efficient EVAs comes with the challenge of fire management in a higher-than-normal O 2 % environment. Although known for decades, the recommended forward work to address fire management has only recently begun. Current flammability tests include examining material propagation and ignition sources as well as fire mitigation processes to better understand these properties for proposed new EA environments. Fire safety, DCS risk, and mission design all contribute to the multifaceted parameters of EA. Thus while it is clear that EA is required to achieve the goals of future exploratory space missions, final specifications are still being evaluated for optimizing crew health and safety.

space atmosphere↗
DOE OSTI2025

Advanced Reactor Designs Security Analysis, Risk, and Recommendations: Risks, Consequences, and Possible by-Design Mitigation Approaches Associated with Select Advanced Reactors

Next-generation advanced reactors (ARs) incorporate enhanced safety systems, have smaller source terms, and feature compact modular designs, which should lessen their collective risk profiles. However, to fully evaluate risk, security needs to be a part of the equation. Without taking security into consideration, safety systems and components in the new ARs may be vulnerable to sabotage. These base attributes, coupled with enhanced security features specific to AR design through sound engineering and security-by-design (SeBD), should provide developers and operators with lower inherent security risk profiles. Building security early into the AR design may remove or passively secure potential critical targets from an adversary’s reach , thereby increasing overall safety and security. An integrated approach and diverse design team that includes engineering, operations, and security experts are fundamental to building security into the design without sacrificing fundamental operational efficiencies and principles. The objective of this project was to evaluate the security and safety interfaces for five classes of reactors, identify potential security vulnerabilities of structures, systems, and components (SSC), and underscore the need to consider security alongside safety in the design o f these concepts. The five reactor classes evaluated in this project and presented in this report are molten-salt reactors (MSR), high temperature gas reactors (HTGR), sodium-fast reactors (SFR), advanced light-water reactors (ALWR), and microreactors. These designs were selected because they reflect the concepts that are closest to market deployment and have received significant resource investments from the public and private sector. This project assesses the inherent security risks posed by common classes of ARs, provides a methodology and framework to assess security along with safety, and offers an analysis of potential mitigation strategies that could be incorporated. For each AR technology, the SSCs that relate to radionuclide source safety functions are discussed to understand the SSC contribution to safety and relative importance in the protective strategy for the design. The assumptions that went into evaluating each reactor concept originated from generic publicly available nonproprietary information and should not directly be used to qualify an absolute risk profile nor to rank specific AR designs. Instead, the purpose of the analysis is to understand and compare the generic inherent security risks of different AR technologies.

98 - NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL↗
DOE OSTI2020

Safety Functions and Features, Events and Processes for the E-Area Performance Assessment

The DOE Technical Standard, “Disposal Authorization Statement and Tank Closure Documentation,” (DOE 2017) recommends the use of safety functions and features, events and processes (FEPs) to support development of conceptual models and identification of scenarios to be considered in a performance assessment (PA). The FEP process provides a means to describe how a PA considers and addresses the factors that could influence the performance of key barriers. Understanding the roles of barriers in terms of limiting migration helps to focus on how changes in the system could lead to a situation where those roles cannot be fulfilled and there is the potential for compromised performance. The FEPs screening and review process was used to identify FEPs that are relevant for the EArea Low-Level Waste Facility (LLWF) and specifically those FEPs that could have a detrimental impact on the effectiveness of a given safety function. For this PA, a default list of FEPs developed at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA 2004) and an approach implemented for PAs at the Hanford and Idaho sites (Mehta et al. 2016, DOE-ID 2019) are used to identify processes and events that could influence the effectiveness of a given safety function for the E-Area LLWF (e.g., subsidence can impact the safety function of the cover system and lead to increased infiltration). The Hanford and Idaho PAs represent two of the most recent applications of this approach. The PA evaluates the potential impacts of changes in performance of different features of the system and demonstrates that the safety functions represent multiple and redundant barriers. Barrier analyses, assuming a safety function is not present, also test the robustness of the system in the event of the loss of one or more safety functions. Such evaluations also support a qualitative illustration of the concept of defense in depth. The safety concept for closure of the E-Area LLWF (generically referred to as “E-Area”) encompasses a variety of different features (i.e., administrative controls, natural site features, and engineered barriers) that reduce the potential impacts on human health and the environment from the residual waste that will remain after closure. These features can be represented as a collection of safety functions acting independently and as a system to provide for overall safety. In some applications, there have been attempts to assign numerical expectations to specific safety functions, but that is not the intent in this case. The concept of safety functions is used more qualitatively in two ways for this PA: 1. To illustrate the robustness of the E-Area design, operational practices and closure approach by documenting features that are and are not credited in different modeling cases. 2. To identify the roles of the different features and potential processes and events that could compromise the performance of safety features and need to be considered when developing the modeling approach. This report addresses both safety functions and FEPs for the E-Area PA.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
NASA NTRS1972

Manned space flight nuclear system safety. Volume 1: base nuclear system safety

The mission and terrestrial nuclear safety aspects of future long duration manned space missions in low earth orbit are discussed. Nuclear hazards of a typical low earth orbit Space Base mission (from natural sources and on-board nuclear hardware) have been identified and evaluated. Some of the principal nuclear safety design and procedural considerations involved in launch, orbital, and end of mission operations are presented. Areas of investigation include radiation interactions with the crew, subsystems, facilities, experiments, film, interfacing vehicles, nuclear hardware and the terrestrial populace. Results of the analysis indicate: (1) the natural space environment can be the dominant radiation source in a low earth orbit where reactors are effectively shielded, (2) with implementation of safety guidelines the reactor can present a low risk to the crew, support personnel, the terrestrial populace, flight hardware and the mission, (3) ten year missions are feasible without exceeding integrated radiation limits assigned to flight hardware, and (4) crew stay-times up to one year are feasible without storm shelter provisions.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS1989

Space Shuttle Orbiter main propulsion system flight safety enhancement

The Space Shuttle main propulsion system, like other major elements of the vehicle, has been part of an ongoing program to enhance the flight safety of the Space Transportation System. This activity, inherent in the basic program since its inception, has continued as part of a renewed review of failure modes and effects pertaining to flight-critical functions. Selected components were further evaluated, their potential for impacting flight safety was defined, and then the necessity for changing their design and/or operational practices was determined. Major examples of such components are the 17-inch disconnect and gaseous oxygen flow control valve. This paper summarizes that activity and provides examples of critical processes and components that have been or are being modified to enhance flight safety.

Cota, Phillip E.↗
NASA NTRS2025

South Pole Lunar Lighting Studies for Driving Exploration on the Lunar Surface

NASA’s Artemis lunar missions will face new exploration challenges due to inherently low sun angles in the lunar south pole region. Whereas the Apollo missions were afforded sunlight for approximately 8 to 50-degrees above the horizon, sunlight for the next lunar missions will only be 1 to 2-degrees about the horizon. With this low angle, long shadows and high contrasts of light and dark areas will be faced by the crew and remote teleop operators while exploring the lunar surface. With this in mind, NASA developed an integrated virtual Lighting and Navigation Simulation to understand these challenges. Two studies have been conducted in this Lunar South Pole environment to evaluate the effects of natural and artificial lighting on driving and navigating a lunar rover across the surface. Early NASA studies, such as this, are used to aid in developing techniques and explore concepts of operations to promote mission success and crew safety. In the Phase One development evaluation, six astronauts were teleported to ten different lighting conditions. For each location, drivers were to drive to an imaginary target approximately 200-meters straight ahead and provide subjective feedback on their ability to drive under the given lighting conditions. Phase Two, a more operational study, four astronauts and a remote operator tested five different Artemis lunar mission scenarios. Results indicated sun direction at such low angles, especially when driving a high speed, can severely impact the crew’s ability to safely drive the rover. In the up-sun situation, with the sun directly in the driver’s eyes and compounded long shadows, the consistent preference among drivers was to initiate a tacking strategy of approximately +/- 20 to 30-degrees to improve visibility. This maneuver does require more time and rover energetics. Conversely, driving down-sun required the crew to tack as well to avoid the shadow of rover blocking the terrain. Less appreciated is how the surrounding landscape is lit. Traveling into shadowed areas, especially while facing a lit terrain beyond the shadowed area, drivers enter at their own risk due to pupil contraction making artificial lights useless. Additionally, the constant transitioning between dark and light areas are mentally taxing to the crew and natural navigational references such as the stars are invisible and therefore unusable. Slope and depth magnitude are very difficult hazards to judge when approaching a shadowed crater. This naturally leads to slower driving speeds than originally anticipated. As for observing scientifically interesting features, assessing them accurately varies greatly by the lighting condition. In most cases, the task can be completed, but the strategy is to use the sun to one’s advantage. Crew workload distribution in the cockpit for driving operations was split amongst crew. The driver primarily focused attention on visual terrain (80%) but referenced displays approximately 20% of the time, while the co-pilot/navigator generally provided directional cues to the driver. These natural lighting conditions present significant challenges for safe rover operations; however, early studies having given investigators a “first-look” into understanding of how operating on the South Lunar Pole can be accomplished.

LTv↗
NASA NTRS1997

Teamwork in the Terminal Area: Organizational Issues and Solutions

Dynamic growth and technology advances in commercial aviation have turned the terminal area into a complex, multi-organization workplace which requires the smooth coordination of many operational teams. In addition to pilots, cabin crew, air traffic controllers, and dispatch (who nominally work together throughout a flight), surface operations additionally involve local, ground and ramp controllers, ramp agents, maintenance, dozens of service contractors, and any number of teams who are responsible for airport operations. Under abnormal or emergency conditions, even more teams become actively involved. In order to accommodate growth and to meet productivity and safety challenges, numerous changes are being made in surface operations. Unfortunately, it is often the case that changes in technologies, organizational roles, procedures, and training are developed and implemented in isolated and piecemeal fashion without regard to cross organizational impact. Thus, there is a need for evaluation methodologies which assure integrated system safety for all organizations. Such methodologies should aid the understanding of how organizations work together and how changes in one domain affects the next. In this study, we develop one approach toward addressing these organizational issues. Examples of surface operations in abnormal situations are examined in regard to their impact on personnel in the terminal area. Timelines are given for the responses to incidents, along with the necessary communication links, the specific roles that members of terminal teams have, and any overlapping responsibilities. Suggestions to improve cross-operational teamwork are given. Methods of graphic representation are explored, both in regards to human links and access to information. The outcome of such an approach should enhance the understanding which is critical for resolving organizational conflicts and maximizing system effectiveness.

Parke, Bonny K.↗
DOE OSTI2020

Los Alamos National Laboratory Nuclear Explosives Safety Office - An Overview

Nuclear Explosive Safety Study Groups (NESSG) are convened to evaluate NEOs to determine if positive measures are adequate to meet the Standards as specified in DOE O 452.2E - Nuclear Explosive Safety, DOE O 452.4E – Security and Use Control of Nuclear Explosives and Nuclear Weapons, and NA SD 452.2.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2024

Assessment of Condition Monitoring Methods and Technologies for Inservice Inspection and Testing of Nuclear Power Plant Components

This report was prepared for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to explore the application of advanced technologies toward meeting the current and future regulatory requirements for maintenance and condition monitoring of structures, systems, and components. The advanced technologies considered in this work are advanced sensors and instrumentation, data analytics, machine learning and artificial intelligence (ML/AI), physics-based models, and digital twins (DT). The interest in the application of advanced technologies for condition monitoring in nuclear power plants continues to grow, and current and future licensees are expected to implement advanced technologies as part of their inservice inspection (ISI) and inservice testing (IST) programs. This report delineates the outcomes of an exploratory investigation into the implementation of advanced condition monitoring technologies to address ISI and IST requirements. A thorough review was conducted of the existing regulatory requirements for ISI and IST, along with an analysis of associated industry practices. Additionally, a state-of-the-art assessment was performed on advanced condition monitoring technologies frequently employed in non-nuclear sectors. This research incorporated two nuclear-specific case studies to illustrate the application of these technologies within the current nuclear fleet. The report provides an exhaustive discussion on the technical challenges, considerations, and opportunities associated with the deployment of advanced condition monitoring technologies. The following are key considerations in the application of advanced technologies for the ISI and IST of nuclear power plant components: • Developing adequate verification and validation procedures to confirm the functional and non-functional requirements, • Developing technical capabilities to conduct real-time asset condition monitoring, • Establishing guidance and protocol for modeling and simulation tools to continuously meet regulatory requirements, • Addressing trustworthiness, explainability, and interpretability of ML/AI methods, • Evaluating maintenance activities to maintain an adequate safety margin and avoid undesirable conditions, • Establishing cybersecure condition monitoring programs associated with a computer-based software system, and • Establishing standardized evaluation metrics for advanced condition monitoring programs. Interest in the use of advanced technologies for condition monitoring in ISI and IST programs continues to grow, and the technology is expected to experience rapid and wide industry adoption in the near future. Adoption of advanced technologies for condition monitoring could have novel and unique impacts on regulatory activities associated with ISI and IST programs. The NRC is continuing to explore the regulatory aspects of advanced technologies as part of ISI and IST programs by pursuing additional research in this technical area.

22 - GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗