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Spin tracking simulations in AGS based on ray-tracing methods - bare lattice, no snakes -

This Note reports on the first simulations of and spin dynamics in the AGS using the ray-tracing code Zgoubi. It includes lattice analysis, comparisons with MAD, DA tracking, numerical calculation of depolarizing resonance strengths and comparisons with analytical models, etc. It also includes details on the setting-up of Zgoubi input data files and on the various numerical methods of concern in and available from Zgoubi. Simulations of crossing and neighboring of spin resonances in AGS ring, bare lattice, without snake, have been performed, in order to assess the capabilities of Zgoubi in that matter, and are reported here. This yields a rather long document. The two main reasons for that are, on the one hand the desire of an extended investigation of the energy span, and on the other hand a thorough comparison of Zgoubi results with analytical models as the 'thin lens' approximation, the weak resonance approximation, and the static case. Section 2 details the working hypothesis : AGS lattice data, formulae used for deriving various resonance related quantities from the ray-tracing based 'numerical experiments', etc. Section 3 gives inventories of the intrinsic and imperfection resonances together with, in a number of cases, the strengths derived from the ray-tracing. Section 4 gives the details of the numerical simulations of resonance crossing, including behavior of various quantities (closed orbit, synchrotron motion, etc.) aimed at controlling that the conditions of particle and spin motions are correct. In a similar manner Section 5 gives the details of the numerical simulations of spin motion in the static case: fixed energy in the neighboring of the resonance. In Section 6, weak resonances are explored, Zgoubi results are compared with the Fresnel integrals model. Section 7 shows the computation of the {rvec n} vector in the AGS lattice and tuning considered. Many details on the numerical conditions as data files etc. are given in the Appendix Section, pages A and sqs.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗

National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants - Radionuclide Emissions, Calendar Year 2011

The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office operates the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) and North Las Vegas Facility (NLVF). From 1951 through 1992, the NNSS was the continental testing location for U.S. nuclear weapons. The release of radionuclides from NNSS activities has been monitored since the initiation of atmospheric testing. Limitation to underground detonations after 1962 greatly reduced radiation exposure to the public surrounding the NNSS. After nuclear testing ended in 1992, NNSS radiation monitoring focused on detecting airborne radionuclides from historically contaminated soils. These radionuclides are derived from re-suspension of soil (primarily by wind) and emission of tritium-contaminated soil moisture through evapotranspiration. Low amounts of legacy-related tritium are also emitted to air at the NLVF, an NNSS support complex in North Las Vegas. To protect the public from harmful levels of man-made radiation, the Clean Air Act, National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP) (Title 40 Code of Federal Regulations [CFR] Part 61 Subpart H) limits the release of radioactivity from a U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) facility to that which would cause 10 millirem per year (mrem/yr) effective dose equivalent to any member of the public. This limit does not include radiation unrelated to NNSS activities. Unrelated doses could come from naturally occurring radioactive elements, from sources such as medically or commercially used radionuclides, or from sources outside of the United States, such as the damaged Fukushima nuclear power plant in Japan. Radionuclides from the Fukushima nuclear power plant were detected at the NNSS in March 2011 and are discussed further in Section III. The NNSS demonstrates compliance with the NESHAP limit by using environmental measurements of radionuclide air concentrations at critical receptor locations. This method was approved by the EPA for use on the NNSS in 2001 and has been the sole method used since 2005. Six locations on the NNSS have been established to act as critical receptor locations to demonstrate compliance with the NESHAP limit. These locations are actually pseudo-critical receptor stations, because no member of the public actually resides at these onsite locations. Compliance is demonstrated if the measured annual average concentration is less than the NESHAP Concentration Levels (CLs) for Environmental Compliance listed in 40 CFR 61, Appendix E, Table 2. For multiple radionuclides, compliance is demonstrated when the sum of the fractions (determined by dividing each radionuclide's concentration by its CL and then adding the fractions together) is less than 1.0. In 2011, the potential dose from radiological emissions to air, resulting from both current and past NNSS activities, at onsite compliance monitoring stations was well below the 10 mrem/yr dose limit. Air sampling data collected at all air monitoring stations had average concentrations of radioactivity that were a fraction of the CL values. Concentrations ranged from less than 1% to a maximum of 12.2% of the allowed NESHAP limit. Because the nearest member of the public resides about 20 kilometers from potential release points on the NNSS, dose to the public would be only a small fraction of the value measured on the NNSS. The potential dose to the public from NLVF emissions was also very low at 0.000024 mrem/yr, more than 400,000 times lower than the 10 mrem/yr limit.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

2011 Radioactive Materials Usage Survey for Unmonitored Point Sources

This report provides the results of the 2011 Radioactive Materials Usage Survey for Unmonitored Point Sources (RMUS), which was updated by the Environmental Protection (ENV) Division's Environmental Stewardship (ES) at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). ES classifies LANL emission sources into one of four Tiers, based on the potential effective dose equivalent (PEDE) calculated for each point source. Detailed descriptions of these tiers are provided in Section 3. The usage survey is conducted annually; in odd-numbered years the survey addresses all monitored and unmonitored point sources and in even-numbered years it addresses all Tier III and various selected other sources. This graded approach was designed to ensure that the appropriate emphasis is placed on point sources that have higher potential emissions to the environment. For calendar year (CY) 2011, ES has divided the usage survey into two distinct reports, one covering the monitored point sources (to be completed later this year) and this report covering all unmonitored point sources. This usage survey includes the following release points: • all unmonitored sources identified in the 2010 usage survey, • any new release points identified through the new project review (NPR) process, and • other release points as designated by the Rad-NESHAP Team Leader. Data for all unmonitored point sources at LANL is stored in the survey files at ES. LANL uses this survey data to help demonstrate compliance with Clean Air Act radioactive air emissions regulations (40 CFR 61, Subpart H). The remainder of this introduction provides a brief description of the information contained in each section. Section 2 of this report describes the methods that were employed for gathering usage survey data and for calculating usage, emissions, and dose for these point sources. It also references the appropriate ES procedures for further information. Section 3 describes the RMUS and explains how the survey results are organized. The RMUS Interview Form with the attached RMUS Process Form(s) provides the radioactive materials survey data by technical area (TA) and building number. The survey data for each release point includes information such as: exhaust stack identification number, room number, radioactive material source type (i.e., potential source or future potential source of air emissions), radionuclide, usage (in curies) and usage basis, physical state (gas, liquid, particulate, solid, or custom), release fraction (from Appendix D to 40 CFR 61, Subpart H), and process descriptions. In addition, the interview form also calculates emissions (in curies), lists mrem/Ci factors, calculates PEDEs, and states the location of the critical receptor for that release point. [The critical receptor is the maximum exposed off-site member of the public, specific to each individual facility.] Each of these data fields is described in this section. The Tier classification of release points, which was first introduced with the 1999 usage survey, is also described in detail in this section. Section 4 includes a brief discussion of the dose estimate methodology, and includes a discussion of several release points of particular interest in the CY 2011 usage survey report. It also includes a table of the calculated PEDEs for each release point at its critical receptor. Section 5 describes ES's approach to Quality Assurance (QA) for the usage survey. Satisfactory completion of the survey requires that team members responsible for Rad-NESHAP (National Emissions Standard for Hazardous Air Pollutants) compliance accurately collect and process several types of information, including radioactive materials usage data, process information, and supporting information. They must also perform and document the QA reviews outlined in Section 5.2.6 (Process Verification and Peer Review) of ES-RN, 'Quality Assurance Project Plan for the Rad-NESHAP Compliance Project' to verify that all information is complete and correct.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Managing Aging Effects on Dry Cask Storage Systems for Extended Long-Term Storage and Transportation of Used Fuel

The cancellation of the Yucca Mountain repository program in the United States raises the prospect of extended long-term storage (i.e., >120 years) and deferred transportation of used fuel at operating and decommissioned nuclear power plant sites. Under U.S. federal regulations contained in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 72.42, the initial license term for an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) must not exceed 40 years from the date of issuance. Licenses may be renewed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) at the expiration of the license term upon application by the licensee for a period not to exceed 40 years. Application for ISFSI license renewals must include the following: (1) Time-limited aging analyses (TLAAs) that demonstrate that structures, systems, and components (SSCs) important to safety will continue to perform their intended function for the requested period of extended operation; and (2) a description of the aging management program (AMP) for management of issues associated with aging that could adversely affect SSCs important to safety. In addition, the application must also include design bases information as documented in the most recent updated final safety analysis report as required by 10 CFR 72.70. Information contained in previous applications, statements, or reports filed with the Commission under the license may be incorporated by reference provided that those references are clear and specific. The NRC has recently issued the Standard Review Plan (SRP) for renewal of used-fuel dry cask storage system (DCSS) licenses and Certificates of Compliance (CoCs), NUREG-1927, under which NRC may renew a specific license or a CoC for a term not to exceed 40 years. Both the license and the CoC renewal applications must contain revised technical requirements and operating conditions (fuel storage, surveillance and maintenance, and other requirements) for the ISFSI and DCSS that address aging effects that could affect the safe storage of the used fuel. The information contained in the license and CoC renewal applications will require NRC review to verify that the aging effects on the SSCs in DCSSs/ ISFSIs are adequately managed for the period of extended operation. To date, all of the ISFSIs located across the United States with more than 1,500 dry casks loaded with used fuel have initial license terms of 20 years; three ISFSIs (Surry, H.B. Robinson and Oconee) have received their renewed licenses for 20 years, and two other ISFSIs (Calvert Cliffs and Prairie Island) have applied for license renewal for 40 years. This report examines issues related to managing aging effects on the SSCs in DCSSs/ISFSIs for extended long-term storage and transportation of used fuels, following an approach similar to that of the Generic Aging Lessons Learned (GALL) report, NUREG-1801, for the aging management and license renewal of nuclear power plants. The report contains five chapters and an appendix on quality assurance for aging management programs for used-fuel dry storage systems. Chapter I of the report provides an overview of the ISFSI license renewal process based on 10 CFR 72 and the guidance provided in NUREG-1927. Chapter II contains definitions and terms for structures and components in DCSSs, materials, environments, aging effects, and aging mechanisms. Chapter III and Chapter IV contain generic TLAAs and AMPs, respectively, that have been developed for managing aging effects on the SSCs important to safety in the dry cask storage system designs described in Chapter V. The summary descriptions and tabulations of evaluations of AMPs and TLAAs for the SSCs that are important to safety in Chapter V include DCSS designs (i.e., NUHOMS{reg_sign}, HI-STORM 100, Transnuclear (TN) metal cask, NAC International S/T storage cask, ventilated storage cask (VSC-24), and the Westinghouse MC-10 metal dry storage cask) that have been and continue to be used by utilities across the country for dry storage of used fuel to date. The goal of this report is to help establish the technical basis for extended long-term storage and transportation of used fuel.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Assessing the Predictive Capability of the LIFEIV Nuclear Fuel Performance Code Using Sequential Calibration

This report considers the problem of calibrating a numerical model to data from an experimental campaign (or series of experimental tests). The issue is that when an experimental campaign is proposed, only the input parameters associated with each experiment are known (i.e. outputs are not known because the experiments have yet to be conducted). Faced with such a situation, it would be beneficial from the standpoint of resource management to carefully consider the sequence in which the experiments are conducted. In this way, the resources available for experimental tests may be allocated in a way that best 'informs' the calibration of the numerical model. To address this concern, the authors propose decomposing the input design space of the experimental campaign into its principal components. Subsequently, the utility (to be explained) of each experimental test to the principal components of the input design space is used to formulate the sequence in which the experimental tests will be used for model calibration purposes. The results reported herein build on those presented and discussed in [1,2] wherein Verification & Validation and Uncertainty Quantification (VU) capabilities were applied to the nuclear fuel performance code LIFEIV. In addition to the raw results from the sequential calibration studies derived from the above, a description of the data within the context of the Predictive Maturity Index (PMI) will also be provided. The PMI [3,4] is a metric initiated and developed at Los Alamos National Laboratory to quantitatively describe the ability of a numerical model to make predictions in the absence of experimental data, where it is noted that 'predictions in the absence of experimental data' is not synonymous with extrapolation. This simply reflects the fact that resources do not exist such that each and every execution of the numerical model can be compared against experimental data. If such resources existed, the justification for numerical models would be reduced considerably. The authors note that the PMI is primarily intended to provide a high-level, quantitative description of year-to-year (or version-to-version) improvements in numerical models, where these descriptions can be used as a means of justifying funding requests to support further model development research. It is in this context that the present report should be considered: the availability of data from experimental tests should be viewed as a time-dependent variable, where experiments are added to the calibration suite as resources become available. For the present report, the experimental data is of course already available (permitting demonstration of the proposed methodology). Furthermore, the authors are not proposing this methodology as the answer to the question of how to allocate resources for experimental tests, and readers are directed to [5] and the references contained in Section 1 of [5] for additional information on the subject. However, the strength of this methodology is that it offers a means by which to select the sequence of experiments in a pre-arranged experimental campaign (a situation for which the methods discussed in [5] are less appropriate). The report is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the methodology employed to formulate the sequences of experiments for the calibrations performed for this study. Section 3 then presents the results associated with two sequences; supplementary results are provided in the Appendix. The report then concludes in Section 4 with a brief summary.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan for the 92-Acre Area and Corrective Action Unit 111: Area 5 WMD Retired Mixed Waste Pits, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada (Rev.1)

This Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan (CADD/CAP) has been prepared for the 92-Acre Area, the southeast quadrant of the Radioactive Waste Management Site, located in Area 5 of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). The 92-Acre Area includes Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 111, 'Area 5 WMD Retired Mixed Waste Pits.' Data Quality Objectives (DQOs) were developed for the 92-Acre Area, which includes CAU 111. The result of the DQO process was that the 92-Acre Area is sufficiently characterized to provide the input data necessary to evaluate corrective action alternatives (CAAs) without the collection of additional data. The DQOs are included as Appendix A of this document. This CADD/CAP identifies and provides the rationale for the recommended CAA for the 92-Acre Area, provides the plan for implementing the CAA, and details the post-closure plan. When approved, this CADD/CAP will supersede the existing Pit 3 (P03) Closure Plan, which was developed in accordance with Title 40 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 265, 'Interim Status Standards for Owners and Operators of Hazardous Waste Treatment, Storage, and Disposal Facilities.' This document will also serve as the Closure Plan and the Post-Closure Plan, which are required by 40 CFR 265, for the 92-Acre Area. After closure activities are complete, a request for the modification of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Permit that governs waste management activities at the NNSS will be submitted to the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection to incorporate the requirements for post-closure monitoring. Four CAAs, ranging from No Further Action to Clean Closure, were evaluated for the 92-Acre Area. The CAAs were evaluated on technical merit focusing on performance, reliability, feasibility, safety, and cost. Based on the evaluation of the data used to develop the conceptual site model; a review of past, current, and future operations at the site; and the detailed and comparative analysis of the potential CAAs, Closure in Place with Administrative Controls is the preferred CAA for the 92-Acre Area. Closure activities will include the following: (1) Constructing an engineered evapotranspiration cover over the 92-Acre Area; (2) Installing use restriction (UR) warning signs, concrete monuments, and subsidence survey monuments; (3) Establishing vegetation on the cover; (4) Implementing a UR; and (5) Implementing post-closure inspections and monitoring. The Closure in Place with Administrative Controls alternative meets all requirements for the technical components evaluated, fulfills all applicable federal and state regulations for closure of the site, and will minimize potential future exposure pathways to the buried waste at the site.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Nuclear Nonproliferation and Arms Control Primer Prepared for the Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future

To provide a brief overview of key arms control and nonproliferation arrangements for the layperson that may be relevant to the Commission's comprehensive review of policies for managing the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle. Primer would be published by the Commission and made publicly available, probably as an appendix to a larger Commission report.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Impact of Fission Products Impurity on the Plutonium Content in PWR MOX Fuels

This report presents the results of a neutronics analysis done in response to the charter IFCA-SAT-2 entitled 'Fuel impurity physics calculations'. This charter specifies that the separation of the fission products (FP) during the reprocessing of UOX spent nuclear fuel assemblies (UOX SNF) is not perfect and that, consequently, a certain amount of FP goes into the Pu stream used to fabricate PWR MOX fuel assemblies. Only non-gaseous FP have been considered (see the list of 176 isotopes considered in the calculations in Appendix 1). This mixture of Pu and FP is called Pu FP . Note that, in this preliminary analysis, the FP losses are considered element-independent, i.e., for example, 1% of FP losses mean that 1% of all non-gaseous FP leak into the Pu stream.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Test Problem: Tilted Rayleigh-Taylor for 2-D Mixing Studies

The 'tilted-rig' test problem originates from a series of experiments (Smeeton & Youngs, 1987, Youngs, 1989) performed at AWE in the late 1980's, that followed from the 'rocket-rig' experiments (Burrows et al., 1984; Read & Youngs, 1983), and exploratory experiments performed at Imperial College (Andrews, 1986; Andrews and Spalding, 1990). A schematic of the experiment is shown in Figure 1, and comprises a tank filled with light fluid above heavy, and then 'tilted' on one side of the apparatus, thus causing an 'angled interface' to the acceleration history due to rockets. Details of the configuration given in the next chapter include: fluids, dimensions, and other necessary details to simulate the experiment. Figure 2 shows results from two experiments, Case 110 (which is the source for this test problem) that has an Atwood number of 0.5, and Case 115 (a secondary source described in Appendix B), with Atwood of 0.9 Inspection of the photograph in Figure 2 (the main experimental diagnostic) for Case 110. reveals two main areas for mix development; 1) a large-scale overturning motion that produces a rising plume (spike) on the left, and falling plume (bubble) on the right, that are almost symmetric; and 2) a Rayleigh-Taylor driven mixing central mixing region that has a large-scale rotation associated with the rising and falling plumes, and also experiences lateral strain due to stretching of the interface by the plumes, and shear across the interface due to upper fluid moving downward and to the right, and lower fluid moving upward and to the left. Case 115 is similar but differs by a much larger Atwood of 0.9 that drives a strong asymmetry between a left side heavy spike penetration and a right side light bubble penetration. Case 110 is chosen as the source for the present test problem as the fluids have low surface tension (unlike Case 115) due the addition of a surfactant, the asymmetry small (no need to have fine grids for the spike), and there is extensive reasonable quality photographic data. The photographs in Figure 2 also reveal the appearance of a boundary layer at the left and right walls; this boundary layer has not been included in the test problem as preliminary calculations suggested it had a negligible effect on plume penetration and RT mixing. The significance of this test problem is that, unlike planar RT experiments such as the Rocket-Rig (Youngs, 1984), Linear Electric Motor - LEM (Dimonte, 1990), or the Water Tunnel (Andrews, 1992), the Tilted-Rig is a unique two-dimensional RT mixing experiment that has experimental data and now (in this TP) Direct Numerical Simulation data from Livescu and Wei. The availability of DNS data for the tilted-rig has made this TP viable as it provides detailed results for comparison purposes. The purpose of the test problem is to provide 3D simulation results, validated by comparison with experiment, which can be used for the development and validation of 2D RANS models. When such models are applied to 2D flows, various physics issues are raised such as double counting, combined buoyancy and shear, and 2-D strain, which have not yet been adequately addressed. The current objective of the test problem is to compare key results, which are needed for RANS model validation, obtained from high-Reynolds number DNS, high-resolution ILES or LES with explicit sub-grid-scale models. The experiment is incompressible and so is directly suitable for algorithms that are designed for incompressible flows (e.g. pressure correction algorithms with multi-grid); however, we have extended the TP so that compressible algorithms, run at low Mach number, may also be used if careful consideration is given to initial pressure fields. Thus, this TP serves as a useful tool for incompressible and compressible simulation codes, and mathematical models. In the remainder of this TP we provide a detailed specification; the next section provides the underlying assumptions for the TP, fluids, geometry details, boundary conditions (and alternative set-ups), initial conditions, and acceleration history (and ways to treat the acceleration ramp at the start of the experiment). This is followed by a section that defines data to be collected from the simulations, with results from the experiments and DNS from Livescu using the CFDNS code, and ILES simulations from Youngs using the compressible TURMOIL code and Andrews using the incompressible RTI3D code. We close the TP with concluding remarks, and Appendices that includes details of the sister Case 115, initial condition specifications for density and pressure fields. The Tilted-Rig Test Problem is intended to serve as a validation problem for RANS models, and as such we have provided ILES and DNS simulations in support of the test problem definition. The generally good agreement between experiment, ILES and DNS supports our assertion that the Tilted-Rig is useful, and the only 2-D TP that can be used to validate RANS models.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗

Decommissioning of the Remediation Systems at Waverly, Nebraska, in 2011-2012

The Commodity Credit Corporation of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (CCC/USDA) operated a grain storage facility in Waverly, Nebraska, from 1952 to 1974. During this time, the grain fumigant '80/20' (carbon tetrachloride/carbon disulfide) was used to preserve stored grain. In 1982, sampling by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) found carbon tetrachloride contamination in the town's groundwater. After an investigation of the contaminant distribution, the site was placed on the National Priority List (NPL) in 1986, and the CCC/USDA accepted responsibility for the contamination. An Interagency Compliance Agreement between the EPA and the CCC/USDA was finalized in May 1988 (EPA 1990). The EPA (Woodward-Clyde Consultants, contractor) started immediate cleanup efforts in 1987 with the installation of an air stripper, a soil vapor extraction system, a groundwater extraction well, and groundwater and soil gas monitoring wells (Woodward-Clyde 1986, 1988a,b). After the EPA issued its Record of Decision (ROD; EPA 1990), the CCC/USDA (Argonne National Laboratory, contractor) took over operation of the treatment systems. The CCC/USDA conducted a site investigation (Argonne 1991, 1992a,b), during which a carbon tetrachloride plume in groundwater was discovered northeast of the former facility. This plume was not being captured by the existing groundwater extraction system. The remediation system was modified in 1994 (Argonne 1993) with the installation of a second groundwater extraction well to contain the contamination further. Subsequently, a detailed evaluation of the system resulted in a recommendation to pump only the second well to conserve water in the aquifer (Argonne 1995). Sampling and analysis after implementation of this recommendation showed continued decreases in the extent and concentrations of the contamination with only one well pumping (Argonne 1999). The CCC/USDA issued quarterly monitoring reports from 1988 to 2009. Complete documentation of the CCC/USDA characterization and remediation efforts, including the quarterly monitoring reports, is on the compact disc inside the back cover of this report. The EPA reported on the progress of the remediation systems in a series of five-year reviews (EPA 1993, 1999, 2004, 2009). These reports and other EPA documentation are also on the compact disc inside the back cover of this report, along with the Woodward-Clyde (1986, 1988a,b) documentation cited. Starting in 2006, the analytical results for groundwater (the only medium still being monitored) showed no carbon tetrachloride concentrations above the maximum contaminant level (MCL) of 5.0 g/L. Because the cleanup goals specified in the ROD (EPA 1990) had been met, the EPA removed the site from the NPL in November 2006 (Appendix A). In 2008 the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit for the remediation system was deactivated, and a year later the EPA released its fourth and final five-year report (EPA 2009), indicating that no further action was required for the site and that the site was ready for unlimited use. In 2011-2012, the CCC/USDA decommissioned the remediation systems at Waverly. This report documents the decommission process and closure of the site.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Embodied Energy and Off-Grid Lighting

The greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from fuel-based lighting are substantial given the paltry levels of lighting service provided to users, leading to a great opportunity for GHG mitigation by encouraging the switch from fuel-based to rechargeable LED lighting. However, as with most new energy technology, switching to efficient lighting requires an up-front investment of energy (and GHGs) embedded in the manufacture of replacement components. We studied a population of off-grid lighting users in 2008-2009 in Kenya who were given the opportunity to adopt LED lighting. Based on their use patterns with the LED lights and the levels of kerosene offset we observed, we found that the embodied energy of the LED lamp was “paid for” in only one month for grid charged products and two months for solar charged products. Furthermore, the energy-return-on investment-ratio (energy produced or offset over the product’s service life divided by energy embedded) for off-grid LED lighting ranges from 12 to 24, which is on par with on-grid solar and large-scale wind energy. We also found that the energy embodied in the manufacture of a typical hurricane lantern is about one-half to one-sixth of that embodied in the particular LED lights that we evaluated, indicating that the energy payback time would be moderately faster if LEDs ultimately displace the production of kerosene lanterns. As LED products improve, we anticipate longer service lives and more successful displacement of kerosene lighting, both of which will speed the already rapid recovery of embodied energy in these products. Our study provides a detailed appendix with embodied energy values for a variety of components used to construct off-grid LED lighting, which can be used to analyze other products.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗

Fire Safety Tests for Spherical Resorcinol Formaldehyde Resin: Data Summary Report

A draft safety evaluation of the scenario for spherical resorcinol-formaldehyde (SRF) resin fire inside the ion exchange column was performed by the Hanford Tank Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) Fire Safety organization. The result of this draft evaluation suggested a potential change of the fire safety classification for the Cesium Ion Exchange Process System (CXP) emergency elution vessels, equipment, and piping, which may be overly bounding based on the fire performance data from the manufacturer of the ion exchange resin selected for use at the WTP. To resolve this question, the fire properties of the SRF resin were measured by Southwest Research Institute (SwRI), following the American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) standard procedures, through a subcontract managed by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL). For some tests, the ASTM standard procedures were not entirely appropriate or practical for the SRF resin material, so the procedures were modified and deviations from the ASTM standard procedures were noted. This report summarizes the results of fire safety tests performed and reported by SwRI. The efforts by PNNL were limited to summarizing the test results provided by SwRI into one consolidated data report. All as-received SwRI reports are attached to this report in the Appendix. Where applicable, the precision and bias of each test method, as given by each ASTM standard procedure, are included and compared with the SwRI test results of the SRF resin.

cesium ion exchange↗

Light Water Reactor Sustainability Non-Destrustive Evaluation for Concrete Research and Development Roadmap

Materials issues are a key concern for the existing nuclear reactor fleet as material degradation can lead to increased maintenance, increased downtown, and increased risk. Extending reactor life to 60 years and beyond will likely increase susceptibility and severity of known forms of degradation. Additionally, new mechanisms of materials degradation are also possible. The purpose of the US Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy’s Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program is to develop technologies and other solutions that can improve the reliability, sustain the safety, and extend the operating lifetimes of nuclear power plants beyond 60 years. The intent of this LWRS Concrete nondestructive evaluation (NDE) roadmap is to define Research & Development (R&D) actions to address gaps between available NDE concrete techniques and the technology needed to make quantitative measurements to determine the durability and performance of concrete structures on our current NPP fleet. To assist in the development of this roadmap, a workshop (See Appendix B for Workshop Agenda) was held on July 31, 2012, at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) Conference Center with 28 attendees: three representatives from the Electrical Power Research Institute (EPRI), one representative from Electricité de France, two representatives from the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), six representatives from universities (University of Tennessee-Knoxville, Georgia Tech, Iowa State University, University of Illinois, and University of Houston), one representative from industry (WesDyne), one representative from a non-USA nonprofit organization (Swiss Association for Technical Inspection), and 14 representatives from DOE national laboratories (ORNL, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Idaho National Laboratory, and Argonne National Laboratory). A multitude of concrete-based structures are typically part of a light water reactor (LWR) plant to provide foundation, support, shielding, and containment functions. Concrete has been used in the construction of nuclear power plants (NPPs) because of three primary properties—its inexpensiveness, its structural strength, and its ability to shield radiation. Examples of concrete structures important to the safety of LWR plants include the containment building, spent fuel pool, and cooling towers. This use has made its long-term performance crucial for the safe operation of commercial NPPs. With respect to the concrete structures, age-related degradation may affect engineering properties, structural resistance/capacity, failure mode, and location of failure initiation that in turn may affect the ability of a structure to withstand challenges in service. In order to ensure the safe operation of NPPs, it is essential that the effects of potential degradation of the plant structures, as well as systems and components, be assessed and managed during both the current operating license period as well as subsequent license renewal periods. In contrast to many mechanical and electrical components, replacement of many concrete structures is impractical. Therefore it is necessary that safety issues related to plant aging and continued service of the concrete structures are resolved through sound scientific and engineering understanding. Unlike most metallic materials, reinforced concrete is a nonhomogeneous material, a composite with low-density matrix, a mixture of cement, sand, aggregate and water, and a high-density reinforcement (typically 5% in NPP containment structures), made up of steel rebar or tendons. Plants have been typically built with local cement and aggregate fulfilling the design specification regarding strength, workability, and durability, but as a consequence, each plant’s concrete composition is unique and complex. In addition, NPP concrete structures are often inaccessible and contain large volumes of massively thick concrete. These structures are exposed to different environments (moisture, temperature) and a diversity of degradation mechanisms (high temperatures, radiation exposure, chemical reactions) at different plant sites, all of which adds to the complexity of determining the integrity/quality of the concrete.

Concrete↗

Inherently Safer Technology Gaps Analysis Study

This project consisted of an analysis of the current state of knowledge for improving safety regarding toxic industrial chemicals, including an examination of current and state-of-the-art techniques and technologies capable of increasing safety and security in production, transportation, storage, and use of hazardous chemicals. The primary goal was to improve national security through improved safety by providing a foundation for a comprehensive evaluation of the current state of knowledge surrounding the source and production methods of the “Release – Toxic” chemicals in DHS CFATS Appendix A list of chemicals of interest. Additionally, this project assisted in the data gathering and development of the CSAC IST Metrics. This involved an in-depth effort to understand specific chemical processes followed by a conceptual effort to redefine the Chemical Release Reduction Modifier that was included in the original Index.

Anstey, Mitchell R.↗

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 570: Area 9 Yucca Flat Atmospheric Test Sites Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, Revision 0

CAU 570 comprises the following six corrective action sites (CASs): • 02-23-07, Atmospheric Test Site - Tesla • 09-23-10, Atmospheric Test Site T-9 • 09-23-11, Atmospheric Test Site S-9G • 09-23-14, Atmospheric Test Site - Rushmore • 09-23-15, Eagle Contamination Area • 09-99-01, Atmospheric Test Site B-9A These sites are being investigated because existing information on the nature and extent of potential contamination is insufficient to evaluate and recommend corrective action alternatives (CAAs). Additional information will be obtained by conducting a corrective action investigation before evaluating CAAs and selecting the appropriate corrective action for each CAS. The results of the field investigation will support a defensible evaluation of viable CAAs that will be presented in the Corrective Action Decision Document. The sites will be investigated based on the data quality objectives (DQOs) developed on April 30, 2012, by representatives of the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office. The DQO process was used to identify and define the type, amount, and quality of data needed to develop and evaluate appropriate corrective actions for CAU 570. The site investigation process will also be conducted in accordance with the Soils Activity Quality Assurance Plan, which establishes requirements, technical planning, and general quality practices to be applied to this activity. The presence and nature of contamination at CAU 570 will be evaluated based on information collected from a field investigation. Radiological contamination will be evaluated based on a comparison of the total effective dose at sample locations to the dose-based final action level. The total effective dose will be calculated as the total of separate estimates of internal and external dose. Results from the analysis of soil samples will be used to calculate internal radiological dose. Thermoluminescent dosimeters placed near the center of each sample location will be used to measure external radiological dose. Appendix A provides a detailed discussion of the DQO methodology and the DQOs specific to each CAS.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Progress in the Measurement of Prompt Neutron Output in Neutron-Induced Fission of 239 Pu: The Chi-Nu Project

Knowledge of the prompt neutron output from neutron-induced fission of 239 Pu is essential to nuclear defense and energy applications. Because the experimental data base is inadequate to constrain models of the spectrum of neutrons from fission, we have embarked on a multi-year program of new measurements of the prompt fission neutron spectrum as a function of the energy of the incident neutron that induces the fission. This is a joint LANL-LLNL project with participation by four university groups in advanced detector development. In the past year much progress has been achieved. The building housing the experiment has been completed and the flight paths including one for this experiment are now constructed. A parallel-plate avalanche counter (PPAC) containing 235 U is installed and working in the beam line. Neutron detectors for both low (<1 MeV) and high (> 0.5 MeV) neutrons have been assembled. The data acquisition system based on waveform digitizers has undergone extensive development and now can handle 10 PPAC channels and 10 neutron detectors simultaneously. In addition, a detector test station centered on a 252 Cf spontaneous fission chamber has been commissioned so that we can characterize our neutron detectors in a well understood experimental environment. Analysis of experiments at this facility has helped us understand the performance of several types of neutron detectors. In addition, the analysis work uncovered that the “standard” 252 Cf fission neutron spectrum in MCNPX disagrees significantly from that presently accepted by the international standards community. One year ago we submitted a report (LA-UR-11-05576) on the accuracies that could be reached under certain assumptions. Several sources of possible systematic uncertainties were identified, and procedures to control these uncertainties were suggested. This report is included as an appendix to this report. One element missing from these estimates was the contribution of backgrounds. It could not be quantified because, at that time, the building and flight path for the experiments had not been constructed. We now have made some measurements of the background and can now add this component to the accuracy projections. This report summarizes the progress in the past year. It also discusses measurements reported in the literature and some factors that should be considered when using these data to optimize parameters in nuclear model codes used in constructing evaluated nuclear data bases.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 105: Area 2 Yucca Flat Atmospheric Test Sites Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, Revision 0

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 105 is located in Area 2 of the Nevada National Security Site, which is approximately 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. CAU 105 is a geographical grouping of sites where there has been a suspected release of contamination associated with atmospheric nuclear testing. This document describes the planned investigation of CAU 105, which comprises the following corrective action sites (CASs): • 02-23-04, Atmospheric Test Site - Whitney • 02-23-05, Atmospheric Test Site T-2A • 02-23-06, Atmospheric Test Site T-2B • 02-23-08, Atmospheric Test Site T-2 • 02-23-09, Atmospheric Test Site - Turk These sites are being investigated because existing information on the nature and extent of potential contamination is insufficient to evaluate and recommend corrective action alternatives (CAAs). Additional information will be obtained by conducting a corrective action investigation before evaluating CAAs and selecting the appropriate corrective action for each CAS. The results of the field investigation will support a defensible evaluation of viable CAAs that will be presented in the Corrective Action Decision Document. The sites will be investigated based on the data quality objectives (DQOs) developed on April 30, 2012, by representatives of the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office. The DQO process was used to identify and define the type, amount, and quality of data needed to develop and evaluate appropriate corrective actions for CAU 105. The site investigation process will also be conducted in accordance with the Soils Activity Quality Assurance Plan, which establishes requirements, technical planning, and general quality practices to be applied to this activity. The potential contamination sources associated with all CAU 105 CASs are from atmospheric nuclear testing activities. The presence and nature of contamination at CAU 105 will be evaluated based on information collected from a field investigation. Radiological contamination will be evaluated based on a comparison of the total effective dose at sample locations to the dose-based final action level. The total effective dose will be calculated as the total of separate estimates of internal and external dose. Results from the analysis of soil samples will be used to calculate internal radiological dose. Thermoluminescent dosimeters placed at the center of each sample location will be used to measure external radiological dose. Appendix A provides a detailed discussion of the DQO methodology and the DQOs specific to each CAS. This Corrective Action Investigation Plan has been developed in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order that was agreed to by the State of Nevada; DOE, Environmental Management; U.S. Department of Defense; and DOE, Legacy Management. Under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order, this Corrective Action Investigation Plan will be submitted to the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection for approval. Fieldwork will be conducted after the plan is approved.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Oak Ridge Reservation Annual Site Environmental Report for 2011

The Oak Ridge Reservation Annual Site Environmental Report is prepared annually and presents summary environmental data to (1) characterize environmental performance, (2) summarize environmental occurrences reported during the year, (3) confirm compliance with environmental standards and requirements, and (4) highlight significant program activities. The report fulfills the requirement contained in DOE O 231.1b, Environment, Safety and Health Reporting, (DOE 2011) that an integrated annual site environmental report be prepared. The results summarized in this report are based on data collected before and continuing through 2011. This report is not intended to, nor does it, present the results of all environmental monitoring associated with ORR. Data collected for other site and regulatory purposes, such as environmental restoration/remedial investigation reports, waste management characterization sampling data, and environmental permit compliance data, are presented in other documents that have been prepared in accordance with applicable DOE guidance and/or laws and are referenced here as appropriate. Appendix A contains a glossary of technical terms that may be useful for understanding the terminology used in this report.

Thompson, Sharon D.↗