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At least 685 records · Page 38
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2021

National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants – Radionuclide Emissions Calendar Year 2020

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) operates the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) and the North Las Vegas Facility (NLVF). From 1951 through 1992, the NNSS was the continental testing location for U.S. nuclear weapons. Radionuclides in air from NNSS activities have been monitored since the initiation of atmospheric testing. After 1962, testing was limited to underground detonations, which greatly reduced radiation exposure to the public. Since the end of nuclear testing in 1992, radiation monitoring has focused on detecting airborne radionuclides from historically contaminated soils because this sources dominates the potential offsite dose. These radionuclides are derived from re-suspension of soil (primarily by wind) and emission of tritium-contaminated soil moisture through evapotranspiration. Low amounts of legacy-related tritium are also emitted to air at the NLVF, an NNSS support complex in North Las Vegas. To protect the public from harmful levels of manmade radiation, the Clean Air Act, National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP), specifically the National Emission Standards for Emissions of Radionuclides Other Than Radon From Department of Energy Facilities (40 CFR 61, Subpart H, 2020) limits the release of radioactivity from a DOE facility to that which would cause 10 millirem per year (mrem/y) effective dose equivalent (EDE) to any member of the public. This limit does not include radiation unrelated to NNSS activities. Unrelated doses could come from naturally occurring radioactive elements, from sources such as medically or commercially used radionuclides, or from sources outside of the United States, such as Japan’s Fukushima nuclear power plant, which was damaged in 2011. NNSA/NFO demonstrates compliance with the NESHAP limit by reporting environmental measurements of radionuclide air concentrations at critical receptor locations on the NNSS. This alternative was proposed and formerly submitted to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 2001 (EPA 2001a) and has been the method used to demonstrate compliance with the 40 CFR 61.92 dose standard since 2005. Six locations on the NNSS have been established to act as critical receptor locations to demonstrate compliance with the NESHAP limit. These locations are closer to radionuclide releases than where the public resides so they act as protective substitutes for public receptor locations. Compliance is demonstrated if the measured annual average concentration is less than the NESHAP Concentration Level (CL) for Environmental Compliance listed in Table 2 of 40 CFR 61, Appendix E. For multiple radionuclides, compliance is demonstrated when the sum of the fractions (determined by dividing each radionuclide’s concentration by its CL and then adding the fractions together) is less than 1.0. The EPAapproved air transport model, called the Clean Air Package 1988 (CAP88-PC) is also used to calculate the effective dose equivalent to the maximally exposed individual from NNSS air emissions. CAP88-PC was also used to calculate the population dose, or the collective EDE (expressed as person-rem [roentgen equivalent man] per year [person-rem/y]) for all individuals combined who reside within 80 kilometers (km) of NNSS emission sources. In 2020, the potential dose from radiological emissions to air from both current and past NNSS activities was well below the 10 mrem/y dose limit. This is demonstrated by both the air sampling data collected at critical receptor air monitoring stations and CAP88-PC modeling. The average concentrations of radioactivity at air critical receptor stations ranged from 0.2% to a maximum of 4.2% of the allowed NESHAP limit. CAP88-PC modeling of all 2020 NNSS radionuclide emissions showed the maximally exposed individual to be in Amargosa Valley and this individual received a potential dose of 0.063 mrem/y. The collective dose was calculated to be 0.29 person-rem/year for the 521,300 people who lived within 80 km of NNSS emission sources.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Stakeholder-Engaged Structured Decision Making for the Los Alamos Legacy Cleanup Mission - 20501

The Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) environmental legacy cleanup program requires decisions to be made for environmental remediation, decommissioning and disposal or management of radioactive waste. This legacy cleanup program was established to address groundwater contamination, material disposal areas (MDAs) that have been used to dispose of radioactive and other waste material, and 'aggregate areas' that might produce radioactive or other chemical waste as a result of remediation activities. The LANL site is regulated for environmental concerns under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). However, some parts of LANL, such as material disposal area G (MDA G), have disposed of radioactive waste under DOE Order 435.1, and are subject to other regulations. For example, decommissioning the remote-handled TRU material stored in 33 shafts at MDA G falls under EPA's 40 CFR 191. Collectively, the regulations are all aimed in the same direction of finding the best solution, either through constructs such as 'as low as reasonably achievable' (ALARA), considering balancing factors as opposed to only cost and human health risk, and, under EPA regulations such as RCRA and NEPA, evaluating impact from all chemicals and both human health and ecological endpoints. Despite the basic goals and objectives of the regulations or their guidance, the main challenge is in their implementation. Arguably perhaps, but really in principle, all of these (and similar) regulations are asking for a decision analysis to be performed. Implementation challenges encountered have included lack of understanding of decision analysis in the industry, lack of effective stakeholder engagement in the decision analysis process, and lack of appreciation of the need to separate value judgments from science, the latter leading to developing conservative, or protective, science-based models. Conservative models lead to poor solutions, lack of effective stakeholder engagement leads to long drawn out protracted approaches to finding a solution (which also might never be found with this approach), and lack of understanding of decision analysis and Bayesian statistics causes poor models to be built, which creates unfortunate situations of 'garbage in, garbage out' becoming the basis for decision making. Stakeholder-engaged structured decision making (SDM) is an approach to solving problems that relies on the theory of decision science to involve stakeholders in the decision-making process. This approach incorporates stakeholder values using a scientifically rigorous methodology that separates value judgments from science in a way that helps avoid the pitfalls of biased, protective, or conservative modeling. This approach has its foundation in Keeney's 1992 treatise on value-focused thinking [1]. Keeney advocated a paradigm shift in decision making based on the idea that the standard way of thinking about decisions is backwards. The standard approach of focusing first on identifying alternatives rather than on articulating values results in a reactive approach with the emphasis on mechanics and fixed choices instead of the core values that have meaning to stakeholders. This paradigm shift effectively engages all stakeholders in the decision-making process while using a values focused thinking approach that can lead to the identification of decision opportunities and the creation of better alternatives. The intent is to be proactive and generate solutions that are related directly to values and objectives as identified by stakeholders. There are, perhaps, two overarching reasons why SDM can be used to benefit LANL's environmental legacy cleanup. Some of LANL's remaining waste management and environmental management problems are challenging and complex (for example, the Cr and RDX plumes, and MDAs) and while the traditional approach has, arguably, worked well for relatively simple risk-based problems, it cannot, or should not, be applied to more complex problems if the most effective and efficient solutions are desired. The second reason is cost. This has perhaps become more critical since publication of the Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports that DoE's environmental liability is considered a high-risk concern for the nation [2]. The focus of SDM is on structuring solutions to decision risk problems by first addressing stakeholder and decision maker values and subsequently developing decision objectives and ways to measure those objectives, preference weighting across objectives, identifying decision alternatives that best achieve those values, and characterizing uncertainty in predictions of the measures. Because a complete decision model is created using SDM, it can be evaluated to find the main elements of the model that drive, or predict, the best solution. This approach creates complete decision models that are transparent, traceable, reproducible and technically defensible. The science behind SDM, or decision analysis, is well founded, yet it is not unusual to see ad hoc approaches to decision making implemented under various environmental regulations that are pertinent to the LANL site, including NEPA, RCRA and DOE Order 435.1. Such ad hoc approaches are often not transparent or traceable, and lack reproducibility and technical defensibility. The LANL legacy cleanup program has embarked on using SDM to address the complex problems that remain. Stakeholder meetings have been held, and a prototype version of the stakeholder value system has been developed. Further meetings are expected in the future to address specific project needs. This is a long-term endeavor considering the complex environmental problems faced by DOE EM in Los Alamos (EM-LA), and careful planning, consideration of stakeholder value systems, and engagement with stakeholders throughout the SDM process is expected to lead to a successful endpoint. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2023

An Integrated Framework for Risk Assessment of Safety-related Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems in Nuclear Power Plants: Methodology Refinement and Exploration

This report documents activities performed by Idaho National Laboratory (INL) during Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program, Risk Informed Systems Analysis (RISA) Pathway, digital instrumentation and control (DI&C) risk assessment project. In FY 2019, the RISA Pathway initiated a project to develop a risk assessment strategy for delivering a technical basis to support effective, and secure DI&C technologies for digital upgrades/designs. A risk assessment-informed framework was proposed for this strategy, which aims to (1) provide a best-estimate, risk informed capability to quantitatively estimate the safety margin obtained from plant modernization, especially for safety-related DI&C systems, (2) support and supplement existing risk informed DI&C design guides by providing quantitative risk information and evidence, (3) offer a capability of design architecture evaluation of various DI&C systems, (4) assure the long-term safety and reliability of safety-related DI&C systems, and (5) reduce uncertainty in costs and support integration of DI&C systems in the plant. To achieve these technical goals, the LWRS-developed framework provides a means to address relevant technical issues by: (1) defining a risk informed analysis process for DI&C upgrade that integrates hazard analysis, reliability analysis, and consequence analysis, (2) applying risk informed tools to address common cause failures (CCFs) and quantify corresponding failure probabilities for DI&C technologies, particularly software CCFs, (3) evaluating the impact of digital failures at the component level, system level, and plant level, and (4) providing insights and suggestions on designs to manage the risks, thus to support the development and deployment of advanced DI&C technologies in nuclear power plants (NPPs). Adding diversity within a system or components is the primary means to eliminate and mitigate CCFs, but diversity also increases system complexity and may not address all sources of systematic failures. Optimization of diversity and redundancy applications for the safety-critical DI&C systems remains a challenge. To deal with the technical issues in addressing potential software CCFs in safety-related DI&C systems of NPPs and supporting relevant design optimization, the proposed framework provides: (a) A best-estimate, risk informed capability to address new technical digital issues quantitatively, focusing on software CCFs in safety-related DI&C systems of NPPs; (b) A common and a modularized platform for DI&C designers, software developers, cybersecurity analysts, and plant engineers to predict and prevent risk in the early design stage of DI&C systems; (c) Technical bases and risk informed insights to assist users address the risk informed alternatives for evaluation of CCFs in safety-related DI&C systems of NPPs; and (d) A risk informed tool that offers a capability of design architecture evaluation of various DI&C systems to support system design decisions in diversity and redundancy applications. The research and development efforts of this project in FY 2023 are focused on refining current methods on software CCF modeling and estimation and exploring additional innovative approaches to risk assessment of DI&C systems to enable a more comprehensive and complete assessment of various safety-related DI&C design architectures. The primary audience of this report are DI&C designers, engineers, and probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) practitioners. This includes stakeholders, such as the nuclear utilities and regulators who consider the deployment and upgrade of DI&C systems, DI&C software developers and reviewers, and cybersecurity specialists. It should be noted that all the analyses are performed for the demonstration of the methodology, not for the evaluation of an actual digital control system. Results are obtained based on limited design information and testing data.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Spinal Cord Dose Tolerance to Stereotactic Body Radiation Therapy

Spinal cord tolerance data for stereotactic body radiation therapy (SBRT) were extracted from published reports, reviewed, and modelled. For de novo SBRT delivered in 1 to 5 fractions, the following spinal cord point maximum doses (D{sub max}) are estimated to be associated with a 1% to 5% risk of radiation myelopathy (RM): 12.4 to 14.0 Gy in 1 fraction, 17.0 Gy in 2 fractions, 20.3 Gy in 3 fractions, 23.0 Gy in 4 fractions, and 25.3 Gy in 5 fractions. For reirradiation SBRT delivered in 1 to 5 fractions, reported factors associated with a lower risk of RM include cumulative thecal sac equivalent dose in 2 Gy fractions with an alpha/beta of 2 (EQD2{sub 2}) D{sub max} ≤70 Gy; SBRT thecal sac EQD2{sub 2} D{sub max} ≤25 Gy, thecal sac SBRT EQD2{sub 2} D{sub max} to cumulative EQD2{sub 2} D{sub max} ratio ≤0.5, and a minimum time interval to reirradiation of ≥5 months. Larger studies containing complete institutional cohorts with dosimetric data of patients treated with spine SBRT, with and without RM, are required to refine RM risk estimates.

62 RADIOLOGY AND NUCLEAR MEDICINE↗
DOE OSTI2020

CISME report on experiments with HMX powder, PBX 9501 prills, and heated PBX 9501

The ability to predict post-ignition explosive response is relevant to explosives safety, particularly weapons assembly/disassembly operations that must operate under a sufficiently conservative safety basis to meet risk mitigation criteria for inadvertent nuclear detonation (IND). In particular, hazard determinations hinge on whether the PBX 9501 main charge can ultimately attain detonation from an initial, non-shock, ignition stimulus. The CISME experiment uses a spherical explosive charge, which is thermally ignited in the center using a fiber-delivered infrared laser pulse. This ignition mechanism - i.e. a localized thermal hotspot - is representative of the ignition-causing insults typical in accident scenarios, including low-velocity impact, drop, skid, and punch events. In fiscal year 2018 CISME experiments were conducted with pristine PBX 9501 spheres, confined and unconfined. Sub-detonative, low-violence reactions were observed. Here we report experiments conducted since 2018. The explosive charge was varied: experiments were conducted with room temperature pour-density HMX powder and prills of PBX 9501, and heated, thermally damaged PBX 9501. Experiments were conducted in a confined configuration, with two 4 mm-thick stainless-steel hemispherical shells bolted around the sphere. Detonation, via DDT (deflagration-to-detonation transition) was observed in the 3-inch diameter powdered HMX and the 6-inch diameter heated and thermally-damaged PBX 9501 tests. No transition to DDT was observed in smaller diameters for those configurations, and no DDT was observed for pour-density prills of PBX 9501 of any diameter. The original test series demonstrated that the response of pristine, undamaged PBX 9501 to a central ignition is relatively benign. This new test series shows that increased porosity, lack of polymer binders and thermal damage can greatly increase the violence of the post-ignition response, up to and including detonation. These results bridge the explosive response of PBX 9501 from sub-detonative through detonation as a function of diameter and provide valuable test cases for modeling efforts that strive to capture the DDT threshold. By exploring explosive response in a more representative 3D geometry, we can also benchmark these new results to more plentiful DDT datasets generated from testing in 1D tube confinement (the historical test configuration)–the configuration upon which almost all DDT models were developed.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2025

How extreme rainfall and failing dams unleashed the Derna flood disaster

On September 11, 2023, Storm Daniel unleashed unprecedented rainfall over the Wadi Derna watershed, triggering one of the most devastating floods in modern history, striking Derna, a coastal city in Libya. This study reconstructs the disaster using an integrated modeling approach that combines satellite imagery, hydrologic, hydraulic, and geotechnical simulations, machine learning, eyewitness accounts, and digital elevation data to assess the impact of cascading dam failures. Our findings reveal that the region’s dams, even if structurally sound, would have provided minimal protection against the extreme runoff. However, their failure unleashed a destructive surge wave, amplifying the disaster’s magnitude and devastation. Here, we show that the collapse of aging flood control infrastructures, compounded by inadequate risk assessment and emergency preparedness, dramatically escalated the disaster’s impact. Our findings underscore the urgent need for systematic dam safety evaluations, enhanced flood forecasting, and adaptive risk management strategies that address climate extremes and infrastructure vulnerabilities.

Hydrology↗
DOE OSTI2025

Summary of Analytical Services for the Hanford Site Radionuclide NESHAP Program

This document is a summary of the point source analytical requirements used to demonstrate compliance for the Department of Energy (DOE) Hanford Site operations with 40 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 61, “National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants,” (NESHAP) Subpart H, “National Emission Standards for Emissions of Radionuclides Other Than Radon From Department of Energy Facilities,” and the Washington Administrative Code (WAC) 246-247, “Radiation Protection – Air Emissions.” This reference collects information from multiple source documents and is not intended to create, supersede, replace or over-ride any existing contractual, DOE, federal or state statutes, regulations, compliance agreements, orders, permits, licenses or other requirements. The requirement source document governs where any difference may exist. The Hanford Mission Integration Solutions (HMIS) Environmental organization has been contracted by DOE to manage and report data collected from the sampling and monitoring of radioactive air emissions point sources, colloquially called stacks. The Environmental organization coordinates the analyses and reporting of samples collected at various facilities across the Hanford Site. These facilities operate approximately 52 stacks that require sampling, monitoring or estimating radioactive air emissions. The stacks are operated by Bechtel National, Inc. (BNI), Central Plateau Cleanup Company (CPCCo), Hanford Tank Waste Operations & Closure (H2C), Hanford Laboratory Management and Integration (HLMI), and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL). Stack samples from CPCCo, HLMI and H2C facilities are collected by the operating contractor staff, delivered to HMIS, and then shipped to an offsite contracted laboratory for analyses. The field and laboratory sample data uploaded into the Sample Management and Analytical Results Tracking (SMART) database are used to calculate sample volumes and concentrations. Sample concentrations are evaluated for compliance with federal and state regulations, permits, and license requirements. The SMART database also calculates total curies released for sampled point sources and stacks. Point source effluent concentrations and releases are published annually in publicly available reports. The BNI and PNNL operate several DOE-Hanford Field Office (HFO) stacks subject to the requirements of 40 CFR 61, Subpart H and WAC 246-247. The concentrations, curies released and dose modeling evaluation for these stacks are included in the DOE-HFO annual radionuclide NESHAP report. The sample collection, analyses and emissions estimates for these stacks are outside the scope of HMIS contracted responsibilities and not addressed further in this document.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2023

Risk Analysis of Various Design Architectures for High Safety-significant Safety-related Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems of Nuclear Power Plants during Accident Scenarios

This report documents the plus-up activities performed by Idaho National Laboratory (INL) during Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program, Risk Informed Systems Analysis (RISA) Pathway, digital instrumentation and control (DI&C) risk assessment project. In FY 2019, the RISA Pathway initiated a project to develop a risk assessment strategy for delivering a strong technical basis to support effective, licensable, and secure DI&C technologies for digital upgrades/designs. An integrated risk assessment technology for the DI&C systems was proposed for this strategy, which aims to (1) provide a best-estimate, risk-informed capability to quantitatively and accurately estimate the safety margin obtained from plant modernization, especially for the high safety-significant safety-related (HSSSR) DI&C systems, (2) support and supplement existing advanced risk-informed DI&C design guides by providing quantitative risk information and evidence, (3) offer a capability of design architecture evaluation of various DI&C systems to support system design decisions and diversity and redundancy applications, (4) assure the long-term safety and reliability of HSSSR DI&C systems, and (5) reduce uncertainty in costs and support integration of DI&C systems in the plant. To achieve these technical goals and deal with the expensive licensing justifications from regulatory insights, the LWRS-developed framework instructs nuclear vendors and utilities on how to effectively lower the costs associated with digital compliance and speed industry advances by: (1) defining an integrated risk-informed analysis process for DI&C upgrade, including hazard analysis, reliability analysis, and consequence analysis, (2) applying systematic and risk-informed tools to address common cause failures (CCFs) and quantify corresponding failure probabilities for DI&C technologies, particularly software CCFs, (3) evaluating the impact of digital failures at the component level, system level, and plant level, and (4) providing insights and suggestions on designs to manage the risks, thus to support the development, licensing, and deployment of advanced DI&C technologies on nuclear power plant (NPPs). Adding diversity within system or components is the main means to eliminate and mitigate CCFs, but diversity also increases plant complexity and errors and may not address all sources of systematic failures. How to optimize the diversity and redundancy applications for the safety-critical DI&C systems remains a challenge. To deal with the technical issues in addressing potential software CCFs in HSSSR DI&C systems of NPPs and supporting relevant design optimization, the framework provides: ? An integrated best-estimate, risk-informed capability to address new technical digital issues quantitatively, accurately, and efficiently in plan modernization progress, such as software CCFs in HSSSR DI&C systems of NPPs ? A common and a modularized platform for DI&C designers, software developers, cybersecurity analysts, and plant engineers to efficiently predict and prevent risk in the early design stage of DI&C systems ? Technical bases and risk-informed insights to assist U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and industry to address and fulfill the risk-informed alternatives for evaluation of CCFs in HSSSR DI&C systems of NPPs ? An integrated risk-informed tool that offers a capability of design architecture evaluation of various DI&C systems to support system design decisions in diversity and redundancy applications. The plus-up research and development efforts of this project in FY 2022 are focused on methodology improvement of software CCF modeling and estimation, prevention analysis, importance analysis and risk analysis of various design architectures of HSSSR DI&C systems. This work greatly enhances the capability of the LWRS-developed framework for the risk assessment and design optimization of safety-critical DI&C systems. It should be noted that all the analyses are performed for the demonstration of the LWRS-developed framework, not for the evaluation of relevant systems. Results are obtained based on very limited design information and testing data.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Flammability and dispersion of tritium in confined release scenarios

Ignition of a flammable tritium-air mixture is the most probable means to produce the water form (T 2 O or HTO), which is more easily absorbed by living tissue and is hence ~10,000 times more hazardous to human health when uptake occurs compared to the gaseous form (T 2 or HT; per Mishima and Steele, 2002). Tritium-air mixtures with T 2 concentrations below 4 mol% are considered sub-flammable and will not readily convert to the more hazardous water form. It is therefore desirable from a safety perspective to understand the dispersion behavior of tritium under different release conditions, especially since tritium is often stored in quantities and pressures much lower than is typical for normal hydrogen. The formation of a flammable layer at the ceiling is a scenario of particular concern because the rate of dispersion to nonflammable conditions is slowest in this configuration, which maximizes the time window over which the flammable tritium may encounter an ignition source. This report describes the processes of buoyant rise and dispersion of tritium. Accumulation of flammable concentrations of tritium next to the ceiling is a common safety concern for hydrogen, but this situation can only occur if dispersion rates are slow with respect to rates of release and rise. Theory and simulations demonstrate that buoyancy does not cause regions with flammable concentrations to form within buildings from sources that have previously been mixed to sub-flammable concentrations. A simulated series of tritium release events with their associated dispersion behavior are reported herein; these simulations apply computational fluid dynamics to rooms with three different ceiling heights and a variety of tritium release rates. Safety related quantities from these simulations are reported, including the mass and volume of tritium occurring in a flammable mixture, the presence or absence of a flammable layer at the ceiling, and the time required for dispersion to nonflammable conditions after the end of the tritium release event. These safety metrics are influenced by the magnitude and rate of the tritium release with respect to the air volume in the room and also the momentum of the plume or jet with respect to the ceiling height. Several screening criteria are recommended to assess whether a specific tritium release scenario is likely to form a flammable layer at the ceiling. The methods and results in this modeling study have applicability to explosion safety analysis for other buoyant flammable gases, including the lighter isotopes of hydrogen.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗
DOE OSTI2024

Feasibility Study for Cathodic Protection of Waste Tanks at Hanford

The Hanford Nuclear Reservation site contains approximately 211 million liters of radioactive and chemically hazardous waste arising from nuclear weapons production, beginning with World War II, and continuing through the Cold War. The waste is stored in 177 carbon-steel underground storage tanks, of which 149 are single-shell tanks (SSTs) and the remaining are double-shell tanks (DSTs). The mission of an ongoing River Protection Project is to retrieve the waste from the underground storage tanks and then treat and immobilize (i.e., vitrify) it for disposal. Waste from the older SSTs is being progressively retrieved into the newer DSTs for storage pending treatment, immobilization, and disposal. Waste chemistry controls are in place to mitigate general corrosion, pitting corrosion, and stress corrosion cracking (SCC) and minimize corrosion risks to the carbon steel tank liners of DST at the Hanford Site. The chemistry control program focuses on preserving liner integrity while balancing the need for caustic/nitrite additions that have large downstream impacts on vitrification. Some of the DSTs store salt cake or sludge waste layers contain out-of-specification interstitial liquids that contact the primary tank bottom or sidewall. Remediation of such layers through chemical additions is not practical. At the present time, the most significant leak integrity concern at Hanford is for corrosion of the tank bottoms of DSTs where the solids layer is out of specification because of hydroxide ion depletion and consequently, pH values that are less than 12. Cathodic protection (CP) has been proposed as a possible way to protect the liners of such tanks against corrosion. The objective of this project was to investigate the feasibility of applying CP to Hanford DSTs to mitigate internal corrosion of the carbon steel tank primary liners. The scope of the project included (1) a literature review on the application of CP to storage tank systems, in general, and to waste tanks at the Savannah River Site (SRS) and Hanford, (2) a review of the finite element analysis (FEA) model recently developed to evaluate potentials for a DST, and (3) the development of a boundary element analysis (BEA) model for CP for a DST. Tank AN-107, one of the Hanford DSTs, was selected for this work because (1) the bottommost waste layer in the tank is out-of-specification, and (2) electrochemical and resistivity data, based on recent waste sampling and testing, are available for this tank. The overarching conclusion of this study is that, based on the available information, it is feasible to apply CP to mitigate internal corrosion of the primary liners of the Hanford DSTs. However, significant additional information and work are required before a CP system can be designed. Recommendations for next steps in the design of the CP system will be presented.

WIERSMA, BRUCE↗
DOE OSTI2020

Analysis of Respirator Cartridge Performance Testing on Hanford Tank A-101

Washington River Protection Solutions (WRPS) conducted tests on two types of chemical cartridges for use in air purifying respirators (APR) to determine the period of time that the cartridges would provide adequate performance1 to protect workers when exposed to a mixture of Chemicals of Potential Concern (COPCs) from vapors emanating from the headspace of tank A-101 on the Hanford Site. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) identifies cartridge testing as a valid approach for establishing a cartridge change schedules.[3] Testing is commonly applied in situations where mixtures of COPCs exist, and where other approaches, such as manufacturer recommendations and modeling, are less reliable. The tests were designed and conducted to ensure measurement and/or control of the key variables OSHA identified as important to estimate cartridge service life, including temperature, humidity, COPC concentration, breathing rate, and cartridge adsorption capacity. Testing was conducted over a period from July 22-24, 2016, using headspace vapors from Hanford tank A-101 under static conditions2 fed to a respirator cartridge test stand developed by WRPS in collaboration with HiLine Engineering (Richland, Washington). Multipurpose respirator cartridges, SCOTT 7422-SD1 and 7422-SC1 (SCOTT Safety, Monroe, North Carolina) were assessed on separate days with A-101 headspace vapors. Sample media (sorbent tubes) were used to collect samples of the vapor stream entering and exiting the respirator cartridge, and were subsequently analyzed for COPC concentrations. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory was tasked with conducting an independent analysis of the analytical results and making recommendations based on the results for respiratory cartridge performance and service life. Key conclusions from the assessment of the 59 COPCs in this study are described below: • Based on d measured cartridge inlet vapor concentrations from tank A-101 headspace, both ammonia and N-Nitrosodimethylamine (NDMA) exceeded their Occupational Exposure Limits (OEL).3 These measurements were generally consistent with maximum A-101 headspace measurements previously obtained for these two compounds. • Ammonia had respirator cartridge outlet concentrations that exceeded 10% of the OEL for both cartridges tested, indicating breakthrough for each. For the SCOTT 7422-SD1 cartridge, ammonia appeared to breakthrough above 10% of its OEL after 2 hours. For the SCOTT 7422-SC1 cartridge, ammonia breakthrough appeared to occur after 8 hours. 1 “Adequate performance” refers to the breakthrough criteria used in this analysis—that is, sustained cartridge outlet concentrations above 10% of the OEL. For some COPCs, an alternate threshold has been applied when necessary due to higher detection limit (DL)/reporting limit (RL) values for specific compounds. Ultimately, Industrial Hygiene professionals will use these results along with specific hazard assessments to determine service life and cartridge use that provides the necessary performance. 2 These tests were conducted under static conditions absent waste-disturbing activities in the subject tank or tank farm. 3 Occupational Exposure Limits accepted for Hanford Tank Farm use are based on OELs established by a U.S. governmental agency or national professional organization (e.g., OSHA, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists), or if no U.S. OEL exists, standard toxicological practices are applied to develop OELs using non-U.S. exposure limits, other established OELs for chemical surrogates when available, or other standard procedures. The OEL for NDMA was established in 2005 based on the MAK (Maximale Arbeitsplatzkonzentration) Commission standard adopted in Europe. iv • Despite respirator inlet measurements for NDMA that were in excess of its OEL, all corresponding outlet measurements, from both respirator cartridges, were below analytical DL 1 for the

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
DOE OSTI2024

Road Lidar Dataset for the TxDOT Austin District

This is a road lidar data collection for developing road elevation models and road inundation mapping methodologies, a joint work between ORNL and The University of Texas at Austin. This dataset is generated as part of the flood transportation infrastructure, partly funded by the NOAA CIROH project. ORNL is a project partner for high-performance computing-empowered flood inundation mapping methodology R&D. The dataset is computed using a GPU-accelerated lidar data processing workflow developed at ORNL. The lidar data source is from TxGIO, the state lidar data collection site. The output dataset is in two formats: laz and copc. It is organized by TxDOT's maintenance sections, covering the Austin District. Data size: 3.86 billion road lidar points, 1.67% of the entire lidar data input Projection: EPSG:32614 (WGS84/UTM zone 14N) Website: https://web.corral.tacc.utexas.edu/nfiedata/road3d/austin_district/AustinMaintenanceSections_H_epsg6343_V_epsg5703/ LICENSE FOR USE -- MAPS AND DATA DISCLAIMER This resource is shared under the Creative Commons Attribution CC BY, http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ MAPS AND DATA DISCLAIMER The Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) shall not be held liable for improper or incorrect use of the data described or information contained on this map or associated series of maps. The data and related map graphics are not legal, land survey or engineering documents and are not intended to be used as such. ORNL gives no warranty, express or implied, as to the accuracy, reliability, utility or completeness of this information. The user of these maps and data assumes all responsibility and risk for the use of the maps and data. ORNL disclaims all warranties, representations or endorsements either express or implied, with regard to the information contained in this map product, including, but not limited to, all implied warranties of merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose or non-infringement. This preliminary map product is for research and review purposes only. It is not intended to be used for emergency management operational or life safety decisions at the local or regional governmental level or by the general public. Users requiring information regarding hazardous conditions or meteorological conditions for specific geographic areas should consult directly with their city or county emergency management office.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2025

Development of a Multi-Robot System for Autonomous Inspection of Nuclear Waste Tank Pits

This paper introduces the overall design plan, development timeline, and preliminary progress of the Autonomous Pit Exploration System project. This project aims to develop an advanced multi-robot system for the efficient inspection of nuclear waste-storage tank pits. The project is structured into three phases: Phase 1 involves data collection and interface definition in collaboration with Hanford Site experts and university partners, focusing on tank riser geometry and hardware solutions. Phase 2 includes the selection of sensors and robot components, detailed mechanical design, and prototyping. Phase 3 integrates all components into a cohesive system managed by a master control package which also incorporates digital twin and surrogate models, and culminates in comprehensive testing and validation at a simulated tank pit at the Idaho National Laboratory. Additionally, the system’s communication design ensures coordinated operation through shared data, power, and control signals. For transportation and deployment, an electric vehicle (EV) is chosen to support the system for a full 10 h shift with better regulatory compliance for field deployment. A telescopic arm design is selected for its simple configuration and superior reach capability and controllability. Preliminary testing utilizes an educational robot to demonstrate the feasibility of splitting computational tasks between edge and cloud computers. Successful simultaneous localization and mapping (SLAM) tasks validate our distributed computing approach. More design considerations are also discussed, including radiation hardness assurance, SLAM performance, software transferability, and digital twinning strategies.

Nuclear waste management↗
DOE OSTI2020

Sorbmatech{sup R}Cs, an Innovative Highly Selective Cs Sorbent for Wastewater Decontamination - 20065

The treatment of radioactive wastewater from the operating nuclear industry (energy production, reprocessing of spent fuel, decommissioning of shut-down facilities, etc.) or in case of incidental or accidental situation (such as Fukushima Daichii NPP accident) is an important issue requiring constant improvement of the technologies and techniques used to prevent radioactive releases into the environment and/or to reduce the production of secondary waste. CEA, Orano and CTI are collaborating since 2014, with the support of the French government's program 'investments for the future', to develop Sorbmatech{sup R}Cs, an innovative and patented selective sorbent (Grandjean and Barre 2014) to deal with the removal of radioactive {sup 137}Cs, one of the most hazardous isotope to be managed in nuclear waste, highly efficient either in agitated reactor or in column process. Sorbmatech{sup R}Cs sorbent consists of mesoporous silica particles loaded with potassium-copper hexacyanoferrate nanoparticles (KCu-HCF). This peculiar structure enables much faster sorption kinetics compared to denser crystalline structures, such as Silicotitanate or Zeolite sorbents, whose drawback consists in hindering the diffusion process through the material, and whose larger sorbent particles slow down the ion exchange process. The equilibrium of Sorbmatech{sup R}Cs is reached in few minutes, even at high flow rates in a fixed-bed column process (up to 10 m.h{sup -1} Darcy velocity) with low drop pressure. Moreover, Sorbmatech{sup R}Cs can be used over a wide pH range from 2 to 10 and has a very high selectivity towards {sup 137}Cs even in brine solution (saline, mineral or sea water). This new sorbent also has a K{sub d} higher than 10{sup 5} mL.g{sup -1} depending on the salinity of the wastewater, enabling a highly efficient removal of Cs trace in radioactive wastewater compared to Cs selective sorbent such as Zeolites and Silicotitanates. Its radiological resistance enables the treatment of high, medium and low activity wastewater. The CEA-Orano-CTI/ALSYS partnership leads to the development of a simple and low-cost synthetic route, which demonstrated large-scale manufacturing of the product on a batch of 100 kg. Two products have been developed and are ready for short run market introduction so far with grain size well adapted either for column processes or agitated reactors.. Finally, the industrial implementation has been studied and largely benefits from the properties of the sorbent. Indeed, its high sorption kinetics enable high flow rates resulting in a decrease of operation times, unit sizes, and volumes of secondary waste produced. Moreover, Sorbmatech{sup R}Cs is designed to be combined into a full and integrated solution, ranging from preliminary optimization of operating conditions through numerical dimensioning model, industrial implementation and treatment of the wastewater (through cartridge or preconditioned columns systems developed thanks to Orano's extensive expertise), to long-term stabilization of generated waste (under progress). (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2023

Exploring NaCl-PuCl 3 molten salts with machine learning interatomic potentials and graph theory

Actinide molten salts are the basis of the liquid fuels used in molten salt reactors. Due to the inherent difficulties associated with high temperature and hazardous conditions, experimental investigations of fundamental properties of these materials are usually challenging. In this work, we describe the structure and transport of NaCl-PuCl 3 mixtures using computational techniques. Three compositions were considered (16, 25, and 36 mol% PuCl 3 ) over a temperature range (730 – 1257K) using ab initio molecular dynamics, which provided the necessary data sets for training machine learned interatomic potentials. Further, molecular dynamics simulations based on these potentials were then used to determine structure and transport properties. A substantial change was noted in the structure factor when increasing the PuCl 3 content from 25 to 36 mol%. This change is linked to the aggregation of larger Pu 3+ clusters. In addition, the similarity of the atomic environments of metal cations in molten salt systems to their solid states counterparts was investigated using an unsupervised learning technique. Finally, graph theory was employed to explore the structure and size of actinide networks. Consistent with the structure factor, a dense Pu 3+ intermolecular structure is observed within the 36 mol% PuCl 3 mixture. The structure of cation-cation inter-junctions is also discussed. In all cases, the diffusion of Pu 3+ is significantly lower than that of Na + and Cl - .

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
DOE OSTI2025

Projected changes in cross-equatorial northerly surges and their hydrological impacts in the near future

Recent decades have witnessed unprecedented extreme precipitation and catastrophic flooding in some of the most populated regions in Southeast Asia during boreal winter. These extreme events are often influenced by the cross-equatorial northerly surge (CENS), characterized by a strengthening of northerly moist monsoon winds south of the equator in the western Maritime Continent. However, the potential future changes in CENS and its hydrological impacts remain underexplored. Here, using an ensemble of high-resolution climate model simulations (CMIP6 HighResMIP), we show that the regional impacts of CENS on the intensity and frequency of extreme precipitation events are projected to significantly increase in the near future (2030–2050), particularly over the adjacent coastal regions of southern Indonesia and northwestern Australia. More specifically, the risk of CENS-related extreme precipitation is projected to increase by up to 39 ± 1.2% relative to the seasonal probability, despite no apparent changes in the CENS characteristics in the near future. Such stronger impact is attributed to the enhanced moistening efficiency and moist static instability due to a more humid and warmer environment, which leads to more intense CENS convection. Our results suggest the need for effective monitoring and disaster managements to respond to the increasing severity of such events in the near future.

Climate sciences↗
DOE OSTI2025

Digital Safety Analysis for Small Modular Nuclear Reactors (SMRs)

A Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) is a Department of Energy (DOE) construct that defines the extent to which a nuclear facility can be operated safely. It includes a description of hazards, safe boundaries, and hazard controls. The authors assert that a Digital Safety Analysis (DgSA) is far superior to a legacy DSA for several reasons: • The underling database is structured such that it is possible to perform a comprehensive design review and safety analysis by iterating systematically across a hierarchy of linked objects versus a redundant and spotty review by entities of various abilities under unknown resource and schedule constraints. • The analysis of a new design can discover elements that are similar to elements in previous designs. The discovery of similarities is made possible by using the same structure for the underlying database for each new DgSA. The “prior learning” from previous designs is then applied automatically to new designs. • Outputs from the DgSA are from a single source to ensure consistency among various views of the same information. After the DgSA is released, the continued use of a single source implements a configuration management program to ensure consistency between the design basis, the design, the built system, and system procedures. • The development of the DgSA is agile in that any change in a linked object triggers an analysis of impacts on other linked objects and updates of linked objects are made accordingly. After the DgSA is released, the continued maintenance of these links and objects automates the “unreviewed safety question” process.

22 - GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Height Above Nearest Drainage (HAND) and Hydraulic Property Table for CONUS

The continental flood inundation mapping (CFIM) framework is a high-performance computing (HPC)-based computational framework for the Height Above Nearest Drainage (HAND)-based inundation mapping methodology. Using the 10m Digital Elevation Model (DEM) data produced by U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) 3DEP (the 3-D Elevation Program) and the NHDPlus hydrography dataset produced by USGS and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), a hydrological terrain raster called HAND is computed for HUC6 units in the conterminous U.S. (CONUS). The value of each raster cell in HAND is an approximation of the relative elevation between the cell and its nearest water stream. Derived from HAND, a hydraulic property table is established to calculate river geometry properties for each of the 2.7 million river reaches covered by NHDPlus (5.5 million kilometers in total length). This table is a lookup table for water depth given an input stream flow value. Such lookup is available between water depth 0m and 25m at 1-foot interval. The flood inundation map is then computed by using HAND and this lookup table based on the near real-time water forecast from the National Water Model (NWM) at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). HAND and the Hydraulic Property Table version 0.2. is created to correspond to data updates in the USGS 1/3 arcsec DEM, the USGS National Hydrography Dataset, including its Water Boundary Dataset, and the NHDPlus medium resolution dataset. This dataset comprises 331 HUC6 units for CONUS (excluding the five great lakes units), each is a downloadable zip file. Version 0.1 was computed at the National Center for Supercomputing Applications (NCSA) at the University of Illinois at Urban-Champaign in 2016 and is currently hosted at the Texas Advanced Computing Center (TACC). Please cite this data DOI and the following publications and data DOIs when you use HAND and the hydraulic property table: Liu, Yan Y., David R. Maidment, David G. Tarboton, Xing Zheng, and Shaowen Wang. 'A CyberGIS integration and computation framework for high-resolution continental-scale flood inundation mapping.' JAWRA Journal of the American Water Resources Association 54, no. 4 (2018): 770-784. DOI: 10.1111/1752-1688.12660 Zheng, Xing, David G. Tarboton, David R. Maidment, Yan Y. Liu, and Paola Passalacqua. 'River channel geometry and rating curve estimation using height above the nearest drainage.' JAWRA Journal of the American Water Resources Association 54, no. 4 (2018): 785-806. DOI: 10.1111/1752-1688.12661 Liu, Y. (2018). Height Above Nearest Drainage (HAND) for CONUS - v0.1, HydroShare, https://doi.org/10.4211/hs.69f7d237675c4c73938481904358c789 LICENSE FOR USE -- MAPS AND DATA DISCLAIMER This resource is shared under the Creative Commons Attribution CC BY, http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ MAPS AND DATA DISCLAIMER The Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) shall not be held liable for improper or incorrect use of the data described or information contained on this map or associated series of maps. The data and related map graphics are not legal, land survey or engineering documents and are not intended to be used as such. ORNL gives no warranty, express or implied, as to the accuracy, reliability, utility or completeness of this information. The user of these maps and data assumes all responsibility and risk for the use of the maps and data. ORNL disclaims all warranties, representations or endorsements either express or implied, with regard to the information contained in this map product, including, but not limited to, all implied warranties of merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose or non-infringement. This preliminary map product is for research and review purposes only. It is not intended to be used for emergency management operational or life safety decisions at the local or regional governmental level or by the general public. Users requiring information regarding hazardous conditions or meteorological conditions for specific geographic areas should consult directly with their city or county emergency management office.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗