Electrical apparatus for detection of thermal decomposition of insulation Patent
Electrical failure detector in solid rocket propellant motor insulation against thermal degradation by fuel grain
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Electrical failure detector in solid rocket propellant motor insulation against thermal degradation by fuel grain
As part of NASA's effort to develop an agency-wide approach to trend analysis, a pilot nonconformance and performance trending analysis study was conducted on the Space Shuttle auxiliary power unit (APU). The purpose of the study was to (1) demonstrate that nonconformance analysis can be used to identify repeating failures of a specific item (and the associated failure modes and causes) and (2) determine whether performance parameters could be analyzed and monitored to provide an indication of component or system degradation prior to failure. The nonconformance analysis of the APU did identify repeating component failures, which possibly could be reduced if key performance parameters were monitored and analyzed. The performance-trending analysis verified that the characteristics of hardware parameters can be effective in detecting degradation of hardware performance prior to failure.
The theory of System Health Management (SHM) and of its operational subset Fault Management (FM) states that FM is implemented as a "meta" control loop, known as an FM Control Loop (FMCL). The FMCL detects that all or part of a system is now failed, or in the future will fail (that is, cannot be controlled within acceptable limits to achieve its objectives), and takes a control action (a response) to return the system to a controllable state. In terms of control theory, the effectiveness of each FMCL is estimated based on its ability to correctly estimate the system state, and on the speed of its response to the current or impending failure effects. This paper describes how this theory has been successfully applied on the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) Space Launch System (SLS) Program to quantitatively estimate the effectiveness of proposed abort triggers so as to select the most effective suite to protect the astronauts from catastrophic failure of the SLS. The premise behind this process is to be able to quantitatively provide the value versus risk trade‐off for any given abort trigger, allowing decision makers to make more informed decisions. All current and planned crewed launch vehicles have some form of vehicle health management system integrated with an emergency launch abort system to ensure crew safety. While the design can vary, the underlying principle is the same: detect imminent catastrophic vehicle failure, initiate launch abort, and extract the crew to safety. Abort triggers are the detection mechanisms that identify that a catastrophic launch vehicle failure is occurring or is imminent and cause the initiation of a notification to the crew vehicle that the escape system must be activated. While ensuring that the abort triggers provide this function, designers must also ensure that the abort triggers do not signal that a catastrophic failure is imminent when in fact the launch vehicle can successfully achieve orbit. That is, the abort triggers must have low false negative rates to be sure that real crew‐threatening failures are detected, and also low false positive rates to ensure that the crew does not abort from non‐crew‐threatening launch vehicle behaviors. The analysis process described in this paper is a compilation of over six years of lessons learned and refinements from experiences developing abort triggers for NASA's Constellation Program (Ares I Project) and the SLS Program, as well as the simultaneous development of SHM/FM theory. The paper will describe the abort analysis concepts and process, developed in conjunction with SLS Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) to define a common set of mission phase, failure scenario, and Loss of Mission Environment (LOME) combinations upon which the SLS Loss of Mission (LOM) Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) models are built. This abort analysis also requires strong coordination with the Multi‐Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) and SLS Structures and Environments (STE) to formulate a series of abortability tables that encapsulate explosion dynamics over the ascent mission phase. The design and assessment of abort conditions and triggers to estimate their Loss of Crew (LOC) Benefits also requires in‐depth integration with other groups, including Avionics, Guidance, Navigation and Control(GN&C), the Crew Office, Mission Operations, and Ground Systems. The outputs of this analysis are a critical input to SLS S&MA's LOC PRA models. The process described here may well be the first full quantitative application of SHM/FM theory to the selection of a sensor suite for any aerospace system.
If the gamma-ray burst sources detected by GRO are coalescing binaries at cosmological distances there should be a coincident gravitational radiation signal. Using the GRBs rate we predict the gravitational radiation detection rate as a function of the gravitational wave strain at Earth. This method of predicting the rate avoids the large statistical uncertainties in the current estimates that are based on the three neutron star binaries containing pulsars found, so far, in the Galaxy. The brightest gamma-ray bursts should be accompanied by a gravitational pulse detectable by LIGO or VIRGO, and by using the bursts as triggers for LIGO/VIRGO their sensitivity can be improved by 50% and the detection rate increases by a factor of 3. LIGO/VIRGO must reach a strain sensitivity of 10(sup-20.7)h(sub 0) to detect one burst per decade, and a failure to find coincidences at a rate of one per year with a strain sensitivity of 10(sup -20.6)h(sub 0) will rule out the binary hypothesis. If they are detected as gravitational wave sources, the time delay between the gamma-rays and the gravitational waves will help to determine the burst mechanism, and the polarization of the gravitational waves will help to determine the burst geometry.
Aircraft structures are designed to guarantee safety of flight in some required operational envelope. When the aircraft becomes structurally impaired, safety of flight may not be guaranteed within that previously safe operational envelope. In this case the safe operational envelope must be redefined in-flight and a means to prevent excursion from this new envelope must be implemented. A specific structural failure mode that may result in a reduced safe operating envelope, the exceedance of which could lead to catastrophic structural failure of the aircraft, will be addressed. The goal of the DFEAP program is the detection of this failure mode coupled with flight controls adaptation to limit critical loads in the damaged aircraft structure. The DFEAP program is working with an F/A-18 aircraft model. The composite wing skins are bonded to metallic spars in the wing substructure. Over time, it is possible that this bonding can deteriorate due to fatigue. In this case, the ability of the wing spar to transfer loading between the wing skins is reduced. This failure mode can translate to a reduced allowable compressive strain on the wing skin and could lead to catastrophic wing buckling if load limiting of the wing structure is not applied. The DFEAP program will make use of a simplified wing strain model for the healthy aircraft. The outputs of this model will be compared in real-time to onboard strain measurements at several locations on the aircraft wing. A damage condition is declared at a given location when the strain measurements differ sufficiently from the strain model. Parameter identification of the damaged structure wing strain parameters will be employed to provide load limiting control adaptation for the aircraft. This paper will discuss the simplified strain models used in the implementation and their interaction with the strain sensor measurements. Also discussed will be the damage detection and identification schemes employed and the means by which the damaged aircraft parameters will be used to provide load limiting that keeps the aircraft within the safe operational envelope.
A recently initiated research project concerned with the concurrent detection of software errors and errors due to physical failures in the hardware of multiprocessor systems is described in this paper. An approach to error detection is described, which is specification based and relies on the structural verification of program control flow and data structure integrity. The techniques discussed utilize the hardware redundancy inherent in parallel processing systems to provide verification of both program structure and data concurrently with program execution.
Error latency, the time that elapses between the occurrence of an error and its detection, has a significant effect on reliability. In computer systems, failure rates can be elevated during a burst of system activity due to increased detection of latent errors. A hybrid monitoring environment is developed to measure the error latency distribution of errors occurring in main memory. The objective of this study is to develop a methodology for gauging the dependability of individual data categories within a real-time application. The hybrid monitoring technique is novel in that it selects and categorizes a specific subset of the available blocks of memory to monitor. The precise times of reads and writes are collected, so no actual faults need be injected. Unlike previous monitoring studies that rely on a periodic sampling approach or on statistical approximation, this new approach permits continuous monitoring of referencing activity and precise measurement of error latency.
In order to ensure long-term ability to meet mission goals and to provide for the safety of the public, ground personnel, and any crew members, nearly all spacecraft include a fault management (FM) system. For a manned vehicle such as Orion, the safety of the crew is of paramount importance. The goal of the Orion Guidance, Navigation and Control (GN&C) fault management system is to detect, isolate, and respond to faults before they can result in harm to the human crew or loss of the spacecraft. Verification of fault management/fault protection capability is challenging due to the large number of possible faults in a complex spacecraft, the inherent unpredictability of faults, the complexity of interactions among the various spacecraft components, and the inability to easily quantify human reactions to failure scenarios. The Orion GN&C Fault Detection, Isolation, and Recovery (FDIR) team has developed a methodology for bounding the scope of FM system verification while ensuring sufficient coverage of the failure space and providing high confidence that the fault management system meets all safety requirements. The methodology utilizes a swarm search algorithm to identify failure cases that can result in catastrophic loss of the crew or the vehicle and rare event sequential Monte Carlo to verify safety and FDIR performance requirements.
At the present time all traveling-wave maser and closed-cycle refrigerator system (TWM-CCR) and their power supply and helium compressor assemblies are operated manually. Many man-hours are required of highly trained and experienced operators, resulting in high operator cost. Of greater importance are the problems of unpredictable failure and long downtimes. Since field performance is not monitored, system degradation is detected only when it has progressed to the point of catastrophic failure. Without the aid of performance histories, failure diagnosis is arduous and slow. Rational and functional requirements for the TWM-CCR Automation project are the following: (1) to improve reliability and reduce downtime by providing unattended monitor and control, alarm and fault location, failure prediction and self-corrective action; (2) to reduce operator cost by providing automatic tuning and cooldown procedures; and (3) to improve system operations and development by providing the needed engineering data.
Fast scan infrared detection and measuring instrument to predict failure of power transistors
Flight test results of the strapdown inertial reference unit (SIRU) navigation system are presented. The fault-tolerant SIRU navigation system features a redundant inertial sensor unit and dual computers. System software provides for detection and isolation of inertial sensor failures and continued operation in the event of failures. Flight test results include assessments of the system's navigational performance and fault tolerance.
Results of flight tests of the Strapdown Inertial Reference Unit (SIRU) navigation system are presented. The fault tolerant SIRU navigation system features a redundant inertial sensor unit and dual computers. System software provides for detection and isolation of inertial sensor failures and continued operation in the event of failures. Flight test results include assessments of the system's navigational performance and fault tolerance. Performance shortcomings are analyzed.
Results of flight tests of the Strapdown Inertial Reference Unit (SIRU) navigation system are presented. The fault tolerant SIRU navigation system features a redundant inertial sensor unit and dual computers. System software provides for detection and isolation of inertial sensor failures and continued operation in the event of failures. Flight test results include assessments of the system's navigational performance and fault tolerance. Selected facets of the flight tests are also described in detail and include some of the following: (1) flight test plans and ground track plots; (2) navigation residual plots; (3) effects of approximations in navigation algorithms; (4) vibration spectrum of the CV-340 aircraft; and (5) modification of the statistical FDICR algorithm parameters for the flight environment.
Silicone or parylene coatings protect circuits from damage by battery of military standard tests. PIND (Partical Impact Noise Detection) test proved unreliable in predicting failure for either coated or uncoated circuits.
Preparational, computational, and operational problems associated with fiber-reinforced composites (FRC) are reviewed. Initial preparation of FRCs is shown to involve consideration of the type of prepreg, the setting time, cure conditions and cycles, and cure temperatures. The effects of the choice of bonding agents, the fiber transfer length, and individual fiber responses to bonding agents are noted to have an impact on fiber strength, moisture uptake, and fatigue resistance. The deformation prior to failure and the failure region are modeled through models of mini-, micro- and macro mechanics formulations employing a stiffness matrix, failure criterion, or fracture mechanics. The detection, evaluation, and repair of defects comprises the operational domain, and it is stressed that no good repair techniques exist for FRCs.
About 95 percent of faults detected. Programable instrument periodically checks for failures in system that generates alphanumerical and other symbol voltages for cathode-ray-tube displays. Symbol-generator tester compares gated test-point voltages with predetermined voltage limits while circuit under test performs commanded operation. A go/no-go indication given, depending on whether test voltage is or is not within its specification. Tester in plug-in modular form, temporarily wired to generator test points, or permanently wired to these points.
The paper discusses four reliability data gathering experiments which were conducted using a small sample of programs for two problems having ultrareliability requirements, n-version programming for fault detection, and repetitive run modeling for failure and fault rate estimation. The experimental results agree with those of Nagel and Skrivan in that the program error rates suggest an approximate log-linear pattern and the individual faults occurred with significantly different error rates. Additional analysis of the experimental data raises new questions concerning the phenomenon of interacting faults. This phenomenon may provide one explanation for software reliability decay. The fourth experiment underscored the difficulty in distinguishing between observations of deficiencies in the design of the algorithm and observations of software faults for real-time process control software. These experiments are a part of a program of serial experiments being pursued by the System Validation Methods of NASA-Langley Research Center to find a means of credibly performing reliability evaluations of flight control software.
This paper discusses the fault protection tesing of the Attitude and Articulation Control Subsystem (AACS) of the Galileo spacecraft. The need for an autonomous fault protection system on an interplanetary spacecraft is discussed. Galileo requirements for the detection and response of specific hardware failures is discussed along with the fault protection software design and implementation. The test beds and test methods used for fault protection testing are described. The paper concludes with a presentation of the results of this testing with an emphasis on requirement and design changes that were made as a result of these tests.