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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.
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NASA's SPICE ancillary informaton system is used by engineers and scientists to capture and access a variety of engineering and other ancillary information throughout the mission lifecycle.
This paper presents a portion of an overall research project on the generation of the network security assessment instrument to aid developers in assessing and assuring the security of software in the development and maintenance lifecycles.
The Multi Mission Power Analysis Tool (MMPAT) provides variable-fidelity power modeling capabilities useful throughout the project lifecycle. It can be employed as a stand-alone desktop tool providing tabular and graphical output or integrated with activity planning tools such as APGEN.
Planning for the optimal attainment of requirements is an important early lifecycle activity. However, such planning is difficult when dealing with competing requirements, limited resources, and the incompleteness of information available at requirements time.
This paper presents a portion of an overall research project on the generation of a software security assessment instrument to aid developers in assessing and assuring the security of software in the development and maintenance lifecycles.
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has launched a range of KM activities-from deploying intelligent "know-bots" across millions of electronic sources to ensuring tacit knowledge is transferred across generations. The strategy and implementation focuses on managing NASA's wealth of explicit knowledge, enabling remote collaboration for international teams, and enhancing capture of the key knowledge of the workforce. An in-depth view of the work being done at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) shows the integration of academic studies and practical applications to architect, develop, and deploy KM systems in the areas of document management, electronic archives, information lifecycles, authoring environments, enterprise information portals, search engines, experts directories, collaborative tools, and in-process decision capture. These systems, together, comprise JPL's architecture to capture, organize, store, and distribute key learnings for the U.S. exploration of space.
This paper presents research on the generation of a software security assessment instrument to aid developers in assessing and assuring the security of software in the development and maintenance lifecycles.
We seek to document and explain the lifecycle of the warm SST anomaly that intensified and weakened off the west coast of the United States to peak anomalies of 4 degrees Kelvin during April-June 1997.
A key obstacle hampering fielding of AI planning applications is the considerable expense of developing, verifying, updating, and maintainting the planning knowledge base (KB). Planning systems must be able to compare favorably in terms of software lifecycle costs to other means of automation such as scripts or rule-based expert systems. This paper describes a planning application of automated imaging processing and our overall approach to knowledge acquisition for this application.
A key obstacle hampering fielding of AI planning applications is the considerable expense of developing, verifying, updating, and maintaining the planning knowledge base (KB). Planning systems must be able to compare favorably in terms of software lifecycle costs to other means of automation such as scripts or rule-based expert systems.
To ensure the science return while minimizing the cost and risk of a mission, a lifecycle-wide concurrent engineering design process must be established.
This paper will overview the project highlighting some of the systems engineering approaches used throughout the project lifecycle to address the challenges as well as lessons learned.
Systems1,2 required to exhibit high operational reliability often rely on some form of fault protection to recognize and respond to faults, preventing faults' escalation to catastrophic failures. Integrated System Health Management (ISHM) extends the functionality of fault protection to both scale to more complex systems (and systems of systems), and to maintain capability rather than just avert catastrophe. Forms of ISHM have been utilized to good effect in the maintenance phase of systems' total lifecycles (often referred to as 'condition-based mainte-nance'), but less so in a 'fault protection' role during actual operations. One of the impediments to such use lies in the challenges of verification, validation and certification of ISHM systems themselves. This paper makes the case that state-of-the-practice V&V and certification techniques will not suffice for emerging forms of ISHM systems; however, a number of maturing software engineering assurance technologies show particular promise for addressing these ISHM V&V challenges.
This paper describes the new process used by the Project Design Center at NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory for the identification, assessment and communication of risk elements throughout the lifecycle of a mission design. This process includes a software tool, 'RAP' that collects and communicates risk information between the various designers and a 'risk expert' who mediates this process. The establishment of this process is an attempt towards the systematic consideration of risk in the design decision making process. Using this process, we are able to better keep track of the risks associated with the design decisions. Furthermore, it helps us develop better risk profiles for the studies under consideration. We aim to refine and expand the current process to enable more thorough risk analysis capabilities in the future.
Micro-Helm is a PC based mission visualization system that can be employed for comprehensive monitoring of mission system states during operation. Micro-Helm was designed as a cost-effective system solution that can be adapted to multiple missions in various mission lifecycle phases. It has been successfully applied to DS1 mission during its entire operation phases and Mars Odyssey mission during its launch and orbit-insertion phase, providing scenario design and validation.
Three questions to which software developers want accurate, precise answers are "How can the software system fail?", "mat bad things will happen if the software fails?t', and "How many failures will the software experience?". Numerous techniques have been devised to answer these questions; three of the best known are: 1) Software Fault Tree Analysis (SFTA) 2) Software Failure Modes, Effects, and Criticality Analysis (SFMECA 3) Software Fault/Failure Modeling. SFTA and SFMECA have been successfully used to analyze the flight software for a number of robotic planetary exploration missions, including Galileo, Cassini, and Deep Space 1. Given the increasing interest in reusing software components from mission to mission, one of us has developed techniques for reusing the corresponding portions of the SFTA and SFMECA, reducing the effort required to conduct these analyses. SFTA has also been shown to be effective in analyzing the security aspects of software systems; intrusion mechanisms and effects can easily be modeled using these techniques. The Bi- Directional Safety Analysis (BDSA) method combines a forward search (similar to SFMECA) from potential failure modes to their effects, with a backward search (similar to SFTA) from feasible hazards to the contributing causes of each hazard. BDSA offers an efficient way to identify latent failures. Recent work has extended BDSA to product-line applications such as flight-instrumentation displays and developed tool support for the reuse of the failure-analysis artifacts within a product line. BDSA has also been streamlined to support those projects having tight cost and/or schedule constraints for their failure analysis efforts. We discuss lessons learned from practice, describe available tools, and identi@ some future directions for the topic. A substantial amount of research has been devoted to estimating the number of failures that a software system will experience during test and operations, as well as the number of faults that have been inserted into that system during its development. One of us has found that the amount of structural change to a system during its development is strongly related to the number of faults inserted into it. Using techniques requiring no additional effort on the part of the development organization, the required measurements of structural evolution can be easily obtained from a development effort's configuration management system and readily transformed into an estimate of fault content. So far, structure-fault relationships have been identified for source code; current work seeks to examine artifacts available earlier in the lifecycle to determine if similar relationships between structure and fault content can be found. In particular, relationships between requirements change requests and the number of faults inserted into the implemented system would provide a significant improvement in our ability to control software quality during the early development phases.
Current mission operations systems are built as a collection of monolithic software applications. Each application serves the needs of a specific user base associated with a discipline or functional role. Built to accomplish specific tasks, each application embodies specialized functional knowledge and has its own data storage, data models, programmatic interfaces, user interfaces, and customized business logic. In effect, each application creates its own walled-off environment. While individual applications are sometimes reused across multiple missions, it is expensive and time consuming to maintain these systems, and both costly and risky to upgrade them in the light of new requirements or modify them for new purposes. It is even more expensive to achieve new integrated activities across a set of monolithic applications. These problems impact the lifecycle cost (especially design, development, testing, training, maintenance, and integration) of each new mission operations system. They also inhibit system innovation and evolution. This in turn hinders NASA's ability to adopt new operations paradigms, including increasingly automated space systems, such as autonomous rovers, autonomous onboard crew systems, and integrated control of human and robotic missions. Hence, in order to achieve NASA's vision affordably and reliably, we need to consider and mature new ways to build mission control systems that overcome the problems inherent in systems of monolithic applications. The keys to the solution are modularity and interoperability. Modularity will increase extensibility (evolution), reusability, and maintainability. Interoperability will enable composition of larger systems out of smaller parts, and enable the construction of new integrated activities that tie together, at a deep level, the capabilities of many of the components. Modularity and interoperability together contribute to flexibility. The Mission Control Technologies (MCT) Project, a collaboration of multiple NASA Centers, led by NASA Ames Research Center, is building a framework to enable software to be assembled from flexible collections of components and services.
For most of the history of space exploration, human and robotic programs have been independent, and have responded to distinct requirements. The NASA Vision for Space Exploration calls for the return of humans to the Moon, and the eventual human exploration of Mars; the complexity of this range of missions will require an unprecedented use of automation and robotics in support of human crews. The challenges of human Mars missions, including roundtrip communications time delays of 6 to 40 minutes, interplanetary transit times of many months, and the need to manage lifecycle costs, will require the evolution of a new mission operations paradigm far less dependent on real-time monitoring and response by an Earthbound operations team. Robotic systems and automation will augment human capability, increase human safety by providing means to perform many tasks without requiring immediate human presence, and enable the transfer of traditional mission control tasks from the ground to crews. Developing and validating the new paradigm and its associated infrastructure may place requirements on operations design for nearer-term lunar missions. The authors, representing both the human and robotic mission operations communities, assess human lunar and Mars mission challenges, and consider how human-robot operations may be integrated to enable efficient joint operations, with the eventual emergence of a unified exploration operations culture.